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Buddhist Studies in Honour of
Venerable Professor KL Dhammajoti**

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**Illuminating the Dharma:
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VENERABLE PROFESSOR KL DHAMMAJOTI

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The articles with footnotes in the present volume
are adopted at the request of their authors.

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Foreword

GUANG Xing

Associate Professor and Director
Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong

It is with great pleasure, the Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong celebrates Venerable Professor KL Dhammajoti's 72nd birthday. We sincerely wish the Venerable in good health and long life and continue to educate and guide those who are interested in Buddhist Studies with his profound knowledge of the Buddha's Teaching and also the ancient Indian languages of Sanskrit and Pāli.

Venerable Professor KL Dhammajoti is a renowned leading scholar of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma studies recognized by the international Buddhist academic community. Although the studies of Abhidharma, especially that of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, are one of the most difficult subjects in Buddhist Studies, Venerable Professor Dhammajoti dedicates his career to it, making significant contribution. In recognition of his scholarship, The University of Hong Kong awarded him the Glorious Sun Endowed Professorship in 2008, first of its kind won by a faculty member of the Humanities, brought honour to CBS and Buddhist Studies in Hong Kong. He has also been serving as a Chair Professor in Renmin University of China. He has also been invited to lecture on Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma at many universities in the world, such as the University of Calgary in Canada and Ghent University in Belgium.

Venerable Professor KL Dhammajoti has worked at the Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong for more than a decade and has contributed much to the Research Postgraduate and the Master of Buddhist Studies Programmes by serving as the Chairman for the two Programmes apart from his scholarly publications. He has promoted Abhidharma studies as well as Sanskrit language studies at our Centre and nurtured many young scholars through his careful but strict guidance. As a result, fourteen PhD students have graduated, many of them now teaching either Buddhist studies or Sanskrit language at different Buddhist institutions. Many of us still remember vividly the compassionate and knowledgeable great master with a yellow robe walking around the campus.

I personally have a special connection with the Venerable Master as I studied under his guidance in Sri Lanka for many years. I am also fortunate enough to have worked together with him at the Centre of Buddhist Studies for another ten years. He guided and helped me in many different ways to be a scholar. I have learned much from him not only in Buddhist studies as a scholar, but also in life as a human being. His compassion to his students,

friends and devotees, his dedication to work and practice, and his persistence in difficult matters always inspire me to work hard and achieve the goal.

Last but not the least, I like to offer my sincere appreciation and thanks to Professor T. Endo for taking the responsibility of being the editor, to Dr. Gao Mingyuan for acting as a coordinator overseeing communications, proofreading, and other work in connection with the publication of this volume, and to Dr. Jnan Nanda Tanchangy for typesetting the articles. Without their dedicated assistance, the publication of this felicitation volume would have long delayed. My appreciation also goes to those whose help in the process, though their names are not individually mentioned here, was a welcome gesture.

Four Decades of *Kalyāṇa-mittatā*: Reminiscences and Best Wishes

Toshiichi ENDO

Visiting Professor

Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong

The Venerable Professor Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti (法光法師) was born in Malaysia and had his early education there before venturing into the outside world. He went to New Zealand to pursue higher education in engineering studies. During this period, which in his own words, he was at the peak of his spiritual emotion, he joined many of his university batch-mates as a spiritual seeker, and eventually rediscovered Buddhism, his childhood religion. Ever since then, he became deeply concerned with existential questions. In his seeking, he came to be profoundly inspired and impressed by an English thinker named Saṅgharakkhita, through his books and taped lectures, and whom he eventually met and studied in person at Christchurch. He was also greatly inspired by the writings of D.T. Suzuki and those of some humanistic psychologists and psychotherapists, particularly, Erich Fromm and Abraham Maslow.

He told us that he was most grateful for his Chinese education in the primary and secondary schools in Malaysia. This enabled him to continue reading Buddhist texts in Chinese sent to him from Malaysia and Singapore, particularly the works of Venerable Yinshun, who had also become a great source of inspiration for him in this period. I remember him telling us, subsequently in Sri Lanka, about the elating and inspiring discussions he had with Venerable Yinshun in Taiwan.

Following his New Zealand experience as a “wanderer”, and moved by what he read from the magazine, *Vajrabodhi Sea*, he went to San Francisco and joined the Gold Mountain Monastery, and later also the College of Oriental Studies (now developed into the University of Oriental Studies). In these places, he practiced meditation and studied Buddhist doctrines in the modern West. But deep in his heart, he was fervently drawn to the Indian subcontinent, where the Buddha was born and where he taught the Dhamma. Following his inner call, he found himself swung from USA to India, where he pursued further study of Sanskrit at Nalanda (Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra) for a considerable period of time.

From India, he was further drawn by the prosperous Buddhist tradition of Sri Lanka, where he eventually settled down as his second home. During his many years of learning, and later lecturing in Sri Lanka, he made regular extended visits to Taiwan, where, among other things, he began to learn to read Japanese systematically, and eventually Tibetan as well. Inspired by De

La Vallée Poussin's translation of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and thirsting to read it, he also began learning French from several well-wishing Buddhist scholars. All these language skills of Buddhist Chinese, Sanskrit, Pāli, Tibetan, together with Japanese and French, made him equipped with the necessary tools to carry out his pursuit of Buddhist Studies, eventually succeeding as an internationally acclaimed scholar as he is today.

It was shortly after his arrival in Sri Lanka towards the latter part of the 1970s, that I first met him, and we have since become very close friends and colleagues. He first pursued his postgraduate studies at the Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies (PGIPBS), University of Kelaniya, in the late 1970s. His MA dissertation of an annotated translation and study of Skandhila's *Abhidharmāvatāra* submitted was of a very high standard, so much so that some examiners recommended the dissertation to be promoted to a PhD degree. Such was his approach to scholarship, meticulous and thorough. One can imagine the great effort he had to put in for researching in a field generally so different from those pursued by the Sri Lankan scholars around him. Much needed references were hardly available. In this connection, I fondly recall lending him Sakurabe's Japanese translation of the Tibetan version of the *Abhidharmāvatāra*—though, unfortunately, only after he had submitted his dissertation.

Although it was crystal clear that he would become a great scholar in any field of Buddhist Studies of his choice in time to come, he was also wavering as a monk, young and sensitive, between the choices of scholarship and practice of the Buddha's compassion. He was touched by many lives that could not even meet daily needs, not to mention their education. Moved and immensely inspired, he became inclined to give scholarship a less prominent place in his list of priorities. This was the time when he started his own home for the deserving young children and named it 'Compassion Home' (憐憫院). Shifting his centre of activities from Kuppiyawatta, Colombo, he established a home in a remote village in the southern district of Sri Lanka. Later, his Compassion Home became the "Compassion Buddhist Institute", set up for the Buddhist novices and young bhikkhus from Bangladesh who, the Venerable Dhammajoti thought, had inflicting conflicts with the majority Muslims, ending sometimes in bloodshed. Under the guardianship of the Venerable Dhammajoti, they grew up with the utmost care, and some of them including the Venerable Amirta Nanda, Jnan Nanda Tanchangya, Dhammarakkhit (Shimul Barua), and Nagasena (Sajib Barua) with their PhD degrees, all from the University of Hong Kong, are the pinnacle of generous educational opportunities that he provided for these young novices.

Meanwhile, he took up a teaching career in early 1980 at PIGPBS where he successively held the posts of associate and full professorship before shifting his place of academic activities to the Centre of Buddhist Studies

(CBS), the University of Hong Kong. After his appointment at CBS in 2004, he became the Glorious Sun endowed Professor of Buddhist Studies, a prestigious post which he held until his retirement from the University in 2016. But the Venerable Dhammajoti in fact has never truly “retired”, and he continues to dedicate himself to the cause of promoting Buddhist Studies and non-sectarian Buddhism as a scholar. For the past several years, he has been the Chair Professor of Buddhist Philosophy at the Renmin University of China.

In a rich and prolific history covering nearly half a century, he produced scholarship of long-lasting influence. Chronologically, his first publication, among other publications, was an annotated translation of the Chinese Dharmapada, submitted for his PhD confirmation and later published by PGIPBS. He then shifted his focus of research more to the Sarvāstivāda School of Buddhist thought, focusing on Abhidharma studies. He ventured into a relatively unknown and less researched area by reading texts like the *Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra* and Saṅghabhadra’s **Nyāyānusāra*, extant only in Chinese. His on-going research results were first published in a book form titled Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma by PGIPBS. This area of research was to continue and enlarged editions were to appear making the latest print around 700 pages.

After his retirement from the University of Hong Kong, he established a private and non-sectarian Institute named The Buddha-Dharma Centre of Hong Kong (BDCHK) with the aim of providing the best education possible for people of all ages interested in the systematic study of Buddhism in Hong Kong. People who are learning there can now obtain MA and PhD degrees from PGIPBS, University of Kelaniya.

The Venerable KL Dhammajoti is shining like a shooting star in the dark night brightening the world as an internationally acclaimed and leading scholar of Abhidharma studies, but also as a genuine practitioner of the Buddha’s teachings. Anyone who had a glimpse into his domain of activities would know how vast and profound these are. The Venerable is indeed an exemplar of determination and compassion anyone would aspire for.

Having had a span of over four decades of friendship with him, I wholeheartedly wish the Venerable KL Dhammajoti contentment and long life, and above all good health.

May he continue to enhance human knowledge through many more of his writings to come!

Tribute to the Venerable KL Dhammajoti on his 72nd birthday.

Introductory Essay

Y. KARUNADASA

Professor Emeritus, University of Kelaniya

I have had the occasion of closely associating with the Most Venerable Professor Dr. KL Dhammajoti for over a period of forty years now, and I consider it a great honour to have this opportunity of writing this introductory essay to this volume of articles written by his friends, colleagues, students and well-wishers to felicitate him in recognition of his contribution to the multiplex branches of Buddhist Studies and for the visionary role he played as the founder Director of The Buddha-Dharma Centre of Hong Kong.

Venerable Professor Dhammajoti began his advanced research in the field of *Dharmapada* Studies. His doctoral dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy was on “The Chinese Versions of the Dharmapada”. It is a well-researched, well-documented monograph presenting a clear and comprehensive disquisition on both philological and doctrinal studies. It was first published in 1990 by Man Fatt Lam Buddhist Temple in Singapore and later in 1995 by the Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies of the University of Kelaniya in Sri Lanka.

I give below Venerable Professor Dhammajoti’s Major Professional Positions and Designations:

- Senior Lecturer, Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka (1982-1996. He was officially appointed in 1981. But owing to the domestic insurgence which broke out in the meantime, he officially reported duties in February 1982.)
- Head of Department of Buddhist Literary Sources, Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka (1995 to early 2006)
- Associate Professor of Buddhist Studies, Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka (1996-1998)
- Professor of Buddhist Studies, Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka (1998-2006. On sabbatical leave to teach at The University of Hong Kong from February 2004 to February 2006).
- Distinguished Numata Chair in Buddhist Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of Calgary (2000)
- Visiting Professor, Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong (2004–2005)
- Professor of Buddhist Studies, Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong (2005–2006)
- Glorious Sun (Endowed) Professorship in Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong (2007–2014)

- Honorary Professor, The University of Hong Kong (2014–)
- Rector, International Buddhist College, Hatyai, Thailand (2008–2010)
- Honorary Rector, International Buddhist College, Hatyai, Thailand (2011–2019)
- Rector Emeritus, International Buddhist College, Hatyai, Thailand (2019–)
- Visiting Professor, Fo Guang University, Taiwan (2006–)
- Visiting Professor, University of Pune, India (2007, 2014, 2018/2019)
- Visiting Professor, Fudan University, Shanghai, China (2008, 2019)
- Chair Professor, School of Philosophy, Renmin University, Beijing, China (since 2016 –)
- At present he is administering and supervising The Buddha-Dharma Centre of Hong Kong as its Chairman and Academic Director.

Among his major contributions as monographs, articles, book-chapters, and reference articles to encyclopedias are, I record below a select few:

- ‘The *Mahāpadāna-Suttanta* and the Buddha’s Spiritual Lineage’. In: *Sri Lanka Journal of Buddhist Studies*, Vol. I. Colombo: Buddhist and Pāli University of Sri Lanka, 1987.
- ‘The Category of *Citta-Viprayukta-Samskāra* in the *Abhidharmāvatāra*’. In: *Sri Lanka Journal of Buddhist Studies*, Vol. II. Colombo: Buddhist and Pāli University of Sri Lanka, 1988.
- ‘The Origin and Development of the *Dharmapada*’. In: *Sri Lanka Journal of Buddhist Studies*, Vol. IV. Colombo: Buddhist and Pāli University of Sri Lanka, 1994.
- ‘The First Verse of the Chinese *Dharmapada*: A Sign-Post of Sectarian Affiliation’. In: *Sri Lanka Journal of Buddhist Studies*, Vol. V. Colombo: Buddhist and Pali University of Sri Lanka, 1996.
- ‘A Bond that is At Once Strong and Lax?’. In: *Bukkyō Kenkyū*, Vol. XXVI. Hamamatsu: Kokusai Bukkyōto Kyōkai, 1997.
- ‘The Abhidharma Controversy on Visual Perception’. In: *Recent Researches in Buddhist Studies – Essays in Honour of Professor Y. Karunadasa*. Colombo: Y. Karunadasa Felicitation Committee, 1997.
- ‘The Defects in the *Arhat*’s Enlightenment: His *Akliṣṭa-Ajñāna* and *Vāsanā*’. In: *Bukkyō Kenkyū*, Vol. XXVII. Hamamatsu: Kokusai Bukkyōto Kyōkai, 1998.
- ‘*Sahabhū-hetu*, Causality and *Sarvāstivāda*’. In: *Ārcanā*. Colombo: Professor M.H.F. Jayasuriya Felicitation Committee, 2002.
- ‘*Sarvāstivādin* Conception of *Nirvāṇa*’. In: *Buddhist and Indian Studies in Honour of Professor Sodo Mori*. Hamamatsu: Kokusai Bukkyōto Kyōkai, 2002.
- Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma*. Colombo: Centre for Buddhist Studies, Sri Lanka (1st edn: Colombo, 2002. 5th edn: Hong Kong, 2015, published by The Buddha-Dharma Centre of Hong Kong).
- ‘The Karmic Role of the *Avijñapti* of the *Sarvāstivāda*’. In: *Bukkyō Kenkyū* Vol. XXXI. Hamamatsu: Kokusai Bukkyōto Kyōkai, 2003.
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- ‘Sarvāstivāda, Darṣāntika, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra’. In: *JCBSSL*, Vol. IV. Colombo: 2006.
- ‘Ākāra and Direct Perception: Vaibhāṣika vs Sautrāntika’. In: *Bukkyō Kenkyū*, Vol. XXXV. Hamamatsu: Kokusai Bukkyōto Kyōkai, 2007.
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- ‘From Abhidharma to Mahāyāna: Remarks on the Early Abhidharma Doctrine of the Three *Yanas*’. In: *JCBSSL*, Vol. IX. Colombo: 2011.
- ‘Summary and Discussion of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*’. In: Gelong Lodrö Sangpo, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu*, by Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Annotated Translation by Gelong Lodrö Sangpo. With a New Introduction by KL Dhammajoti*. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2012.
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Venerable Professor Dhammajoti’s greatest strength as a Buddhist scholar is his mastery of almost all Buddhist scriptural languages, including Pāli, Sanskrit, Classical Tibetan, and Chinese—though, in his own words, his primary concern is really not so much with these languages as tools for Buddhist Studies, but with the understanding of Buddhist doctrines of the various Buddhist traditions to which he is well exposed, particularly, Theravāda and Mahāyāna. This has enabled him to approach Buddhist studies from many perspectives and to understand Buddhist doctrines and their interpretations in a variety of Buddhist denominations. Another area where he has made a distinct contribution is Comparative Studies in the Pāli *Nikāyas* and Chinese *Āgamas*. This is a subject closely associated with identifying and solving the problems of interpretation in early Buddhist teachings.

Professor Dhammajoti is a prolific writer and his writings cover the multiplex branches of Buddhist Studies ranging from Buddhist doctrines to Buddhist societal thought and from Buddhist culture and civilization to Buddhist scriptural languages. For the past many years, his main focus has been Abhidharma of the Northern Traditions, Early Yogācāra, and Early Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. In these multiple branches of Buddhist scholarship, especially Abhidharma, he has become a world renowned and a universally celebrated Buddhist scholar.

By way of reminiscence, I like to add a few words here on Venerable Professor Dhammajoti’s contribution to developing the international dimension of the Postgraduate Institute of Pali & Buddhist Studies of the University of Kelaniya in Sri Lanka. It was in fact his presence as a member of the academic staff of the Institute that encouraged a large number of students from Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Mainland China, Taiwan, Korea and Japan to enroll at our Institute. His lectures on schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma based on a wide variety of Buddhist scriptural languages, Pāli, Prakrit, Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese, helped our students to understand Buddhist Thought and Culture in a broader perspective and with a greater measure of precision. I must also mention here that it was because of Venerable Professor’s inspiration and persuasion that many Chinese Buddhist Monasteries and Lay Buddhist Societies (e.g. Man Fatt Lam Buddhist Temple in Singapore, Fo Guang Shan Monastery in Taiwan) made substantial financial assistance to the Institute’s development. As a former

Director of the Institute, I have great pleasure to state here that Venerable Professor Dhammajoti indeed played a very vital role in developing the Institute as an international centre of excellence for Buddhist Studies.

Let me conclude this introductory essay, by wishing our Most Venerable Professor Dr. KL Dhammajoti many, many more years of good health and long life to successfully continue his noble mission as a true son of the Śākyamuni.

SUKHĪ DĪGHĀYUKO BHAVA!

Dhammavinaya and Dhamma and Vinaya A Clarification

Kapila ABHAYAWANSA

The term *Dhammavinaya* is a recurrent word appearing in the teachings of the Buddha. The Pali term is a collective compound (*dvanda*) word of the two terms *Dhamma* and *Vinaya*. Therefore, one may think that these two terms refer to two separate subjects namely, *Dhamma* (doctrine) and *Vinaya* (monastic discipline). The fact that led one to consider this compound as referring to two subjects is that there are two separate subjects in the teachings of the Buddha denoting doctrine and discipline (for the monastic disciples). It is evident from the following statement from the Buddha:

Yo vo Ānanda mayā Dhammo ca Vinayo ca desito paññatto so vo mamaccayena Satthā¹

(Whatever doctrine and discipline has been taught and laid down by me for you, Ānanda that is your master after my demise).

It is certain that here the term *Dhamma* refers to the doctrine preached by the Buddha while *Vinaya* refers to the rules and regulations laid down by the Buddha for his monastic disciples. But it should be mentioned here that the two terms *Dhamma* and *Vinaya* are not used as a collective compound word in the foregoing statement. When we examine the contexts where the doctrine (*Dhamma*) and the disciplinary rules (*Vinaya*) are discussed, it is quite evident that these two terms are not used as a compound word but, as two separate terms. This fact is further attested by the following statement: *Handa mayaṃ āvuso dhammañca vinayañca saṅgāyāma²* (Come, friends, we will recite *Dhamma* and *Vinaya*).

Quite contrary to the above mentioned statements which denotes two separate subjects, there are many references to the term *Dhammavinaya* together as a compound word which does not denote two separate subjects. For example the statement coming in the *Pahārāda sutta* of *Aṅguttaranikāya* as to “just as the sea has a single taste, that of salt, so too the *Dhammavinaya* has a single taste: that of release”.³ It is clear that *dhammavinaya* used here cannot refer to two separate subjects namely the doctrine (*Dhamma*) and the rules and regulations (*Vinaya*) but to one and the same subject for two reasons. One is that it is incompatible with the content of the discourse. In the *Pahārāda sutta*, *Dhammavinaya* is compared to the ocean. It is true that *Dhamma* has the characteristics of the ocean, mentioned in the discourse but, *Vinaya* (disciplinary rules laid down by the Buddha) cannot be said of having the same characteristics. Therefore, the two terms cannot be taken separately in order to point out two subjects as the doctrine and the disciplinary rules. The second reason is that according to Pāli grammatical rules whenever the

collective compound known as enumerative (*itatītara*) which refers to all its constituents separately is used as the subject of the sentence, it should be in the plural and the verb of the sentence should also be in plural because of the fact that the two terms in the collective compound have equal weight separately for example *Yāvatā candimasuriyā pariharanti disā ‘bhanti virocāmānā*. There is another collective compound known as *Samāhāra dvanda* which refers to the group or collection of the constituent members. Such a compound word takes always neutral gender and singular number. But quite interestingly, the compound *Dhammavinaya* does not obey those grammatical rules relating to both type of collective compound. It is always used in the singular form and its gender is determined according to the last constituent member of the compound. The following example makes this clear: *Tathāgatappavedīto bhikkhave dhammavinayo vivāto virocāti no paṭicchanno*⁴ (the *Dhammavinaya* preached by the Buddha shines when it is open and not when it is hidden). Here the term *Dhammavinaya* used as the subject of the sentence does not relate to the verb as two separate terms. These two terms stand for just one subject, which is in the singular. Though this term does not come under the normal grammatical rules pertaining to collective compound (*dvanda-samāsa*) appeared in two forms known as *Samāhāra-dvanda* and *itaritara-dvanda* in Pāli grammar, there is no doubt that it belongs to a collective compound of special form unknown to Pāli grammarians. The Pāli term *assāsapassāsa* too can be added as an example to this special kind of collective compound which appears in singular form. The following verse clearly refers to the same characteristics:

*Nāhu assāsapassāso - ṭhitacittassa tādīno
anejo santimārabbha – cakkhumā parinibbuto*⁵

(No breathing in and out – just with steadfast heart

The sage who’s free from lust – has passed away to peace).⁶

If we do not take the distinction between *Dhammavinaya* as a collective term and *Dhamma* and *Vinaya* as two separate terms into our consideration, we would lose the proper connotation of these two types of usage in Buddhism and will give the wrong interpretation to them. It seems that most Buddhist scholars have taken the term *Vinaya* in the collective compound of *Dhammavinaya* as the same as *Vinaya* in the separate two terms *Dhamma* and *Vinaya*. In other words, those scholars do not find any difference between *Vinaya* (discipline) and *Vinaya* (rules and regulations). It should be emphasized here that Buddhist scriptures use the term *Vinaya* to denote two things namely, Buddhist virtue or conduct or morality (*sīla*) which is inseparable with Buddhist doctrine, and *Vinaya* rules which were laid down by the Buddha for his monastic community. The term *Vinaya* in Buddhist scriptures has contextual meaning and must be understood carefully. If we overlap the two contexts of the term *Vinaya*, it is certain that we will be misled and will be unable to get the proper meaning of the term.

Ven. Thanissaro Bhikkhu in his *The Buddhist Monastic Code I* introducing *Dhammavinaya* observes:

DHAMMA-VINAYA was the Buddha's own name for the religion he founded. The Dhamma – the truth – is what he discovered and pointed out for all who want to gain release from suffering. Vinaya is what he formulated as rules, ideals and standards of behavior for those of his followers who go forth from home life to take up the quest for release in greater earnestness.⁷

In the above passage Ven. Thanissaro correctly introduced *Dhammavinaya* as the name of the religion founded by the Buddha. There are evidences to show that not only the Buddha but also other contemporary religious teachers, used the collective term *Dhammavinaya* to denote their religions. The *Ariyapariyesana sutta* and *Mahāsaccaka sutta* both in *Majjhima nikāya* tell us that the ascetic Siddhattha Gotama asked permission from both Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta to follow their religion which he referred to as their *Dhammavinaya*.⁸ Hence, Ven. Thanissaro is right to call *Dhammavinaya* the religion of the Buddha in the context of Buddhism. But it seems that he failed to grasp the proper context of *Dhammavinaya* for he takes the term *Vinaya* to mean the disciplinary rules and regulations for monastics. His explanation of *Vinaya* therefore only agrees with the term *Vinaya*, if it is taken as a separate word from the term *Dhamma*.

The fact that the compound word *Dhammavinaya* was known to the Buddha even before the introduction of *Vinaya* rules by him is evident from both the *Ariyapariyesana-* and the *Mahāsaccaka suttas* mentioned above. Therefore, how can we say that the *Vinaya* is the formulated rules? If we take *Vinaya* in the compound word to mean the rules formulated by the Buddha for those of his followers who go forth from home life to take up the quest for release in greater earnestness, then the religion of the Buddha must be separated from his lay followers.

The religion of the Buddha is known to us in his discourses not only in the name of *Dhammavinaya* (collective compound) but also in many other names such as *Dhamma*, *Ariyadhamma*, *Vinaya* (used in a sense devoid of the monastic *Vinaya* rules), *Sugatavinaya*, *Ariyavinaya*, *Satthusāsana* and so on. Though whatever name is given to it, it is meant not only for the monastic communities but also for lay people as well. The Buddha introducing *Sugatavinaya* in the *Sugatavinaya sutta* and stated that his teaching is for the benefit, welfare and happiness of all human and divine beings. There is no special reference to his monastic followers:

*Katamo ca, bhikkhave, Sugatavinayo? So dhammaṃ deseti ādikalyāṇaṃ majjhakalyāṇaṃ pariyosānakalyāṇaṃ sātthaṃ sabyañjanaṃ, kevalaparipuṇṇaṃ parisuddhaṃ brahmacariyaṃ pakāseti. Ayaṃ, bhikkhave, sugatavinayo. Evaṃ Sugato vā, bhikkhave, loke tiṭṭhamāno Sugatavinayo vā tadassa bahujanahitāya bahujanasukhāya lokānukampāya atthāya hitāya sukhāya devamanussānan-ti*⁹

(What, monks, is the Sugata's Discipline? He teaches the Dharma good in the beginning, good in the middle, good in the end, both in the spirit and in the letter. He proclaims the holy life that is entirely complete and pure. This, monks, is the Sugata's discipline. The Sugata, monks, or the Sugata's discipline remains in the world for the good of the many, for the happiness of the many, out of compassion for the world, for the good and happiness of gods and humans).

This *sutta* passage exactly tells us what is meant by *Vinaya* when it is used without referring to the disciplinary rules and regulations. It is none other than the religion of the Buddha. It was presented by the Buddha for the good of the many, for the happiness of the many, out of compassion for the world, for the good and happiness of the gods and humans. Here the term *Vinaya* is directly related to the teachings (*Dhamma*) of the Buddha and completely excluded the monastic disciplinary rules.

The purposes of *Dhammavinaya* and that of monastic *Vinaya* are not the same. The main purpose of *Dhammavinaya* or *Brahmacariya* is said to be the complete eradication of suffering which is *Nibbāna*.¹⁰ The same purpose is variously enumerated in the *Satthusāsana sutta* as follows: disenchantment (*nibbidā*), dispassion (*virāga*), cessation (*nirodha*), calm (*upasama*), direct knowledge (*abhiññā*), self-awakening (*sambodhi*), and emancipation (*nibbāna*).¹¹

The purpose of *Vinayasikkhāpada* (disciplinary rules) is quite different from what is given above. They are enumerated as

*thena hi bhikkhave bhikkhūnam sikkhāpadam paññāpessāmi dasa
athavase paṭicca: katame dasa saṅghasutthutāya saṅghaphāsutāya
dummaṅkūnam puggalānam niggaḥāya pesalānam bhikkhūnam
phāsuviharāya diṭṭhadhammikānam āsavānam samvarāya
sampaṛāyikānam āsavānam paṭighātāya appasannānam pasādāya
pasannānam bhiyyobhāvāya saddhammaṭṭhitiyā vinayānuggahāya*¹²

(Therefore bhikkhus I promulgate disciplinary rules for the bhikkhus depending on ten reasons: the well-being of the Saṅgha, convenience of the Saṅgha, restraint of evil-minded persons, ease of well-behaved monks, restraint against the defilements of this life, eradication of the defilements of the life after, faith of the people who do not have faith, enhancement of the faith of people who have already the faith, stability of the dhamma and supporting of the discipline).

As there are clear differences between *Dhammavinaya* and monastic *Vinaya*, in their purposes, the term *Vinaya* in the discourses of the Buddha should be understood according to the proper context.

Talking about the *Dhamma* and *Vinaya* in the sense of doctrine and disciplinary rules respectively, Ven. Thanissaro tries further to overlap the two contexts of the term *Vinaya* when he explains *Dhammavinaya* in the following way:

Although this book deals primarily with discipline, we should note at the outset that total training in the Buddha's path requires that *Dhamma* and *Vinaya* function together. In theory they may be separate, but in the person who practices them they merge as qualities developed in the mind and character.¹³

In order to confirm what he explained above, Ven. Thanissaro presents the following illustration which really reveals not the nature of monastic *Vinaya* but that of *Dhammavinaya*:

Gotamī, the qualities of which you may know, 'These qualities lead to dispassion, not to passion; to being unfettered and not to being fettered; to shedding and not to accumulating; to modesty and not to self-aggrandizement; to contentment and not to discontent; to seclusion and not to entanglement; to aroused energy and not to laziness; to being unburdensome and not to being burdensome': You may definitely hold, 'This is the *Dhamma*, this is the *Vinaya*, this is the Teacher's instruction. [Cv.X.5]¹⁴

In this quotation there are three terms namely, *Dhamma*, *Vinaya* and the teacher's instruction which invite our attention. The Pāli term for the teacher's instruction is *Satthusāsana*. It is quite evident that these three terms were used by the Buddha in the same sense without giving special preference to any one of the terms. The factors which refer to *Dhamma*, *Vinaya* and *Satthusāsana* in the above passage have no bearing whatsoever on the monastic *Vinaya*. Therefore, the later statement of Ven. Thanissaro seems to be not compatible with the former nor the former with the latter.

A similar treatment given to the collective term *Dhammavinaya* can be found in the Buddhajayanti Tripitaka Series published by the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. The Board of Translators of this series has employed the following Pāli passage taken from the *Paṭicchannasutta* of *Aṅguttaranikāya*¹⁵ as the motto in each book of the series with its Sinhala translation: *Tathāgatappavedito bhikkhave Dhammavinayo vivaṭo virocati no paṭicchanno*. The term *Dhammavinaya* in the above quotation has been taken to mean *Dhamma* and *Vinaya* as two separate items in the Sinhala translation. Treating *Dhammavinaya* as two separate words gives the wrong idea to the effect that both *Dhamma* and *Vinaya* (monastic *Vinaya*) shine when they are opened.

As the religion of the Buddha, *Dhammavinaya* consists of *sīla*, *samādhi*, *paññā* and *vimutti*. These four factors represent the noble eightfold path together with its resultant emancipation (*vimutti*). It is said that "one who does not possess four things is said to have fallen from this *Dhammavinaya*. What four? (1) One who does not possess noble virtuous behavior is said to have fallen from this *Dhammavinaya*. (2) One who does not possess noble concentration ... (3) One who does not possess noble wisdom ... (4) One who does not possess noble liberation is said to have fallen from this

Dhammavinaya.¹⁶ This means that so long as those four factors are present in a person, he lives with *Dhammavinaya*. It should be seen that here the above statement does not include the *Vinayasikkhā* (disciplinary training rules) among the factors which lead a person to fall away from *Dhammavinaya* when he does not possess it. This further reveals to us the reason why it is called *Dhammavinaya*. The teaching of the Buddha is invariably connected with the discipline. *Sīla* (virtuous conduct), *samādhi* (concentration) and *paññā* (wisdom) are known as *tisso sikkhā* (the threefold training). They provide bodily, verbal and mental discipline of the person who follows the *Dhammavinaya*. Therefore *Dhamma* has discipline as an integral part. That is the reason it is called *Dhammavinaya*. It is impossible to separate *Dhamma* from *Vinaya* and *Vinaya* from *Dhamma*. If we treat *Dhammavinaya* as *Dhamma* and *Vinaya*, it leads to the wrong interpretation that *Dhamma* is the doctrinal teachings of the Buddha and *Vinaya* is the regulations of the Buddha whereas *Dhammavinaya* provides the doctrine and discipline as one whole system of teachings.

We have even more evidence to prove that the *Dhammavinaya* in the quotation of the *Paṭicchanhasutta* cannot be separated into *Dhamma* and *Vinaya*. The adjective to *Dhammavinaya* used in the discourse *Tathāgatappavedito* is inappropriate for *Dhamma* and *Vinaya*. It is really, appropriate to *Dhamma* only and not to the *Vinaya* regulations. When we take the *Vinaya* as a separate single term which denote rules and regulations they cannot be said to be ‘preached’ (*pavedito*) by the Buddha; but it is really, ‘promulgated’ or ‘laid down’ (*paññatto*). In this regard, we can remember the saying which is correctly formulated as *dhammo ca vinayo ca desito paññatto*.¹⁷ On the other hand, if we take the term *Vinaya* in the sense of promulgated rules and regulations of the monastic members, we have to think how far such a *Vinaya* is compatible with the saying *vivaṭo virocati*.

There is no doubt that the *Dhamma* (the teaching of the Buddha) shines when it is opened. The *Dhamma* is not something esoteric and mystical. It has global application. It has no limit in time and space. Many people gets its benefits when it is opened to many. In this sense we can say that the *Dhamma* shines when it is opened. On the other hand, the Buddha himself admitted that there are some teachings in the *Dhamma* which are not so open. Discourses, those of indirect meaning or the meanings of which are not already drawn out (*neyyattham suttantam*)¹⁸ needs more elaboration to provide an accurate interpretation. In that sense also we can say that the *Dhamma* shines when it is opened. If we take the *Vinaya* in the sense of rules and regulations, it is meaningless to say that the *Vinaya* shines when it is opened. The *Vinaya* has no universal application. Not only it is limited only to monastic members, but also some of the minor rules and regulations have no universal value and they have a restriction in time and space. This may be the reason why the Buddha allowed monks to violate lesser and minor rules if the monks were willing to do so.¹⁹ Therefore, we cannot admit that the *Vinaya* shines when it is opened in the same way that we say this about the *Dhamma*.

Vinaya in the *Dhamma* and *Vinaya* in the *Vinayaṭṭaka* are considerably different. They cannot be taken synonymously as referring to one and the same thing. *Vinaya* in the *Dhamma* is inseparable from the *Dhamma* as they are associated together as the linking parts of a chain. The *Dhamma* provides the theory while the *Vinaya* provides the practice of the Buddhist system of religion. The *Dhamma* is meaningful when the *Vinaya* is associated with it and vice versa. These inseparable two parts which constitute the whole system of religion of the Buddha seem to be represented by *paññā* (wisdom) and *sīla* (morality) respectively. The mutual relation of these two parts is nicely delineated in the *Soṇadaṇḍa sutta* of *Dīghanikāya* as follows:

*sīlaparidhotā paññā paññā paridhotam sīlam. Yattha sīlam tattha paññā yattha paññā tatattha sīlam*²⁰

(Wisdom is cleansed by virtue and virtue is cleansed by wisdom. Where there is virtue there is wisdom and where there is wisdom there is virtue).

Another distinction of *Vinaya* in the *Dhamma* is that it goes a step further, exceeding the productive capacity of *Vinaya* in the *Vinayaṭṭaka*. According to Buddhism, its final outcome can be achieved through the refinement of every aspect of life. Life activity is led by thought word and deed. Therefore, Buddhism as the religion of the Buddha presents a way of life in terms of *Dhammavinaya* which has the capacity of purifying all the three avenues of thought, word and deed. In this sense *Dhammavinaya* represents the Three-fold Discipline (*tisso sikkhā*). The *Vinaya* in the *Vinayaṭṭaka* on the other hand, cannot claim that it has an appeal to the discipline in terms of thought. Its capacity of restraint is confined only to word and deed. Hence, Bhaddanta Buddhaghosa defines *Vinaya* in the following way: *tasmā vividhanayattā vīsesanayattā kāyavācānañca vinayanato vinayo'ti akkhāto*²¹ (Therefore, it is called *Vinaya* as it has various methods and special methods and also as it restrains body and words).

Vinaya in the *Vinayaṭṭaka* can be considered as a system of codified law of the Buddhist monastic community which regulates the life of the members of the community. The distinguishable characteristic of those rules from the *Vinaya* in the *Dhamma* and *Vinaya* is that each rule has been given a legal status which is characterized by the capacity of imposing appropriate punishment. Regarding the nature of the rules (*sikkhāpada*) of the code of law of the Buddhist monastic order, Prof. Jotiya Dhirasekera observed:

Each one of these *sikkhāpada* or rules which constitute the text of Pātimokkha, according to the text of *Vinaya Ṭṭaka*, was laid down on the commission of some offence which thereafter on the authority of the rules thus laid down, was declared illegal. These rules, as instruments of prosecution and punishment, therefore carried with them a host of carefully worded clauses which determine the gravity of the offence and the consequent changes in the nature of the punishment according to the circumstances of each case.²²

Disciplinary precepts coming under *Dhammavinaya*, on the other hand, are not confined to any special group of followers and are expected to be followed by anyone who is honestly seeking the result of the *Dhammavinaya*, that is to say the cessation of suffering. There is no governing force behind them which compel them to be followed. They are an integral part and parcel of one and the same path leading to the eradication of all the *āsavas*. Hence, the *Vinaya* in the *Dhammavinaya* and the *Vinaya* in the *Vinayaṭṭakā* cannot be taken as interchangeable or substitutable terms.

Inseparable two terms in the collective compound word *Dhammavinaya* more likely can be compared respectively to *Dhamma* and *Bramacariya* appeared in the recurrent statements in the discourses, e.g.,

*so dhammaṃ deseti ādikalyāṇaṃ majjhakalyāṇaṃ pariyosānakalyāṇaṃ sātthaṃ sabyañjanaṃ kevalaparipuṇṇaṃ parisuddhaṃ brahmacariyaṃ pakāseti*²³ (He preaches the *Dhamma* which is lovely in its beginning, lovely in its middle, lovely in its ending, in the spirit and in the letter, and displays the fully perfected and purified).²⁴

Here, in this statement, the usages “*dhammaṃ deseti*” and “*brahmacariyaṃ pakāseti*” appears to be referred to one and the same thing, it is definite that in the real sense they represent two different aspects of the teachings of the Buddha namely, the doctrine and the discipline which is included inseparably in the doctrine of the Buddha. The following statement seems to be clearer in this respect:

*dhammo ca svākkhāto suppavedito niyyāniko upasamasānvattaniko sammā sambuddhappavedito aviññāpitatthā camhā saddhammo kevalaṃ ca no paripūraṃ brahmacariyaṃ āvikataṃ hoti*²⁵ (*Dhamma* is well-proclaimed, well-expounded, leading out, conducive to calming, expounded by one who is rightly self-awakened. And we have been instructed in the meaning/goal of the True *Dhamma*, and the complete holy life has been entirely disclosed to us).²⁶

Even in this quotation terms *dhamma* and *brahmacariya* are mentioned separately to indicate two aspects of the teachings of the Buddha. When we get the definition of the term *brahmacariya* in Buddhist context, we can see quite clearly the term *brahmacariya* and the term *vinaya* in the usage of the *dhammavinaya* are referred to the same thing. The term *brahmacariya* is explained in the following manner: *katamañca bhikkhave brahmacariyaṃ? ayameva ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo*²⁷ (O monks, what is *brahmacariya*? It is this Noble Eightfold Path itself). Noble Eightfold Path is included in the Threefold Discipline.²⁸ Hence, *Brahmacariya* represents disciplinary aspect of the teachings of the Buddha. In the division of the entire teachings of the Buddha into three parts namely *pariyatti*, *paṭipatti* and *pativedha*, the *dhamma* and the *vinaya* in the *Dhammavinaya* context stand for *pariyatti* and *paṭipatti* respectively while the results of *brahmacariya* which are considered to be *sotāpatti*, *sakadāgāmi*, *anāgāmi* and *arahatta*²⁹ represents the aspect of

paṭivedha. The following verse nicely delineates those three aspects known as threefold *sāsana* taking together as a whole:

Yo imasmin dhammavinaye appamatto vihessati

*Pahāya jāti-saṃsāraṃ dukkhassantaṃ karissati*³⁰

(If one lives in the *dhammavinaya* diligently, one makes the end of suffering having left behind the cycle of birth).

Notes

- 1 *Dīghanikāya, Mahāparinibbāna sutta*, II. 154.
- 2 *Cūlavaggaṭṭhā, Pañcasatikkhandaḥaka*, II. 285.
- 3 *Aṅguttaranikāya, Pahārāda sutta. Seyyathā pi, Pahārāda, mahāsamuddo ekaraso loṇaraso, evameva kho Pahārāda, ayaṃ Dhammavinayo ekaraso vimuttirasō.*
- 4 *Aṅguttaranikāya, Paṭicchanna sutta*, I. 283.
- 5 *Dīghanikāya, Mahāparinibbāna sutta.*
- 6 Translation from *The Long Discourses of the Buddha, A Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya*, by Maurice Walshe, Wisdom Publication: Boston, 1995, p. 271.
- 7 Thanissaro Bhikkhu. *The Buddhist Monastic Code I*, Third edition, revised. Malaysia: 2013, p. 1.
- 8 M. I. 160; M. I. 237: *Ichāmahaṃ āvuso Kālāma imasmīṃ Dhammavinaye brahmacariyaṃ caritunti.*
- 9 *Aṅguttaranikāya, Sugatavinaya sutta.*
- 10 M. I. 304: *Nibbānogaḍhaṃ hi āvuso visākhābrahmacariyaṃ nibbānapariyosānaṃ nibbānaparāyanaṃ.*
- 11 *Aṅguttaranikāya, Sattusāsana sutta*, A. IV. 143.
- 12 A. I. 98; A. V. 70; Vin. III. 20
- 13 Thanissaro Bhikkhu. *The Buddhist Monastic Code I*, Third edition, revised. Malaysia: 2013, p. 1.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 A. I. 283.
- 16 *Catūhi bhikkhave dhammehi asamannāgato imasmā dhammavinayā papatitoti vuccati. Katamehi catūhi? Ariyena bhikkhave sīlena asamannāgato imasmā dhammavinayā papatitoti vuccati. Ariyena bhikkhave samādhinā ... Ariyāya bhikkhave paññāya asamannāgato ... Ariyāya bhikkhave vimuttiyā asamannāgato imasmā dhammavinayā papatitoti vuccati. Imehi kho bhikkhave catūhi dhammehi asamannāgato imasmā dhammavinayā papatitoti vuccati. Aṅguttaranikāya, Papatita sutta*, A. II. 2.
- 17 Quoted above from *Dīghanikāya, Mahāparinibbāna sutta*, II. 154.
- 18 A. I. 60.
- 19 *Dīghanikāya, Mahāparinibbāna sutta.*
- 20 D. I. 124.
- 21 VinA. I. 19.
- 22 Jotiya Dhirasekera, *Buddhist Monastic Discipline*, Second Edition, Buddhist Publication Centre: Nedimale, Dehiwala, Sri Lanka, p. 148.
- 23 *Dīghanikāya: Poṭṭhapāda sutta.*
- 24 *The Long Discourses of the Buddha, A Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya*, by Maurice Walshe, Wisdom Publication: Boston, p. 161.
- 25 *Dīghanikāya: Pāsādika sutta* (D. III. 123).
- 26 <https://www.dhammadata.org/suttas/DN/DN29.html>
- 27 S. V. 26.
- 28 M. I. 301.
- 29 *Katamāni bhikkhave brahmacariyaphalāni? sotāpattiphalaṃ sadāgāmiphalaṃ anāgāmiphalaṃ arahattaphalaṃ.*
- 30 *Aruṇavati sutta* (S. I. 154).

How the Steps of Mindfulness of Breathing Decreased from Sixteen to Two

Bhikkhu ANĀLAYO

Introduction

We are indebted to Bhikkhu Dhammajoti for two detailed studies of mindfulness of breathing (2008 and 2009). The first of these surveys a range of texts that present instructions on the sixteen steps of mindfulness of breathing, whereas the second examines in detail approaches to the same meditation object based on counting the breath and associated techniques.

In this chapter, written to honour Bhikkhu Dhammajoti's work, I attempt to relate these two different modalities of practice. A central question in my exploration is whether indications can be found that explain why in later exegesis counting the breath and associated techniques became increasingly prominent, whereas at an earlier time the sixteen steps were apparently seen as sufficient in themselves, without a need for additional tools.¹

Mindfulness of Breathing in Sixteen Steps

My exploration begins and ends with passages from the **Śāriputrābhidharma*, a Dharmaguptaka Abhidharma text (Anālayo 2014a: 88n119) that testifies to a reduction of mindfulness of breathing from sixteen to two steps. In keeping with a general tendency of early Abhidharma texts,² the **Śāriputrābhidharma* contains extracts and quotations from the *Āgamas*. In the present case this is particularly opportune, as the Dharmaguptaka *Dirgha-āgama* extant in Chinese translation does not have an exposition of the sixteen steps. The Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya* does contain such an exposition (to which I will come back in the next section of this article), but unfortunately this is abbreviated. This lacuna could conveniently be filled out with the help of the following discourse quotation in the **Śāriputrābhidharma*:³

The Blessed One spoke thus: “Monastics, cultivate mindfulness of exhalations and inhalations, train to be familiar with it and cultivate it much. Having trained to cultivate it much, you will gain great fruits ... *up to* ... you will gain the deathless.

“How to cultivate mindfulness of exhalations and inhalations, train to be familiar with it and cultivate it much, to gain great fruits ... *up to* ... to gain the deathless?

Thus a monastic stays in a quiet place, in a forest, under a tree, or in an empty place, in a mountain cave, in an open place on a spread of grass, or in a cemetery, on a cliff or on a river bank.

Thus in the morning the monastic approaches the village to beg for food. Having eaten, after noon one stores away robes and bowl and washes the feet. With feet washed, the monastic sits down cross-legged with straight body and mindfulness collected, attending to the abandonment of longings and, practicing with a mind free of longings and greedy attachments, gains purification from longings and greedy attachments. One abandons aversion, practicing with a mind of benevolence, and gains purification by separating the mind from aversion.

One abandons sloth-and-torpor and, being without sloth-and-torpor and with right knowing and clarity of perception, gains purification by separating the mind from sloth-and-torpor. One abandons restlessness-and-worry and, practising being without restlessness-and-worry and with the mind stilled within, gains purification by separating [the mind] from restlessness-and-worry. One abandons doubt and, practising being without doubt and with certainty about wholesome states, gains purification by separating the mind from doubt.

Thus a monastic abandons the five hindrances, which are defilements that harm the mind, and with wise understanding is rightly mindful of the exhalations and rightly mindful of the inhalations. Thus breathing out long the monastic knows to be breathing out long, and breathing in long knows to be breathing in long. Breathing out short one knows to be breathing out short, and breathing in short knows to be breathing in short. One trains to experience the whole body on breathing in, and trains to experience the whole body on breathing out.⁴ One trains to calm bodily activity on breathing out,⁵ and trains to calm bodily activity on breathing in.

One trains to experience joy on breathing out, and trains to experience joy on breathing in. One trains to experience happiness on breathing out, and trains to experience happiness on breathing in. One trains to experience mental activity on breathing out, and trains to experience mental activity on breathing in. One trains to calm mental activity on breathing out, and trains to calm mental activity on breathing in.

One trains to experience the mind on breathing out, and trains to experience the mind on breathing in. One trains to gladden the mind on breathing out, and trains to gladden the mind on breathing in. One trains to concentrate the mind on breathing out, and trains to concentrate the mind on breathing in. One trains to liberate the mind on breathing out, and trains to liberate the mind on breathing in.

One trains to contemplate impermanence on breathing out, and trains to contemplate impermanence on breathing in. One trains to contemplate dispassion on breathing out, and trains to contemplate dispassion on breathing in. One trains to contemplate cessation on breathing out, and trains to contemplate cessation on breathing in. One trains to contemplate emergence from the world on breathing out, and trains to contemplate emergence from the world on breathing in.

The presentation in the above passage from the **Śāriputrābhidharma* is in close agreement with its Theravāda counterpart in the *Ānāpānasati-sutta*.⁶ In general, the instructions for the sixteen steps show relatively few variations.⁷ Hence Deleanu (1992: 49) rightly comments that

I think we can agree that the sixteen bases of the mindfulness of breathing are a practice peculiar to Buddhism and that they belong to the earliest Buddhist stratum.

For an appreciation of the dynamics of the meditative progression delineated above, the exegesis provided in the **Śāriputrābhidharma* after this exposition is of further interest. Of particular relevance for my overall exploration is the third step of experiencing the whole body. In its explanation of this step, the **Śāriputrābhidharma* illustrates the relationship between the body becoming void internally and the taking of an inhalation with the example of an empty bag that had earlier been deflated.⁸ In order to let air in, one opens the mouth of that bag. The description clearly takes the reference to the body (*kāya*/身) in this third step to intend the physical body.

This differs from the position taken in Theravāda exegesis. According to the *Visuddhimagga*, executing the instruction to experience the whole body requires clearly discerning the beginning, middle, and end of the breath.⁹ In other words, the “body” is here understood as a reference to the breath only.

The different perspectives that emerge in this way, alongside a basic agreement on the actual instructions in sixteen steps, involve a somewhat different approach to the practice. On following the *Visuddhimagga*, the third step is concerned with the breath only. In contrast, on adopting the perspective offered in the **Śāriputrābhidharma*, the third step involves a broadening of awareness from the length of the breath, observed in the previous two steps, to the whole physical body. This offers a more compelling explanation, as the progression through the entire set of sixteen steps regularly introduce new perspectives. Such is not the case when the third step is considered to be only about the whole breath, as the same has already been the object of the first two steps. Without experiencing the whole breath, it would be impossible to know if it is short or long. As already pointed out by Nhat Hanh (1990: 43):

the practice of being mindful of the whole ‘breath body’ was already dealt with in the ... exercise: ‘breathing in a long breath, he knows, “I am breathing in a long breath.” Breathing out a short breath, he knows, “I am breathing out a short breath.”’ Why then do we need to repeat this exercise?

In this way, it seems fair to conclude that the canonical instructions on mindfulness of breathing involve a focus on the breath only for the first two steps, but not for the ensuing step. Pursuing this suggestion further requires examining the relationship of this particular form of meditation to concentration.

Concentration on Mindfulness of Breathing

The early discourses explicitly indicate that the purpose of the sixteen steps of mindfulness of breathing is to serve as an implementation of the four *satipaṭṭhānas/smṛtyupasthānas* in order to cultivate the seven awakening factors so as to result in knowledge and liberation.¹⁰ In this context, concentration features as the eleventh step in the sixteen-step scheme and as the sixth of the seven awakening factors. Evidently, concentration is an important factor in the meditative cultivation described, but at the same time it is not the central concern of mindfulness of breathing, let alone its final aim.

According to the early discourses, concentration as an awakening factor arises based on happiness.¹¹ The same basic principle obtains for the progression through the sixteen steps. Here joy (step 5) and happiness (step 6) lead to calming mental activity (step 8), which in turn furnishes the foundation for concentrating the mind (step 11). For ease of reference, here is a summary of the first three tetrads and their corresponding steps:

- 1 breathing in/out long
- 2 breathing in/out short
- 3 experiencing the whole body & breathing in/out
- 4 calming bodily activity & breathing in/out
- 5 experiencing joy & breathing in/out
- 6 experiencing happiness & breathing in/out
- 7 experiencing mental activity & breathing in/out
- 8 calming mental activity & breathing in/out
- 9 experiencing the mind & breathing in/out
- 10 gladdening the mind & breathing in/out
- 11 concentrating the mind & breathing in/out
- 12 liberating the mind & breathing in/out

The overall progression up to the eleventh step of concentrating the mind begins with an initial cultivation of focus in the first two steps, when the length of the breath has to be discerned as either long or short. The remainder of the progression, however, no longer involves such an exclusive focus. The steps in the second and third tetrad clearly require combining mindfulness of breathing in and out with other meditative tasks, such as experiencing certain mental conditions or even actively cultivating them.

In this way, the cultivation of the sixteen steps of mindfulness of breathing is not just a matter of focussing. Instead, based on an initial deployment of focus, it rather requires the cultivation of mindfulness. It is through the open and receptive stance of mindfulness that it becomes possible to monitor different things taking place, such as the continuity of breathing and the carrying out of various other tasks. For this reason, the meditation practice described here is called “mindfulness” of breathing in and out.

There is, however, an alternative expression found in several discourses and in later exegesis, which combines “mindfulness of breathing” with “concentration” to form the compound *ānāpānasati-samādhi*. This requires further examination.

The first occurrence of this expression among the collected discourses on mindfulness of breathing, the *Ānāpānasati-saṃyutta*, is of particular relevance for understanding its implications. In this discourse, the Buddha draws the attention of the other monastics to one monastic who sits in meditation quietly and without any fidgeting around. The other monastics confirm that they had also noticed this quality of his. The Buddha then explains that the reason for this quiet behaviour is the *samādhi* this monastic was practising. In this context, the term *samādhi* seems to carry a broader sense than its usual rendering of “concentration” and could perhaps best be captured by translating it as “meditation”. This broader sense of the term *samādhi* is evident also elsewhere in the early discourses.¹²

In what follows I translate the Chinese and Pāli versions of the Buddha’s explanation, beginning with the former, where in each case I employ the term *samādhi* rather than an English translation:¹³

The monastics said to the Buddha: “What is the *samādhi* that [this] monastic has attained, such a *samādhi* that body and mind are immovable and one dwells in the most excellent dwelling?”

The Buddha said to the monastics: “Suppose a monastic dwells in dependence on a (hamlet) or town.¹⁴ Having put on the robes in the morning, taken the bowl, and entered the village to beg for food, and having returned to the lodgings, put away robes and bowl, and washed the feet, one enters a forest or an empty hut or [goes to] an open [ground] to sit down and attend with collected mindfulness ... up to ... well trains to contemplate cessation when breathing [out].

“This is called the *samādhi* by which, if a monastic is seated properly with attention to it, body and mind become immovable and one dwells in the most excellent dwelling.”

Here is the Pāli counterpart in the *Saṃyutta-nikāya*, which differs insofar as the Buddha himself poses the questions to which he then provides the replies:¹⁵

Monastics, by the cultivation and making much of what *samādhi* will there be neither moving around and quivering of the body nor moving around and quivering of the mind?

Monastics, by the cultivation and making much of the *samādhi* of mindfulness of breathing there will be neither moving around and quivering of the body nor moving around and quivering of the mind.

Monastics, by what kind of cultivation and making much of the *samādhi* of mindfulness of breathing will there be neither moving around and quivering of the body nor moving around and quivering of the mind?

Here, monastics, gone to a forest or to the root of a tree or to an empty hut, a monastic sits down ... *up to* ... and trains: 'I shall breathe out contemplating letting go'.

Monastics, by the cultivation and making much of the *samādhi* of mindfulness of breathing like this there will be neither moving around and quivering of the body nor moving around and quivering of the mind.

On comparing the two passages, it is noteworthy that in the *Samyukta-āgama* discourse the term *samādhi* occurs each time on its own. This is only the case for the first occurrence in the *Samyutta-nikāya* version, where the remaining three occurrences instead involve the expression *ānāpānasati-samādhi*.

The same expression recurs repeatedly in the remainder of the *Ānāpāna-samyutta*, but only in discourses that follow the present one in the collection, not those that precede it. In each case, the *Samyukta-āgama* does not have such a combination of the term *samādhi* with mindfulness of breathing. This in turn makes it fairly probable that this combination is the result of a development happening during oral transmission. On reciting the above discourse, the probably original formulation would have been a question and answer taking the following forms:

By the cultivation and making much of what *samādhi* will there be neither moving around and quivering of the body nor moving around and quivering of the mind?

By the cultivation and making much of mindfulness of breathing there will be neither moving around and quivering of the body nor moving around and quivering of the mind.

Due to the repetitive nature of the texts, times and again a term found in a previous sentence makes its way into the next, where it originally did not belong. This type of transmission error would have led to "mindfulness of breathing" becoming "*samādhi* of mindfulness of breathing", an expression that, starting from the present occurrence, would then have affected the subsequent discourses in the collection.

One of these subsequent discourses reports the well-known story of a mass suicide by monastics due to developing excessive disgust with their own bodies.¹⁶ On being informed of what had happened, the Buddha is on record for giving instructions on mindfulness of breathing. Besides being found in the *Samyukta-āgama* and *Samyutta-nikāya* collections, this episode is also reported in several *Vinayas*. Among them is also the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, this being the occasion mentioned at the outset of this article where the practice of mindfulness of breathing is presented in abbreviation.

The Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya* agrees with the Theravāda *Vinaya* in qualifying mindfulness of breathing as a *samādhi*.¹⁷ Parallels in the Mahāsāṅghika, Mahīśāsaka, and Sarvāstivāda *Vinayas*, however, just speak of "mindfulness of breathing", without adding the term "concentration".¹⁸ This gives the

impression that the proposed error during oral transmission, which in the Pāli tradition influenced the wording of subsequent discourses in this part of the *Samyutta-nikāya*, would have happened at a time before the oral transmission lineages separated into what we now refer to as the Dharmaguptaka and Theravāda traditions.

Mindfulness of Breathing and Contemplation of the Body

In addition to the standard exposition of sixteen steps, the breath features in a few other contexts as an object of meditation. One usage involves the breath as a means to recollect death.¹⁹ This takes the form of turning awareness to the fact that the present breath could in principle be one's last.

Another relevant instance involves a monastic who had developed his own individual approach to meditation on the breath. Notably, on hearing him report his practice, the Buddha first of all approved it. After expressing approval, the Buddha then presented the sixteen steps as a preferable mode of meditating on the breath. According to the *Samyukta-āgama* account, the sixteen steps are “more excellent”, “go beyond”, and are “superior” to what this monastic was doing.²⁰ The *Samyutta-nikāya* parallel qualifies the sixteen steps as “perfect in every detail”.²¹ Although employing different expressions, the two versions clearly agree on the superiority of the sixteen steps, which were apparently not seen as requiring any additional tools or props in order to be implemented.

Yet another type of occurrence is in the context of expositions of contemplation of the body, found in the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* and the *Kāyagatāsati-sutta*, together with their *Madhyama-āgama* parallels. In order to make the most of the potential of comparing parallel discourses, in what follows I will take up the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta*, which in addition to a *Madhyama-āgama* parallel has another parallel preserved in the *Ekottarika-āgama*.

This *Ekottarika-āgama* parallel is in fact of particular importance, as it does not contain any instructions on mindfulness of breathing. Its survey of the first *satipaṭṭhāna/smṛtyupasthāna* begins with contemplation of the anatomical parts of the body, listing such parts as hairs, nails, teeth, bones, etc. A similar exercise is found also in the two parallels.

Next the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse presents contemplation of the body as made up of the four elements of earth, water, fire, and wind. These four elements are representative of solidity, cohesion, warmth, and motion. This is another exercise shared with its two parallels. A difference manifests in the *Madhyama-āgama* version, which speaks of six elements, adding space and consciousness to the list. This is in line with a general tendency of this version to go beyond the actual topic of body contemplation, where a reference to consciousness is clearly out of place.

The next exercise in the *Ekottarika-āgama* concerns the impure liquids that come out of the body's orifices. This is not found in the other versions. The last body contemplation in the *Ekottarika-āgama* version describes a corpse in different stages of decay, another exercise common to the three parallels.

Here and elsewhere, exercises found in only one version are probably later additions. From a comparative perspective, contemplation of the anatomical parts, the elements, and of a corpse appear to reflect an early formulation of the first *satipaṭṭhāna/smṛtyupasthāna*.²² In other words, instructions on mindfulness of breathing appear to be a later addition to the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel.

Now the *Ekottarika-āgama* collection in general needs to be handled with care. There is clear evidence of a reworking of the collection in China and the intrusion of extraneous material.²³ As rightly pointed out by Dhammajoti (2015: 27f) in a different context, in the case of the *Ekottarika-āgama*:

It is therefore risky to put too much weight on the content or form of a given *sūtra* in this collection in arguing for its being the "original form" of a canonical discourse, on the basis of its often briefer description or absence of a particular list.

However, in the present case the presentation in the *Ekottarika-āgama* receives support from early Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma works. The *Vibhaṅga* has only contemplation of the anatomical parts for contemplation of the body as a *satipaṭṭhāna/smṛtyupasthāna*, and the *Dharmaskandha* mentions just contemplation of the anatomical parts and the elements.²⁴ This makes it safe to conclude that the presentation in the *Ekottarika-āgama* indeed points to an early description of body contemplation. In terms of the three exercises common to the discourse versions, the main concern is then a deconstructing of perceiving the body as sensually alluring, as a solid entity, and as something that is lasting rather than being mortal.

The *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse appears to have followed this basic trajectory by adding another exercise that also deconstructs the body's attractiveness. The other two versions take a broader approach, including various exercises related to the general theme of the body. In fact the *Madhyama-āgama* version has been expanded to such an extent that some of its exercises no longer have a relationship to the physical body at all, as evident in its inclusion of the sixth element of consciousness under the heading of contemplation of the body. Such contemplations can with a fairly high degree of confidence be considered later accretions.²⁵

The *Madhyama-āgama* version begins with contemplation of the postures of the body (sitting, standing, etc.) and clear comprehension of bodily activities, two exercises also found in the Pāli discourse. Then come two exercises peculiar to the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse. One of these instructs to rectify the mind

when unwholesome thoughts arise by recollecting what is wholesome, whereas the other recommends achieving the same aim by forceful mind control. It is after these practices that the instructions on mindfulness of breathing appear:²⁶

A monastic is mindful of breathing in and knows to be breathing in mindfully; is mindful of breathing out and knows to be breathing out mindfully.

Breathing in long, one knows to be breathing in long; and breathing out long, knows to be breathing out long. Breathing in short, one knows to be breathing in short; and breathing out short, knows to be breathing out short. One trains [in experiencing] the whole body when breathing in; and trains [in experiencing] the whole body when breathing out. One trains in calming bodily activity when breathing in; and trains in calming (bodily) activity when breathing out.²⁷

Next the *Madhyama-āgama* turns to the bodily experience of the four absorptions, followed by a cultivation of the perception of light and of the reviewing sign. None of these are found in the parallels. The last three exercises are those shared with its two discourse parallels, namely contemplation of the anatomical parts, the elements, and a corpse in decay.

The *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse places mindfulness of breathing right at its outset, followed by the postures, bodily activities, anatomical parts, elements, and the cemetery contemplations. The instructions on mindfulness of breathing are as follows:²⁸

Here gone to a forest or to the root of a tree or to an empty hut, a monastic sits down; having folded the legs crosswise, keeping the body erect, and having established mindfulness to the fore, mindful one breathes in and mindful breathes out.

Breathing in long, one knows: 'I breathe in long', and breathing out long, knows: 'I breathe out long'. Breathing in short, one knows: 'I breathe in short', and breathing out short, knows: 'I breathe out short'. One trains: 'I breathe in experiencing the whole body', and trains: 'I breathe out experiencing the whole body'. One trains: 'I breathe in calming the bodily activity', and trains: 'I breathe out calming the bodily activity'.

These instructions are followed by a simile that describes a turner at work on a lathe. I will examine this simile in relation to other similes for body contemplation in the next section of this article.

From a comparative perspective, it is noteworthy that the *Majjhima-nikāya* discourse has also the preliminary description of retiring to a secluded place, unlike the *Madhyama-āgama* version. Given that these preliminaries are placed at the outset of the descriptions of all the body contemplations in the Pāli version, this can in fact give the misleading impression that it applies to all of them.²⁹ Closer inspection shows that this is not the case. The very next contemplation instructs "when walking, a monastic knows: 'I am walking'; or when standing, knows: 'I am standing'."³⁰ This shows that the

sitting down, described in the preliminaries to mindfulness of breathing, no longer applies. The subsequent contemplation requires that “when wearing the outer robe and [other] robes and [carrying] the bowl, one acts clearly knowing.”³¹ This description is relevant to going to beg alms and not to being in seclusion. In fact the passage from the **Śāriputrābhidharma* translated at the outset of this chapter, in line with other more detailed descriptions of the preliminaries to mindfulness of breathing, explicitly mentions the storing away of the outer robe and bowl before approaching a secluded place to cultivate mindfulness of breathing.

The inclusion of the preliminaries to mindfulness of breathing in the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* is unexpected, as according to the *Ānāpānasati-sutta* these are not part of contemplation of the body. The latter discourse provides a correlation of the instructions on the sixteen steps with the four *satipaṭṭhānas/smṛtyupasthānas*, according to which the first four steps, from understanding long breath to calming bodily activity, correspond to the first *satipaṭṭhāna/smṛtyupasthāna* of contemplation of the body.³² It must have been this thematic connection that motivated the inclusion of the first tetrad under the header of contemplation of the body in the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* and its *Madhyama-āgama* parallel. Yet, in doing so it would have been more natural to take only the first tetrad without the preliminaries, as is indeed the case in the *Madhyama-āgama* version.

As a net result of the development evident in the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* and its parallels, the first tetrad of mindfulness of breathing features as a form of meditation on its own. This results in a loss of the transition to the next tetrads in the scheme of sixteen steps, in particular to those steps, discussed above, that serve to bring about concentration of the mind.

A further stage of reduction can be seen in two discourses in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, in which only the first three steps of mindfulness of breathing are found.³³ Here, knowing the long and short breaths and experiencing the whole body are the only elements in common with the sixteen steps. These three steps occur in combination with attention given to other aspects of the breath, such as noting its coolness or warmth. Such additional tools are only natural, since with a reduction of mindfulness of breathing to only three steps (or even only four), the actual practice no longer has the same potential to bring about a stilling of distracting thoughts, a potential mentioned in several discourses.³⁴

Similes Illustrating Contemplation of the Body

For appreciating the tendency to reduction, the turner simile in the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* is of further relevance. By way of setting a background to this simile, in what follows I survey the other similes employed in the three versions to illustrate various body contemplations. Of particular interest in this survey is the degree to which the respective simile illustrates the whole of the meditative practice or only a part of it.

The only practice illustrated in all three versions with a simile is contemplation of the elements. This simile takes the following forms in the *Ekottarika-āgama*, *Madhyama-āgama*, and *Majjhima-nikāya* respectively:³⁵

This is just like a capable cow butcher or the apprentice of a cow butcher who divides a cow [into pieces by cutting through] its tendons. While dividing it he contemplates and sees for himself that ‘these are the feet’, ‘this is the heart’, ‘these are the tendons’, and ‘this is the head’. It is just as a butcher who, on having slaughtered and skinned a cow, divides it into six parts and spreads them on the ground [for sale].³⁶ Monastics, it is just as a skilled butcher or a butcher’s apprentice who, having killed a cow, were to be seated at a crossroads with it cut up into pieces.

With varying degrees of detail, the parallel versions illustrate the purpose of contemplating the elements of the body. Just like cutting up a cow into different parts, so the body is to be mentally cut up into its material elements. The concern of the exercise is not with only some of the elements, but with all of them together as making up the body.

Contemplation of the anatomical parts comes with a simile in the *Madhyama-āgama* and *Majjhima-nikāya* versions:³⁷

It is just as a clear-sighted person who, on seeing a vessel full of various seeds, clearly distinguishes them all, that is: ‘rice, millet seed, turnip seed, or mustard seed’.

Monastics, it is just as a person with good eyes who has opened a double-mouthed bag full of different sorts of grain, such as hill rice, red rice, beans, peas, millet, and white rice, which he would examine: ‘This is hill rice, this is red rice, these are beans, these are peas, this is millet, and this is white rice’.

Just as the practitioner is aware of hair, nails, teeth, bones, etc., so in this simile the person is aware of different grains. Here, too, the simile illustrates the whole of the exercise. It is the vision of all the grains together that conveys the practice, not of a single grain to the exclusion of others.

The remaining similes occur only in one of the three versions. In the case of the *Ekottarika-āgama* discourse, the contemplation of the bodily orifices comes with the following illustration:

It is just as a person who, contemplating a bamboo garden, contemplates clumps of reeds.³⁸

The illustration conveys the gist of the whole exercise.

The *Madhyama-āgama* has two separate similes that I present here together. These illustrate overcoming unwholesome states by recollecting what is wholesome or else by forceful mind control:³⁹

It is just as a carpenter or a carpenter's apprentice who might apply an inked string to a piece of wood [to mark a straight line] and then cut the wood with a sharp adze to make it straight ...

It is just as two strong men who might grab a weak man and, turning him this way and that way, might beat him up as they wish.

Both similes serve to convey the sense of the whole contemplation. The same *Madhyama-āgama* version also has four similes to illustrate the experience of each of the four absorptions:⁴⁰

It is just as a bath attendant who, having filled a vessel with bathing powder, mixes it with water and kneads it, so that there is no part [of the powder] that is not completely drenched and pervaded with water ...

It is just as a mountain spring that is full and overflowing with clear and clean water, so that water coming from any of the four directions cannot enter it, with the spring water welling up from the bottom on its own, flowing out and flooding the surroundings, completely drenching every part of the mountain so that there is no part that is not pervaded by it

It is just as a blue, red, or white lotus, being born in the water and having come to growth in the water, remains submerged in water, with every part of its roots, stem, flower, and leaves completely drenched and pervaded [by water], so that there is no part that is not pervaded by it ...

It is just as a person who covers himself from head to foot with a cloth measuring seven or eight units, so that no part of his body is not covered.

Each of these depictions illustrates the experience of the corresponding level of absorption; none concerns just a part of such experience. Yet another simile occurs in the *Madhyama-āgama* discourse in relation to the reviewing sign:⁴¹

It is just as a person who is seated and contemplates another person who is lying down, or while lying down contemplates another person who is seated.

In line with all of the similes surveyed so far, the above depiction also illustrates the whole exercise.

A simile found only in the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* illustrates mindfulness of breathing:⁴²

Monastics, it is just as a skilled turner or a turner's apprentice who knows, when making a long turn: 'I make a long turn'; knows, when making a short turn: 'I make a short turn'.

The turner simile only illustrates the first two of the four steps given in the actual instructions. It corresponds to knowing that one is breathing in or out long and breathing in or out short. It has no evident relation to training in the third step of experiencing the whole body or to the fourth step of calming bodily activity.

Working on a lathe requires a strong focus, as the turner has to observe very carefully what is happening in order to make sure that just the right amount of material is being taken off at exactly the right place. In this way, with the turner simile the need for focus on the breath receives additional emphasis.

This points to a nascent tendency towards further reduction of the instructions on mindfulness of breathing. Even though the discourse still gives the four steps, the simile conveys an interest in the first two of these only and conveys an emphasis on exclusive focus.

In evaluating this incipient stage of further reduction, it is significant that the turner simile is found only in the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta*. It does not occur in the *Kāyagatāsati-sutta*, which otherwise has all the similes that are found in the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta*. This in turn implies that the turner simile would have become part of the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* only at a relatively advanced stage in the transmission of the *Majjhima-nikāya* collection, otherwise it would have been added also to the *Kāyagatāsati-sutta* in the same collection, which otherwise contains identical instructions on mindfulness of breathing.⁴³

Mindfulness of Breathing in Two Steps

The tendency towards reduction, evident in the passages surveyed so far, becomes fully manifest with the exposition of *smṛtyupasthāna* in the **Śāriputrābhidharma*. For the case of mindfulness of breathing, one of the practices given in this work under the rubric of contemplations of the body, this takes the following form:⁴⁴

Again, breathing out long a monastic knows it to be long, and breathing in long knows it to be long. Breathing out short one knows it to be short, and breathing in short knows it to be short.

It is like a master turner who pulls the cord, pulling it long [the master turner] knows it to be long and pulling it short knows it to be short ... *up to* ... this is called practicing contemplation of the body in relation to the internal body.

In this way, the **Śāriputrābhidharma* confirms what the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta* hints at: a reduction of the practice to the first two steps.

The *Visuddhimagga* in fact achieves basically the same result with its interpretation of the third step of experiencing the whole body as intending the whole breath. Given that the Pāli commentarial tradition understands the fourth step of calming bodily activity to imply a progression up to the attainment of the fourth absorption,⁴⁵ all that is available now for reaching such lofty attainment is focussing on the breath.

From the perspective of an increasing emphasis on just focussing on the breath, it is of further interest that the *Visuddhimagga*, as well as the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, no longer mention the turner simile. Instead they present

a simile of a saw, which in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* is the only metaphor employed for illustrating the practice of mindfulness of breathing.⁴⁶ The simile of the saw compares proper cultivation of mindfulness of breathing to cutting a piece of wood, where the worker's attention is continuously at the point where the teeth of the saw cuts the wood, without attending to other parts of the saw as they move forward and backward. In the same way the practitioner should focus exclusively on the point where the breath touches, without attending to the remainder of the breaths as they move inward and outward.

This points to a further degree of focussing. Whereas the turner needs to pay attention to the length of each turn in order to execute his work with precision, avoiding that neither too little nor too much is cut off from the piece, for the worker cutting wood the length of the motion of the saw is no longer of any importance, all that counts is to cut as deep as possible into the wood at the point of contact. In the same way, with the development under discussion eventually even the length of the breaths becomes less important and is replaced by an all-out focus on the touch sensation of the breaths as the most important aspect of the practice.

The tendency to emphasize focussing on the breath and a reductionism to the first tetrad continues in the present, evident in the fact that at times publications on mindfulness of breathing only cover the first four steps.⁴⁷ The general attitude can be conveniently illustrated with a statement by Ledi Sayādaw (1999/2011: 40), according to which “the first tetrad is the main and essential stage.”

This shows the degree to which the whole practice of the sixteen steps can come to be subsumed under its first four steps. As is plainly evident in the **Śāriputrābhidharma*, such a tendency to reduction holds sway even though there is clear awareness of the existence of the sixteen-step scheme.

As a result of such reduction, it is not surprising that other techniques had to be relied on in order to enable meditators to stay with the breath. An obvious example is the method of counting the breaths in order to avoid distraction. Among the different approaches to mindfulness of breathing prominent in later texts, counting is in fact the one factor common to all approaches surveyed by Dhammajoti (2009). This suggests that counting would have been their common starting point. In fact Cousins (2015: 4) reasons that “one may suspect that from an early date some kind of counting was employed in the initial two stages.” The gradual reduction of the sixteen steps to the first tetrad and eventually to only the first two steps, concerned only with the length of the breath, must indeed have set the stage for the need to employ counting and eventually other related techniques in an attempt to recover the potential of mindfulness of breathing to counter distraction.

Acknowledgement

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Abbreviations

AN	<i>Aniguttara-nikāya</i>
EĀ	<i>Ekottarika-āgama</i>
MĀ	<i>Madhyama-āgama</i>
MN	<i>Majjhima-nikāya</i>
Paṭis	<i>Paṭisambhidāmagga</i>
Ps	<i>Papañcasūdanī</i>
SĀ	<i>Saṃyukta-āgama</i>
SN	<i>Saṃyutta-nikāya</i>
T	Taishō edition (CBETA)
Vin	<i>Vinaya</i>
Vism	<i>Visuddhimagga</i>
< >	emendation
[]	supplementation

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Notes

- 1 As already noted by Dhammadīpa 2009: 574: “now the question arises why there is no factor system [i.e. counting and related methods] mentioned in the early canon and early Abhidhamma/Abhidharma, but then later it becomes so important for the technique of *ānāpānasati/smṛti*? This is another complicated issue that would require a detailed study before it could be answered fully.” Since to the best of my knowledge this question has so far not been taken up for further research, my presentation here and in Anālayo 2019a is meant to serve as a step towards a better understanding of the problem identified by Bhikkhu Dhammadīpa.
- 2 On the evolution of early Abhidharma in close interrelation with *Āgama* texts see Anālayo 2014a.
- 3 T 1548 at T XXVIII 705a28.
- 4 As already pointed out by Dhammajoti 2008: 285 note 32, here the sequence is reversed and the inhalation is mentioned first. The difference seems negligible from a practical perspective.
- 5 T 1548 at T XXVIII 705b15 uses the verb 除 here, which has as its primary meaning “to eliminate”. As already noted by Dhammajoti 2008: 255, however, the same character can also serve as a rendering of *pratīprasrambhayati*, as indicated by Hirakawa 1997: 1212. This is clearly the appropriate sense here.
- 6 MN 118 at MN III 82,24.
- 7 This can be seen quite well from the detailed survey in Dhammajoti 2008; see also Anālayo 2013a: 231–233.
- 8 T 1548 at T XXVIII 706a22; the explanation given here has already been translated by Dhammajoti 2008: 268.
- 9 Vism 273,23: *sabbakāyapaṭisaṃvedī ... sakalassa assāsakāyassa ādimajjhapariyosānaṃ viditaṃ karonto*.
- 10 For example, SN 54.13 at SN V 329,1 and its parallel SĀ 810 at T II 208a11.
- 11 SN 54.13 at SN V 332,20: *sukhino cittaṃ samādhiyati*; and its parallel SĀ 810 at T II 208b25: 身心樂已, 得三昧 (with the slight difference that SĀ 810 explicitly indicates that such happiness extends to body and mind).
- 12 On different nuances of *samādhi* in its usage in the early discourses see Anālayo 2006.
- 13 SĀ 806 at T II 206c29.
- 14 The translation “hamlet” is based on an emendation of an obvious copyist’s error.
- 15 SN 54.7 at SN V 316,8.
- 16 For a comparative study of this episode see Anālayo 2014b.
- 17 T 1428 at T XXII 576b7: 阿那般那三昧 and Vin III 70,19: *ānāpānasatisamādhi*.
- 18 The Mahāsaṅghika *Vinaya*, T 1425 at T XXII 254c7: 阿那般那念, (which is preceded by a question after the type of *samādhi*, 何等三昧?, here in the original sense of “meditation” also relevant in SĀ 806), the Mahīśāsaka *Vinaya*, T 1421 at T XXII 7c6: 安般念, and the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, T 1435 at T XXIII 8a13: 阿那般那念. The Mūlasarvāstivāda *Vinaya* does not relate the mass suicide to instructions on mindfulness of breathing.
- 19 AN 6.19 at AN III 306,7 and AN 8.73 at AN IV 319,24, with a parallel in EĀ 40.8 at T II 742a25; see also Anālayo 2016: 200–207.
- 20 SĀ 805 at T II 206c8: 勝妙, 過其, 上者.
- 21 SN 54.6 at SN V 315,9: *vitthārena paripuṇṇā*.
- 22 Anālayo 2013a: 39–62.
- 23 For the addition of an entire discourse that must have happened in China see Anālayo 2013b; on several cases testifying to an apparent tendency to rework early discourse material see Anālayo 2014/2015 and 2015.
- 24 Vibh 193,17 and T 1537 at T XXVI 476a7.
- 25 Pace Kuan 2008.
- 26 MĀ 98 at T I 582c13.
- 27 The present passage actually speaks of the ‘verbal activity’ when breathing out, which is clearly a textual error.
- 28 MN 10 at MN I 56,12.
- 29 In a discussion of internal and external *satipaṭṭhāna*, Ditrich 2016: 136f comments that “in the *Satipaṭṭhānasutta* it is said: ‘having gone to the forest or to the foot of a tree, or to an empty place’, which indicates that there would be no other people to observe.” Apparently, she takes this specification to qualify the practice of all four *satipaṭṭhānas* described in the discourse and to imply that these are invariably practiced in total seclusion and the absence of any other people. This is, of course, not the case.

- 30 MN 10 at MN I 56,36.
 31 MN 10 at MN I 57,7.
 32 MN 118 at MN III 83,21. Although the same correlation in the *Samyukta-āgama* includes the previously mentioned practice of just being aware of inhalations and exhalations, it also does not include the preliminaries of withdrawing into seclusion; see SĀ 810 at T II 208a23 and Anālayo 2019b: 199.
 33 EĀ 3.8 at T II 556b1 (a discourse for which no parallel is known) and EĀ 17.1 at T II 582a15, parallel to an exposition of the whole scheme of sixteen steps in MN 62 at MN I 425,3.
 34 For example, AN 9.3 at AN IV 358,16 and its parallel MĀ 56 at T I 491c16; similar indications in other *Āgamas* can be found, e.g., in SĀ 804 at T II 206b16 or EĀ 2.8 at T II 553b8.
 35 EĀ 12.1 at T II 568a26, MĀ 98 at T I 583b19, and MN 10 at MN I 58,1.
 36 In line with its presentation of six elements instead of four, the *Madhyama-āgama* speaks of six parts of the cow.
 37 MĀ 98 at T I 583b9 and MN 10 at MN I 57,20.
 38 EĀ 12.1 at T II 568b2.
 39 MĀ 98 at T I 582c2.
 40 MĀ 98 at T I 582c22.
 41 MĀ 98 at T I 583a29.
 42 MN 10 at MN I 56,22.
 43 MN 119 at MN III 89,9.
 44 T 1548 at T XXVIII 613b7.
 45 Ps I 249,1.
 46 Paṭi I 171,7, quoted in Vism 281,25; see also the 解脫道論 (*Vimuttimaggā*), T 1648 at T XXXII 430a13, and Anālayo 2019a.
 47 Examples are Gñānārāma 1989, Ariyadhamma 1995/2014, and Johnson 2012.

Transformation and Abhidhamma in Three Theravāda Meditation Traditions

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As part of his close attention to Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, Professor KL Dhammajoti demonstrates the significance of its relationship with meditative practice.¹ Inspired by this, we seek in this contribution in his honour to explore aspects of the relationship between Theravāda Abhidhamma and meditation, by examining the use of Abhidhamma in three case studies of the early modern to contemporary periods.

While Abhidhamma is often referred to as scholasticism in Western writings, we regard this as a misunderstanding. As Dhammajoti writes, “Properly speaking, Abhidharma is soteriology; neither ‘scholasticism’ nor ‘philosophy.’ Its ultimate aim is stated to be the transcendence of the saṃsāric predicament.” (Dhammajoti 2019a: 69). Abhidhamma’s analysis of causality includes a mapping out of how progress is made on the path to this transcendence, relating progress to meditative attainments, as meditation provides techniques for inculcating the desired changes and insights. This close relationship between Abhidhamma and meditation has to a large extent been lost or downplayed in the globalisation and secularisation of Buddhist-based meditation practices. Yet within the Theravāda world the relationship often remains close.

This paper starts with a summary the path of transformation that leads to individual enlightenment according to Theravāda, by way of background, then explores how Abhidhamma texts provide a blueprint and set of vocabulary for the transformative processes and experiences of meditation. We focus on the relationship between Abhidhamma and advanced meditation practice in three case studies. The first case study is the type of meditation promoted among the Sangha hierarchy of Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Sri Lanka until the European colonial period, when it began to be referred to the ‘old’ method, *boran* (Thai/Khmer). The second and third case studies stem from Myanmar. One is the contemporary Pa-Auk method of Pa-Auk Sayadaw Ven. Āciṇṇa (1934–), usually grouped under the Burmese Vipassanā methods of the modern revival. The other is the Kanni method, which takes its origins to the 19th century, and has features in common with the other two case studies.

After examining the place of Abhidhamma in each of these practice traditions, we consider the role of Abhidhamma as prescriptive or descriptive, and relate this to Robert Sharf’s discussion of the relationship between meditation master and scholar-monk. Recognising that the use of Abhidhamma

terminology to label experience may become distinctive within different traditions leads us to consider the use of *vinicchaya*, formal investigations, into such terminology in Myanmar from the colonial period to the present day. We then consider why Abhidhamma has remained so significant to Burmese practitioners even while its use in relation to meditation has fallen away or even disappeared elsewhere.

A Summary of the Theravāda Path of Transformation

In this section we summarise the overall path of transformation to be realised according to Theravāda. This summary provides the basis for a more detailed consideration of how this is explained in Abhidhamma, and provides us with a framework for examining how our case studies, three different meditation traditions, approach meditative transformation in relation to Abhidhamma.

The ultimate aim of Buddhist meditation is to achieve radically transformative insights into reality in order to ‘see and understand the way things are’ (*yathā-bhūta-ñāṇa-dassana*). These insights relate to understanding the interdependent conditioning factors—physical, psychological, environmental, etc.—of our experience. This interdependence is captured in the core doctrine of the three fundamental characteristics (*ti-lakkhaṇa*), of all phenomena, namely ‘impermanence’ (*anicca*), ‘suffering/insecurity’ (*dukkha*), and ‘no-self’ (*anattā*). Various expressions of how these relate to our lived experience are found, such as the analysis of individuality into mentality and materiality’ (*nāma-rūpa*) or further into the five impermanent, interconnected aggregates (*khandha*), of causality into the twelve chains of ‘interdependent origination’ (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) and of interdependent conditionality into the components, *dhammas*, and types of conditioning interactions *paccaya*, that shape causality. This last analysis typifies the more extensive Abhidhamma approach. Abhidhamma categorises the components of reality, *dhamma*, into four kinds: *rūpa*, materiality; *citta*, states of consciousness; *cetasika*, aspects of consciousness; and *nibbāna*, enlightenment. Insights into the *ti-lakkhaṇa* and interdependence bring about a deep change in the nature, character, and perception of a person. This change entails abandoning unskillful mental states and acquiring ‘noble’ (*ariya*) positive or ‘beautiful’ (*sobhana*) mental states (*citta* and attendant *cetasika*), culminating in the realisation of the truth of *anattā*, and the attainment of liberation (*nibbāna*).

Through this transformation, one ceases to be an ‘ordinary person’ (*puṭhujjana*), stuck in the endless cycle of death and rebirth (*saṃsāra*), and enters the ‘noble path’ (*ariya-magga*). Theravāda analyses these supramundane states into four progressive stages. The ‘stream-enterer’ (*sotāpanna*) has gained a first glimpse of *nibbāna* and abandoned the first three of ten ‘fetters’ (*saṃyojana*). These are ‘view of individuality,’ or identification with one’s current embodiment (*sakkāya-diṭṭhi*), ‘doubt’ (*vicikicchā*), and ‘clinging to precepts and vows’ (*sīla-bbata-parāmāsa*). By abandoning the first three fetters and permanently weakening the next two fetters, ‘sensual desire’

(*kāma-rāga*) and ‘ill-will’ (*byāpāda*), one becomes the ‘once-returner’ (*sakadāgāmi*), who will be reborn as a human being no more than once. The third stage is the ‘non-returner’ (*anāgāmi*), who has completely abandoned the first five fetters. The non-returner is so called because they are not to be reborn in the sense-desire realm, as a human or lower god, but may be reborn once or more within five pure abodes, realms corresponding to the fourth *jhāna*, and will gain final awakening there. The five remaining fetters are ‘attachment to the form realm’ (*rūpa-rāga*), ‘attachment to the formless realm’ (*arūpa-rāga*), ‘conceit’ (*māna*), ‘restlessness’ (*uddhacca*) and ‘spiritual ignorance’ (*avijjā*). By abandoning these five one becomes an arhat, bringing all rebirths in *saṃsāra* to an end.

This information is recorded in the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* and the commentaries and handbooks that have developed from it. The most well-known of the handbooks is the *Visuddhimagga*, the post-canonical compendium of the path attributed to the fifth-century Indian commentator Buddhaghosa, influential because of its clear and systematic presentation of meditation. While giving descriptions of how to do meditation, the *Visuddhimagga* also explains experience and attainments within an Abhidhamma framework.

The Path According to the *Visuddhimagga*

This section gives an overview of how the path of transformation outlined above is broken down into stages of ‘purification’, *visuddhi*, in the *Visuddhimagga*. This provides a reference point for our later examination of different lineages of Theravāda practice and allows us to begin to see how practitioners have used the Abhidhamma contents of the *Visuddhimagga* to develop and understand their practice.

The *Visuddhimagga* is divided into three sections, the first on correct behaviour or conduct (*sīla*), the second on concentration or meditation technique (*samādhi*), and the third on liberating insight (*paññā*). The *Visuddhimagga*’s path of meditation consists of seven stages of ‘purification’ (*visuddhi*). They are: (1) ‘purification of conduct’ (*sīla-visuddhi*); (2) ‘purification of mind’ (*citta-visuddhi*); (3) ‘purification of view’ (*ditṭhi-visuddhi*); (4) ‘purification by overcoming doubt’ (*kankhāvitarāṇa-visuddhi*); (5) ‘purification by knowledge and vision of what is and what is not the path’ (*maggāmaggañāṇa-dassana-visuddhi*); (6) ‘purification by knowledge and vision of the way’ (*patipadāñāṇa-dassana-visuddhi*); and (7) ‘purification by supramundane knowledge and vision’ (*ñāṇadassana-visuddhi*).

The first two levels of ‘purification’, i.e., *sīla-visuddhi* and *citta-visuddhi*, correspond to the *Sīla* and *Samādhi* sections of the *Visuddhimagga* respectively. The *Paññā* section encompasses the remaining five levels of purification, *visuddhi*. The *Paññā* section relates its five *visuddhi* to a scheme of sixteen ‘insight knowledges’ (*vipassanāñāṇa*) attained as one makes progress (see Figure 1). For example, when the practitioner reaches *visuddhi* 3, purification


of view (*diṭṭhi-visuddhi*), this corresponds with them attaining the first insight knowledge, ‘knowledge of analysing mentality and materiality’ (*nāmarūpa-pariccheda-ñāṇa*). This understanding that there is only mentality (*nāma*) and materiality (*rūpa*) results from a detailed analysis of them (Ñāṇamoli 1999: 616). The final two *visuddhi* correspond to intense, radical changes in the level of insight. It is at these higher stages of *visuddhi* that most of the sixteen insight knowledges are attained. These sixteen insights are progressive stages of ‘seeing and understanding the way things are’ (*yathā-bhūta-ñāṇa-dassana*), which become more and more refined as one progresses along the path.

Now let us see how the *Visuddhimagga* relates these attainments to practice. The first section on *Sīla*, appropriate conduct, begins the process of eliminating unskilful mental states. The second section, on *Samādhi*, explains forty objects of meditation that Buddhaghosa considered to further eliminate unskilful mental states and lead primarily, but not exclusively, to different levels of *samatha*, ‘tranquillity’ or ‘calm.’ The *Visuddhimagga*’s *Samādhi* section provides instructions with explanations and discussions to develop tranquillity based on *Abhidhamma* and other sources of knowledge, including medical knowledge of the time. *Samatha* outcomes enhance the strength and receptiveness of the mind, while *vipassanā* refers to different levels of transformative insight, the subject of the *Visuddhimagga*’s *Paññā* section. We will return to the distinction between *samatha* and *vipassanā* in the next section. Breath as a meditation object, although it is contained in the *Samādhi* section, relates to both *samatha* and *vipassanā* practice, and we will see its application to both outcomes in our case studies.

The *Paññā* section is dedicated to practices aimed at the higher levels of transformative liberation based on insight into ultimate reality. One could read this section as a listing of the categories of ultimate reality, which lends itself to the interpretation of *Abhidhamma* as scholastic. Alternatively, one can see this as a description of what the practitioner may experience at the advanced stages of meditation. For example, the *Visuddhimagga* account was used to explain, after the event, the advanced experience of the modern Burmese practitioner Theinngu Sayadaw Ven. Ukkaṭṭha (1913-1973), who had very limited education. His experiences were interpreted to mean that he had realised the ‘knowledge of arising and passing way’ (*udayabbayañāṇa*), the fourth insight knowledge, which is the second stage within the fifth *visuddhi* (Kyaw 2019: 15-16). In contrast to this descriptive reading of the *Paññā* section, some meditation traditions in Myanmar, such as the Mahāsī and Pa-Auk traditions,² the former being emblematic of the Burmese *Vipassanā* movement, use it as a set of prescriptive instructions for *vipassanā* practice. This prescriptive application of the *Visuddhimagga*’s meditation system in the Pa-Auk tradition is visually represented in Figure (1).³ We will look at the Pa-Auk tradition in more detail as one of our case studies below.

Figure (1): Diagram of how the *Visuddhimagga's* meditation system is adapted and applied in the Burmese Pa-Auk tradition

THE NOBLE EIGHTFOLD PATH LEADING TO THE CESSATION OF SUFFERING, NIBBĀNA⁴



Samatha and *Vipassanā* in Practice

Looking at its distinction between *samatha* and *vipassanā* in terms of meditation practice and experience will allow us to begin to explore some of the phenomena experienced in meditation and the Abhidhamma analysis of what is happening during such experiences. We can also begin to see how living practice traditions take up these distinctions into the methods they teach.

Samatha meditation in general involves (1) choosing a meditation object such as the breath, (2) placing the mind on the object and staying with it, and (3) being mindful of it. The gross meditation object at the beginning is termed the ‘preparatory sign’ (*parikamma-nimitta*). Concentration (*samādhi*) is developed, with mindfulness (*sati*) as an adjunct quality. The practitioner becomes increasingly aware of the subtle, tranquil states of the mind which arise from deep *samādhi*. Buddhaghosa describes three levels of *samādhi*, i.e. ‘momentary concentration’ (*khaṇika-samādhi*), ‘access concentration’ (*upacāra-samādhi*) and ‘absorption concentration’ (*appanā-samādhi*) (Ñāṇamoli 1999: 142). With *samatha*, a meditator develops *samādhi* in relation to all three, while a *vipassanā* practitioner may develop only the first, which arises when one internally settles, unifies and concentrates one’s mind (Ñāṇamoli 1999: 792). As *samādhi* and *sati* strengthen, there arises the ‘acquired sign’ (*uggaha-nimitta*), a mental image, which appears initially as a patch of grey light or other forms. It then turns into the ‘counterpart sign’ (*paṭibhāga-nimitta*), which appears as a brighter, clearer form. Unskilful mental factors, known as the five ‘hindrances’ (*nīvaraṇa*) for the way in which they act as obstacles to progress, are suspended at this stage. As soon as the counterpart sign arises, the mind becomes concentrated in access concentration, *upacāra-samādhi* (Ñāṇamoli 1999: 125). Access concentration precedes *jhāna*, ‘meditative absorption,’ a term given to increasingly subtle states of consciousness.⁵ In access concentration, the mind is accompanied by skilful mental factors (*cetasika*), known as the five *jhāna* factors, namely ‘thinking’ (*vitakka*), ‘examining’ (*vicāra*), ‘joy’ (*pīti*), ‘happiness’ (*sukha*), and ‘unification’ (*ekaggatā*), although they are still weak at this stage. Once they are strong, the mind enters into a state of absorption concentration, a proper *jhāna*.

A *vipassanā* practitioner pays attention to each passing sensory or mental object, rather than focusing on a single object. One mindfully observes the nature and characteristics of the current bodily and mental experiences. One contemplates them constantly arising and falling away, and analyses them to be unsatisfactory and impersonal processes. *Vipassanā* meditation often emphasises the use of a high degree *sati*, mindfulness. Other mental qualities such as *samādhi*, concentration, and *virīya*, energy, are also important to some degree. However, in the Buddhist revival in response to colonial in 19th–20th century, we see the development of what has come to be known as ‘dry *vipassanā*.’ This involves pursuing *vipassanā* without the deliberate development of *jhāna* to prepare the capacity of the mind. Even access

concentration is seen as unnecessary for awakening. Rather, momentary concentration is seen as sufficient. This dry *vipassanā* is taught in the influential Mahāsī method developed by the Mahāsī Sayadaw U Sobhana (1904–1982) (Mahāsī Sayadaw 2016: 46–49).

As noted above, mindfulness of breath (*ānāpānasati*) is both a *samatha* and *vipassanā* practice. As a *samatha* practice, one focuses on the in-breath and out-breath. Using *sati* and the breath as an anchor, one develops and establishes concentration to the extent that one might develop different levels of *jhāna*. As a *vipassanā* practice, the practitioner may take the breath as one's 'home', which means that one's primary meditation object is the breath. However, one's mind does not remain solely on the breath because one observes the various bodily and mental experiences as they arise. As one always returns to one's home, the practitioner returns to the breath after other objects have been observed and noted. *Sati* here is very important because the mind has to multitask, and with *sati* the mind does 'not float away' but remembers to return to the breath (Gethin 2011: 171; Kyaw 2019: 259). Taking the breath as a home-base also has a calming effect as *samādhi* increases. The practitioner then moves on to observation and investigation of more subtle states of mentality and materiality to see and understand the way things are (*yathā-bhūta-nāṇa-dassana*), the liberating insight that is the ultimate goal of the practice.

Case Studies of the Relationship between Abhidhamma and Meditation

To illustrate the relationship between Abhidhamma and meditation training, we will now provide case studies of three traditions, each of which uses Abhidhamma in a different way. We will also use these case studies to look most closely at some aspects of meditation already mentioned, such as the steps involved in the practice in each tradition, the relationship between *samatha* and *vipassanā*, how the practitioner makes progress from *samatha* to *vipassanā*, how 'signs' (*nimitta*) are understood, and how the Abhidhamma analysis of consciousness and materiality is used to guide practice.

Boran/yogāvacara meditation and its relationship to Abhidhamma

The first case study is *boran* 'old' (Thai/Khmer) or *yogāvacara* 'practitioner' meditation, a network of related practices found in Cambodia, Laos, Sri Lanka and Thailand between the 16th and late 19th to early 20th centuries, at which point it began to disappear, a subject we have explored elsewhere.⁶ To begin *boran* practice one induces the visual image, such as bright lights or signs (*nimitta*), sometimes described within this tradition as a gem or sphere of light. The *nimitta* may or may not contain an image of a Buddha and may also appear in the form of, or be represented by, Pāli syllables. To induce the first *nimitta* one focuses on the breath and a phrase such as *a-ra-haṃ*, recited with the three stages of the breath (in, out and resting), with eyes closed or slightly open, and allows the *nimitta* to arise spontaneously. Alternatively, one actively visualises the gem-like light (Crosby 2020: chapter

2). The light or *nimitta* usually appears in front of one, in the mind's eye. From there, one draws it into the nostril then through intermediary bases down to a point near the navel.

We noted above the significance accorded to *nimitta* in the *Visuddhimagga*. They are widely recognised by meditators particularly in relation to *jhāna* experience and given various interpretations, such as being a representation of the *bhavaṅga-citta*, the resting moments of consciousness, or as translucent materiality (below). In *boran* practice *nimitta* are treated as helpful diagnostics of meditative attainments and as useful catalysts of change. Specifically, the *nimitta* represent the relevant *citta* and *cetasika* attained in meditation.

After being drawn down to the navel, first singly, then in combinations of multiple *nimitta*, the *nimitta* are repeatedly moved around the body, especially between the navel and the heart. This movement in different patterns, beginning with a simple sequence in forward order (*anuloma*) and reverse order (*paṭiloma*). The practitioner is instructed to combine the *nimitta* with the five physical elements that make up 'materiality' (*rūpa*). These are earth, water, fire, wind, and space. The aim is that the practitioner's *rūpa* is transformed by the increasingly purified *citta* and their associated *cetasika* at every stage.

The emphasis on *nimitta* in *boran* practice had contributed to it being dismissed by late 19th–20th century reformers and scholars as an unorthodox practice (see Crosby 2020, Chapter 1), but on closer inspection we find it presents a detailed method aimed at guiding the practitioner through the different levels of the beautiful mental states, *sobhana cetasika* and *citta*, to arhatship. In other words, it follows the *Abhidhamma* framework. What makes *boran* practice different is that it also takes seriously the idea that the practitioner is physically changed by their progress on the path. It seeks to change the practitioner's *rūpa*, as well as their *nāma*.

We can see the detailed relationship between *boran* practice and *Abhidhamma* in manuals compiled by monks in 18th century Sri Lanka, who studied under meditation masters from Siam (Thailand) as part of the project to revive Buddhism on the island. Knowing that their teachers would return to Siam, they recorded the advanced stages of these practices, which guide the practitioner through a lengthy sequence of step-by-step processes aimed to transform the ordinary person (*puṭhujjana*) to *arhat*. The manuals indicate that the *nimitta* induced in meditation – and later other experiences 'without signs' (*a-nimitta*) – are understood to represent the changes in consciousness. For example, in the attainment of the first *jhāna*, one experiences joy (*pīti*) which in the commentarial period is analysed into five levels or types of *pīti*. For each of these five *pīti*, *boran* manuals identify an accompanying *nimitta*, usually consisting of a light with specific colours, tones and textures, sometimes with additional physical sensations. We noted the arising of *nimitta* with the strengthening of *sati* and *samādhi* above.

The special qualities of the strongest *nimitta*, the *paṭibhāga-nimitta*, is explained by Buddhaghosa in his *Visuddhimagga*; it is regarded as a purified essence derived from the meditation topic, and is associated with the attainment of ‘access concentration’, *upacāra-samādhi*, precursor to the first *jhāna* state. *Boran* practice takes the use of *nimitta* much further. After attaining first *upacāra-samādhi* and then the full absorption *appanā-samādhi*, ‘absorption concentration’, the practitioner breaks down the state of *jhāna*, which is a state of consciousness (*citta*), in more detail. *Boran* practice regards each *nimitta* as marking the correct attainment of the individual ‘mental concomitants’ (*cetasika*) that are associated with that moment of *citta*. The *boran* sequence breaks down the path into the *citta* and *cetasika* that one develops as one makes progress on the path. At the early stages these are the skilful (*kusala*) and resultant (*vipāka*) states of consciousness. At the highest stage, the level of *arhat*, these are the functional (*kiriya*) states of consciousness that have no karmic consequences and so do not bind one into continued *samsāra*. In *boran* practice the practitioner progresses through all these, broken down into their *cetasika* components, each substituted in turn.

Progress through these stages is also found in the *Visuddhimagga* and meditation on the *cetasika* is found in the Pa-Auk tradition (below), which follows the *Visuddhimagga* closely. What is different in *boran* practice is the combining of the *citta* and *cetasika* with the material aspects of the body (*rūpa*). The relationship between consciousness and materiality is further applied to healing and protective practices such as the creation of protective diagrams (*yantra*), including tattoos. In healing, the movement of the *nimitta* is extended to places in one’s own or the patient’s body, in order to clarify the humour imbalances underlying sickness (Skilton and Choompolpaisal 2017). The breaking down of five *pīti* is a distinctive feature of *boran* practice and usually constitutes the first section of the first main practice, after a number of preliminaries. To some extent they appear to have become ritualised. For example, in Cambodia, the five *pīti* are associated with other symbolic sets of five, such as five important sets of relatives (mother, father, etc.) that one honours in the early stages of practice, yet their attainment is still diagnosed by the teacher in relation to the *nimitta* reported by the practitioner.

As has been demonstrated elsewhere (Crosby 2013, 2020), the *boran* methods used to internalise the *citta* and *cetasika* are drawn from techniques used to bring about change in other technologies such as traditional medicine, obstetrics and chemistry. Yet the path these methods seek to enact is recognisably that of early commentarial Abhidhamma (Crosby 2019: 138–142). It should be noted that in Cambodia and Thailand, where *boran* had been popular and widespread, reforms of Buddhism from the 19th century onwards led to a marginalisation of Abhidhamma, in contrast to the situation in Myanmar. A lack of familiarity with Abhidhamma and with the related physical sciences, as Western alternatives became hegemonic, contributed to the lack of recognition of *boran* practice as genuine Theravāda. The esoteric transmission of the more advanced stages also contributed to this lack of

recognition. Its relationship to Abhidhamma is one of enactment. *Boran* meditation uses Abhidhamma, particularly its analysis of the *dhmma* and causal conditions at each stage of progress on the path, as a guide to follow, and identifies the experiences of meditation practitioners in relation to those stages.

The Burmese Pa-Auk tradition and its use of Abhidhamma

We shall now turn to two living Burmese traditions. As we shall see, while Burmese practices are generally characterised as *vipassanā*, many employ *samatha* to some extent. First let us examine Pa-Auk practice, named after the meditation method taught by Pa-Auk Tawya Sayadaw Ven. Āciṇṇa (b.1934), the abbot of Pa-Auk Forest Monastery, near Mawlamyine in Mon State.

As shown in Figure (1), the Pa-Auk meditation tradition closely follows the system found in the *Visuddhimagga*, starting with *sīla*, developing *samādhi*, and progressing to *paññā* that consists of the sixteen insight knowledges (*vipassanāñāṇa*). Trying to understand the shift from *samatha* to *vipassanā* on the basis of the *Visuddhimagga* alone is challenging because of a lack of detail therein. In contrast, the Pa-Auk system breaks down the levels of *vipassanā* and what one actually sees at each stage into much finer detail. It uses the more detailed analyses of the *dhmmas* found in later commentarial works, such as in the *Visuddhimagga-mahāṭīkā* of Dhammapāla (c. 9–11th century) and the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* of Anuruddha (c. 11th–12th century). For example, the Pa-Auk tradition, when developing insight into mentality and materiality (*nāma* and *rūpa*), used the Abhidhamma correlation of the term materiality (*rūpa*) as the twenty-eight types of *rūpa*, and mentality (*nāma*) as the eighty-nine types of *cittas* and the fifty-two *cetasikas*, as found in the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*. When practising *vipassanā*, the practitioner is instructed to observe fine material particles called *kalāpa*. The term *kalāpa* literally means ‘cluster’ or ‘group’, and in these later texts refers to a cluster of qualities, forming a basic unit of materiality.

The Pa-Auk practitioner begins the practice with a *samatha* subject such as the breath or coloured discs (*kasīna*). Alternatively, one starts with the meditation on the four elements that make up materiality, namely earth, water, fire and wind. While the first two types of meditation could lead up to the fourth *jhāna*, the elements meditation leads only up to access concentration, *upacāra-samādhi*, the precursor to *jhāna* (Bodhi 2000: 335; Āciṇṇa 2008: 95 and 116). Once the practitioner has attained either the fourth *jhāna* or *upacāra-samādhi*, they switch to *vipassanā* practice. Here we will look at how the Pa-Auk tradition moves the practitioner from *samatha* outcomes to realising insight, *vipassanā*.

Those following the *samatha* path (*samatha-yānika*) begin by discerning either *nāma*, namely the *citta* and *cetasika*, or *rūpa*. The discernment of *nāma* in the Pa-Auk tradition entails detailed examination of the eighty-nine types of *citta* and the fifty-two *cetasika*, according to the correlation already noted

above. Each type of *citta* has its associated *cetasikas*. The practitioner discerns not only all types of *citta*, but also every *cetasika* in each type of *citta*. In this way, one discerns all the thought processes (*vīthicitta*) that occur within oneself. Moreover, the practitioner discerns the thought processes of others by using the strong *samādhi* and *sati* that have developed at this stage. To move from *samatha* to *vipassanā*, the *samatha* practitioners emerge from the fourth *jhāna*. A *jhāna* state has its associated *cetasikas*, which includes the *jhāna* factors (above). They first examine the *jhāna* factors that are associated with the fourth *jhāna* in detail. Once all five *jhāna* factors are examined, they proceed to discern the other *cetasikas* that are associated with the *jhāna*. They then discern the remaining mentality, i.e. the remaining types of *citta* – including *akusala-cittas* – and their associated *cetasikas*, and the twenty-eight types of materiality. Alternatively, they can start discerning *rūpa*. In this case, they also need to emerge from *jhāna*, do the four-elements meditation (below), and then move to the discernment of the rest of *rūpa*. When the examination of *rūpa* is completed, they move to the discernment of *nāma*.

Those following the insight track (*vipassanā-yānika*), who therefore do not try to develop *jhāna*, start by discerning *rūpa*. Following the *Visuddhimagga* (Ñānamoli 1999: 606), the discernment of *rūpa* must begin with the four-elements meditation for both types of practitioners (Āciṇṇa 1996: 8). The option of using the four elements directly rather than attaining *jhāna* through the other *samatha* methods gives some flexibility to this system for those not predisposed to *jhāna*.

When doing the four-elements meditation, the practitioner is taught to observe each of the characteristics of each element one at a time, following the description of the four elements in the *Dhammasaṅgani*, the first book of the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*. For earth there are six characteristics, for water there are two, for fire there are two and for wind also two, giving a total of twelve characteristics for the elements. The practitioner should start with an easy characteristic, such as the nature of wind to push, then work up to other characteristics. The order of the characteristics taught in the Pa-Auk system is: pushing, hardness, roughness, heaviness, supporting, softness, smoothness, lightness, hot, cold, cohesion and flowing.

The practitioner contemplates one characteristic, then adds the others, cycling back to the beginning to ensure a thorough, iterative and cumulative absorption of the understanding of the elements. Each characteristic must be discerned in one place in the body, and then throughout the body. After completing all twelve from the easiest characteristic to the most difficult one, the practitioner then rearranges the characteristics by grouping them in terms of the type of the elements to which they belong, starting with the six characteristics of earth (hardness, roughness, heaviness, softness, smoothness, and lightness), two of water (cohesion and flowing), two of fire (hot and cold), and two of wind (supporting and pushing). This in-depth, progressive contemplation leads to access concentration, at which point lights appear, from greyish to brighter light culminating in a bright white light.

The Pa-Auk tradition interprets this bright, white light as *pasāda*, translucent materiality, where the practitioner's body appears as a translucent form, like a block of ice or glass (Āciṇṇa 2008: 122). The practitioner is then instructed to concentrate on and penetrate into the translucent form so that one can discern the *rūpa-kalāpa* in the mind's eye.

The next step in the practice is to continue with the discernment of the four elements, but this time one discerns each of the four elements in a fine cluster of *rūpa*, i.e. a *rūpa-kalāpa*. While the *Visuddhimagga* explains that one should discern all the four elements at once, the Pa-Auk method instructs the practitioner to observe one-by-one. When the practitioner is able to discern and see the four elements in the *rūpa-kalāpas*, the Pa-Auk tradition interprets this stage as the end of the *samatha* practice, and the beginning of *vipassanā* practice (Āciṇṇa 2008: 125). It is also regarded as the beginning of *diṭṭhi-visuddhi*, purification of view, i.e. the third of the seven *visuddhi* of the *Visuddhimagga*, and the first of the *visuddhi* in its *Paññā* section (see Figure 1). After this stage, the practitioner analyses each sense organ and each part of the body in terms of different types of *rūpa-kalāpa*. The insight practitioner then continues with the discernment of *nāma* using the same method as we have seen above.

To achieve the first *vipassanā* knowledge, i.e. 'knowledge of definition of mentality and materiality', *nāmarūpaparicchedañāna*, the practitioner contemplates *nāma* and *rūpa* internally—referring to those within oneself, as well as externally—referring to those in others. This in turn leads the practitioner to establish that there is no entity or person or deity apart from *nāma* and *rūpa*. One understands the truth of no-self (*anattā*) and becomes established in right view (*sammādiṭṭhi*), seeing things as they are (*yathābhūta-ñāna-dassana*). Since there are many things to examine in *vipassanā*, the Pa-Auk Sayadaw recommends that whenever tiredness occurs, the practitioner can either enter *jhāna* or use their access concentration to rest and refresh their mind (Āciṇṇa 2008: 123).

The Kanni method and its relationship to Abhidhamma

Our third study case study is the Kanni method as taught by Maung-htaung Myae Zin Sayadaw Ven. Sobhita (1920–2006). Although it comes from Myanmar, it shares features with both the methods describe above. Like Pa-Auk, and contrary to the popular understanding of Burmese practices as *vipassanā* only, it uses *samatha* practice as the starting point. The followers of this tradition trace it to a Tibetan monk called Śīlatissa, who they believe resided at a forest monastery in upper Myanmar probably in the late 19th century, though the exact dates are not known (Hlaing 2003: *da* and *da-pha*). Despite this authorisation to a Tibetan origin, as we shall see, some of the practices are similar to the *boran* methods which we can date with certainty to at least as far back as the turn of the 15th–16th centuries (Crosby 2020: 88), while the terminology reflects Theravāda Abhidhamma and not the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma so influential in Tibetan Buddhism.

In the Kanni method, the practitioners begin the practice by (1) recollection of the qualities of the Buddha for three days, (2) loving-kindness meditation for one day, and (3) meditation on foulness of the body and on death for one day. After this preparatory work, they practice mindfulness of breath, and develop *nimitta* using the breath as an anchor. They are instructed to move the *nimitta* to outside of their body, initially to nearby places such as onto the wall of the room that they are practicing in. This movement of *nimitta* is coordinated with the movement of the in-breath and out-breath. Gradually, the practitioners project *nimitta* to different geographical places such as various pagodas around Myanmar and observe them. The practitioners are then asked to access and observe different realms and features of the Buddhist cosmos.

The next step is to move the *nimitta* within the body using different patterns of movement from the top of the head to the middle of the chest, the navel and the toes of the feet in the given order and reverse order, and observe different parts of the body. The practitioners then move the *nimitta* beyond the body to include different realms of the Buddhist cosmos from the zenith to the nadir. There are eleven ways of moving *nimitta* around within the body and beyond, and for each the practitioners do it in the forward order (*anuloma*) and in the reverse (*paṭiloma*) (Kelāsa 2006: 149–150). This movement of the *nimitta* is reminiscent of the external extension of *kaṣiṇa*-derived *nimitta* in the *Visuddhimagā* as well as the *boran* movement of *nimitta* noted above.

As in the Pa-Auk tradition, after the *samatha* practice, the practitioner progresses to the *vipassanā* practice. The Kanni practitioner focuses on the *hadayavatthu*, ‘heart-base’, using it as a primary meditation object in *vipassanā* (Kelāsa 2006: 173, 176 and 200). The *hadayavatthu*, located within the physical heart, is the physical base or support for consciousness, first labelled as such in the Abhidhamma commentaries and found in all the traditions examined here (Karunadasa 2010: 79–81). In practice, focusing on the *hadayavatthu* means that the practitioner focuses first around the heart area in the middle of the chest, and gradually becomes aware of the heart and the heartbeat. By placing the practitioner’s attention on the heart, one observes the present *nāma* (*citta* and *cetasika*) and *rūpa*. In terms of the scheme of *vipassanāñāṇa*, the Pa-Auk system follows the *Visuddhimagga*’s sixteen kinds of *vipassanāñāṇa*, while practitioners in the Kanni system aim to develop the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*’s classification of the ten kinds of *vipassanāñāṇa*.⁷

Abhidhamma as a language for meditative experience

We may observe that the Abhidhamma categories of *citta*, *cetasika* and *rūpa* are significant to all three traditions, as are the specific stages of *samādhi*, *jhāna* and *vipassanā*. The meditation instructions, practice and experience of all three traditions closely correspond to the analysis of the path and of the individual found within different layers of commentarial Abhidhamma.

As seen above, the practitioner in Pa-Auk and Kanni observes and analyses materiality at the level of detail that we find described in later Abhidhamma literature. In this context, the Abhidhamma understanding of *nāma* and *rūpa* seems to become a prescription. In other words, its description of *nāma* and *rūpa* is used as the meditation object that the practitioner should observe and discern. Without practicing these methods to this level, it is hard for us to know whether this is prescription and in fact creates a kind of projection onto experience, or descriptive in providing labels for what the practitioner experiences through this method. For example, how would we recognize what a *rūpa-kalāpa* with life-faculty (*jīvitindriya*) looks like, either to discern it or to recognize it? We put this question to an experienced practitioner from the Pa-Auk tradition. He explained to us that the life-faculty can only be found in the *rūpa-kalāpas* of living beings. The meditator is therefore instructed to compare their own internal *rūpa-kalāpas* with those in the external inanimate things, a technique used when discerning *nāma*. After many attempts, the meditator may see or have a sense of a particular “liveliness” or “vitality” in their own materiality, but not in others. It usually takes about two months to discern all types of *rūpa*. Our respondent added that the meditator’s use of words and adjectives to describe such experiential reality varies because this kind of discernment falls under the domain of the individual’s subjective judgement.

This additional point suggests that Abhidhamma has both functions, to some extent prescribing the practice and the quest, but with experience explained in ordinary language being recognised as corresponding to Abhidhamma categories by the teacher. So, while for outsiders the level of detail inclines one to see this as providing a doctrinal framework which the practitioner must take on board in detail while absorbed in very focused meditation over a long period of time, it is possible that the analysis is discerned as described and only labelled in this Abhidhamma account. This then creates a common language and discourse for practitioners to make sense of their experience and for the teacher to validate the practitioner’s attainments and guide them further.

In *boran* practice, the early stages are mainly taught without explanation in order to prevent the practitioner from projecting the concepts derived from language onto their experience, so that they do not imagine seeing things. However, how practitioners manage the shift from the early stages to the full incorporation of the Abhidhamma stages documented in 18th century Sri Lanka, particularly at the *vipassanā* stage, is currently unclear from the living traditions assessed, some of which now treat the process as only applying to the *samatha* stages (Skilton and Choempolpaisal 2014: 112).

Abhidhamma and Validation of Experience

Because Abhidhamma can function as the blueprint or map for the transformative path, it can be used to assess and confirm the validity of meditators’ experiences. This can operate at two levels: (1) the verification of the meditator’s experience for their own understanding of the practice and

progress along the path, and (2) the verification of their meditative experience in their religious, social and even political relations. In relation to the second type of affirmation, Robert Sharf, drawing on modern meditation movements in Asia including the Burmese Vipassanā movement, has proposed that the rhetoric of meditative experience such as the *jhāna* states has a performative function employed in the interests of legitimation, authority and power, and that there is a symbiotic relationship between meditation masters and scholar-monks (Sharf 1995: 265, 270). For Sharf, Buddhist meditation does not “engender a specific experiential state so much as it *enacts* it” (Sharf 1995: 269, emphasis his).

There are passages in the *Sutta Nipāta*, widely regarded as the earliest section of the Pāli canon, which offer apophatic statements relating to meditation and do not describe the anticipated outcomes. However, most Theravāda texts on meditation are kataphatic, providing descriptions of what the experience and attainments should be. Sharf’s thesis should therefore apply very easily to Theravāda, in that practitioners may follow textual descriptions and refer to them to describe their experience. Indeed, the informative nature of Theravāda meditation texts supported the Buddhist revival in South and Southeast Asia in the colonial period that provided us with the wide range of Burmese *vipassanā*-oriented methods we find today. As indicated above, outsiders may assume that this is what is happening in the detailed account of *kalāpa* in the Pa-Auk method.

However, some living traditions and specific meditation teachers are explicitly silent on the experience to be attained, with teachers only affirming it after the pupil has reported relevant diagnostic information.⁸ As we have seen, in *boran* meditation, diagnostic information at the early stages relates to the *nimitta*, ‘signs’, in the form of colours and physical feelings that attend the elements of the experience, the *cetasika*. This is at one end of a very wide spectrum of attitudes to *nimitta* in meditation. In the absence of Abhidhamma expertise, or the loss of the tradition of *nimitta*-based diagnostics derived originally from Abhidhamma, *nimitta* experiences could be discounted as interesting side-effects related at best only to *samatha* rather than as indicating important stepping stones. Later stages in unreformed *boran* practice involve the incorporation of meditation experiences that are *a-nimitta*, have no physical or visual counterpart, through the same process that practised in the earlier stages with *nimitta*. While in some *boran* lineages (Choompolpaisal 2019: 153, 165–166) *nimitta* are actively visualised on the basis of description, rather than just allowed to appear in response to the technique being applied, this active visualisation, i.e. prescription rather than post-experience explanation, may make it harder to rehearse the process to be applied to experiences when there is no *nimitta*.

As noted above, in some Burmese meditation traditions, certain light qualities and physical experiences including sounds may be interpreted as relating to experience of the *bhavaṅga*. For a more advanced practitioner

to apply the terminology and analysis of Abhidhamma to the practitioner's experience can offer very important validation of being on the right path. It may also confirm as central and shared experiences that the practitioner may otherwise have assumed were irrelevant or idiosyncratic. Sharf's point does not seem to take account of subtleties of experience or validation at the personal level, which may not be anticipated by the overall discourse and instructions. Only after the experience does the practitioner recognise or even receive the labelling provided by the Abhidhamma specialist, and that labelling allows the practitioner to locate their experience both within the path of progression and in relation to the mentality, *nāma* (*citta* and *cetasika*), and materiality, *rūpa*, that make-up their psychophysical being at any given point.

Even teachers who seek to avoid concepts may inevitably end up using terminology, trying to balance guidance while avoiding pre-empting experience, to ensure the student arrives at genuine attainments through the appropriate steps rather than imagining attainments from descriptions. According to our respondent from the Pa-Auk tradition, the teacher's role in giving instruction to the meditators is not to describe in detail what specific *rūpa* or *rūpa-kalāpa* looks like, but instead to guide the meditator by providing techniques and tips for the discernment of *nāma* and *rūpa*. In Burmese meditation traditions that draw on specific texts as the basis for the practice, terminology in such guidance tends to be drawn from Abhidhamma literature.

Contrasting with this use of Abhidhamma is the language of Sunlun Sayadaw Ven. Kavi's (1878–1952) and Theinngu Sayadaw, two meditation masters with large followings in Myanmar, but whose lineages have only recently spread to the wider world (Kyaw 2019: 284). The path of these two masters began with the practice not with study, and they initially used colloquial language and non-Abhidhamma terminologies when they talked about their meditative experience and attainments. Nonetheless, even in these traditions most teachers have come to use more Abhidhamma terminology for experience and instruction, although their usage may not exactly follow definitions found in the texts. They may use certain Pāli words or Abhidhamma terms in Burmese that are derived from Pāli-loan words. For instance, when a meditator experiences intense bodily sensation in or around the heart area, or *hadayavatthu*, such experience in the Theinngu system is referred to as *bhavan-kyāt*, which literally means 'tension in *bhavaṅga*.' The *bhavaṅga-citta*, according to Abhidhamma, is the resting, passive moments of consciousness. In some *boran* traditions, the practitioner performs worship to the *cetasika* and *citta* that they hope to experience, addressing them with honorifics alongside the Abhidhamma terminology, and invites them to arise, as if they are honoured guests (Skilton and Choopolpaisal 2014: 93). We can therefore see that each meditation tradition or community uses specific Abhidhamma, or Buddhist, terms with specific meanings and nuances, developing shared language and discourse that are particular to that community (Jordt 2006).

The specific meanings of shared language and terminology among a given meditation tradition may come to be judged as deviations from the teachings and the usages found in the Pāli canon and its commentarial literature, especially Abhidhamma literature. The formal monastic ‘investigations’ (*vinicchaya*) or court cases conducted by senior monks in Myanmar illustrate this point. While such *vinicchaya* cases have a long history within the Sangha itself, the form they have taken in modern Myanmar, with state involvement and imposition of penalties including incarceration, can be traced to a series of measures introduced by Ne Win’s military government in the early 1980s (Ashin and Crosby 2017: 200–205). Seventeen *vinicchaya* cases have been tried at the national level in Myanmar since then. Of them, eleven are at least in part concerned with the authenticity and orthodoxy of meditation and specific ways in which the Dhamma has been interpreted and taught by prominent meditation teachers. Before these modern *vinicchaya* cases, in the late 1960s, there was a *vinicchaya* case that involved Theinngu Sayadaw, although the details are unrecorded (Kyaw 2019: 279–281). The *vinicchaya* court later withdrew the restrictions imposed on Theinngu Sayadaw, which had presumably delimited his teachings and *dhamma* talks.

The post 1980 national *vinicchaya* cases are recorded in some detail and published. One tried in 2005 centres specifically around “incorrect names, place names and terminology” (Janaka and Crosby 2017: 237) that are found in the *dhamma* talks given by Mogok Sayadaw Ven. Vimala (1899–1962), a prominent meditation teacher who founded the Mogok Vipassanā tradition. The prosecutor took issue with minor matters of terminology but also accused Mogok Sayadaw of offering interpretations of the Dhamma which deviated from canonical norms, in other words, as teaching false doctrine (*adhamma*). The senior monastic judges rejected the accusation of *a-dhamma*, but required the removal from Mogok *dhamma* talks and publications of the specific elements not validated in Pāli literature.

These trials reveal a number of issues that are quite specific to Burmese Buddhist society. First, the colonial threat to Buddhism’s survival that commenced in the early 19th century heightened anxieties that the Buddha’s teaching, *sāsana*, might disappear. This led Buddhists to become more protective of the *sāsana*, popularising Abhidhamma studies, and promoting the rise of Burmese Vipassanā that drew on Abhidhamma. Second, the formal, standardised monastic education that focuses exclusively on the Pāli canon and its commentaries since King Mindon’s reign (1853–1878) has shaped how monastics and laity think about the issue of validity and legitimacy. This education informed a process of informal *vinicchaya* and a burgeoning discourse debating many aspects of Buddhism within Myanmar out of concern to ensure it was the true Dhamma that they were protecting (Nagasena Bhikkhu 2012: 153–157). Third, the socio-political conditions since Independence in 1948, including the isolationist policy imposed on Myanmar by the military government until very recently, have had a profound

impact on how citizens of Myanmar relate to modernity and progress. As international relationships faltered after 1962, both the Sangha and laity of 21st century Myanmar are still seeking to address some of the same issues that pioneers such as Abhidhamma specialists Ledi Sayadaw (1846–1923), also highly influential in the development of the *vipassanā* movement, and Shwe Zan Aung (1871–1932), a civil servant under the colonial government, tried to address a century earlier.

In the context of the British rule that presented real threats to belief and ways of life, these two pioneers – among others – looked to Pāli literature and Abhidhamma thought to find Buddhist teachings both to address these dangers and to find responses to the challenges of the modern world. The *vinicchaya* system and people's close attention to Abhidhamma in validating meditation practice and experience may seem anathema to global practitioners of simplified practices such as those found under the label Mindfulness. Certainly, such globalised practices would struggle to find validation in Myanmar, divorced as they often are from the doctrinal, ethical and soteriological framework. However, just as globalised meditation has opened up new opportunities for personal transformation around the world, these measures, which may seem restrictive to outsiders, emerged in Myanmar from the process of carving out opportunities for freedom in the overlapping spheres of politics, society, religion and personal salvation.

In contrast to the affirmation of the relationship between meditation and Abhidhamma in Myanmar, the *boran* practice described here circulated in parts of the Theravāda world where Abhidhamma became de-emphasised, largely under the hegemonic influence of the Thai royal family from Mongkut (1804–1868) onwards, which pursued a different pattern of modernisation in response to colonial threat. The result was that the relationship of *boran* methods to Abhidhamma ceased to be recognised and even among some of its own practitioners it came to be regarded as providing only *samatha*-related methods. Nonetheless, when we look closely, we find a shared belief among the meditation traditions that we have surveyed here – and indeed in most meditation traditions stemming from Myanmar – that Abhidhamma is fundamental both in mapping out the path of transformation the practitioner must pursue and to understanding the meditative attainments experienced at each stage. Abhidhamma was, and still is, central to Theravāda Buddhism as a lived system of thought and an authoritative body of literature.

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Notes

- 1 See, for example, his pursuit of the development of the term *adhimukti/adhimokṣa* from early *suttas*, through Abhidharma right up to developed Yogācāra, showing how the development of the doctrinal term in relation to meditative experience in turn has a significant influence on the theory of *viññaptimātratā* Dhammajoti 2019b.
- 2 The Mahāsi and Pa-Auk meditation traditions of Myanmar have a global outreach in terms of the number of meditation centres throughout Asia and in the West. The former was established by Sayadaw U Sobhana (1904–1982), who was the founder of the Mahāsi *vipassanā* meditation tradition, and was a questioner of the Sixth Buddhist Council in 1954. He had a significant impact on the global spread of insight meditation and on the Mindfulness movement, as he taught *vipassanā* meditation to practitioners such as Sayadaw U Paṇḍita (1921–2016), Nyanaponika Thera, Joseph Goldstein (1944–) and Sharon Salzberg (1952–) who became key figures in spreading insight meditation globally. Since 1964, Pa-Auk Tawya Sayadaw Ven. Āciṇṇa, the founder of the Pa-Auk meditation tradition, practised meditation under the guidance of numerous meditation teachers including Mahāsi Sayadaw and Sayadaw U Paṇḍita of the Mahāsi method, and Kathitwaing Sayadaw Ven. Revata (1904–1965) of Kathitwaing Forest Monastery near Pegu. Since 1983, Pa-Auk Sayadaw has been teaching meditation to practitioners from Myanmar and other countries at the Pa-Auk Forest Monastery near Mawlamyine. Now, there are 40 branches and associated meditation centres within Myanmar and in other countries such as Sri Lanka, Singapore, Malaysia, China and USA.
- 3 We follow Nāṇamoli's translation of the Pāli terms, rather than that of Pa-Auk Tawya Sayadaw found in Figure (1).
- 4 With permission, the colour of the image and the font size has been modified for printing.
- 5 These hindrances are 'sensory desire' (*kāmacchanda*), 'ill-will' (*byāpāda*), 'sloth-torpor' (*thīnamiddha*), 'restlessness-worry' (*uddhacca-kukkucca*), 'doubt' (*vicikicchā*). For a description of the *jhāna* as experienced by the practitioner including how to progress in the *jhāna*, see Brasington 2015.
- 6 Both labels came to be applied to it only as it disappeared. On the hegemony of *boran* meditation between the 16th and early 20th centuries, as well as its history, practice and disappearance, see Crosby 2020. For more detail on how it relates to Abhidhamma, see Crosby 2019.
- 7 See Anālayo 2012 on various schemes of insight knowledges in different Buddhist texts.
- 8 Another question is whether informal talks or hints by fellow practitioners form an important part of the shaping of practice in such cases, and whether this may support Sharf's analysis.

The Ordination of Bhaddā Kuṇḍalakesā and the *ehibhikkhunī* in the Theravāda Textual Tradition

Bhikkhunī DHAMMADINNĀ

Introduction

This study takes up the case of Bhaddā Kuṇḍalakesā's full ordination or acceptance (*upasampadā*) into the Buddha's monastic community according to the Theravāda textual tradition, both canonical and commentarial. It is primarily a review of legal-textual sources and interpretations emic to the Theravāda canonical and commentarial corpus. Thus its aim is not to find out what actually happened, proving or disproving a historical hypothesis, as this cannot be constructed on the basis of a single textual tradition such as the Theravāda; I touch upon texts transmitted outside the Theravāda tradition only cursorily in the concluding part of the study.

It is my pleasure to dedicate my study to the venerable Bhikkhu Dhammajoti 法光, a master of the Buddhist scholastic traditions, whose work bridging canonical and commentarial scriptures has encouraged me to attempt the same in the following pages.

1. The '*ehi, Bhaddē*' verse in the *Therīgāthā* and the *Apadāna*

The *Therīgāthā* is strictly speaking the only Theravāda canonical record of Bhaddā Kuṇḍalakesā's ordination.¹ The Therī's story is also recorded in verse in the *Apadāna*, a text whose canonical status is disputed by tradition.²

In a verse attributed to her in the *Therīgāthā*, Bhaddā plainly states that the Buddha's words 'Come, Bhaddā' (*ehi, Bhaddē*) constituted her *upasampadā*. The verse reads:³

Bent on my knees, having paid homage, I made *añjali* before him.
"Come, Bhaddā", he said to me. That was my full ordination.

The ordination episode is part of Bhaddā's story as recounted in several literary sources, some of which include a multi-life biography of this female monastic disciple whom the Buddha was to declare foremost in quick penetrative insight. There are many differences between the extant versions of the narrative, differences which are not my present concern as I solely focus on the event of her ordination.⁴

Bhaddā appears to have already been a wandering mendicant, most probably a Jain, for some time before she met the Buddha.⁵ In some versions of her story, such as the one in the *Therīgāthā*, she first sought refuge with

the venerable Sāriputta, who had defeated her in debate. Sāriputta, however, had her go for refuge with the Buddha rather than with himself.⁶

The *Apadāna*, just like the *Therīgāthā*, also appears to present Bhaddā as being ordained by the Buddha's direct command.⁷ According to its account, Bhaddā had become a wandering ascetic, most probably a Jain. She had acquired fame and reputation for her quick wit, and at some point her religious fellows had encouraged her to pay a visit to the Buddhist monks, maintaining that these would be well equipped to answer her questions. Thus she was taken along to meet the Buddha himself, without a prior encounter with Sāriputta. During their first meeting the Buddha taught her the Dhamma, at which point, Bhaddā recounts:⁸

Hearing his Teaching, I purified the Dhamma-eye.


Then at the request [of me], who had understood the True Teaching,⁹ the Leader, [being asked] for the going forth and the full ordination, said "Come, Bhaddā."

At that time being fully ordained, I saw a small amount of water.

As I was washing [my] feet, discerning the passing away along with the arising, in that way I realised that all fabricated things are also like that.

At that time my mind was liberated, entirely without clinging.

The poem continues with more details concerning Bhaddā's spiritual attainments and the Buddha declaring her foremost in quick penetrative insight, as in the *Therīgāthā*, but it does not supply any additional information with regard to her monastic status or her whereabouts after the encounter with the Buddha.



55. වහා අවබෝධ වන භික්ෂුණීන් අතර අග්‍ර හඳුනා කුණ්ඩලකේසී මහ රහත් තෙරණීන් වහන්සේ

Bhaddā Kuṇḍalakesī in a popular printed album featuring portraits of the Buddha's eminent disciples in circulation in Sri Lanka (n.d., reprint 2018)

A noteworthy feature shared by the *Therīgāthā* and the *Apadāna* verse is that both have a statement with Bhaddā's proper name in the vocative, rather than the vocative of the noun *bhikkhunī* as would be expected in a verbatim record of an *ehibhikkhuni* ordination modelled on the 'ehi, bhikkhu' canonical formula for males who are ordained in this way by the Buddha. No *bhikkhus* are on record as being ordained using their personal name in this type of formula, be it in the *Theragāthā* or in the Theravāda *Vinaya*. No instances, for example, of 'ehi, Aṅgulimāla' or 'ehi, Koṇḍañña' are attested. By saying 'ehi, bhikkhu' the Buddha is shown to make what in linguistics is termed a 'performative act of speech'. That is, an utterance by means of which the speaker performs or actualises a particular act, in this case accepting the person into the *saṅgha* and reckoning him as coming into the monastic fold as a *bhikkhu*.¹⁰ This difference is quite significant.

Of course, the exceptionality of Bhaddā's case cannot, in and of itself, disprove its very occurrence, for the Buddha would have been free to ordain anyone in whichever way he saw fit. However, had her ordination been an *ehibhikkhuni* ordination, there seems to be no particular reason why the Buddha should be reported to use a different expression.

I now take a closer look at the terms *ehibhikkhu* and *ehibhikkhunī* in the Theravāda legal tradition so as to better position the formal and legal aspects of Bhaddā's declaration in her verse. I then turn to the significance of cases of *ehibhikkhus* documented in the *Theragāthās*, followed by a closer look at the formal features of this formula, which leads me to tentatively position the *ehibhikkhunī* in the history of the legal evolution of the early Buddhist monastic community according to the Theravāda tradition.

2. The *ehibhikkhu* and *ehibhikkhunī* in the Theravāda *Vinaya*

2.1 The *Mahāvagga*

According to the *Mahāvagga* account, the Buddha founded the order of *bhikkhus* by conferring the ordination upon his former companion in asceticism Koṇḍañña with an 'ehi bhikkhu' declaration: "Come [here], *bhikkhu*." At the conclusion of the Buddha's first discourse (handed down by tradition as the *Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta*) Koṇḍañña saw the Dhamma, and having thereby become the first stream-enterer in the Buddha's dispensation, he became *Aññātar Koṇḍañña, 'Koṇḍañña who has understood', and requested to be ordained. The Buddha made him a (Buddhist) *bhikkhu* by simply calling him '*bhikkhu*' and instructing him to 'come'. That is, to come (here) in communion with the Buddha both in the sense of physical proximity and figuratively. Here is an excerpt of the episode from the *Mahāvagga*:¹¹

Then the venerable *Aññātar Koṇḍañña, having seen the Dhamma, attained the Dhamma, known the Dhamma, plunged into the Dhamma, having crossed over doubt, having done away with uncertainty, having attained self-confidence, having become independent of others in

the Teacher's instruction (*sāsana*),¹² spoke thus to the Blessed One: "May I, Blessed One, receive the going forth in the Blessed One's presence, may I receive the full ordination."

"Come, *bhikkhu*" (*ehi, bhikkhu*), the Blessed One said, "well taught is the Dhamma. Practice the holy life for making a complete end of *dukkha*." Thus, this came to be this venerable one's full ordination.

Then the Blessed One exhorted [and] instructed those remaining *bhikkhus* with a discourse on the Dhamma. Then while they were being exhorted [and] instructed by the Blessed One with a discourse on the Dhamma, the dustless, stainless Dhamma-eye arose to the venerable Vappa and to the venerable Bhaddiya, [namely that] "whatever is of the nature to arise, all that is of the nature to cease."

These, having seen the Dhamma, attained the Dhamma, known the Dhamma, plunged into the Dhamma, having crossed over doubt, having done away with uncertainty, having attained self-confidence, having become independent of others in the Teacher's instruction, spoke thus to the Blessed One: "May we, venerable Sir, receive the going forth in the Blessed One's presence, may we receive the full ordination."

"Come, *bhikkhus*" (*etha, bhikkhavo*), the Blessed One said, "well taught is the Dhamma, practice the holy life for making a complete end of *dukkha*." Thus, this came to be these venerable ones' full ordination.

As a record of the first *ehibhikkhu* ordinations, this represents the textual and legal prototype, as it were, for this type of procedure. There are altogether eleven occurrences of the formula '*ehi, bhikkhu*' for a single monk or '*etha, bhikkhavo*' for a pair or a group of monks in the *Vinaya*, all of which are found in the *Mahāvagga*.¹³ The '*etha, bhikkhavo*' occurrences in the *Mahāvagga* all feature the 'Western' (probably later) vocative ending *bhikkhavo* rather than the 'Eastern' (probably earlier) *bhikkhave*. This either reflects later editorial standardisation or a relatively early application, in oral context, of a by then already consistently standardised narrative module.¹⁴

2.2 The *Suttavibhaṅga*

Proceeding from the history of the development of the early *saṅgha* collected in the *Mahāvagga* to the monastic rules in the *Suttavibhaṅga*, the *ehibhikkhu* is included here in what may be termed a descriptive definition of a *bhikkhu* in the context of the Word Commentary (*padabhājanīya*) on the first *pārājika* offence for *bhikkhus*, which gives the functional definition of what the *Vinaya* means by the term *bhikkhu*. In this context the term or notion of '*bhikkhu*' is illustrated in various ways, for the purpose of determining to whom the rules for *bhikkhus* are applicable, who is to be identified as a properly ordained co-monastic, etc. The *ehibhikkhu* is the sixth case itemised in the definition:¹⁵

A '*bhikkhu*' [means]: ... [6] a *bhikkhu* [because of having been ordained by the address] 'come [here], *bhikkhu*'.

In contrast to the relatively numerous cases of *ehibhikkhus* ordained as individuals, as a pair or as a group, no individual woman or group of women is on record in the Theravāda *Vinaya* as having been admitted into the *saṅgha* in this way. That is to say, apart from the witness of Bhaddā's verses in the *Therīgāthā* and in the *Apadāna*, no historical *ehibhikkhunī* is known in Theravāda sources, either canonical or commentarial.¹⁶

The Theravāda *Vinaya* does, however, recognise the *ehibhikkhuni* formula as a legal form of female ordination in that it includes it in the context of the definition of a *bhikkhunī* in the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga*. This definition is found in the Word Commentary on the fifth *pārājika* rule for *bhikkhunīs*. Being the first of the rules that *bhikkhunīs* do not have in common with the *bhikkhus* and thus placed at the outset of the received text of the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga*, the exposition of this rule specifically calls for spelling out the functional definition of what the *Vinaya* means by '*bhikkhunī*'. It does so in the same way as the *Bhikkhu-Vibhaṅga* quoted above defines a *bhikkhu* in the context of the Word Commentary to the first *pārājika* for *bhikkhus*. In parallel with the *Bhikkhu-vibhaṅga* list, on which it depends, the *ehibhikkhunī* occupies the sixth position:¹⁷

A '*bhikkhunī*' [means]: ... [6] a *bhikkhunī* [because of having been ordained by the address] 'come [here], *bhikkhunī*.'

The parallel placement did not go unnoticed by the commentarial tradition, as will be seen in section 6.1.2 below.

3. Records of *ehibhikkhus* in the *Theragāthā*

The *Theragāthā* contains three cases of *ehi*-type ordinations: that of Bhadda Thera, that of Sunīta Thera, and that of the well-known Aṅgulimāla Thera. In contrast to the third-person, standardised narrative of the *Mahāvagga*, the *Theragāthā*'s (and *Therīgāthā*'s) verses are shown as spoken personally by their respective protagonists.

Bhadda tells the story of how he was an only child, loved by his parents, who had conceived him with difficulty by resorting to prayers and petitions. Seeking his welfare, they had taken the child to the Buddha, offering him as an attendant. Bhadda was seven years old at that time. The Teacher, having accepted him (*paṭiggayha*), ordered Ānanda to quickly give him the going forth (*pabbājehi*), for Bhadda would be a thoroughbred. "After he, the Teacher, had sent me forth (*pabbājetvāna*), the Conqueror entered his dwelling", the *bhikkhu* Bhadda reports, and before the sunset his mind was fully liberated. When the Buddha came out from seclusion, "He said: 'Come, Bhadda': that was my *upasampadā*. At seven years old I received the *upasampadā*."¹⁸

Bhadda's verse is almost identical to the verse attributed to Bhaddā. The content of this shared verse is a good example of the numerous floating verse and modules in the *Theragāthā* and *Therīgāthā*.¹⁹ This suggests the possibility

that the verse attributed to the male Bhadda might have been adapted to the feminine formulation for Bhaddā. This could well have happened without the *Therīgāthā* transmitters realising the legal implications of the formula.

In the case of Sunīta, born of a humble family and despised by many, the phrasing is again almost identical to that of Bhaddā, the main exception being that *bhikkhu* is used instead of the proper name, which conforms with the same formal feature of *ehi*-type ordinations recorded in the *Mahāvagga*.²⁰

Lastly, Aṅgulimāla is shown as asking for the going forth, with the Buddha saying *ehi bhikkhu*, which was considered his monkhood (*bhikkhubhāva*).²¹ Aṅgulimāla's verses have a parallel in the *Aṅgulimāla-sutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya*.²²

In summary, in the *Theragāthā* and the *Therīgāthā* there are four apparent instances of the *ehi* ordination in total. In two of these occurrences the title *bhikkhu* is used, and in the other two proper names (Bhadda and Bhaddā) are used. Out of the two occurrences employing proper names, not only Bhaddā's but also Bhadda's case remains ambivalent and eludes a stringent legal reading. It cannot be conclusively stated whether Bhadda's case counts as a legally significant example of a proper name used in the case of an *ehibhikkhu* ordination. Here the Buddha asks Ānanda to give the seven-year old boy the *pabbajjā* and, a few hours later, the young Bhadda affirms to have received his *upasampadā* from the Buddha. If the verse were to be read in legal terms, this would imply that the ordination occurred at an early time when even men under twenty years from conception in the mother's womb, such as the boy Bhadda, could receive the higher ordination (and not just *sāmaṇera*'s *pabbajjā* as per the later regulation). Moreover, it is unclear whether the verse implies a formal separation between *pabbajjā* and *upasampadā* procedures (as per the later standard formulation) or the time lapse is a simple reflection of the circumstance that Bhadda obtained the *upasampadā* after his attainment of arhatship within hours of his *pabbajjā*, when in the evening the Buddha emerged from seclusion.

4. A closer look at the *ehi*-type statements

Coming back to the Theravāda *Vinaya*, the prototype furnished by the ordination of Koṇḍañña and his companions in the passage excerpted in section 2.2 above illustrates three key factors that appear in each and every case of *ehi*-type ordination in the *Mahāvagga*. These are:

1. In all of these instances the personal names of the protagonists are not expressed – including, for example, those of Kolita and Upatissa, later to be known as the venerables Mahāmoggallāna and Sāriputta, the two chief disciples of the Buddha, who were also ordained as a pair, with the words '*etha, bhikkhavo*'. (Thus the sole exception of a monk ordained by using his name would be the doubtful case of the monk Bhadda in the *Theragāthā*.)

2. All occurrences refer to males, and never to *abhikkhunī* or a group of *bhikkhunīs*. (The sole exception would be Bhaddā’s case or, at least, presumed case; I return to give a closer look at this gender divide in the following pages.)
3. The *ehi*-utterance is always followed by the exhortation *svākkhāto dhammo, cara/caratha brahmacariyaṃ sammā dukkhassa antakiriyaṃ*, “the Dhamma has been well expounded; you should practise the holy life in order to make a complete end of *dukkha*.” Thus the *ehi*-ordination in the *Mahāvagga* does not merely consist of the sentence ‘*ehi, bhikkhu*’ – or, if there were several monks, ‘*etha, bhikkhavo*’ – but includes the exhortation to live the holy life up to the attainment of the final goal of the eradication of *dukkha*.²³ (This exhortation is not found in the *Therīgāthā* and *Therīgāthā* verses, but only in prose in the *Vinaya*.)

As observed by a contemporary Thai Theravāda scholar, Phra Payutto (b. 1938) (2016 [2013]: 234), there are canonical uses of *ehi* unrelated to legal contexts.²⁴ A few examples of this are when one of Ānanda’s disciples challenges one of Anuruddha’s disciples, by saying “Come, monk (*bhikkhu*), who can speak more? Who can speak better? Who can speak longer?”²⁵ or when *ehi* is used as an invitation in the phrase “Come, monk, here is a seat, please be seated.”²⁶ The use of *ehi* in the Pali Canon when sending someone to some place – going over there, rather than coming here – was already singled out by Ludwig Alsdorf (1967: 316–318). An instance of the structure of the phrases in question is the following:²⁷

You go [there], monk (*bhikkhu*), and speak to [that] monk (*bhikkhu*)
in my name.

Now, returning to Bhaddā’s verse in the light of these formal observations, the following points become apparent:

1. On close reading, Bhaddā’s statement in the *Therīgāthā* cited above does not record an *ehibhikkhuni* injunction as such, in that the second person singular *ehi* (imperative of *eti*, ‘come’, ‘come here’, ‘come near’, but also ‘go’, ‘go near’, ‘approach’) is followed by Bhaddā’s name in the vocative, rather than by the title *bhikkhunī* (also in the vocative) as in ‘*ehi, bhikkhuni*’.²⁸
2. Bhaddā’s statement does not conform to the usual pattern found in scriptural prose passages to the effect that the Dhamma has been well-expounded and the holy life should be practised.²⁹
3. It is Bhaddā herself who makes known her ordained state in that she states that “this [utterance] was my full ordination” (*sā me ās’ ūpasampadā tī*, Thī 109) or, in the *Apadāna* parallel, “I was then fully ordained” (*tad āhaṃ ūpasampanā*, Ap XXI.44).

What to make of this discrepancy in wording between the *Vinaya* module and the verse? A verse needs to meet the metrical requirements, which might perhaps explain why *Bhadde*, rather than *bhikkhuni*, is used. On the other

hand, it would be easy to make a metrical version of the same: *ehi, bhikkhuni avaca* in lieu of *ehi, Bhadde ti maṃ avaca*, with *maṃ* and *ti* being redundant, or could be considered so, in verse. In fact, shortening for metrical reasons does not usually involve a shift from *bhikkhu/bhikkhuni* to a proper name. More importantly, the concern of a poetic account is not strictly with legalities and therefore such a difference vis-à-vis the standard narrative formula for the *ehi*-type ordination should not be overinterpreted.³⁰

Combined with the fact that here we do not find *ehi* plus *bhikkhuni*, but *ehi* followed by Bhaddā's proper name, and that the usual exhortation after which the ordination is considered accomplished by stating "and that became the *upasampadā* of that venerable one" (*sā va tassa āyasmato upasampadā ahoṣi*) is not recorded, a motion-to injunction like 'Go, Bhaddā' in line with the usage highlighted by Alsdorf (1967: 316–318) as found in other canonical contexts, cannot be ruled out. Such a scenario would fit well with the fact that, according to the *Therīgāthā* Commentary to be discussed below, she then goes to the nunnery to receive the going forth and the ordination there (although of course the canonical and commentarial layers need to be kept clearly distinct). Yet this need not imply that the *ehi*-type of ordination as a whole is a later textual invention as such, as surmised by Alsdorf (1967: 316–317).³¹

Interestingly, such a usage is also documented in the Mūlasarvāstivāda textual tradition, in which the imperative *gaccha*, 'go', followed by the vocative of the person's name or of her title, for instance 'young lady', is attested in accounts of ordinations or of apparent ordinations that, from a typological perspective, show close affinity with the *ehi*-ordination, in that they are also conferred by the Buddha. On closer inspection, however, some of these accounts, which I discuss in section 9 below, are perhaps more correctly understood as expressing a form of reception into the *saṅgha* by the Buddha together with a command to receive the ordination according to the usual procedure for nuns. These accounts pertain to textual layers overall later than the *Therīgāthā* but roughly belong to the same Middle-Period scriptural horizon of the Pali commentarial narratives.

To summarise up to this point, the main point of contention is whether the Buddha's injunction '*ehi, Bhadde*' – come [here], Bhaddā – did actually constitute Bhaddā's *upasampadā* and, if so, whether her own poetic assertion that that was indeed her *upasampadā* really does need to be at all reconciled with the story that the Buddha sent her to the nunnery to receive the going forth and full ordination there. Whereas the verses in the *Therīgāthā* and the *Apadāna* taken on their own terms and at face value simply imply that Bhaddā's full ordination took place as an '*ehibhadde*', if not as an '*ehibhikkhuni*', the Buddha's utterance does not correspond with that on record in the *Vinaya* for the *ehibhikkhu* ordinations. In the two works in verse there is no further description of her monastic career in terms of ordination or going to a nunnery, with the spotlight being on her spiritual career and attainments. The use of

Bhaddā's personal name rather than the designation '*bhikkhunī*', together with the use of *ehi* in different cases highlighted by Alsdorf (1967: 316–318) and Phra Payutto (2016 [2013]: 234), may argue against interpreting the use of the imperative followed by Bhaddā's proper name as a form of ordination. These indications stand in contrast to the prevalent modern perceptions of Bhaddā's ordination, and are in line with the position taken by classical Theravāda scholarship, as will be seen in the next sections of this study.

From a broader methodological point of view, I find that the 'come' or 'go' ambivalence and the various textual issues that I have surveyed so far throw into relief two main aspects. One is the subtlety of the legal exegesis involved in a proper understanding of these procedures. The second is the critical need to take into account the ongoing adjustment and standardisation of the texts – legal formulas, verse attribution, etc. – up to their final redactional closure. This process might well have been responsible for a re-framing of earlier accounts in light of the later developed, standardised *Vinaya* framework. In this light, I do wonder whether the very need to interpret or label Bhaddā as a proper so-called *ehibhikkhunī*, and to subject her verse to legal hermeneutics, might ultimately pertain to this later, more systematic frame of reference.

5. *Ehibhikkhunī* ordination and the early legal history of the *saṅgha*

In relation to Bhaddā's verse and the occurrence of the *ehibhikkhunī* terminology in the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga*, modern scholarship seems to have generally worked on the basis of two assumptions. The first is explicitly or implicitly taking the *ehi-Bhadde* declaration and Bhaddā's own identification of it as her *upasampadā* in the *Therīgāthā* or the *Apadāna* as testifying to an *ehibhikkhunī*-type of *upasampadā*.³² The second is placing Bhaddā's ordination in the *Therīgāthā* at a very early date in the history of the early Buddhist female ordination, prior to the actual foundation of the *bhikkhunī-saṅgha* with the ordination of Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī and her Sakyan followers, or seeing it in apparent conflict with the prescription of two-year *sikkhamānā* training laid down in the sixth *garudhamma* (of which there is no trace in the *Therīgāthā* or the *Apadāna* nor elsewhere).³³

In terms of legal-historical chronology, these assumptions postulate that an *ebhikkhunī* form of ordination in parallel with the *ehibhikkhu* form of ordination for monks must indeed be 'primitive', to be later superseded by other more formalised procedures.³⁴ This perception has at times been instrumental to, or even resultant from, the wish to see an early stage of nun ordination obtained directly from a pro-women (if not feminist) Buddha without the involvement of the *bhikkhu-saṅgha* (postulated as a later development), and the expression of an option equal to that available to males in the early stage of formation of the *saṅgha* prior to the advent of the *bhikkhu-saṅgha*'s patriarchy.³⁵

A different opinion is expressed by William Pruitt (1998–1999: 380 note 3),³⁶ when he comments that “KRN [K.R. Norman] incorrectly accepts Mrs Rhys David’s remark ... that Bhaddā was ordained by the *ehibhikkhunī* formula.” Pruitt’s remark and his criticism of K.R. Norman and thereby C.A.F. Rhys David (cf. note 31 above) appears to be based on his own adoption of the commentarial position in the *Therīgāthā* Commentary. Traditional scholarship – represented by the Theravāda Commentaries, Subcommentaries and the oral *Vinaya* teaching tradition – firmly rejects that Bhaddā’s verse should be documenting an *ehibhikkhuni*-type of *upasampadā*, a position to which I will return in greater detail below. Pruitt is then followed, for instance, by Danièle Masset (2005: 130 note 77) in a note to her French translation of the *Therīgāthā*. On the contrary, the commentarial interpretation is discarded by Peter Skilling (2001: 154), who comments that

the *Therīgāthā-aṭṭhakathā* goes to great length to deny that the ‘*ehī* [sic] ordination’—direct ordination by the Buddha himself—was ever used for nuns, but there is tantalizing evidence to the contrary.

Shih Juo-Hsüeh (2000: 420–421) sees a contradiction between the portrayal of Bhaddā’s ordination in the *Therīgāthā* without mention of the two-year *sikkhamānā* training and this prescription stipulated by the sixth *garudhamma* laid down in the Theravāda account of the foundation of the *bhikkhunī* order. She writes:

[o]ne passage in the *Therīgāthā* [Thī 109] goes against the Cv’s [*Cullavagga*] account of the sixth rule of hierarchy ... According to her poem, she was ordained by the Buddha through the simple formula “Come, Bhaddā”, which is equivalent to the “Come, monk” formula for the ordination of monks by the Buddha. This case and the sixth rule of hierarchy would seem to be incompatible. Firstly, the latter required a two years’ probationary training, which separates going forth from ordination, but the “Come, nun” formula indicates the unification of going forth and ordination. Secondly, the requirements of ordination in both the *Saṅghas* makes the “Come, nun” formula impossible as the latter was used by the Buddha alone, and the former is to be conferred by means of a fourfold legal act (*nātticatutthakamma*).

Bhaddā’s ordination as portrayed in the *Therīgāthā* is taken by Shih Juo-Hsüeh as representative of what she identifies as an ‘undifferentiated’ type of ordination in which the going forth and the higher ordination take place simultaneously.³⁷

In general, as already commented above, I feel hesitant to draw such inferences on the basis of a work such as the *Therīgāthā*, which is not meant to offer fully detailed autobiographies of the early Buddhist nuns at each and every step of their monastic career as a prescriptive legal treatise might do.

The perceived contradiction and the need to reconcile Bhaddā’s verse in the *Therīgāthā* with the account in the *Cullavagga* of the Theravāda *Vinaya* have been resolved by Phra Payutto (2016 [2013]: 233–235) and Bhikkhu Anālayo (2017: 266 note 95), who clarifies that

such testimony to the *ehi* type of ordination does not stand in contrast to *garudhamma* 6 as recorded in the *Cullavagga*, since the Buddha as the legislator was not subject to his own rules and thus free to grant the “come nun” type of ordination any time he wished to do so. In the case of Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī’s followers, the Buddha could have freely chosen to ordain them in whatever way he preferred, without being himself bound in this by *garudhamma* 6.

The *ehibhikkhu/ehibhikkhuni* ordination is an exclusive prerogative of the Buddha, theoretically possible throughout his lifetime. From this it follows that the above-mentioned assumption with regard to the earliness of the (hypothetical) ordination of Bhaddā through an *ehibhikkhuni* ordination becomes unnecessary. Just as with any other type of ordination, the Buddha as the lawmaker remains free to ordain in whichever way he sees fit. He is not bound by the *Vinaya* rules that he establishes for the *saṅgha*, and can continue to ordain discretionally according to circumstances even once a particular procedure has been established, superseded or amended as regards its application on the part of the *saṅgha*. In other words, the Buddha retains life-long legislative and executive rights while not being bound to the observance of the *saṅgha* legislation he would lay down and modify in the course of time.³⁸ Thus, setting aside for the time being the interpretive issues involved by Bhaddā’s or other women’s ordination by means of an *ehi*-injunction by the Buddha, it is in any case not necessary to postulate its earliness in order to make it square with the fact that the Buddha established the *bhikkhunī* order with the help of a different type of procedure, namely ordination by acceptance of the *garudhammas* and an ordination carried out by the *bhikkhu-saṅgha* for Gotamī and her Sakyan followers respectively. It seems, moreover, unlikely that the Buddha would formally ordain any woman before he founded the female branch of the monastic community in Theravāda sources.³⁹

In summary, an *ehibhikkhuni* ordination for Bhaddā after the foundation of the *bhikkhunī-saṅgha* does not in and of itself pose any timeline or legal problem with regards to the chronology of the establishment and early development of the *bhikkhunī* community.

5.1 Bhaddā’s ordination in the contemporary debate on the re-establishment of the Theravāda *bhikkhunī* order

The chronological implications of the canonical verse on Bhaddā’s ordination have come up not only in textual scholarship, but also in public discourse on the contemporary re-establishment of the Theravāda *bhikkhunī* order, concerning two areas in particular. The first concern is which type of legal procedure can or cannot be validly adopted in order to revive the Theravāda *bhikkhunī* order, and the second is the requirement for *sikkhamānā* training imposed on female ordination candidates.⁴⁰

To give an example of the first area of discussion, I quote from a laywoman's post hosted in a blog run by Australian-born Bhikkhu Sujāto (1966–), a Western Theravāda monk ordained in the Thai forest tradition who has been quite vocal in the *bhikkhunī* revival movement:⁴¹

[i]n the Buddha's time if someone got faith in the Dhamma and asked to go forth as a lay or ordained follower of the Buddha, he just said 'Ehi bhikkhu/bhikkhuni' and that's it! Simple. A simple ordination is keeping in line with the Buddha's teachings and Dhamma. It is the essence of the Dhamma. Creating all this papanca and hesitations about ordination is NOT in keeping with the Buddha's teachings and Dhamma. So a simple and straightforward ordination is keeping in line with 'the spirit' of the Buddha's teachings. ... 'Ehi Bhikkhu!' 'Ehi Bhikkhuni' was all that was done.

Informed by a pop-view, as it were, of *Vinaya* legalities and a passion for 'the spirit' of the Dhamma as opposed to contemporary proliferations, this voice appropriates Bhaddā's verse moved by an advocacy intention. Intriguingly, this stance stands in direct contrast with the already mentioned idea expressed in an academic publication by the German philologist Ludwig Alsdorf (1967: 316–317) that the *ehi*-type of ordination as a whole – for *bhikkhunīs* as well as *bhikkhus* – must be a later textual invention. It also stands in contrast to the Theravāda scholastic tradition, which, as I will show in the following pages, casts serious doubts on the Buddha's *ehi*-injunction in the *Theragāthā* as representing Bhaddā's actual ordination.

Setting aside the traditional position, that is, irrespective of whether Bhaddā (or other women) ever received their full ordination by means of an *ehibhikkhuni* utterance on the part of the Buddha, a revival method based on such a procedure is clearly out of the question according to the Theravāda legal tradition. This is because although the *ehibhikkhuni* appears in the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga*'s definition of '*bhikkhunī*', such a mode of ordination can only be implemented personally by the Buddha.

The second area of contemporary discourse in which Bhaddā's verse comes up is the debate on the desirability of *sikkhamānā* training for adult candidates to ordination and its status in the *Vinaya*. A trend in this debate is to identify canonical antecedents that would lend support to the dispensability of the *sikkhamānā* stage in the training of perspective *bhikkhunīs*.

According to Bhikkhu Sujāto (2012: 177) "accounts in the Therīgāthā depict the Buddha giving bhikkhuni ordination to women without the period of *sikkhamānā* training, such as Bhaddā Kuṇḍalakesā." He further points out that other accounts in the same work suggest that *sikkhamānā* training may however have been undertaken by some mature women (Sujāto 2012: 177–178; see Thī 97–101).

Indeed none of the texts in question – canonical, para-canonical or commentarial – makes any mention of Bhaddā undergoing *sikkhamānā* training. However, I would not take the absence of references to *sikkhamānā* training in the *Therīgāthā* as serving as evidential basis for the history of the *sikkhamānā* institution.⁴² Although the scantiness of the textual evidence at our disposal certainly demands that even negative evidence be taken into consideration, it seems to me that, given the literary genre and purpose of the *Therīgāthā*, one should be particularly careful not to overinterpret the text.⁴³

6. Bhaddā's ordination in the Theravāda Commentaries

Leaving the contemporary arena behind and returning to the world of medieval Pali Commentaries, relevant sources on Bhaddā's ordination are the *Therīgāthā* Commentary and the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* Commentary. A subsequent textual layer is represented by the Theravāda *Vinaya* Subcommentaries. These works concern themselves with Bhaddā's case when they discuss the wording of the *Therīgāthā*, *Apadāna* and *Therīgāthā* Commentary in relation to the occurrence of the *ehibhikkhunī* in the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga* list of different examples of *bhikkhunī*-hood when it defines what is meant by the term '*bhikkhunī*' in the *Vinaya*.

6.1 The *Therīgāthā* Commentary

The *Therīgāthā* Commentary ascribed to Ācariya Dhammapāla (active at the earliest a century after Buddhaghosa)⁴⁴ is of the opinion that the declaration in Bhaddā's verse was not a case of ordination by the method of *ehibhikkhunī*, but rather a form of address used by the Buddha to invite her into the fold of the *saṅgha* by eventually participating in the normal ordination procedure. In other words, the canonical verse – the Commentary states – should be understood to mean that Bhaddā Kuṇḍalakesā was sent off to the nuns' quarters to receive the going forth and higher ordination there, not that she received her higher ordination from the Buddha then and there by means of the *ehibhikkhunī* formula.

This, to a certain extent, would fit the earlier mentioned observations by Alsdorf and Phra Payutto that in the canon the imperative *ehi* is essentially used when sending someone to some place. In addition, taking '*ehi, Bhaddā*' as 'go, Bhaddā' in a directional sense – to proceed to the nunnery, as in "Get thee to a nunnery, Bhaddā" – would also leave open the possibility of understanding *upasampadā* here as merely referring to her acceptance or welcome by the Buddha and his injunction that she should go to the female community, and not as the legal technical term for ordination consistent with the later formalised *Vinaya* terminology.⁴⁵

Here follows a full translation of the relevant passage in the *Therīgāthā* Commentary. I tentatively opt for a rendering of '*ehi*' in '*ehi, Bhadde*' as 'go' (there) in order to faithfully represent the commentarial understanding

and also to differentiate this expression from the order ‘*ehi, bhikkhu*’, in view of the commentator’s denial of the existence of an ‘*ehi, bhikkhuni*’ utterance on the part of the Buddha.⁴⁶

Similarly, they [i.e., the *therīs*] are of two kinds: [those] with full ordination obtained from the Teacher and [those] with full ordination obtained from the *saṅgha*. In accepting the eight *garudhammas* Mahāpajāpati Gotamī is one who obtained the full ordination; because this full ordination was obtained in the presence of the Teacher indeed she is called ‘one with the full ordination obtained from the Teacher’. All the remaining [women are called] ‘[ones] with the full ordination obtained from the *saṅgha*’. The latter are also of two kinds: fully ordained on one side and fully ordained on both sides. There, with the exception of Mahāpajāpati Gotamī herself, those five hundred Sakyā women who walked out [of the home life] together with Mahāpajāpati Gotamī are ordained on one side, because they have the full ordination obtained from the *bhikkhu-saṅgha* only. The others were ordained on both sides, because they have the full ordination [obtained] in both *saṅghas*.⁴⁷

In the present case, a ‘Come (*ehi*), *bhikkhuni*’ pair like the ‘Come (*ehi*), *bhikkhu*’ pair cannot be correct. Why? Because such a type of full ordination does not exist for *bhikkhunīs*. If it is like that (*yadi evam*), why is that which has been said by Subhaddā Kuṇḍalakesā in the *Therīgāthā* [stated], [as follows]?⁴⁸

Bent on my knees, having paid homage, I made *añjali* before him.⁴⁹
“Go (*ehi*), Bhaddā”, he said to me. That was my full ordination (*upasampadā*).” [= Thī 109]

And why is that similarly [stated] even in the *Apadāna* [as follows]?

Being asked [for ordination], then the Leader enjoined: “Go (*ehi*), Bhaddā.”

With that I was fully ordained (*upasampannā*). Then, I saw a small amount of water. [= Ap XXI.44 at Ap 563,23–24]⁵⁰

This [i.e., the verse quoted from the *Therīgāthā* and the *Apadāna*] was not said with reference to full ordination by means of the mode ‘Come (*ehi*), *bhikkhuni*’.⁵¹ Rather, because it was the Teacher’s order that was the cause of the full ordination, it is said [by Bhaddā]: ‘**that was my full ordination.**’

For similarly it is said in the Commentary: “‘Go (*ehi*), Bhaddā’ [means] having gone to the residence of the *bhikkhunīs*, in the presence of the *bhikkhunīs* go forth and receive the full ordination. **He said to me** [means] he ordered [me]. Because **the** Teacher’s order to me was the cause of [my] full ordination, it became [my] **full ordination.**” By this indeed the meaning is explained even in the stanzas of the *Apadāna*; [this meaning] shall be shown.

Nevertheless, [the reading] “Come (*ehi*), *bhikkhuni*” [does occur] in the *Bhikkhuni-vibhaṅga*. How is that? It is not (a-) a statement explaining (*jotana*) the nature (*sabhāva*) of the full ordination of *bhikkhunīs* by means of the *ehibhikkhuni*-mode,⁵² because such a full ordination for *bhikkhunīs* does not exist.

If that is the case, how is it that the description ‘Come (*ehi*), *bhikkhunī*’ [is present] in the [*Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga*? [– Someone may ask.]⁵³ It is because it has fallen into the flow of the serial order (*naya*) of the exposition. For “the having fallen into the flow [of the exposition] (*sotapatitā*)” means:

[1] on certain occasions, even though [something] is [theoretically] possible, it is not conveyed, as in the exposition (*niddesa*) on the mind element in the Abhidhamma,⁵⁴ the absorption factor, although possible, is not conveyed, because it has fallen into the stream of the five [types of] consciousness;

[2] on [other] occasions, [something] does not come up in an exposition, as the heart basis in the description of the bases just there [i.e., in the Abhidhamma] [= Dhs 133];

[3] on [yet other] occasions, [something is mentioned] by virtue of grasping it even if it is not possible [in reality], [as] in such manner in the exposition on the duration of an aeon. As [the Buddha] says [in the *Puggalapaññatti*:] “What type of individual is one who holds up an aeon? Should such an individual be practicing for the realisation of the fruit of stream-entry, and should it be the time for the conflagration of the aeon, the aeon would not be conflagrated as long as that individual has not realised the fruit of stream-entry.” [= Pp 13]⁵⁵

Thus, here too [i.e., in the case of the *ehibhikkhunī* in the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga*], this [i.e., the mention of the *ehibhikkhunī*] is to be understood by virtue of adopting [what] should not be possible. For this is the expression of a hypothetical case: “If ‘Come, *bhikkhunī*’ were to be said by the Blessed One to any woman who was fit for the status of a *bhikkhunī*, then there would be the status of *bhikkhunī* accordingly.”

But why did the Blessed One not speak thus? [It is] because of [their] not having performed an outstanding deed accordingly (*tathā*).⁵⁶ [Further,] those who, having given as a reason the fact that women were not placed close [to the Buddha], say it is only *bhikkhus* who, living close to the Teacher, are indeed always near [him], and they are therefore fit to be addressed with the words ‘Come (*ehi*), *bhikkhu*’, [but that this is] not [the case] with *bhikkhunīs* – that is merely their opinion, because the capability or else incapability of being close to or far from the Teacher is not established (*asiddhattā*). For this was indeed said by the Blessed One:

Monks, even if a monk, grasping a corner of [my] outer robe, were to follow close behind [me] step by step, but he has a tendency to be covetous of sensual pleasures, full of passion, of malevolent heart, of corrupt intention in his mind, of muddled mindfulness, without clear knowing, not composed, with a wandering mind, with uncontrolled faculties, at the same time he would be far from me and I from him. What is the reason for that? Monks, indeed that monk does not see the Dhamma. Not seeing the Dhamma, he does not see me. Monks, even if a monk were to live a hundred leagues away but does not have a tendency to be covetous of sensual pleasures, is not full of passion, is

not of malevolent heart, not of corrupt intention in his mind, of established mindfulness, with clear knowing, composed, with a concentrated mind, with controlled faculties, at the same time, he would be in my presence and I in his. What is the reason for that? Monks, indeed that monk sees the Dhamma. Seeing the Dhamma, he sees me. [= It 92]

Therefore, being in a location placed near or not near the Teacher is not the cause [of the statement]. Conversely, the unsuitability of *bhikkhunīs* in that regard is on account of [their] not having performed the [required] outstanding deeds. Therefore, it is said [above]: “In this case, a ‘Come (*ehi*), *bhikkhunī*’ pair is not possible.” In this way, they are of two kinds.

6.1.1 The position of Ācariya Dhammapāla

In what follows I analyse closely the position taken by Dhammapāla, who appears to embrace a number of doctrinal and soteriological developments that took place in Middle-Period Buddhism in India, as well as in Sri Lanka.

6.1.2 Style and function of the definition of a ‘*bhikkhunī*’ in the *Suttavibhaṅga*

Dhammapāla argues that the utterance ‘*ehi*, Bhaddā’ was not said with reference to full ordination by means of the mode ‘Come (*ehi*), *bhikkhunī*’. Instead, it was the Teacher’s order (*āṇatti*) that was the cause of the full ordination, whereby Bhaddā could affirm: ‘That was my full ordination’. He then goes on to quote from an unnamed Commentary (*aṭṭhakathā*) to explain that, because the Teacher’s order (*āṇā*) was the cause of her full ordination, it became her full ordination. Dhammapāla then says that the same explanation applies to the verse in the *Apadāna*, which he quotes.

In principle, this reference to an unnamed *aṭṭhakathā* could be a cross-reference within the same *aṭṭhakathā*, namely Dhammapāla’s own Commentary. Alternatively, he could be referring either to one of the old Commentaries – yet, he is not normally on record for quoting from the Sinhala *aṭṭhakathā* – or to one of the known extant *aṭṭhakathās*, but with a different wording. It is however quite likely that the cross-reference is internal to *Therīgāthā-aṭṭhakathā*. This sentence is found there twice, once with *avaca* (Thī-a 107, the commentary on Bhaddā’s verses in an earlier part of the Commentary),⁵⁷ once with *avoca* (Thī-a 298, the passage presently under discussion). From this it can be safely concluded that the cross-reference is to the first occurrence of the sentence in the same Commentary.

Dhammapāla duly notices the inconsistency of the reading in the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga* in contrast to what he considers the historical reality, namely the non-existence of *ehibhikkhunīs*. He says that although the case *ehibhikkhunī ti bhikkhunī* is included in the *Vibhaṅga* in accordance with the style of the exposition, having ‘fallen’ into the flow of the exposition

(*sotapatita*), nevertheless the procedure in question never actually happened. Then he explains the meaning of such an accidental occurrence by giving three different examples:

1. something possible is not mentioned (as the absorption factor or *jhānaṅga* in the exposition on the mind element in the Abhidhamma); reason: it has fallen into the flow of the serial order of the exposition;
2. something possible simply does not come up in the exposition; no reason given;
3. something impossible is given by merely adopting it in the text although it does not exist in reality.

This third variant is the one applicable to the mention of the *bhikkhunī* by way of an *ehibhikkhuni* ordination in the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga*.

This interpretive solution is assumed and further elaborated upon by Vajirabuddhi in his *Vinaya* Subcommentary, commonly known by the title *Vajirabuddhi-ṭīkā*. Vajirabuddhi states that although in the present Buddha's time there was no *ehibhikkhunī* nor any *bhikkhunī* ordained with the three refuges, these were nonetheless mentioned merely prompted by the style of the exposition. In a similar manner, he argues, because the description for *bhikkhunīs* was spoken merely in accordance with the sequence of the exposition for *bhikkhus*, following its style, although there actually were *bhikkhunīs* who had been unilaterally ordained by the *bhikkhu-saṅgha*, such as the Sakyan followers of Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī, they are not mentioned in the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga*.⁵⁸

Thus, to make sense of the supposed incongruity in the *Bhikkhunī-Vibhaṅga*, both Dhammapāla and Vajirabuddhi provide a text-critical analysis. This analysis juxtaposes a reading that, although it could occur, is not mentioned (*labbhamānassā 'pi, anāhaṭaṃ hoti*) to a reading that, although it could not occur, is mentioned (*alabbhamānassā 'pi, āhaṭaṃ hoti*).⁵⁹ The reason why the Buddha did not say '*ehi, bhikkhuni*' to any woman, Dhammapāla explains, is because of the absence of women who performed the (necessary) *adhikāra* or outstanding deed (on which see section 6.1.3 below).

This explanation however contradicts the earlier mentioned 'impossibility', which is argued for, because it implies that on condition that women had performed the outstanding deeds, then the *ehibhikkhuni* ordination would have been given. The mere absence of a woman who has performed the required outstanding deed (that would allow for the *ehibhikkhuni* ordination) would not necessarily allow for the conclusion that this is an inherent impossibility, unless it is shown and proven that women by their very nature are incapable of performing such outstanding deed.

To put it in more general terms: the absence of observability of rare phenomena does not allow for conclusions about impossibility. The conclusion of impossibility would be justified, however, if it is reasonably shown that

women by their very nature, or due to another law of nature, cannot perform the outstanding deed necessary to receive an *ehibhikkhuni* ordination; but no explanation is given in the earlier quoted passages to show that this is truly the case.

On the assumption that the definition of a *bhikkhunī* in the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga* was indeed copied over from and modified after the pre-existent definition of a *bhikkhu*,⁶⁰ Dhammapāla's textual explanation cannot be liquidated as unjustified. It cannot be ruled out that already relatively early on, well before Dhammapāla's time, *ehibhikkhuni* ordinations by the Buddha were simply considered as a theoretical and legal possibility without needing to have actually taken place. This position can be best appreciated in the light of the functioning of the oral formation and transmission of the early Buddhist texts: the *ehibhikkhunī* would appear in the recitation simply because it was mechanically inserted in the course of the flow of the already existing and already memorised recitation of the *bhikkhu* definition, which had been rehearsed by the *bhikkhu* transmitters of the texts countless times, recitation after recitation.

As seen in section 2 above, the *ehibhikkhu* and *ehibhikkhunī* both occupy the sixth position in the respective *Bhikkhu-* and *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga* lists. The items in the two parallel listings – twelve in total – are identical except for the last which refers to *samaggena saṅghena ñatticatutthena kamma* for *bhikkhus* and *samaggena ubhatosaṅghena ñatticatutthena kamma* for *bhikkhunīs*, meaning ordination by means of a formal transaction with one motion and three proclamations in a harmonious *saṅgha* (of *bhikkhus*) and ordination by means of a formal transaction with one motion and three proclamations in a harmonious dual *saṅgha* (of *bhikkhus* and *bhikkhunīs*). The sequence of this list is precisely what Dhammapāla refers to by 'the flow of the serial order of the exposition' (*desanā-naya-sota*), into which the *ehibhikkhunī* would have just been inserted during the recitation as a matter of form.

Notably, a historical instance of the seventh item in the *bhikkhunī* list, a *bhikkhunī* by way of being fully ordained through the three refuges (*tīhi saraṅgamanehi upasampannā ti bhikkhunī*) is also not recorded anywhere in the *Vinaya* or in other Theravāda texts. In view of the chronology of the establishment of the *bhikkhunī* order, it appears that by the time of the ordination of Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī and her Sakyan followers, ordination through the three refuges had already been restricted exclusively to novice ordination, superseded by an ordination consisting in a formal transaction with one motion and three proclamations for *bhikkhus*. The Sakyan women were in all likelihood ordained through such a type of procedure.⁶¹ Thus from the point of view of narrative chronology of the formation of the legal system (within the framework of the Theravāda tradition), a *bhikkhunī* ordination could not have been seen to have taken place by means of the three refuges. Nevertheless, the procedure is still included in the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga*'s exposition.

This situation does not pass unnoticed by Vajirabuddhi, who in his Subcommentary explains that although historically there were no *ehibhikkhunīs* and also none ordained with the three refuges, these were both mentioned on account of the harmony or style of the exposition (*desanā-vilāsa-vasena*) in the *Vibhaṅga*.⁶² He quotes this as the opinion of ‘some’ (*eke*). As he states elsewhere, the opinions of *eke* are not so reliable, so that one has to ponder such opinions.⁶³ In fact, Vajirabuddhi applies the same type of explanation to the absence of *bhikkhunīs* ordained only by the *bhikkhus*. They, on the contrary, did exist historically according to the *Cullavagga* account, yet are not listed under the *bhikkhunī* definition in the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga*.⁶⁴

A similar observation is to be made with regard to the *bhikkhunī* ordained by virtue of her acceptance of the eight *garudhammas*. Such a *bhikkhunī* is absent in the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga* listing yet Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī is on record in the *Vinaya* as having been ordained in such a way.

This brings me to a crucial structural characteristic of canonical legal textuality: the purpose of the *Vibhaṅga* definitions of a *bhikkhu* or a *bhikkhunī* needs to be properly assessed in order to avoid misconstruing their implications. An example of misunderstanding the nature of such definitions is found in a publication by Bhikkhunī Kusumā (2015: XVIII). She holds that, because in the canonical standard definition there is no mention of ordination by accepting the eight *garudhammas* (with only three types of ordination for *bhikkhunīs* being mentioned, namely a “Come, *bhikkhunī*” ordination, ordination by taking the three refuges and ordination by a dual *saṅgha*),

[t]his is conclusive evidence for the oldest forms of *bhikkhunī* ordination. Mahāpajāpatī was ordained by *ehi-bhikkhunī* ordination and not by *īṇi-saraṇagamana* or *aṭṭha-vācika* ordination, because before her no *bhikkhunīs* existed in the world. This standard description in the *Suttavibhaṅga* is obviously earlier than *Cullavagga* chapter X in its present form, where her ordination by accepting the eight ‘important rules’ (*garudhamma*) is recorded.

From this Bhikkhunī Kusumā goes on to argue that the eight *garudhammas* “are not Buddha word”, that the “*Cullavagga* was compiled after the passing away of the Buddha”, “[t]here were no codified *Vinaya* rules in the fifth year after reaching Buddhahood”, “Mahāpajāpatī was ordained by the ‘come *bhikkhunī*’ ordination”, “[t]he five hundred Sakyan ladies were ordained by monks only by repeating the three refuges”, “[t]hey all observed *ājīva-aṭṭhamaka sīla* precepts”, and “the *vikāla bhojana* precept was not yet observed.”

This argument is based on a misinterpretation. As already explained by Bhikkhu Anālayo (2015: 418–423 and 2018: 146–150) in another context, the expectation of finding exhaustive definitions in the *Suttavibhaṅga* is faulty. The definitions of a *bhikkhu* and a *bhikkhunī* are not complete nor are they meant to be complete. The fact that just because Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī’s ordination by acceptance of the *garudhammas*, or the ordination

of *bhikkhunīs* by *bhikkhus* only, is not cited in the definition of a *bhikkhunī*, does not in itself imply that such ordinations were late additions to the text, nor that the ordination of monastics carried out in that way under exceptional circumstances was not seen as a valid ordination according to the legal standard of the *Vinaya*. The old Word for Word Commentary (*padabhājanīya*) of the *Suttavibhaṅga* serves the purpose of elucidating the wording of the *Vinaya* rules. It was a practical tool aimed at making the rules understandable – based on the understanding of the time of this commentary – for the *bhikkhus* and *bhikkhunīs* living at that time. Thus the definitions need not contain exceptional forms of ordination such as that of Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī.

6.1.3 *Adhikāra* and *mahā-adhikāra*: a misogynous stance?

Dhammapāla's conclusion that Bhaddā or other women were not furnished with the required *adhikāra* to qualify for an *ehi*-ordination is at first reading baffling even from within the Theravāda commentarial world itself, where she is portrayed as possessing wise aspirations and having done highly meritorious deeds harking back many lifetimes. According to the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* Commentary, the *Apadāna* and the *Therīgāthā* Commentary itself, at the time of the Buddha Padumuttara she was born in a good family in Hamsavatī. She listened to the Teacher giving a Dhamma sermon and on seeing him place a certain nun in the position of being foremost amongst those who are quick in penetrative knowledge, she performed an appropriate outstanding deed (*adhikārakammaṃ*) and aspired to that position in the future.⁶⁵

What to make of the assertion made by Dhammapāla that Bhaddā's lacked the *adhikāra*? Is the commentator falling into self-contradiction, trying to reconcile different traditions, moved by an underlying assumption that these must be reconciled? Is he trying to say that had Bhaddā and the other women acquired outstanding merits they would not have been born as women in the first place? Is his scholastic position – and that of the other commentators who follow him – to push forward an agenda of downgrading the female potential? Is text-critical practice being deployed to that end and resulting in a denial of the existence of *ehibhikkhunīs* at the Buddha's time?

Upon closer scrutiny, Dhammapāla's position appears to be fully consistent with a particular 'gendered' view expressed elsewhere in Theravāda scriptures: an exceptional meritorious deed conjoined with the aspiration for chief discipleship or other eminent positions in the dispensation of Buddhas does not alone suffice to qualify for obtaining an *ehi*-type ordination under a Buddha.⁶⁶

When taking up the case of Aṅgulimāla, ordained as an *ehibhikkhu* by the Buddha, the *Majjhima-nikāya* Commentary, ascribed to Buddhaghosa, describes a miraculous feat that precedes the accomplishment of an *ehi*-ordination. A bowl and robes created by psychic power manifest (*iddhimayapattacīvaraṃ*) as soon as the person hears the Buddha's utterance '*ehi, bhikkhu. svākhāto*

dhammo Hair, beard and lay attire (*gihilingaṃ*, the householder's characteristics) disappear instantly, the recluse's attire (*samaṇalingaṃ*) appears, and all eight monastic requisites (*aṭṭhaparikkhārā*) become attached to the body of the candidate (*sarīrapaṭibaddhā*).⁶⁷ The miraculous disappearance of the lay attributes is also recorded in the *Anguttara-nikāya* Commentary for Kolita and Upatissa, the two future chief disciples of the Buddha who were also ordained as an *ethabhikkhavo* pair.⁶⁸ The same Commentary explains that such a feat has an exceptional gift of robes and other requisites as its indispensable condition, enabling the manifestation of the requisites by dint of psychic powers. The exceptional gift of requisites is called a 'great' *adhikāra* (*mahā-adhikāra*); it is said to have been accomplished for example by Koṇḍañña at the time of the Buddha Padumuttara in Hamsavatī, so that he became the first *bhikkhu* and the first *ehibhikkhu* in the present Buddha's dispensation.⁶⁹ A candidate is to be duly inspected by the Buddha so as to ascertain the presence of such a karmic qualification before being given the *ehibhikkhu* order.⁷⁰ A similar description of the qualification the Buddha examines (*upadhāreti*) in perspective *ehibhikkhus* is also found in the *Dhammapada* Commentary,⁷¹ an anonymous work traditionally but dubiously ascribed to Buddhaghosa.⁷²

Some women, the same *Dhammapada* Commentary clarifies, do indeed perform such a *mahā-adhikāra*, but this does not result in the miraculous appearance of the requisites that is mandatory in order to receive an *ehi*-utterance. The laywoman Visākhā, for instance, performed such an exceptional deed at the time of the Buddha Kassapa, but all she obtained from it was the possession of a garland made from creepers.⁷³

For whereas a women's [exceptional] gift of robes culminates in the possession of a large creeper-garland (*mahālatāpasādhana-bhaṇḍa*), a men's [culminates] in bowls and robes created by psychic power (*iddhimayapattacīvara*).

This proposition explains Dhammapāla's position from the perspective of mediaeval Theravāda scholasticism. His 'gendered' stance on Bhaddā's ordination has caught the attention of several scholars.

With regard to the lack of the needed *adhikāra*,⁷⁴ Pruitt (n.d.: 4–5) observes that:

[t]his mention of insufficient merit gained in past lives is consistent with [Dhammapāla's] view that the two chief women disciples, Khemā and Uppalavaṇṇā, first made an aspiration to gain that status under Buddha Padumuttara only 100,000 æons ago, whereas the two chief male disciples, Sāriputta and Mahā-Moggallāna, made their aspiration under Buddha Anomadassī, as long ago as one incalculable (*asaṅkheyya*) plus 100,000 æons past.

Liz Williams (2000: 172–173) reasons:⁷⁵

Dhammapāla ... goes to extreme lengths to explain that there is no 'Ehi bhikkhunī' ordination equivalent to that for bhikkhus. His

explanation appears to be merely a denial of something he is not comfortable with, that is, that the Buddha ordained women in the same way as men, implying an equivalent status to men. ... This is merely a circular argument which adds nothing in the way of evidence or reasoning to support his contention. I would argue that the passage on Bhaddā Kuṇḍalakesā has just demonstrated that bhikkhuṇīs were indeed sometimes admitted to full ordination in this way, just as bhikkhus were sometimes admitted by the formula ‘Come Bhikkhu!’

Williams (2000: 173) further relates Dhammapāla’s misogynist view to the socio-historical climate in which he lived (seventh to tenth century ?):

[h]is views of and attitude towards women are obviously coloured by the socio-historical context in which he was writing ... even from the earliest days of the monastic Sangha, shortly after the decease of the Buddha, and for centuries later, women were denied the status, respect and recognition that was acknowledged by the Buddha.

A commentator like Dhammapāla would have no doubt approached the earlier texts carrying his own cultural and ideological conditioning.⁷⁶ Although his authorial pen displays individual character and originality, his gendered position on karmic retribution does not emerge in isolation within the worldview of Theravāda scholasticism. It is best read in conjunction with the *Dhammapada* Commentary’s assumption that a woman’s exceptional giving of monastic requisites remains ineffective for the purpose of the appearance of the psychically produced robes and bowl necessary for an *ehi*-ordination.⁷⁷ There is furthermore a close relationship between the *adhikāra* performed by disciples that end up being ordained in such a distinguished form and the *prañidhāna* they had made to become prominent disciples. This is also shown by the triad *adhikāra/abhinīhara/veyyākaraṇa* found in the *Nidāna-kathā*, the introduction to the *Jātaka* Commentary, which is in turn another context where women are excluded from a trajectory implying *adhikāra*.⁷⁸

6.2 Bhaddā’s ordination in the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* Commentary

The *Aṅguttara-nikāya* Commentary – attributed to Ācariya Buddhaghosa, and thus earlier than the *Therīgāthā* Commentary – presents the story of Bhaddā Kuṇḍalakesā, foremost nun disciple amongst those who are quick in penetrative knowledge, in the context of the list of seventy-four monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen singled out by the Buddha as outstanding in a certain quality.⁷⁹

Bhaddā’s story is told from the time of the Buddha Padumuttara onwards.⁸⁰ When it comes to the stages prior to her becoming a Buddhist disciple in her eventful present and last lifetime, she had been a Jain nun for some time. Bhaddā excelled in oratory and had been touring the country challenging others in debate, until reaching Sāvattihī and meeting the venerable Sāriputta, who seamlessly defeated her. The rest of the story goes as follows:⁸¹

Having fallen at the Elder's feet right there, she said: "I go to you for refuge, venerable Sir."

[The Elder said:] "There is no rite of going to me for refuge, the supreme person in the world with its *devas* lives in a nearby monastery, go to him for refuge." She [said]: "I will do so, venerable Sir."

In the evening time, at the time of the Teacher's discourse on the Dhamma, having gone into the Teacher's presence, having paid homage with the fivefold prostration, she stood at one side.

The Teacher, as a way of subduing her [mental] constructions, spoke this verse [found] in the *Dhammapada*:

Better than verses which are composed with meaningless words, even if they are thousands, is the single line of a verse which, when heard, makes one calm. [= Dh 101]

At the conclusion of [this] verse, just as she was standing there, having attained arahatship together with the analytic knowledges, she asked for the going forth. The Teacher consented to her going forth. Having proceeded to the residence of the *bhikkhunīs*, she went forth.

The narration continues with the news spreading of Bhaddā's extraordinary attainment of arahatship at the end of just a four-line verse, at which the Teacher, as the proper occasion had arisen, placed her in the foremost position amongst those who are quick in deep penetrative knowledge.

A noteworthy feature of the excerpt translated above is that the commentator does not bring in the *ehibhikkhuni* formula at all.

The verse spoken to Bhaddā also recurs in the *Dhammapada* (Dhp 101), as cross-referenced in the passage from the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* Commentary translated above. The story that in the *Dhammapada* Commentary comes with this verse is, however, unrelated to Bhaddā's present or past lives. It is instead associated to Bhaddā's male counterpart as the monastic disciple quickest in attaining penetrative knowledge, Bāhiya Dārucīriya. Bāhiya passed away shortly after having become an arahat, and the monks questioned the Buddha on whether it was possible that Bāhiya attained to arahatship after hearing so little. The Buddha exhorted the monks not to measure his teaching as being 'little' or 'much', since even thousands of verses may be unbeneficial, whereas a single sentence of a verse, which contains the truth, is superior. This is then followed by the Buddha speaking the verse in question.⁸²

Buddhaghosa's explanation appears to presuppose that the Buddha's words '*ehi, Bhadde*' do not mean '*ehi, bhikkhuni*' to the effect of an actual ordination, but that they indicate that the Buddha approved of her going forth (*tassā pabbajjaṃ sampaṭicchī*) and sent her to the nunnery where she received the going forth (*sā bhikkhunupassayaṃ gantvā pabbajī*). Such a position is basically shared by all Theravāda *Vinaya* Subcommentaries, albeit with variations in points of detail. Before taking them up, I give a brief look at the testimony of two non-classical Theravāda Commentaries.

7. Contemporary Theravāda scholarship: the *Therī-apadāna-dīpanī* and the *Mahābuddhavaṃsa*

The classical *Apadāna* Commentary (*Visuddhajanavilāsini*) is limited to the stories of the Theras.⁸³ All forty stories of the Therīs, including that of Bhaddā, are however dealt with in a modern-day Pali composition, the *Therī-apadāna-dīpanī*, authored by the Burmese monk Bhaddanta Kumārābhivaṃsa (also known as the Bamaw Sayādaw, b. 1930). The *Dīpanī* was published in Burmese script in 1992 and Roman script in 2009,⁸⁴ and it draws from the classical Commentaries on the *Therīgāthā*, *Theragāthā*, *Aṅguttara-nikāya* and *Dhammapada*, often directly identifying its own sources.

Bhaddanta Kumārābhivaṃsa appears to imply that Bhaddā gained the *pabbajjā* and *upasampadā* there and then from the Buddha:⁸⁵

She, having seen the Dhamma, asked the going forth and full ordination from the Blessed One. She, having obtained the full ordination ...

If this is what is intended by the author, then the *Dīpanī* would stand apart from the otherwise monolithic position embraced by all known Theravāda Commentaries and Subcommentaries. Moreover, it would be an interesting case of a divergent position taken by a most conservative institutional figure belonging to probably the generally most conservative tradition within Theravāda, that is, the Burmese. Bhaddanta Kumārābhivaṃsa was one of the participants in the Chaṭṭha-saṅgīti held in Rangoon in 1954–1956 and is the current chairman of the State Saṅgha Mahā Nāyaka Committee of the Union of Myanmar (2018).⁸⁶

The conventional line of interpretation is instead followed by another contemporary Theravāda work, the monumental *Mahābuddhavaṃsa*, originally written in Burmese by the *tipīṭakadhara* monk Bhaddanta Vicittasārābhivaṃsa (1911–1992), also known as the Jetavun Mingun Sayādaw, who headed the Chaṭṭha-saṅgīti and is known for innovative and controversial positions on the performance of the *kaṭhina* ceremony and on the revival of the *bhikkhunī* order he took in his Pali *Milindapañha* Commentary. Apropos Bhaddā, the *Mahābuddhavaṃsa* states:⁸⁷

At the end of the verse Kuṇḍalakesā attained arahatship together with the four Discriminative Knowledges. She requested the Buddha to admit her into the Order of Bhikkhunīs. The Buddha agreed. She went to a bhikkhunī monastery and was admitted as [a] bhikkhunī.

8. Bhaddā and the *ehibhikkhunī* in the Theravāda *Vinaya* Subcommentaries

In this section I finally turn to the understanding of Bhaddā's status in relation to the *ehibhikkhunī-upasampadā* according to the Theravāda post-canonical legal tradition.

The *Samantapāsādikā*, the *Vinaya* Commentary ascribed to Buddhaghosa by tradition but probably the work of several authors,⁸⁸ does not present a passage directly relevant this issue. It is only at the level of the *Vinaya* Subcommentaries that Bhaddā's case comes up for discussion: in Vajirabuddhi's already quoted Subcommentary, a *Gaṇṭhipada* (literary, a 'glossary') generally known as *Vajirabuddhi-ṭīkā*, which is probably dated to the tenth century;⁸⁹ in Sāriputta Thera's *Sāratthadīpanī-ṭīkā*, composed in Sri Lanka about two centuries later;⁹⁰ and in the *Vimativinodanī-ṭīkā*, ascribed to Colīya Kassapa or Mahākassapa Thera, a slightly younger contemporary of Sāriputta Thera who in his commentary often quotes and rejects Sāriputta's views.⁹¹

8.1 The *Vajirabuddhi-ṭīkā*

As already discussed in section 6.1 above, Vajirabuddhi assumes and elaborates on Dhammapāla's philological explanation of the non-existence of *ehibhikkhunīs* by extending it to two further instances. The first instance is that of *bhikkhunīs* ordained with the three refuges, mentioned in the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga* in accordance with the style of the exposition. The second is that of *bhikkhunīs* unilaterally ordained by the *bhikkhu-saṅgha*, omitted in the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga* because the *bhikkhunīs*' description was given on the basis of the exposition for *bhikkhus*.

Additionally, the *Vajirabuddhi-ṭīkā* explains the peculiarity of the occurrence of the statement '*ehibhikkhunī ti bhikkhunī*' in the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga* by bringing in a case of sex change. A *bhikkhu* who, while a worldling, has received the full ordination by means of the *ehibhikkhu* declaration or by means of the three refuges, and after the appearance of characteristics of the female sex is endowed with the status of a *bhikkhunī*, is also counted as an *ehibhikkhunī*, having initially ordained as a male *ehibhikkhu*. Vajirabuddhi seems to feel compelled to provide such a solution: he goes on to say that otherwise the definition in the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga* would fall into self-contradiction and concludes that one should investigate the matter and decide for oneself.⁹²

Another interesting feature of Vajirabuddhi's Subcommentary is that it objects to the opinion of 'some' who argue in favour of the historical existence of *ehibhikkhunīs* at the time of other Buddhas. This does not seem acceptable, because also in our Buddha's time there is no trace of *ehibhikkhunīs*. The *Dhammapada* Commentary's explanation, that only an exceptional gift of requisites by men is able to culminate in bowls and robes created by psychic power, is quoted as evidence for the impossibility of *ehibhikkhunīs* also during the dispensations of past Buddhas.⁹³

8.2 The *Sāratthadīpanī-ṭīkā*

The *Sāratthadīpanī-ṭīkā* verbatim reuses a lengthy passage from the *Therīgāthā-aṭṭhakathā*, beginning from the statement "*sabbā bhikkhuniyo satthuladdh' ūpasampadā saṅghato laddh' ūpasampadā ti duvidhā*" (= Thī-a

269,14–15) up to and including the sentence “*Apadānagāthāyam pi evam-eva attho gahetabbo*” (Thī-a 270,7: *Apadānagāthāya pi attho saṃvaṇṇito ti daṭṭhabbo*).⁹⁴ It then categorically concludes:⁹⁵

Accordingly, one should here come to this conclusion: there simply is no *ehibhikkhuni-upasampadā* for *bhikkhunīs*. And just as *ehibhikkhuni* is said on account of [its] having fallen into the flow [of the exposition], similarly *tīhi saraṇagamanehi upasampannā ti bhikkhuni* is also said on account of [its] having fallen into the flow [of the exposition]. [This conclusion] shall be shown because the full ordination through going for refuge does not exist for *bhikkhunīs*.

8.3 The *Vimativinodanī-ṭīkā*

The *Vimativinodanī-ṭīkā* stands out by introducing an ingenious and speculative explanation for the presence of the *bhikkhuni* ordained with the three refuges in the definition in the *Bhikkhuni-vibhaṅga*, in spite of the presumed non-existence of a corresponding historical occasion. The text argues:⁹⁶

[The following statement] in the Canonical Text: “**A *bhikkhuni* [because of having been fully ordained by the address] ‘come (*ehi*), *bhikkhuni*’ and a *bhikkhuni* [because] of having been higher ordained by way of going for the three refuges**” is said for the purpose of showing the same as in the Canonical Text of the *Bhikkhu-vibhaṅga*, [here] with reference to Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī,⁹⁷ who received the full ordination by way of acceptance of the eight *garudhammas* and [with reference to] the five hundred Sakyā [women] who set forth together with her and were unilaterally fully ordained by *bhikkhus* on the Blessed One’s order (*āṇā*).

For, after the Buddha allowed [her] the going forth at the Elder Ānanda’s request, they [i.e., Mahāpajāpatī together with the five hundred Sakyā women] were as if (*viya*) they had been called: “Come (*ehi*), *bhikkhunīs*, you too enter my dispensation.” And because only the Sakyā [women] were fully ordained by giving them the refuges and the precepts [and then] by the formula of the [*ñatticatuttha*] formal act, they were called ‘fully ordained by the taking the three refuges’. For other than those, there are no [others] who are called ‘fully ordained by the *ebhikkhuni*-mode’.

This is followed by direct quotations of the *ehi-Bhadde* verses from the *Therīgāthā*⁹⁸ and the *Apadāna*⁹⁹ respectively, which are explained in this way:¹⁰⁰

Even this ‘You go (*ehi, tvam*)’ [meaning] ‘[you] take the going forth and the full ordination in the presence of the *bhikkhunīs*’, has been said with respect to the [following] meaning: the Blessed One’s order (*āṇā*) was the cause of the full ordination, it became the full ordination.

Such a conclusion is then supported by quoting the statement in the *Therīgāthā* Commentary that ‘Go (*ehi*), Bhaddā’ stands for having gone to the residence of the *bhikkhunīs*, in the presence of the *bhikkhunīs* having gone forth and

received the full ordination, etc.¹⁰¹ Thus, like the *Sāratthadīpanī-ṭīkā*, the *Vimativinodanī-ṭīkā* quotes the passage presently under discussion from the *Therīgāthā-aṭṭhakathā*.

In summary, all Theravāda *Vinaya* Subcommentaries indicate that historically there was no *ehibhikkhuni* ordination parallel to that of the *bhikkhus*, in spite of exegetical differences among them.

9. Gleanings from other *Vinaya* traditions

The historicity of Bhaddā's, or other nuns' ordinations as *ehibhikkhunīs* cannot, of course, be established on the basis of the available records. Any hypothesis of historical reconstruction cannot be constructed on a single *Vinaya* tradition such as the Theravāda.

In fact, similar to the Theravāda, at least some of the existing *Vinayas* belonging to the other monastic traditions acknowledge the *ehibhikṣuṇī*,¹⁰² such as the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*¹⁰³ and the Sāṃmitīya *Vinaya*.¹⁰⁴ This might point to an early inclusion of the *ehibhikkhunī/ehibhikṣuṇī* in the *Vibhaṅgas*, or to parallel but independent dynamics of formation of the list in question.¹⁰⁵ Close inspection of all these sources from within the framework of their respective traditions and then in comparative perspective would be necessary in order to arrive at an informed text-historical hypothesis. Such a project falls outside my present focus on Theravāda legalities.

Nevertheless, I would like to briefly draw attention to the situation in the Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda traditions so as to give an example of the broader textual patterns involved. The Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* states that there are three types of *bhikṣuṇī* ordination (by acceptance of the *gurudharmas*, by messenger, and by way of a formal transaction with one motion and three proclamations), thus not including the *ehibhikṣuṇī*.¹⁰⁶ The same position is found in the **Vinaya-māṭrkā*,¹⁰⁷ a canonical text that, despite its Chinese title bearing the mark of the Sarvāstivāda (薩婆多部毘尼摩得勒伽, Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* **māṭrkā*), appears to be more closely affiliated with the Mūlasarvāstivāda *Vinaya* than with the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* (十誦律).¹⁰⁸ Yet the Sarvāstivāda **Vinaya-vibhāṣā*, a commentary on the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya* only extant in Chinese and known for containing interpolations that occurred in China,¹⁰⁹ lists the ordination by way of the *ehibhikṣuṇī* formula¹¹⁰ among the types of ordinations that nuns do not have in common with monks, to conclude that only the ordination by way of a formal transaction with one motion and three proclamations is shared by the two orders.¹¹¹

The Chinese Mūlasarvāstivāda *Bhikṣuṇī-vibhaṅga*, on the other hand, identifies Bhadrā Kāpileyā as an *ehibhikṣuṇī*.¹¹² This position is, to the best of my knowledge, unique to this text. In Theravāda sources Bhaddā Kāpilānī goes forth into the homeless life in the first year of the Buddha's ministry,

at the same time as her former husband Mahākassapa. Since there are no *bhikkhunīs* at that time, she goes to the monastery of *paribbājaka* ascetics near Sāvattthī and lives there for five years. Upon the Buddha's advice, once Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī has also become a nun, Bhaddā Kāpilānī approaches her.¹¹³ The Theravāda Commentaries add that she had been sent specifically to receive the going forth and full ordination under her.¹¹⁴ The Mūlasarvāstivāda *Bhikṣuṇī-vibhaṅga*'s unique position might be due to some fluctuation that happened in this tradition, with an exchange of motifs between the accounts of the two Bhadrās, which could be similar to the shared formula between Bhadda and Bhaddā in the Pali tradition discussed above.

The Sanskrit *Avadānaśataka*, a collection of stories in circulation within Mūlasarvāstivāda textual communities,¹¹⁵ presents the tale of Suprabhā's extraordinary ordination as its story no. 71. Suprabhā requests from the Buddha the going forth and the full ordination in his Dharmavinaya. Having received a 'Go, young lady' (*gaccha, dārike*) injunction from the Buddha, she therefore leaves Jeta's Grove, levitates in the air, where she displays various miracles, and then descends back to earth, at which the Buddha entrusts her to Mahāprajāpatī, under whom she receives the going forth and the full ordination.¹¹⁶

The Tibetan version of the same text supplies the remarkable detail that after the Buddha's injunction the hair of the head and hair of the body were instantly shaved off, the alms bowl and a water jug were (miraculously) obtained, and a piece of cloth attached itself to the freshly shaven body of Suprabhā. In this version, however, after the ordination in the presence of the Buddha no mention is made of being sent to Mahāprajāpatī or to a nunnery.¹¹⁷

The same story preserved in the Chinese *Avadānaśataka* collection is much shorter, a pattern that is observed throughout the recension of this work witnessed by the Chinese translation when compared to the extant Sanskrit and Tibetan versions. Here Suprabhā simply sees the Buddha, joy and happiness arise in her heart, she requests to become a monastic, the Buddha apparently tells her to "go" (though it seems difficult to translate the Chinese in this way; see below), her hair falls off, the robes come into contact with her body, and she becomes a *bhikṣuṇī* therein, with no follow-up ordination by the nuns.¹¹⁸

Suprabhā's story is of interest in relation to the sense 'go' rather than 'come', as the Pali Commentaries interpret in Bhaddā Kuṇḍalakesā's verse in the *Therīgāthā* and *Apadāna* discussed above. In the present context the Sanskrit verb *gacchati*, in the second person of the imperative (*gaccha*), clearly indicates a command of going to or towards, moving away from the speaker, that is, the Buddha.¹¹⁹ A different impression is conveyed by the Tibetan version, with the adverb 'here', 'hither', 'to this place', 'over here', 'towards here' (*tshur*) plus the imperative 'come' (*shog*) that follow the vocative 'young lady' (*gzhon nu*). This reading makes sense contextually since

in this version the Buddha is not shown referring Suprabhā to Mahāprajāpatī or sending her to a nunnery. The Chinese version uses the expression 善來, ‘well-come’, ‘welcome’, which seems to leave little room for ambivalence, in that it is commonly used as a counterpart to the imperative *ehi* as in *ehi, bhikṣuṇī*/善來比丘尼.

An aspect of interest is that the miraculous disappearance of the hair – symbolising the lay condition – and the appearance of the robes on Suprabhā’s body in the Tibetan and Chinese versions of the *Avadānaśataka* are suggestive of the supernormal change to monastic appearance and of the materialisation of the monastic requisites that the Theravāda commentators, as discussed earlier, reserve exclusively for prospective male *ehi*-monastics.

Furthermore, the *Śārdūlakarṇa-avadāna* of the *Divyāvadāna*, a text stemming from a Mūlasarvāstivāda tradition,¹²⁰ tells the story of the ordination of the outcaste *caṇḍālā* girl Prakṛti as an *ehibhikṣuṇī*.¹²¹ Prakṛti’s story presents all the indispensable elements that appear to constitute an *ehi-upasampadā*, namely an *ehi*-statement followed by an exhortation to live the holy life as well as the miraculous monastic metamorphosis. The fact that she appears shaven and robed (*muṇḍā kāṣāyapravṛtā*) immediately after the *ehi*-injunction, as in the two versions of Suprabhā’s story, indicates that at least for the transmitters of these stories such a supernormal event in connection with the Buddha’s utterance of an *ehi*-order was not categorically restricted to males.

An allusion to the same episode is found in the **Vinaya-mātrkā* (毘尼母經), a text of uncertain school affiliation.¹²² A passage in this text explains that there are four types of *bhikṣuṇī* ordination, the first being the type of the **Mātāṅgī* girl, which must be a reference to the ordination of the *caṇḍālā* girl of the Mātāṅgī clan.¹²³ The same text describes the miraculous appearance of the robe on the body of an *ehibhikṣuṇī*.¹²⁴

Last, another Sanskrit collection of Mūlasarvāstivāda affiliation, the *Ratnamālā-avadāna*, a mediaeval versification of the *Avadānaśataka*, describes how Kṣemā, having received her parents’ consent, goes to the Buddha to request ordination, and the latter sends her to Mahāprajāpatī. In other cases the instruction is given by an anonymous preceptress.¹²⁵ The *Ratnamālā-avadāna* furnishes the additional detail that Mahāprajāpatī Gautamī welcomes Kṣemā by means of an *ehi*-utterance followed by the going forth with the customary exhortation to live the holy life and, apparently, by the instant appearance of the shaven head and the bowl and robe requisites.¹²⁶ These elements are not present in the fixed module employed in the corresponding story of Kṣemā in the *Avadānaśataka* (VIII.79) in which the Buddha sends a woman to Mahāprajāpatī Gautamī and the woman is ordained under her,¹²⁷ a module that recurs also in other stories included in the same chapter of the *Avadānaśataka* as well as in the *Karmaśataka*.¹²⁸ This is the only intriguing case I have encountered so far of a monk or a nun, in this case the founding

figure of the nuns' order, Mahāprajāpatī Gautamī, rather than the Buddha, being on record for giving an *ehi*-type order. Further exploration in this area is much needed but it falls outside my present scope.

From this limited excursus into the Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda canonical and later traditions – the latter being, just like the Pali Commentaries, a testimony to textual and doctrinal developments underway in the Middle Period of Buddhism – it is apparent that the Theravāda canonical and commentarial traditions are not alone in uncertainties and multivocality in the matter of *ehibhikkhunīs*.

It seems that the Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda are closer to the canonical Theravāda perspective than to the commentarial Theravāda perspective, which is quite monolithic in its opposition to the idea of *ehibhikkhunīs*. This monolithic stance could point to a change in attitude within the Theravāda tradition, and it could also signify authority pressure and less freedom for divergent views within a given group, namely the Theravāda, in contrast to less homogenous and standardised traditions such as those of the Greater Sarvāstivāda.

On the other hand, it seems to me that the discrepancy in the positions taken even within a single textual tradition may not only reflect regional variation or a divergence in opinions. It may also reflect the fact that these lists and definitions had a practical function: deciding who is a legal and valid *bhikkhunī*/*bhikṣuṇī*, who is to follow the rules, etc. Such a practical function continued to be of relevance both in the beginning of the legislative and textual process as well as over time. Thus types of ordination and monastic statuses that were relevant in the early stages of the institutional development of the *saṅgha* would no longer be relevant at a later time (e.g., the case of the *ehibhikkhu*/*ehibhikṣu*). These passages illustrate well how the later textual tradition inherits the earlier definitions and finds itself compelled to handle them on a purely normative level once they no longer have direct practical application.

(Uncertain) conclusion

What has the foregoing lengthy and somewhat intricate case study of Baddhā Kuṇḍalakesā's ordination demonstrated? A considerable degree of historical and legal uncertainty deserves to be acknowledged in the canonical evidence. This comes combined with the undisputed opinion of the classical Theravāda Commentaries and Subcommentaries that Baddhā was not an *ehibhikkhunī* and that there were no *ehibhikkhunīs*. A cursory look outside the confines of the Theravāda tradition makes the textual, let alone historical, uncertainties increase.

Where the canonical evidence is scanty and indecisive, and the received texts conditioned by the peculiar dynamics of the oral transmission, the Theravāda commentarial exegeses present a coherent text-critical and

legal reading of the canonical sources that – coloured as it is by notions of insufficient merit on the part of Bhaddā or women in general, etc. – in my opinion deserves to be studied on its own terms and in its own right, and to be taken seriously as a philological and legal explanation among others.

In line with the explanation in the Theravāda Commentaries and Subcommentaries, it is possible that the *ehibhikkhuni-upasampadā* was actually included in the *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga* definition of a *bhikkhunī* in parallel with the corresponding listing in the *Bhikkhu-vibhaṅga*, either without fully taking into consideration the textual problems implied by such an insertion, or considering it as a theoretical possibility that is normatively envisaged as possible, regardless of whether historically the Buddha ordained Bhaddā as an ‘*ehi, Bhadde*’ *bhikkhunī* (possibly even sending her to the nunnery afterwards) or other women as *ehibhikkhunīs*. In other words, from a Theravāda legal perspective the *ehibhikkhunī* is normatively envisaged as possible (which is why it is included in the canonical list), yet it is viewed as historically impossible (which is why it is explained away by the Commentaries).

The interpretation of what the injunction ‘*ehi, Bhadde*’ may have meant to the transmitters and the audience of the texts remains uncertain. Might Bhaddā Kuṇḍalakesā simply be an exceptional case, an **ehibhadde-bhikkhunī* rather than an *ehibhikkhuni-bhikkhunī*, as it were, just like the seven-year old monk Bhadda in the *Theragāthā*, who apparently received his *upasampadā* from the Buddha through the address ‘*ehi, Bhadda*’? Might instead ‘*ehi, Bhadde*’ actually mean ‘go, Bhaddā’, rather than ‘come, Bhaddā’. indicating an order to go and get ordained in the regular manner? If so, could this be a case of textual abbreviation, with the details of the ordination procedure omitted due to the verse medium? Or might the almost identical verse attributed to the male Bhadda in the *Theragāthā* have been simply applied to the female case of Bhaddā at an early stage of transmission, with or without the transmitters realising the legal implications of the formula? Might it be that after all neither Bhaddā nor any other nun in the early Buddhist community ever were *ehibhikkhunīs*?

A close reading of the relevant sources has shown that the textual inconsistencies and uncertainties cannot be easily harmonised or explained away, but rather point to a process of concurrent and multiple redactional developments. A more in-depth comparative study of all *Vinayas* and their respective scholastic traditions might throw further light on this process. In fact, the complexity of the transmission process and of the received sources is such that the historical circumstances of Bhaddā Kuṇḍalakesā’s *upasampadā* may well remain uncertain regardless of the number of textual accounts employed.

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Abbreviations

AN	<i>Aṅguttara-nikāya</i>
AN-ṭ	<i>Aṅguttaranikāya-ṭikā</i> (<i>Sāratthamañjūsā</i>)
Ap	<i>Apadāna</i>
Ap-a	<i>Apadāna-aṭṭhakathā</i> (<i>Visuddhajanavilāsini</i>)
As	<i>Atthasālinī</i>
B ^e (CS)	Burmese edition (Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana Tipiṭaka 4.0, Vipassana Research Institute)
B ^e	Burmese edition
Bv-a	<i>Buddhavaṃsa-aṭṭhakathā</i>
CBETA	Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association
CS	Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana Tipiṭaka
Cv	<i>Vinayapiṭaka Cullavagga</i>
D	Derge edition (Tōhoku)
Dhp	<i>Dhammapada</i>
Dhp-a	<i>Dhammapada-aṭṭhavaṇṇanā</i>
Dhs	<i>Dhammasaṅgaṇī</i>
DN	<i>Dīgha-nikāya</i>
E ^e	European edition (PTS)
It	<i>Itivuttaka</i>
Jā	<i>Jātaka-aṭṭhavaṇṇanā</i> or <i>Jātaka-aṭṭhakathā</i>
MN	<i>Majjhima-nikāya</i>
Mp	<i>Manorathapurāṇī</i>
Mv	<i>Vinaya-piṭaka Mahāvagga</i>
P	Peking edition (Ōtani)
Pj (I)	<i>Paramatthajotikā</i> (I)
Pp	<i>Puggalapaññatti</i>
Ps	<i>Papañcasūdanī</i>
PTS	Pali Text Society
SĀ	<i>Samyukta-āgama</i> (T 99)
SĀ ²	<i>Samyukta-āgama</i> (T 100)
SN	<i>Samyutta-nikāya</i>
Sp	<i>Samantapāsādikā</i>
Sp-ṭ	<i>Samantapāsādikā-ṭikā</i>
Spk	<i>Sāratthappakāsini</i>
Sv	<i>Sumaṅgalavilāsini</i>
Sv-pt	<i>Sumaṅgalavilāsini-purāṇa-ṭikā</i>
T	Taishō edition (CBETA, 2014)
Th	<i>Theragāthā</i>
Th-a	<i>Theragāthā-aṭṭhakathā</i>
Thī	<i>Therīgāthā</i>
Thī-a	<i>Therīgāthā-aṭṭhakathā</i>
Ud	<i>Udāna</i>
Vin	<i>Vinaya-piṭaka</i>
Vjb-ṭ	<i>Vajirabuddhi-ṭikā</i>
Vmv	<i>Vimativinodanī</i>

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Notes

- 1 Bhaddā's epithet is also sometimes spelled Kuṇḍalakesī; on this epithet see note 5 below. The *Therīgāthā* gives her name as Subhaddā rather than Bhaddā as more commonly found in other literary sources, and it contains five verses attributed to her, Thī 107–111. Among modern translations of these verses see, e.g., Filippani-Ronconi 1968: 707, Norman 1991: 14, Pruitt 1998–1999: 141 (which is nearly identical to Norman's), Masset 2005: 45–46 and Hallisey 2015: 65.
- 2 The *Apadāna* is not recognised as canonical by the *dīgha-bhānakas* and is considered to be one of the last books added to the Theravāda canon; see von Hinüber 1996: 61 [§ 121]. In the 'practical canon' of Theravāda, however, the *Apadāna* is basically perceived as 'canonical', just as are the stories in the *Jātaka* Commentary or the *Dhammapada* Commentary.
- 3 Thī 109: *nihacca jāṇuṃ vanditvā, saṃmukhā añjaliṃ akaṃ; ehi, bhadde ti maṃ avaca, sā me ās' ūpasampadā.*
- 4 Among recent publications studying Bhaddā's story are Todeschini 2013 and Collett 2016: 57–65.
- 5 That she was a former Jain is indicated by the epithet 'curly locks' acquired from her hair growing back in curls after she had sought to have it pulled out in observance of the practice of *keśaluñcana* when going forth as a Jain ascetic. The episode is found in Mp I 372,19–22 (translated in Ānandajoti 2015: 121), Ap XXI.36b at Ap II 563,8 (*santikāṃ setavatthānaṃ upetvā pabbajim ahaṃ*, "Having gone into the presence of the White Robed Ones, I went forth") and Thī-a 105,7–11 on Thī 107 (translated in Pruitt 1998–1999: 141); cf. also Todeschini 2013: 174 note 57. The reference to wearing only a single robe (*ekasāṭī*) in Thī 107 points to a rule belonging to Śvetāmbara Jainism, as highlighted by Thī-a 105,11 (*ekasāṭī ti nigaṇṭhacāritavasena ekasāṭikā*, translated in Pruitt 1998–1999: 141); cf. also Nakamura 1984: 394 note 107 and Todeschini 2013: 160–161 note 11. My references to the *Therīgāthā* Commentary (Thī-a) are to the pages in the new PTS edition by Pruitt (1998) rather than to the 1893 edition by Müller.
- 6 Mp I 374,20–24 (translated in Ānandajoti 2015: 125) and Thī-a 102,6–8 (translated in Pruitt 1998–1999: 136); in Ap XXI.41 at Ap II 563,17–18 she does not have an encounter with Sāriputta but directly with the Buddha. Sāriputta is also on record in Jā II 2,20–25 for declining to give the going forth to four female ascetics he had just defeated in debate (Saccā, Paṭācārā, Lolā and Avavādakā) who had requested to ordain under him and for sending them to the nun Uppalavaṇṇā.
- 7 Ap XXI.44 at Ap II 563,23. The chapter of Bhaddā goes from Ap II 560 to 564 (translated in Walters 2018: 87–94).
- 8 Ap XXI.43–46a at Ap II 563,21–564,3: *tassa dhammaṃ suṇitv' āhaṃ, dhammacakkhuṃ visodhayaṃ; tato viññātasaddhammā, pabbajjaṃ upasampadaṃ, āyācito tadā āha, ehi, bhadde ti nāyako; tad āhaṃ upasampannā, parittaṃ toyam addasaṃ. pādapakkhālenāhaṃ, ṇatvā sa-udayabbayaṃ; tathā sabbe pi saṅkhārā, idisaṃ cintayaṃ tadā. tato cittaṃ vimucci me, anupādāya sabbaso.*
- 9 I take *tato viññātasaddhammā ... āyācito* as implying the truncated instrumental *mayā*: "then at the request of me, who had understood the True Teaching ..."; alternatively *viññātasaddhammā* could be understood as a *bāhubhīhi* compound in the nominative feminine singular, and thus *tato viññātasaddhammā* rendered as "and from that I understood the True Teaching."
- 10 In certain *Vinaya* narratives the imperative of the root *i* is sometimes replaced by another imperative fitting the context better; see for instance, the formula *siṃca bhikkhu imāṃ nāvāṃ* used in the *Mahāvastu* discussed in Tournier 2017: 95–96.
- 11 Vin I 12,19–13,2 [= Mv I.6.32–34]: *atha kho āyasmā aññāsi Koṇḍañño diṭṭhadhammo pattadhammo viditadhammo pariyoḡāḥhadhammo tiṇṇavicikiccho viḡatakathaṃkatho vesārajappatto aparappaccayo satthusāsane Bhagavantaṃ etad avoca: labheyyāhaṃ, bhante, Bhagavato santike pabbajjaṃ, labheyyaṃ upasampadaṃ ti. ehi bhikkhu ti Bhagavā avoca – svākkhāto dhammo, cara brahmacariyaṃ sammā dukkhassa antakiriyaṃ ti. sāva tassa āyasmato upasampadā aho. aha kho Bhagavā tad-avasese bhikkhū dhammiyā kathāya ovadī anusāsi. aha kho āyasmato ca Vappassa āyasmato ca bhaddiyassa Bhagavatā dhammiyā kathāya ovadīyamānānaṃ anusasiyamānānaṃ virajaṃ vītamalaṃ dhammacakkhuṃ udapādi: yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ sabbhaṃ taṃ nirodhadhammaṃ ti. te diṭṭhadhammā pattadhammā viditadhammā pariyoḡāḥhadhammā tiṇṇavicikicchā viḡatakathaṃkathā vesārajappattā aparappaccayā satthusāsane Bhagavantaṃ etad avocum: labheyyāma mayaṃ, bhante, Bhagavato santike pabbajjaṃ, labheyyāma upasampadaṃ ti. etha, bhikkhavo ti Bhagavā avoca – svākkhāto dhammo, caratha brahmacariyaṃ sammā dukkhassa antakiriyaṃ ti. sāva tesāṃ āyasmantānaṃ upasampadā aho. The version of the *Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta* included in the *Samyutta-nikāya* (SN 36.11) ends earlier.*

- 12 The rendering “having attained without another’s help to full confidence in the teacher’s instruction” here and below in Horner 1951: IV 18 and 19 is incorrect; obviously, the Buddha’s former companions received their instruction from the Buddha himself, and only with their own attainment of stream-entry they awoke to the Dhamma as instructed by the Buddha, becoming thereupon independent of others and self-reliant in the Teacher’s instruction: cf., e.g., SN 12.15 at SN II 17,17–20: *dukkham-eva uppajjamānaṃ uppajjati, dukkhaṃ nirujjhamānaṃ nirujjhatī ti na kaṅkhatī na vicikicchati aparapaccayā nāṇaṃ ev’ assa ettha hoti. ettāvātā kho ... sammā dīṭṭhi hoti.*
- 13 These are: the already mentioned Koṇḍañña and, as a group, his four companions in ascetic Vappa, Bhaddiya, Mahānāma and Assaji, all five after having attained stream-entry (Vin I 12–13 = Mv I.6.32–34); Yasa, right after having attained arahatship (Vin I 17–18 = Mv I.7.15) and, as a group, his four householder friends, young men of families of merchants (Vin I 19 = Mv I.9.3–4), and then his further fifty householder friends, all after having attained stream-entry; a group of thirty friends (Vin I 23–24 = Mv I.14.5), introducing themselves to the Buddha as being a group of as many as thirty friends of high standing, with their wives, who were amusing themselves in a grove, one of them having no wife, so that a woman of low standing was brought along for him (Vin I 23 = Mv I.14.2); as a group, the matted-haired ascetic Kassapa of Uruvelā and his followers (Vin I 33 = Mv I.20.19); as a group, the matted-haired ascetic Kassapa of the River and his followers (Vin I 33 = Mv I.20.20); as a group, the matted-haired ascetic Kassapa of Gayā and his followers (Vin I 33–34 = Mv I.20.23); and, as a pair, Kolita and Upatissa (Moggallāna and Sāriputta) (Vin I 42–43 = Mv I.24.4). Thus the remark in Sujāto 2012: 144 that Bhaddā “was ordained by the Buddha in Rājagaha using the ‘Come, bhikkhuni!’ formula, the same method used to give bhikkhu ordination to the early *jaṭila* and *samana* converts” is incorrect: first, the texts never state anywhere that the Buddha used the *ehibhikkhuni* formula (if she was ordained, it was by an ‘*ehi, Bhaddē*’ formula); second, Bhikkhu Sujāto’s formulation seems to convey the wrong impression that the *ehi*-formula is exclusively used for ordaining former non-Buddhist ascetics such as Bhaddā, who had probably been a Jain mendicant for some time before encountering Sāriputta or the Buddha.
- 14 On these two forms see the discussion in Anālayo 2011a: I 21–22.
- 15 Vin III 24,3–6: *bhikkhū ti ... [6] ehibhikkhū ti bhikkhu.*
- 16 The Theravāda Commentaries and Subcommentaries contain several references to instances of *ehibhikkhu* ordinations; e.g., Dh-p-I 85 refers to Yasa’s ordination, Sp II 506,11–13 = Spk II 216,1–3 speaks of the venerable Lakkhaṇa from among a thousand Jaṭilas who was fully ordained as an *ehibhikkhu*. A passage in the *Vinaya* Commentary (*Samantapāsādikā*) adds many more cases to the five ascetics former companions of the Bodhisatta who became the first five *bhikkhus*, Yasa and his following of fifty-four friends, the thirty Bhaddavaggiyas, the thousand Jaṭilas (fire worshippers led by Uruvela-Kassapa), the two hundred and fifty wanderers together with the two future chief disciples of the Buddha Sāriputta and Moggallāna, and Aṅgulimāla that, the Commentary notes, are mentioned in the (other) Commentaries; see Sp I 240,4–241,7 (on Vin III 24,5): *ehi bhikkhū ti ehi bhikkhu nāma Bhagavato ehi bhikkhū ti vacanamattena bhikkhubhāvaṃ ehibhikkhūpasampadam patta. Bhagavā hi ehibhikkhubhāvaṃ upanissayasampannaṃ puggalaṃ disvā rattapaṃsukūlantarato savaṇṇavaṇṇaṃ dakkhiṇahatthaṃ nīharitvā brahmaghosāṃ nicchārento: ehi, bhikkhu, cara brahmacariyaṃ sammā dukkhassa antakiriyaṃ ti vadati. tassa saḥ’ eva Bhagavato vacanena gihiliṅgaṃ antaradhāyati, pabbajjā ca upasampadā ca ruhati. haṇḍu kāsāyavasano hoti. ekaṃ nivāsetvā ekaṃ pārupitvā ekaṃ aṃse thapetvā vāmaṃsakūṭe āsattanūppalavaṇṇamattikāpato: ticīvaraṇ ca patta ca, vāsi sūci ca bandhanaṃ; parissāvanena aṭṭhete, yuttayogassa bhikkhuṇo ti. evaṃ vutehi aṭṭhahi parikkhārehi sarīre paṭimukkehiyeva Saṭṭhivassikatthero viya iriyāpāthasampanno buddhācariyako buddhupajjhāyako sammāsambuddhaṃ vandamāno-y-eva tiṭṭhati. Bhagavā hi paṭhamabodhiyaṃ ekasmiṃ kāle ehibhikkhūpasampadāya eva upasampādeti. evaṃ upasampannāni ca saḥassupari ekacattālīsuttarāni tīṇi bhikkhusatāni ahesuṃ, seyyathidam: pañca Pañcavaggiyattherā, Yaso kulaputto, tassa parivārā catuṃsaṃsā sahāyaka, tiṃsa Bhaddavaggiyā, saḥassa Purāṇajaṭilā, saddhīṃ dvīhi aggasāvakehi aḍḍhateyyasatā paribbājaka, eko Aṅgulimālatthero ti. vuttaṃ h’ etaṃ Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ: tīṇi satāṃ saḥassaṇ ca, cattālīsaṃ punāpare; eko ca therō Sappaṇṇo, sabbe te ehibhikkhukā ti. na kevalaṇ ca ete eva, aññepi bahū santi. seyyathidam tīsataparivāro Selo brāhmaṇo, saḥassaparivāro Mahākappino, dasasahassā kapilavathuvāsino kulaputtā, soḥsasahassā Pārāyanikabrāhmaṇā ti evam ādayo. te pana Vinayapiṭake pāḷiyaṃ na niddiṭṭhattā na vuttā. ime tattha niddiṭṭhattā vuttā ti. sattavisa saḥassāni, tīṇi-y-eva satāni ca; ete’ pi sabbe saṅkhātā, sabbe te ehibhikkhukā ti. Payutto 2016 [2013]: 235 writes: “[t]he commentaries state that the method of *ehi bhikkhu upasampadā* only occurred in the beginning period of the Buddha’s teaching (the texts conclude that this was the first twenty years after the*

- Buddha's awakening). It did not occur in the final twenty-five years of the Buddha's life" and gives reference to Sp I 240 in support of his statement. I was not able to find a chronological statement in the passage in question except for the positioning of the *ehibhikkhu* ordinations at a time right after his attainment of full awakening mentioned at Sp I 240,20–21: *Bhagavā hi pathambodhiyaṃ ekasmiṃ kāle ehibhikkhūpasampadāya eva upasampādesi*.
- 17 Vin IV 214,4–7: *bhikkhunī ti: ... [6] ehibhikkhunī ti bhikkhunī*.
 - 18 Th 473–479a at Th 50,1–13 (translation in Norman 2007b: 55): *ekaputto ahaṃ āsiṃ, piyo mātu piyo pitu; bahūhi vatacariyāhi, laddho āyācanāhi ca. te ca maṃ anukampāya, atthakāmā hitesino; ubho pitā ca mātā ca, buddhassa upanāmayuṃ. kicchā laddho ayaṃ putto, sukhumālo sukhedhito; imaṃ dadāma te nātha, jīnassa paricārakaṃ. sathā ca maṃ paṭiggayha, ānandaṃ etad abravi; pabbājehi imaṃ khippaṃ, hessatvājāniyo ayaṃ. pabbājetvāna maṃ sathā, vihāraṃ pāvīsī jīno; anoggatasmīṃ sūriyasmiṃ, tato cittaṃ vimucci me. tato sathā nirākatvā, paṭisallānavuṭṭhito; ehi, Bhaddā ti maṃ āha, sā me āsūpasampadā. jātiyā sattavassena, laddhā me upasampadā*.
 - 19 On problems of authorship, dating and duplication of verses in the *Theragāthā* see Norman 2007b [1997]: xvi–xviii; a recent exploration of some of the different types of 'authorial presence' within the early strata of the Pali corpus is Shaw 2013–2014 (2015), see particularly pp. 437–444 for the *Theragāthā* and *Therīgāthā*.
 - 20 Th 624–625 at Th 64,5–8 (translation in Norman 2007b [1997]: 69): *vanditvā sathuno pāde ekamantaṃ thito tadā, pabbajjaṃ ahaṃ āyāciṃ sabbasattānaṃ uttamaṃ; tato kāruṇiko sathā sabbalokānukampako: ehi, bhikkhū ti maṃ āha; sā me ās' upasampadā*.
 - 21 Th 869–870 at Th 81,12–17 (translation in Norman 2007b [1997]: 91): *avandī coro sugatassa pāde tath' eva pabbajjaṃ ayāci buddhaṃ. Buddha ca kho kāruṇiko mahesi yo sathā lokassa sadevakassa; tam ehi, bhikkhū ti tadā avoca, es' eva tassa aha bhikkhubhāvō*.
 - 22 MN 86 at MN II 100,7–11. In view of my main focus on the Theravāda tradition, here and elsewhere I do not give reference to discourse parallels transmitted by other early lineages of reciters.
 - 23 Cf. Payutto 2016 [2013]: 234.
 - 24 Payutto 2016 [2013]: 234: "the term *ehi* or *ehi bhikkhu* is not a formal name for this method of ordination. It is simply a Pali term used for addressing an individual. When the monks from the past wished to refer to this kind of ordination, however, it was difficult to find a concise designation for it, and therefore they used this term of address to describe this form of ordination. The expression *ehi bhikkhu* translates simply as 'Come, bhikkhu,' 'Welcome, venerable,' or something of this manner. And it is used in other contexts as well, as can be seen in Tipiṭaka passages in which bhikkhus speak with one another."
 - 25 SN 16.6 at SN II 204,8–10: *ehi, bhikkhu, ko bahutaraṃ bhāsissati ko sundaratarāṃ bhāsissati ko ciratarāṃ bhāsissati ti*.
 - 26 SN 16.8 at SN II 209,13–14: *ehi, bhikkhu, idaṃ āsanaṃ nisidāhi*.
 - 27 *ehi, tvam, bhikkhu, mama vacanena* [proper name] *bhikkhuṃ āmantehi* in DN 16 at DN II 143,30, MN 22 at MN I 131,35, MN 38 at MN I 258,1, MN 48 at MN I 321,8, SN 21.4 at SN II 277,23, SN 22.84 at SN III 106,25, Ud 2.10 at 19,9, Ud 3.2 at Ud 22,2, Ud 2.8 at Ud 18. Other examples given by Alsdorf 1967: 316–318 are: DN 16 at DN 98,26 (*etha, tumhe, bhikkhave, samantā vesālīṃ yathāmittaṃ yathāsandīṭṭhaṃ yathāsambhattaṃ vassaṃ upetha*); MN 65 at MN I 436,18–25 (*tathāgato purisadammaṃ labhitvā pathamaṃ evaṃ vineti: ehi, tvam bhikkhu sīlavā hoti pātīmokkhasaṃvarasaṃvutā viharāhi ācāragocarasampanno, aṇumattesu vajjesu bhayadassāvī samādāya sikkhassu sikkhāpadesu ti. yato kho brāhmaṇa, bhikkhu sīlavā hoti, pātīmokkhasaṃvarasaṃvuto viharatī ācāragocarasampanno aṇumattesu vajjesu bhayadassāvī samādāya sikkhati sikkhāpadesu. tamaṇaṃ tathāgato uttariṃ vineti: ehi, tvam bhikkhu, indriyesu guttadvāro hohi*); MN 21 at MN I 124,9–13 (*ahaṃ kho, bhikkhave, ekāsanabhojanaṃ bhūñjāmi. ekāsanabhojanaṃ kho ahaṃ bhikkhave bhūñjāmaṇō appābādhatāṇ ca saññānāmi appātaṅkataṇ ca lahuṭṭhānaṇ ca balaṇ ca phāsuvihāraṇ ca. etha, tumhe pi bhikkhave ekāsanabhojanaṃ bhūñjatha*); SN 35.127 at SN IV 110,30 (*etha, tumhe, bhikkhave, mātumattīsu mātucittaṃ upaṭṭhāpetha*).
 - 28 By way of a tangential observation, the words *bhikkhu* or *bhikkhunī* do not always refer to someone who has received the higher ordination. There are passages where the Buddha says "a [true] *bhikkhu* is someone who ..." or "not a [true] *bhikkhu* is someone who ...", for instance the verse in the *ovāda-pātīmokkha*. In such contexts *bhikkhu* is a synonym of spiritual practitioner, renunciant or *samaṇa*. Likewise, when the Buddha addressed his former five companions of asceticism, he called them '*bhikkhus*' even before they had gained faith in him or got ordained under him. A particularly clear example from the discourses is a passage in the *Āṅguttara-nikāya* in which Ānanda is asked what kind of *bhikkhu* he is, thereby showing

- that even non-Buddhist monastics would sometimes be called *bhikkhus*; see AN 10.96 at AN V 196,9-13 (translated in Bodhi 2012: 1472), in which the venerable Ānanda, questioned in his identity by the non-Buddhist wanderer Kokanada, introduces himself as ‘a *bhikkhu*’, at which the non-Buddhist wanderer queries from which group of *bhikkhus*, and Ānanda says that he belongs to the recluses (*samaṇa*) who follow the Sakyan son. The parallels SĀ 967 at T II 248b16-18 and SĀ² 201 at T II 448a26-29, however, speak throughout of an ascetic (沙門); the relevant words are not preserved in the fragmentary Sanskrit manuscript in Pischel 1904: 813 and Lévi 1904: 300–301.
- 29 Cf. Payutto 2016 [2013]: 234.
- 30 Cf. also Payutto 2016 [2013]: 233: “[Bhaddā’s] statement, however, is found in a poetic verse (there are similar verses quoting *bhikkhus*), and therefore it is not totally clear or decisive.”
- 31 Alsdorf 1967: 316–317: “[d]enn wenn zwar die altkanonischen Palitexte keine mit *ehi bhikkhu / etha bhikkhavo* beginnende Ordinationsformel kennen ... In ihr haben wir also keineswegs die echte älteste Ordinationsformel vor uns, sondern eine nachträgliche Erfindung, eine Fiktion, die in die Urgeschichte des Ordens hineinprojiziert wird.” Cf. also Anālayo 2015: 416 note 15 and Anālayo 2017: 266 note 95, who finds the suggestion by Alsdorf that the *ehi*-type of ordination is a later invention unconvincing.
- 32 E.g., Rhys Davids’ 1909: 67 note 4, Norman’s 2007b [1971]: 84, Skilling 2001: 154, von Hinüber 2008: 20 note 53, Anālayo 2010: 84, Sujāto 2012: 144, Anālayo 2015: 416 note 15.
- 33 E.g., Anālayo 2010: 84 (a position revisited in Anālayo 2017: 266 note 95), Shih 2000: 420–421, Sujāto 2012: 177.
- 34 Chung 2006: 13–14 suggests that it is not impossible that, initially, the *bhikkhunī-saṅgha* developed in a way that is parallel to the *bhikkhu-saṅgha*. Similar to the first monks, the first nuns would have been ordained through an *ehi*-formula pronounced by the Buddha himself. The *bhikkhunī-saṅgha* would have subsequently developed similar to the way the monks’ community did, leading to a *ñātticatuttha-kamma* ordination for monks in the *bhikkhu-saṅgha* and for nuns in the *bhikkhunī-saṅgha*, that is, each community having its own single ordination procedure performed by their own members. The second *ñātticatuttha-kamma* for women in the *bhikkhunī-saṅgha* would then only be a later addition. In light of the textual sources at our disposition on the development of the *bhikkhunī-saṅgha* (Theravāda or stemming from other lineages of transmission) and in the absence of any instances of *ehibhikkhuni* ordinations in the *Vinaya*, this reconstruction is implausible.
- 35 E.g., Williams 2000 and Williams 2005: 117–120.
- 36 Cf. also Pruitt 1998–1999: 140 note 1 and 142 note 2.
- 37 Cf. also Shih 2000: 387.
- 38 Payutto 2016 [2013]: 234 comments: “whether Ven. Bhaddā-Kuṇḍalakesā was an *ehi bhikkhunī* or not, this does not alter the points of the discussion here. If she was an *ehi bhikkhunī*, she would have entered the monastic sangha in the same way as an *ehi bhikkhu*, having been ordained directly by the Buddha. This is a unique form of ordination which does not require a formal community decision. It is an exception to the rule.”
- 39 To remain within the Theravāda tradition, the case of Bhaddā Kāpilānī, the former wife of Mahākassapa, is different. After having gone forth from the household life, she made her own way to the Tithiyārāma near the Jetavana and only five years later, after Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī and her Sakyan followers were ordained, became a disciple of Gotamī, received the full ordination and attained arahantship; see Mp I 376,10–16: *ayaṃ Bhadda-Kāpilānī vāmamaggaṃ gaṇhītvā mātuḡāmassa pabbajjāya ananuññātabhāvena paribbājikārāmaṃ agamāsi. yadā paṇa Mahāpajāpatīgotamī pabbajjā ca upasampadañ ca labhi, tadā sā therī theriyā santike pabbajjā ca upasampadañ ca labhītvā, aparabhāge vipassanāya kammaṃ karonī arahattaṃ patvā pubbenivāsāṇe cinnavasī ahoṣi.*
- 40 I discuss the different legal interpretations at the basis of the contemporary re-establishment of the Theravāda *bhikkhunī* order and the institution of *sikkhamānā* as a case study in a monograph under preparation.
- 41 Published at <https://sujato.wordpress.com/2009/11/08/bhikkhu-bodhis-revised-response/> on 12.09.2009.
- 42 Note that there also are a few non-technical occurrences of *sikkhamānā*-related lexicon in the *Therīgāthā*, in the sense of trainees on the path; see Thī 2, Thī 99, Thī 331 and Thī 518.
- 43 The same could be said for the inference by Sujāto 2012: 75–111 that the rules prohibiting nuns from dwelling in the wilderness or traveling alone – notably *saṅghādisesa* rule no. 3 for *bhikkhunīs* – must be late additions. He bases this on the diction of the *Therīgāthā*, which he regards as evidence that nuns were wandering across India and meditating alone at the foot of trees. A poetic hagiography in verse with the spotlight on specific features and symbols of

- the ascetic life need not be taken literally, for example ruling out that another nun would be meditating not far from the *therī* in question yet allowing her enough seclusion, or that the featured nun would be accompanied by a follower on her tours.
- 44 See von Hinüber 1996: 141–142 [§ 286]. According to Cousins 1972, Dhammapāla could have lived in the seventh century at the earliest and it still remains unclear whether there are one or two Dhammapālas: if there was only one, he would be the author not only of the *aṭṭhakathās* but also of the *ṭīkāś*, and thus date from the tenth century at the earliest; see also Kieffer-Pülz 2013: I 10–11 for further references.
- 45 In fact, in the older layers of the *Vinaya* the verb *vuṭṭhāpeti* is used for nuns and not *upasampādeti* as in the *Therīgāthā* verse. On *vuṭṭhāpeti* see Shih 2000: 373–404 and especially Norman 2001: 121–37 [= Norman 2007a: 199–215]. As noted by Kieffer-Pülz in Norman, Kieffer-Pülz and Pruitt 2018: 80 note 1, Norman and Pruitt in their translation of the *Pāṭimokkha* translated *vuṭṭhāpeti* as ‘to sponsor [for ordination]’, however, “[s]ince in connection with the ordination in the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha the verb *vuṭṭhāpeti* is used, and the casuistry makes it clear that the legal procedure spoken about is a *ñatti-catuttha-kamma* (for instance, Vin IV 317,25–30) — not a *ñatti-dutiya-kamma* as necessary for the *vuṭṭhā(pa)na-sammūti* ‘allowance for ordination’ which precedes the ordination — it is clear that the activity referred to by *vuṭṭhāpeti* is the ordination of a candidate within the Bhikkhunī Saṅgha.” Accordingly, in this context they translate it as ‘ordain’.
- 46 Thī-a 269,14–271,14: *tathā satthuladdh’ ūpasampadā saṅghato laddh’ ūpasampadā ti duvidhā. garudhammapaṭiḅggaṇaṃ hi laddh’ ūpasampadā Mahāpajāpatiḅgotamī satthusantikā va laddhūpasampadattā satthuladdh’ ūpasampadā nāma. sesā sabbāpi saṅghato laddhūpasampadā. tāpi ekato-upasampannā ubhato-upasampannā ti duvidhā. tattha yā tā Mahāpajāpatiḅgotamiyā saddhiṃ nikkhantā pañcasatā Sākiyāniyo, tā ekato-upasampannā bhikkhusaṅghato eva laddhūpasampadattā Mahāpajāpatiḅgotamiṃ thapetvā. itarā ubhato-upasampannā ubhatosāṅghe upasampadattā. ehibhikkhuduko viya ehibhikkhuniduko idha na labbhati. kasmā? bhikkhunīnaṃ tathā upasampadāya abhāvato. yaḍi evaṃ yaṃ taṃ therīgāthāya subhaddāya kuṇḍalakesāya vuttaṃ: nihacca jāṇuṃ vanditvā, sammukhā aṅjalim akāṃ; ehi, bhadde ti maṃ avaca, sā me ās’ ūpasampadā ti. tathā Apadāne pi: āyācīto tadā āha, ehi, bhadde ti nāyako; tad āhaṃ upasampannā, parittam toyamaddasān ti taṃ kathan ti? na-y-idaṃ ehibhikkhunibhāvena upasampadam sandhāya vuttaṃ; upasampadāya pana hetubhāvato yā satthu āṇatī, **sā me ās’** ūpasampadā ti vuttaṃ. tathā hi vuttaṃ Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ: **ehi, Bhadde**, bhikkhunupassayaṃ gantvā bhikkhunīnaṃ santike pabbajja upasampajjassū ti. **maṃ avoca** āṇāpesi. **sā** satthu āṇā mayhaṃ upasampadāya kāraṇattā **upasampadā** ahoṣī ti. eten’ eva Apadānagāthāya pi attho saṃvaṇṇito ti daṭṭhabbo. evaṃ pi bhikkhunivibhāṅge ehibhikkhunī ti. idaṃ kathan ti? ehibhikkhunibhāvena bhikkhunīnaṃ upasampadāya asabhāvavajatanavacanaṃ, tathā upasampadāya bhikkhunīnaṃ abhāvato. yaḍi evaṃ, kathaṃ ehibhikkhunī ti vibhāṅge niddeso kato ti? desanāyasaṅgapatitabhāvena. ayaṃ hi sotapatitā nāma [1] katthaci labbhamānassāpi anāhaṭaṃ hoti, yathā abhidhamme manodhātuniddese labbhamānaṃ pi jhānaṅgaṃ pañcaviṅṇānasotapatitāya na udhaṭaṃ. [2] katthaci desanāya asambhavato, yathā tath’ eva vatthuniddese hadayaṃvatthu. [3] katthaci alabbhamānassāpi gahaṇavasena tathā ṭhitakappiniddese. yathāha: katamo ca puggalo ṭhitakappī? ayaṃ ca puggalo sotāpattiphalaśacchikiriyāya paṭipanno assa, kappassa ca uddayaṇavelā assa, n’ eva tāva kappo uddayaheyya, yāvāyaṃ puggalo na sotāpattiphalaṃ sacchikarotī ti. evaṃ idhāpi alabbhamānagahaṇavasena veditabbaṃ. parikappavacanaṃ h’ etaṃ: sace Bhagavā bhikkhunibhāvayogyaṃ kañci mātuḅgāmaṃ ehibhikkhunī ti vadeyya, evaṃ pi bhikkhunibhāvo siyā ti. kasmā pana Bhagavā evaṃ na katheṣī ti? tathākatādhikāraṇaṃ abhāvato. ye pana anāsannasannihitabhāvato ti kāraṇaṃ vatvā bhikkhū eva hi satthu āsannaṅgāti sadā sannihitā va, tasmā te ehibhikkhū ti vattabbaṃ arahanti, na bhikkhunīyo ti vadanti, taṃ tesaṃ matimattaṃ, satthu āsannadārabhāvassa bhabbābhabbabhāvāsiddhattā. vuttaṃ h’ etaṃ Bhagavatā: saṅghāṭikaṇṇe cepi, bhikkhave, bhikkhu gaheṭvā piṭṭhito piṭṭhito anubandho assa pade padaṃ nikkhipanto, so ca hoti abhijjhālu kāmesu tibbasārāgo byāpannacitto padaṭṭhamaṇasaṅkappo muṭṭhassati asampajāno asamāhīto vibbhantacitto pakatindriyo, atha kho so ārakā va mayhaṃ, ahaṃ ca tassa. taṃ kissa hetu? dhammaṃ hi so, bhikkhave, bhikkhu na passati. dhammaṃ apassanto na maṃ passati. yojanasate cepi so, bhikkhave, bhikkhu vihareyya so ca hoti anabhijjhālu kāmesu na tibbasārāgo abyāpannacitto appaduṭṭhamanaśaṅkappo upaṭṭhamaṇasaṅkappo samāhīto ekaggacitto saṃvutindriyo, atha kho so santikeva mayhaṃ, ahaṃ ca tassa. taṃ kissa hetu? dhammaṃ hi so, bhikkhave, bhikkhu passati. dhammaṃ passanto maṃ passati ti. tasmā akāraṇaṃ desato satthu āsannānāsannatā. akatādhikāratāya pana bhikkhunīnaṃ tattha ayogyatā. tena vuttaṃ ehibhikkhuniduko idha na labbhati ti. evaṃ duvidhā. Here and when translating other commentarial passages, the parts put in bold are the words in the root text that are taken up for explanation (*pratīkas*), the sentences between the bold words are the explanations. The*

- text has been already translated in Pruitt 1998–1999: 379–382 and Comba 2019 [2016], a publication that came to my attention only after the present article had already been finalised.
- 47 This type of formulation may suggest reading all the events related to nuns recorded in the *Cullavagga*, up to the embarrassment episode leading to the establishment of the final stage of dual ordination, as being only about the Sakyan *bhikkhunīs*; I discuss the legal evolution of *bhikkhunī* ordination according to the Theravāda *Vinaya* in a monograph under preparation (cf. note 40 above).
- 48 An alternative rendition would be: “why is that which has been said in the Subhaddā Kuṇḍalakesā’s *Therīgāthā* [stated]?”
- 49 Pruitt 1998–1999: 380 renders *saṃmukhā añjaliṃ akaṃ* as “putting my raised hands together, I stood face to face with him.” Grammatically, the addition of the verb “I stood” appears unwarranted, as *saṃmukhā* refers to the spatial direction of the gesture of homage (Norman 1991 [1971]: 14, on which Pruitt’s rendering is based, marks the integration with parentheses: “Having bent the knee, having paid homage to him, (I stood) with cupped hands face to face with him.”).
- 50 The stanza corresponds verbatim with that in Ap XXI.44 at Ap 563.23–24. Multiple recensions of the *Apadāna* are known; see von Hinüber 1996: 61 [§ 123]. Although the recension quoted by Dhammapāla in his *Therīgāthā* Commentary is known to differ in wording from the transmitted *Apadāna*, there is no discrepancy in the present case. The verse is also identical in the *Sārattadīpanī-tīkā* and the *Vimativinodanī-tīkā* (to be discussed in sections 8.2 and 8.3 below), with the latter reusing Dhammapāla’s text. The reference to the water alludes to the event that precipitated Bhaddā’s attainment of arahatship. According to Ap XXI.44–46 as she was cleaning her feet, she discerned the movement of the water as a process of arising and disappearing, reflecting that all conditions are of the same nature, thereby attaining complete liberation from clinging. However, according to Mp I 375.5–7, she attained full awakening upon her first encounter with the Buddha, on the same evening of the day she had been defeated in debate by Sāriputta. She had expressed the wish to go for refuge in the presence of Sāriputta and the latter referred her to the Buddha. The verse uttered by the Buddha that precipitated her attainment is also found as Dh 101 (see section 6.2 below). It is after hearing this verse and attaining arahatship that Bhaddā asks the Buddha to go forth (*sā gāthāpariyosāne yathā thitā va, saha paṭisambhīdāhi arahattaṃ patvā pabbajjaṃ yāci*). With his assent, she goes to the monastery of the *bhikkhunīs* and finally goes forth there (*satthā tassā pabbajjaṃ sampaṭicchī, sā bhikkhunī-upassayaṃ gantvā pabbajī*). Thus whereas the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* Commentary places the ordination after the attainment of arahatship, the *Apadāna* places the episode of discerning the arising and disappearing of phenomena upon seeing the water and the attainment of arahatship after her ordination.
- 51 Possibly, *sandhāya* in *na ... sandhāya vuttaṃ* might carry a nuance of obliqueness, in the sense of ‘with implicit reference’, ‘with an allusion to’.
- 52 An alternative translation of the ambivalent sentence *ehibhikkhunibhāvena bhikkhunīnaṃ upasampadāya asabhāvajotanavacanaṃ* would be: “This is not a normal (*asabhāva*) statement (*jotanavacanaṃ*) which explains the *upasampadā* of *bhikkhunīs* by means of the *ehibhikkhuni-mode*” (considering *asabhāvajotanavacanaṃ* as a descriptive determinate compound (*kammadhāraya-samāsa*) in which the adjective (*visesana*) or qualifying word is placed before (*visesanapubbapade kammadhāraya*): *asabhāva* and *jotana* become adjectives to the noun *vacanaṃ* as they are conjoined and placed before it which they thus qualify, that is, they express what kind of attribute *vacanaṃ* has).
- 53 Here I take the quotative *ti* as marking that this is a reported question, the commentator taking up others’ views and refuting them.
- 54 Dhs 566–567 (≠ As 264.7–8).
- 55 The affirmation of such an impossibility is to be understood in light of the commentator’s understanding that the supramundane fruition immediately follows the path, as per the momentariness-based mapping of the noble path presupposed by the Theravāda Abhidhamma Commentaries; cf. also the remarks in Pruitt 1998–1999: 381 note 5: “*I.e.*, an impossible situation is described to show the power of attaining the fruition state of a Stream-Winner immediately after attaining the path.”
- 56 Alterative translation: “[It is] like this because of the absence of those [women] who performed an outstanding deed.”
- 57 Thī-a 105.21–28: *nihacca jāṇuṃ vanditvā ti jāṇudvayaṃ pathaviyaṃ nihantvā paṭiṭṭhapetvā pañcapaṭiṭṭhitena vanditvā. sammukhā añjaliṃ akaṃ ti satthu sammukhā dasanakhasamodhānasamujjalaṃ añjaliṃ akāsiṃ. ehi, Bhadde ti maṃ avaca, sā me ās’ upasampadā ti yaṃ maṃ Bhagavā arahattaṃ patvā pabbajjaṃ ca upasampadañca yācivā*

- thītaṃ ehi, Bhadde, bhikkhunupassayaṃ gantvā bhikkhunīnaṃ santike pabbaja upasampajjassū ti avaca ānāpesi. sā satthu ānā mayhaṃ upasampadāya kāraṇattā upasampadā āsi ahoṣi.*
- 58 Vjb-ṭ B° 350 [CS § 658].
- 59 I take up Vajirabuddhi's opinion on Bhaddā's case a few pages below, in section 8.1.
- 60 Shih 2000: 44–45 note 31 comments: “[t]his may be a mere copying of ‘Come, monk’ (*ehi bhikkhu*) ... Here the copying of ‘Come, nun’ formula indicates that to the canonical commentators this formula applied to both monks and nuns. The post-canonical commentators, however, intended to restrict this formula to monks alone.”
- 61 I am indebted to Bhikkhu Nāṇadassana for in-depth exchanges on this chronology, which I study in detail in a monograph under preparation (cf. notes 40 and 47 above).
- 62 Vjb-ṭ B° 350 [CS § 658]: *ehibhikkhunī ti bhikkhunī, tīhi saraṇagamanehi upasampannā ti bhikkhunī ti idaṃ pana desanāvīlāsavasena vuttan ti eke.*
- 63 Vjb-ṭ B° 128,24–26 [CS § 59–60] in Kieffer-Pülz 2013: I 127: *yattha yattha apare ti vā eke ti vā vuccati, tattha tattha suṭṭhu upaparikkhitvā yuttaṃ gaheṭṭabbaṃ, itaraṃ chaḍḍeṭṭabbaṃ,* “wherever ‘others’ (*apare*) or ‘some’ (*eke*) is said there, having well pondered it, a correct [statement] is to be accepted, the other is to be dismissed.” Kieffer-Pülz 2015: 432–433 comments: “[the] author, unlike later authors, rarely takes a firm stand but aims at presenting various opinions to enable the reader to form his or her own opinion.”
- 64 Vjb-ṭ B° 350 [CS § 658]: *desanāvīlāsena pana bhikkhudesanākamen’ eva bhikkhunīdesso vutto. ten’ eva bhikkhusaṅghavasena ekato-upasampannā bhikkhunīyo vijjānāpi tattha na vuttā.*
- 65 Mp I 368,1–3: *satthu dhammakathaṃ sutvā, sathāraṃ ekaṃ bhikkhunīṃ khippābhīṇānaṃ aggaṭṭhāne thapentaṃ disvā, adhikārakammaṃ katvā taṃ thānantaraṃ patthesi* (translated in Anandajoti 2015: 109); Ap XXI.46 at Ap II 563,3–4: *tato cittaṃ vimucci me, anupādāya sabbaso; khippābhīṇānaṃ aggaṃ me, tadā paññāpayi jino* (translated in Walters 2018: 93); Thī-a 97,22–24: *satthu santike dhammaṃ suṇanti sathāraṃ ekaṃ bhikkhunīṃ khippābhīṇānaṃ aggaṭṭhāne thapentaṃ disvā, adhikārakammaṃ katvā taṃ thānantaraṃ patthetvā.*
- 66 I am indebted to Bhikkhu Nāṇadassana for this clarification (personal communication, 02.05.2018).
- 67 Ps III 334,7–22: *tam ehi bhikkhū ti tadā avocāti Bhagavato imaṃ pabbājento kuhiṃ sathakam labhissāmi, kuhiṃ pattacīvaraṃ ti pariyesanakkiccam natthi, kammaṃ pana olokesi. athassa pubbe silavantānaṃ aṭṭhaparikkhārabanḍakassa dinnabhāvaṃ nātva dakkhīnahatthaṃ pasāretvā: ehi, bhikkhu svākhāto dhammo, cara brahmacariyaṃ sammā dukkhassa antakiriyyāyā ti āha. so saha vacaneneva iddhiṃ ayapattacīvaraṃ paṭilabhi. tāvad-evassa gihiliṅgaṃ antaradhāyi, samaṇaliṅgaṃ pāturu ahoṣi: ticīvaraṃ ca patto ca, vāsi sūci ca bandhanam; parissāvanena aṭṭhete, yuttayogassa bhikkhuno ti. evaṃ vuttā aṭṭha parikkhārā sarīrapaṭibaddhāva hutvā nibbattiṃsu. eeva tassa ahu bhikkhubhāvo ti esa ehibhikkhubhāvo tassa upasampannabhikkhubhāvo ahoṣi, na hi ehibhikkhūnaṃ visuṃ upasampadā nāma atthi.*
- 68 Mp I 159,21–23: *sathā etha, bhikkhavo ti hatthaṃ pasāresi. sabbesaṃ kesamassu antaradhāyi, iddhiṃ ayapattacīvaraṃ kāyapaṭibaddhaṃ ahoṣi.*
- 69 Mp I 138,7–19: *so ten’ eva niyāmena satta divasāni mahādānaṃ datvā bhattakiccapariyosāne dussakoṭṭhāgāraṃ vivarāpetvā uttamasukhumavattaṃ Buddhānaṃ pādamūle thapetvā bhikkhusatasahassaṃ ticīvarena acchādetvā tathāgataṃ upasaṅkamitvā, bhante, yo tumhehi ito satta divasamatthake bhikkhu etadagge thapito, aham pi so bhikkhu viya anāgata uppañjanakabuddhassa sāsane pabbajitvā paṭhamaṃ dhammaṃ paṭivijjhituṃ samattho bhavyeyyan ti vatvā satthu pādamūle sīsaṃ katvā nīpajji. sathā tassa vacanaṃ sutvā iminā kulaputtana mahā-adhikāro kato, samijjhissati nu kho etassa ayaṃ patthanā no ti anāgataṃ nānaṃ pesetvā āvajjento samijjhanabhāvaṃ ti passi.*
- 70 Sv II 473,11–16: *ehibhikkhubhāvena. Bhagavā kira tesaṃ iddhiṃ ayapattacīvarassūpanissayaṃ olokeno anekāsu jātsu cīvaradānādāni disvā etha, bhikkhavo ti ādimāha. te tāvad-eva bhaṇḍū kāsāyavasanaṃ aṭṭhahi bhikkhuparikkhārehi sarīrapaṭimukkeheva vassasatikattherā viya Bhagavantaṃ namassamānāva nisīdiṃsu.*
- 71 Dh-p-a II 121,15–122,4: *sathā, āgamiṣṣati nu kho imesaṃ kulaputtānaṃ iddhiṃ ayapattacīvaraṃ ti upadhārento, ime kulaputtā Paccekabuddhasahassassa cīvarasahassaṃ adamsu, kassapaṃ sammāsambuddhakāle vīsatiyā bhikkhusahassānaṃ pi vīsaticīvarasahassāni pi adamsu. anacchariyaṃ imesaṃ iddhiṃ ayapattacīvarāgamanānaṃ ti nātva dakkhīnahatthaṃ pasāretvā, etha, bhikkhavo, caratha brahmacariyaṃ sammā dukkhassa antakiriyyāyā ti āha. te tāvad-eva aṭṭhaparikkhārādhārā vassasatṭhikattherā viya hutvā vehāsaṃ abhuggantvā paccorohitvā sathāraṃ vanditvā nisīdiṃsu.*
- 72 von Hinüber 1996: 132 note 453 and 132–135 [§§ 260 and 262–269].
- 73 Dh-p-a I 395,7–8: *itthīnaṃ hi cīvaradānaṃ mahālatāpasādhanaḥḍena matthakaṃ pappo ti, purisānaṃ iddhiṃ ayapattacīvarena ti.*

- 74 Thī-a 270,24–25: *katādhikārānaṃ abhāvato*.
- 75 In her feminist-informed paper, Williams reads the descriptions in several stanzas in the *Therīgāthā* as being hints of *bhikkhunī* ordinations originally carried out by the *bhikkhunis* only, without the involvement of the *bhikkhus*; cf. also Williams 2005: 118–120. Such a reading is further articulated by Bhikkhu Sujāto: “[t]he institution of the dual ordination constitutes a major point of control by the bhikkhus over the bhikkhunis. Perhaps the Mahāvihāravāsin Vinaya preserves, in its intriguingly precise pattern of distinct ordination vocabularies for bhikkhus and bhikkhunis, a trace of a time when the bhikkhunis performed ordination by themselves, without the involvement of the bhikkhus” (Sujato 2012: 153–154). After presenting a philologically unconvincing elaboration based on an assemblage of passages in different Vinayas, he concludes: “[t]he texts speak of bhikkhuni ordination as *vuṭṭhāpana*, and there is no suggestion that the bhikkhus were involved. This is represented by the bhikkhuni *pāṭimokkha* and the *Therīgāthā*. If this textual strata represents a genuine historical stage, then I conclude that the bhikkhus did not, during the Buddha’s lifetime, take part in the bhikkhuni ordination. Later the bhikkhus introduced the dual ordination ... The dual ordination is mandated in all existing Vinayas, so it would be controversial to suggest that single ordination be applied in practice. My feeling is that it is nice for the bhikkhunis to take ordination from both Sanghas, and to experience a genuine acceptance from both the male and female communities. In fact, I would like to look at ways of mirroring the procedure, so that bhikkhus also went before the bhikkhuni Sangha to have their ordination acknowledged. Nevertheless, it remains the case that the dual ordination is potentially a powerful instrument of control by the bhikkhus. It seems undeniable that this was one of the purposes for introducing it in the first place” (Sujāto 2012: 158–159). Interestingly, such propositions, presented with scholarly authoritativeness, are often quite influential in contemporary social media and networks, being appropriated by Buddhist practitioners and at times ‘activists’ who campaign against gender discrimination and patriarchy in the Buddhist *saṅgha*.
- 76 The same has been noted also outside academic scholarship; for example, the Malaysian Buddhist teacher Piya Tan 2014: 143 writes: “Strangely, Dhammapāla strenuously, with obvious contrivance, tries to deny that there were *no* nuns ever admitted by the *ehi-bhikkhunī* formula. The words ‘Come, Bhaddā!’ are explained away as simply being the Buddha’s ‘instruction’ or ‘command’ (*āṇā*) to Bhaddā to approach! The main reason that he gives is even more troubling: ‘Because none of them had done (the appropriate) meritorious deed’.”
- 77 I have studied the topic of gendered readings of karmic retribution across Middle-Period Indian Buddhist texts, stemming not only from the Theravāda but also from other traditions, in Dhammadinnā 2018, 2019a and 2019b.
- 78 Jā I 1–94 (translated in Jayavickrama 1990).
- 79 AN 1.5.9 at AN I 25,17+26: *etaḍ aggaṃ, bhikkhave, mama sāvikaṇaṃ bhikkhunīnaṃ ... khippābhīñṇānaṃ, yad idaṃ Kuṇḍalakesā*.
- 80 For a full edition and translation of Bhaddā’s story see Bode 1893: 771–785 and Ānandajoti 2015: 108–126.
- 81 Mp I 374,20–375,7: *sā that’ eva therassa pādesu pativā: tumhākaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi, bhante ti āha. mama saraṇagamanakammaṃ natthi, sadevake loke aggapuggalo dhuravīhāre vasati, taṃ saraṇaṃ gacchā ti. sā: evaṃ karissāmi, bhante ti. sāyanhasamaye, satthu dhammadesanāvelāya, satthu santikaṃ gantvā, pañcapaṭiṭṭhitena vanditvā, ekamantaṃ aṭṭhāsi. satthā, tassā maddiāsaṅkhārāya cariyāvasena, Dhammapade imaṃ gātham āha: sahasam api ce gāthā: anathapadasaṃhitā, ekaṃ gāthāpadaṃ seyyo, yaṃ sutvā, upasammatī ti. sā gāthāpariyosāne yaṭhā thitā va, saha paṭisaṃbhidāhi arahattaṃ patvā, pabbajjaṃ yāci. satthā tassā pabbajjaṃ sampāṭicchi, sā bhikkhunī upassayaṃ gantvā pabbaji*.
- 82 Dh-p II 216 (translated in Burlingame 1921: II 226). With regard to the presence of this verse in the *Therīgāthā* and the *Āṅguttara-nikāya* Commentaries, Todeschini 2013: 178 notes: “I confess that I do not understand this verse’s presence here. Nowhere in our sources is there any reference to verses in connection with Bhaddā. Of course, Bhaddā allegedly authored the five verses I quoted at the beginning of the paper, but these would have been uttered after her encounter with the Buddha.” The *Āṅguttara-nikāya* Subcommentary contains an interesting discussion how the particular verse in the *Āṅguttara-nikāya* Commentary here would differ from that in the *Dhammapada*; see AN-ṭ B^o I 197 (CS § 243): *navame catukketi vīthicatukke. catunnaṃ samāhāro catukkaṃ. cārakato ti bandhanāgārato. ubbaṭṭetvāti uddharitvā. muhuttam api cintayeti muhuttam taṅkhaṇaṃ pi thānupattikapaññāya taṅkhaṇānurūpaṃ atthaṃ cintitum sakkuṇeyya. sahasam api ce gāthā, anathapadasaṃhitā ti ayaṃ gāthā dārucīriyatherassa Bhaḡavatā bhāsītā, idhāpi ca sāyeva gāthā dassitā. Therīgāthāsaṃvaṇṇāyaṃ ācariyadhampālattherena pi Kuṇḍalakesittheriyā vatthumhi ayameva gāthā vuttā. Dhammapadaṭṭhakatthāyaṃ pana*

Kuṇḍalakesittheriyā vatthumhi: yo ca gāthasataṃ bhāse, anattapadasaṃhitā; ekaṃ dhammapadaṃ seyyo, yaṃ sutvā upasammatī ti. ayaṃ gāthā āgatā. taṃtaṃbhāṇakānaṃ kathāmaggānusāreṇa tattha tattha tathā vuttanti na idha ācariyassa pubbāparavirodho saṅkitabbo.

- 83 On this work, edited by Godakumbura 1954 for the Pali Text Society, see von Hinüber 1996: 147 [§§ 302–304] and the introduction in Godakumbura 1954.
- 84 Cf. Kumārābhivamsa 2009: xvi.
- 85 Kumārābhivamsa 2009: 182: *sā dīṭṭhadhammā pabbajjaṃ upasampadāṃ ca Bhagavato yāci. sā laddh' upasampadā ...* (Bhaddā's story is found on pp. 174–189).
- 86 On the other hand, the Commentaries sometimes contain all the possible explanations, even if they do not fit in the commented passage. This method of presentation is called *atthuddhāra* by the commentators; see Kieffer-Pülz 2013: I 236–237. Bhaddanta Kumārābhivamsa's presentation, however, does not give the impression that this is the rhetorical approach being pursued here.
- 87 Vicittasārābhivamsa 1998: VI 2 68 (quoting from the English translation; Bhaddā's story is found on pp. 60–69).
- 88 von Hinüber 1996: 103–109 [§§ 208–220].
- 89 Kieffer-Pülz 2013: I 70–107 and Kieffer-Pülz 2015: 431.
- 90 von Hinüber 1996: 172–173 [§§ 372–375]; Kieffer-Pülz 2015: 432.
- 91 von Hinüber 1996: 158–160 [§§ 338–339]; Kieffer-Pülz 2015: 432.
- 92 Vjb-ṭ B^e 351 [CS § 658]: *atha vā, puthujjanakāle ehibhikkhusaraṇagamanena upasampanno va ithiliṅgapātubhāvena bhikkhunibhāve tīthā puris' upasampannaṃ upādāya ehibhikkhunī ti, tīhi saraṇagamanehi upasampannā bhikkhunī ti ca saṅkhyāṃ gacchati. no ce, taṃ vadanāṃ virujjheyā ti eke. vicāretvā gahetabbaṃ.* The specification of having been ordained and changing sex while being a worldlyling (*puthujjanakāle*) is made due to an understanding that a (male) *ariya* (*bhikkhu*) would not be able to change sex. Sex change, according to the *Vinaya* Commentary, takes place when the male sexual characteristic disappears due to powerful bad actions. Female sexual characteristics are established due to weak good actions. The disappearance of the female sexual characteristics is due to the disappearance of weak bad actions; see Sp I 273,20–22: *tasmā purisalīṅgaṃ balava-akusalena antaradhāyati. ithiliṅgaṃ dubbalakusalena patiṭṭhāti. ithiliṅgaṃ pana antaradhāyantaṃ dubbala-akusalena antaradhāyati.* Therefore, it seems unlikely that male sex change is possible for *ariyas* as a result of *balava-akusala cīttas*. In addition, *ariyas* are characterised by *balava-kusala cīttas* so that, from this perspective, it would seem very unlikely that female sex change is possible among *ariyas*; on this passage cf. also Kieffer-Pülz 2018: 44. Moving from *ariyas* to Theravāda *bodhisattas*, the Pali narrative tradition does not record any sex change to a female for the Bodhisatta, and the Pali commentarial tradition represented by the Commentary to the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* and the Commentary to the *Apadāna* does not allow sex change in its enumeration of eighteen different states of existence in which *bodhisattas* who have received the final prediction will not be reborn; cf. Pj (I) I 49,33–50,5 and Ap-a 141,15–19: *evaṃ samiddhābhinihāro ca bodhisatto imāni aṭṭhārasa abhabbaṭṭhānāni na upeti ... nāssa liṅgaṃ parivattati.* The passage expands on a stanza found in the *Buddhavaṃsa* and it appears, identical in wording, in several other Pali Commentaries; see Ap-a 49,2–11: *āgacchanto ca ye te katābhinihārānaṃ bodhisattānaṃ ānisamsā saṃvaṇṇitā ... ithibhāvaṃ na gacchanti*; cf., e.g., B^e (CS) 71 [E^e not given], Bv-a 271,13–22. The *Dīgha-nikāya* Sub-commentary in turn links these benefits to the listing of the eighteen forms of existence into which a *bodhisatta* will not be born, thus seemingly instituting a correlation between the two listings; see Sv-pt I 129,23–30: *ko ānisamsa ti? ye te katābhinihārānaṃ bodhisattānaṃ ... aṭṭhārasa abhabbaṭṭhānānupagamanappakārā ānisamsā saṃvaṇṇitā.* Cf. also Dhammadinnā 2018: 84.
- 93 Vjb-ṭ B^e 350 [CS § 658]: *aññabuddhakāle atthī ti eke, taṃ na yuttaṃ viya dissati amhākampi buddhakāle sambhavappasāṅgato, ehibhikkhunīyā paṭisedhachāyāḍḍissanato ca. yathāha Dhammapade Viśākhāvattusmiṃ ...*
- 94 Sp-ṭ B^e 350 [CS § 656].
- 95 Sp-ṭ B^e 350 [CS § 656]: *tasmā bhikkhunīnaṃ ehibhikkhun' upasampadā natthi y-evā ti niṭṭham etha gantabbaṃ. yathā c' etaṃ sotapatitavasena ehibhikkhunī ti vuttaṃ, evaṃ tīhi saraṇagamanehi upasampannā ti bhikkhunī ti idam pi sotapatitavaseneva vuttan ti daṭṭhabbaṃ saraṇagamanūpasampadāya pi bhikkhunīnaṃ asambhavato.*
- 96 Vmv B^e II 65 [CS § 656]: *pāliyaṃ ehibhikkhunī ti bhikkhunī, tīhi saraṇagamanehi upasampannā ti bhikkhunī ti idam Bhikkhuvibhāṅgapāliyaṃ samadassanattaṃ aṭṭhagarudhammapaṭiggahaṇena laddh' upasampadaṃ Mahāpajāpatigotamiṃ c' eva tāya saha nikkhantā Bhagavato āṇāya bhikkhūnaññ' eva santike ekato-upasampannā Pañcasatasākīyāniyo ca sandhāya vuttaṃ.*

- tā hi Bhagavatā Ānandattherassa yācanāya pabbajjaṃ anujānanta etha, bhikkhuniyo, mama sāsaṇe tumhe pi pavisaṭhā ti vuttā viya jātā. Sākiyāniyo eva saraṇasīlāni datvā māmavācāya upasampādītattā tīhi saraṇagamanehi upasampannā ti vuttā. na hi etāhi aññā ehibhikkhunibhāvādīnā upasampannā nāma santi.*
- 97 On the use of *sandhāya* see note 53 above. The implication of obliqueness in this word might be suggested by the comparison that follows. In other words, *ehibhikkhuni* might point figuratively to the peculiar ordination undertaken by Mahāpajāpatī, etc.
- 98 Vmv B° II 65 [CS § 656]: *yaṃ pana Therīgāthāsu Bhaddāya Kuṇḍalakesiyā ... [= Thī 109] ... vuttaṃ.*
- 99 Vmv B° II 65 [CS § 656]: *yañ ca Apadāne pi ... [= Ap XXI 44] ... vuttaṃ.*
- 100 Vmv B° II 67 [CS § 656]: *tam pi ehi tvaṃ bhikkhuniṇaṃ santike pabbajjaṃ upasampadañ ca gaṇhāhī ti Bhagavato āṇā upasampadāya kāraṇattā upasampadā ahoṣī ti imam atthaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ.*
- 101 Vmv B° II 65 [CS § 656]: *tathā hi vuttaṃ Therīgāthāṭṭhakathāyaṃ: ehi, Bhadde, bhikkhun' upassayaṃ gantvā bhikkhuniṇaṃ santike pabbajja upasampajjassū ti maṃ avaca āṇāpesi, sā sathu āṇā mayhaṃ upasampadāya kāraṇattā upasampadā āsi ahoṣī ti (= Thī-a 105,26-28).*
- 102 On the listings of types of ordination in general cf. Yao 2015: 234–237 (including references to secondary literature in Japanese); see also Dhammadinnā 2016: 117 note 5 for a survey on the position of ordination by the acceptance of the eight *gurudharmas* in a few Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda legal and scholastic texts.
- 103 T 1428 at T XXII 714a15–21: 若比丘尼者, 名字為比丘尼, 相似比丘尼, 自稱比丘尼, 善來比丘尼, 乞求比丘尼, 著割截衣比丘尼, 破結使比丘尼, 受大戒白四羯磨如法成就得處所比丘尼. 是中比丘尼, 若受大戒白四羯磨如法成就得處所, 住比丘尼法中, 是謂比丘尼義 (translated in Heirman 2002: II 244); cf. also Shi Daoxuan's 釋道宣 Commentary on the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya in T 1808 at T XL 499b12–14: 授比丘尼戒法 (佛言. 有八敬比丘尼. 善來比丘尼. 破結使比丘尼. 羯磨受中有遺信比丘尼. 十歲曾嫁比丘尼. 十八童女. 二歲學戒. 二十眾比丘尼. 邊方義立十眾比丘尼. 前三唯局佛世. 後五通於像末).
- 104 T 1461 at T XXIV 668c17–24: 釋曰: “律中說依他圓德有七種. 比丘有四種圓德: 一由善來比丘方得, 二由受三歸方得, 三由略羯磨方得, 四由廣羯磨方得. 比丘尼有三種圓德: 一由善來比丘尼方得, 二由遣使方得, 三由廣羯磨方得. 獨覺有量功德至得, 諸佛至尊無量功德波羅蜜至得, 合有九種圓德.”
- 105 The Mahāsāṅghika Vinaya does not seem to contemplate the *ehibhikṣuṇī* as a type of *upasampadā*, whereas the *ehibhikṣu* is regularly found, for example in the list of four types of *upasampadā* in the Mahīśāsaka Vinaya, T 1421 at T XXII 412b24–27: 世尊成道五年, 比丘僧悉清淨, 自是已後漸漸為非, 世尊隨事為制戒, 立說波羅提木叉四種具足法: 自具足, 善來具足, 十眾具足, 五眾具足, with a parallel in the *Nidānavastu* to the Mahāvastu of the Mahāsāṅghika-Lokottaravāda Vinaya, in Tournier 2017: 411,3–5 (Senart 1882: I 2,15–16; translated in Tournier 2017: 477): *catuṛvidhā upasampadā svāmaṃ upasampadā: ehibhikṣukāya upasampadā, daśabaddhena gaṇena upasampadā, paṃcabaddhena gaṇena upasampadā ca*. The Mahāsāṅghika formula also includes the exhortation to live the holy life as part of the formula, e.g. T 1425 at T XXII 2c26–27: 佛言: “善來比丘, 修諸梵行”; cf. also Tournier 2017: 68–70. Note that the four types of ordination in Mahāsāṅghika sources are male-focused because they stem from the *Bhikṣu-Prakīrnaka* (there is thus no pretence of covering all types of *upasampadā*).
- 106 T 1435 at T XXIII 410 a21–23: 諸比丘尼三種得受具足戒: 一, 受八重法; 二, 遣使; 三, 白四羯磨.
- 107 T 1441 at T XXIII 594b1–2: 比丘尼受具足戒有三種受: 一, 受八敬法; 二, 遣使; 三, 二部僧現前白四羯磨, 受具足戒.
- 108 Clarke 2015: 80–81.
- 109 Funayama 2006: 44–46 and 55.
- 110 Cf. also Edgerton 1953: II 157 s.v. *ehibhikṣuṇī-vāda*.
- 111 T 1440 at T XXIII 512a25–b2: 問曰: “七種戒, 幾是比丘, 不共比丘尼?” 答曰: “五是比丘, 不共比丘尼: 一者見諦戒, 二者善來, 三者三語, 四者三歸, 五者自誓.” 問曰: “七種受戒, 幾是比丘尼, 不共比丘尼?” 答曰: “一是比丘尼, 不共比丘, 所謂八法受戒. 問曰: “七種受戒, 幾是比丘比丘尼共?” 答曰: “一是比丘比丘尼共, 所謂白四羯磨戒也” (translated in Chung 2006: 10–11).
- 112 T 1435 at T XXIII 426b12–14: 佛言: “善來跋陀迦毘羅! 當佛作是語時, 即失夫人被服, 頭髮自落, 袈裟著身, 作比丘尼” (already noted by Chung 2006: 11 note 76). I was not able to locate a corresponding passage in the Tibetan translation of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya. On the Sanskrit form Kāpileyā as attested in an inscription from Silao see Tournier 2012: 381–382 (correcting Edgerton 1953: II 176, s.v. *kāpileya*).
- 113 Ap XXVII.62 at Ap II 583,19–20 and Thī-a 73,22–23: *yadā pabbajitā āsi, Gotamī jīnaposikā; tad āhaṃ tam upaganvā, Buddhena anusāsītā.*

- 114 Thī-a 66,34–36: *pañca vassāni titthiyārāme pavisitvā aparabhāge Mahāpajāpatīgotamiyā santike pabbajjāṃ upasampadañ ca labhivā*; Mp I 375,11–14: *mātuḡāmassa pabbajjāya ananuññātabhāvena paribbājīkārāmaṃ aḡamāsi. yadā pana Mahāpajāpatīgotamī pabbajjāñ ca upasampadañ ca labhi, tadā sā therī theriyā santike pabbajjāñ ca upasampadañ ca labhivā*.
- 115 On the circulation of the *Avadānaśataka* within Mūlasarvāstivāda textual communities see Dhammadinnā 2015: 491 note 22.
- 116 Speyer 1906–1909: II 3,8–9: *atha Suprabhā dārikā utthāyāsanaḡ ekāmsam uttarāsaṅgaṃ kṛtvā yena Bhāḡavāms tenāñjaliṃ pranamāyā Bhāḡavantam idam avocat: labheyāhaṃ bhadanta svākyāte dharmavināye pravrajyāṃ upasampadaṃ bhikṣuñībhāvam Careyam ahaṃ Bhāḡavato 'ntike brahmacāryam iti. tato Bhāḡavān saṃlakṣayati: anayā asmāc chāsane* (Speyer: *asmacchāsane*) *mahadvineyākaraṇaṃ kartavyam iti. tato Bhāḡavatoktā: gaccha dārike ... tato Bhāḡavatā Mahāprajāpatyāḡ saṃnyastā, tatas tayā pravrajītā upasampādītā ca* (translated in Feer 1891: 262).
- 117 D 343, *mdo sde*, am 167b6–168a3 and P 1012, *mdo sna tshogs*, u 171b3–8: *de nas re zhig na pha ma la gsol nas bcom ldan 'das kyi thad du song ste phyin nas bcom ldan 'das kyi zhabs la mgo bos phyag 'tshal te bcom ldan 'das ga la ba de logs su thal mo sbyar ba btud nas bcom ldan 'das la 'di skad ces gsol to. btsun pa bdag legs par gsungs pa'i chos 'dul ba la rab tu byung ba dang bsnen par rdzogs shing dge slong gi dngos po 'thob tu rung na bdag kyang bcom ldan 'das kyi thad du tshangs par spyod pa spyad par 'tshal lo. de nas bcom ldan 'das kyi phyag gser gyi kha dog can glang po che'i sna ltar 'dug pa brkyang nas khye'u gser 'od la 'di skad ces bka' stsal to. gzhon nu tshur shog tshangs par spyod cig. de skad ces bka' stsal pa'i mod la skra dang kha spu bregs nas zhag bdun lon pa tsam du gyur. spyod lam ni bsnen par rdzogs nas lo brgya lon pa la bur 'dug par gyur. lag na ni lung bzed dang chu snod thogs par gyur to. 'dir smras pa. de bzhin gshegs pas tshur zhes bka' stsal pas de ni mgo bregs lus la snam sbyar gyon.*
- 118 T 200 at T IV 238c4–6: 女見佛已, 心生喜樂, 求索入道. 佛即告言: “善來比丘尼!” 頭髮自落, 法服著身, 成比丘尼; cf. also T 2122 at T LIII 557c26–28, being a quotation of the passage in T 200.
- 119 The Chinese version of the *Avadānaśataka* contains six more stories (nos. 72, 73, 74, 75, 76 and 77) featuring this type of ordination followed by the miraculous falling off of the hair and the appearance of the robe, but here the corresponding Sanskrit and Tibetan versions do not feature the same circumstance.
- 120 According to the findings in Hiraoka 1998, at least seven individual *Divyāvadāna* stories were extracted from the Mūlasarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, and all nineteen stories in the *Divyāvadāna* have Mūlasarvāstivāda parallels.
- 121 *Divyāvadāna XXXIII* in Cowell and Neil 1886: 616,16–21: *atha Bhāḡavān ... tāṃ Prakṛtiṃ mātaṅgadārikāṃ idam avocat: ehi, tvāṃ bhikṣuñī cara brahmacāryam. evam ukte Prakṛtir Mātaṅgadārikā Bhāḡavatā muñḡā kāṣāyaprvṛtā. atha Bhāḡavān Prakṛtiṃ Mātaṅgadārikāṃ ehibhikṣuñīvadena pravrajāyivā dharmāyā kathayā saṃdarśayati sma, samādāpayati sma, smuttejayati sma, saṃpraharṣayati sma.*
- 122 It has been disputedly assigned to the Haimavata or the Dharmaguptaka traditions; on the affiliation of this text see Anālayo 2011b: 270–271 note 11 and Clarke 2015: 63.
- 123 T 1463 at T XXIV 806b27–c2: 比丘尼亦有四種受具: 一者如摩登祇女是; 二者師法是; 三者遣使現前是; 四者白四羯磨是. 勅聽受具, 上受具, 此二皆作建立善法上受具名說, 比丘尼上受具亦建立善法上受具名說. 是名受具. **Mātaṅgī* appears as 摩登祇女 in the Taishō/CBETA edition, with 燈 for 登 in the Old Sung 宮 and Shōgozō 聖 editions and 祈 for 祇 in the Song 宋, Yuan 元, Ming 明 and Old Sung 宮 editions. There are parallels in the Mūlasarvāstivāda *Vinaya* at T 1435 and T 1441 to this **Māṭṛkā* section, but they do not seem to contain any reference to *ehibhikṣuñīs*. See also the first chapter of the **Mātaṅga-sūtra* (T 1300 at T XXI 399c24–401b9) for a version of the tale of the *Mātaṅgī* girl's ordination and eventual attainment of arahatship.
- 124 T 1463 at T XXIV 803b26–c4: 云何名善來比丘尼受具? 當於爾時, 世尊在舍衛國. 摩登祇女來到佛所, 頭面著地禮世尊足, 退坐一面. 佛即為說法, 深悟法性, 得須陀洹果, 求佛出家. 世尊告曰: “聽汝於我法中善修梵行盡諸苦際.” 佛言已訖, 頭髮自落, 法服應器忽然在身, 威儀庠序如久服法者. 是故名為善來受具.
- 125 Cf. Skilling 2001: 154.
- 126 *Ratnamāla-avadāna XXXIII.24–25* in Takahata 1954: 379,21–25: *ity arthitāṃ tayā śrutvā Gautāmī sā prasādītā / tac chiro dakṣahastena pṛṣṭvaivaṃ tām abhāṣata || ehi bhikṣuñi vatse śāsane saugate śubhe / pravrajāyāṃvaram dhṛtvā brahmacāryaṃ samācara || ehi tī samādīṣṭe Gautamyāṣya śubhāśayā / Kṣemābhūn muñḡitā pātradarā sucīvarāvṛtā.*

- 127 *Avadānaśataka* VIII.79 (Kṣemā) in Speyer 1906–1909: II 50,2–3: *tataḥ Kṣemā dārikā pitaram anujñāpya Bhagavat sakāśam upasaṃkrāntā Bhagavatā ca mahāprajāpatyāḥ saṃnyastā. tatas tayā pravrajītā upasampādītā ca* (translated in Feer 1891: 295); D 343, *mdo sde*, am 212b1 and P 1012, *mdo sna tshogs*, u 219a3: *de nas bu mo bde byed mas phal gsol te bcom ldan 'das kyi thad du song nas bcom ldan 'das kyi skye dgu'i bdag mo chen po la gtad do. de nas de rab tu phyung nas*. The Chinese version does not bring in Mahāprajāpatī Gautamī, T 200 at T IV 242b1–3: 爾時王女, 聞是語已, 尋詣祇洹, 見佛世尊, 求索出家. 佛即聽許, 作比丘尼.
- 128 E.g., in the case of Somā, D 340, *mdo sde*, ha, 31a2–3 or P 1007, *mdo sna tshogs*, su, 32a1–2: *de nas bcom ldan 'das kyi de skye dgu'i bdag mo chen mo gau ta mi la gtad nas, skye dgu'i bdag mo chen mo gau ta mis der rab tu phyung nas, bsnyen par rdzogs par byas nas de la lun phog go*.

A Note on Śaṅkaranandana's *Sambandhaparīkṣānusāriṇī*

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1.1. Dharmakīrti's *Sambandhaparīkṣā* (SP) is a short (25 stanzas) polemical tract the main purpose of which is to demonstrate that relations (*sambandha*), far from being real (*vastubhūta*, *vāstava*, *bhāvika*, *pāramārthika*, etc.), are mere conceptual constructs (*kalpanākṛta*) with no counterpart in reality. As far as causality is concerned, the treatise is thus well in line with, and is likely intended to provide evidence for, the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) according to which the arising of a certain effect can be exhaustively accounted for by the joint presence, in a "causal complex" (*hetusāmagrī*), of a set of physical and/or psychological factors/events: "When/if X is present, Y occurs; due to the arising of X, Y arises" (*asmin satīdam bhavaty asyotpādād idam utpadyate*).¹ As we shall see, the treatise is heavily indebted to the first chapter of Dharmakīrti's *magnum opus*, the *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV), whose teachings on relations, directed mostly against the Vaiśeṣika/(Nyāya) and the Mīmāṃsā, it can be said to summarize.

1.2. The SP was the object of several (sub)commentaries. The earliest one, the *Sambandhaparīkṣāvṛtti* (SPV), has long been regarded as an autocommentary on the basis of the colophon of its Tibetan version, which states that it is "the work (*kṛti*) of the lion among debaters (**vādisiṃha*), the teacher (*ācārya*) Dharmakīrti."² The colophon of the Sanskrit *codex unicus* recently edited by Ernst Steinkellner, however, quite plausibly ascribes the SPV to Dharmakīrti's alleged pupil, Devendrabuddhi (630–690 ?).³ The SPV was then commented upon by Vinītadeva (710–770) in a *Sambandhaparīkṣāṭīkā* (SPT), with no mention of the author of the SPV by name) that has come down to us in its Tibetan version only. Although the SPT is a philosophically empty, purely literal gloss, it has the great merit of making the understanding of the SPV significantly easier. The same cannot be said, however, of the third and last commentary preserved in the Tanjur,⁴ the **Sambandhaparīkṣānusāriṇī* (SPAN),⁵ whose author, the 9th–10th-century Kashmiri philosopher Śaṅkaranandana, was styled a "second Dharmakīrti" (*Chos kyi grags pa gñis pa*) in the colophon of his *Pratibandhasiddhi* (see below). As was to be expected from such an author, the SPAN, which directly comments on Dharmakīrti's SP,⁶ and not on the SPV, is of scant help for the literal understanding of the treatise, but provides the initial stanzas (1–4) with an original and abundant, if often terse, philosophical amplification.⁷

1.3. Until the turn of the 21st century, the little that was known of Śaṅkaranandana derived from the four works preserved in the Tanjur (*Pratibandhasiddhi* [stanzas only], *Anyāpohasiddhi*, *Pramāṇavārttikānusāriṇī*,

and SPAn) and a few quotes and allusions by Abhinavagupta (950–1020). “Known” is certainly an exaggeration, though, for none of these four works has ever been studied in its own right or simply as a commentary, this being due to their author’s utterly elliptic style of exposition, the difficulty of the Tibetan translations, and of course the works’ unavailability in Sanskrit. Besides, Abhinavagupta’s rare quotations and remarks have often been misunderstood, due at least partly to the interference of apparently contradictory Tibetan testimonies presenting Śāṅkaranandana both as a “Great Brahmin” (*Bram ze chen po*, **mahābrāhmaṇa*) and as a brahmin convert to Buddhism.⁸ The numerous (but generally incomplete) Sanskrit manuscripts that recently resurfaced in the Tibetan Autonomous Region and the Tucci Collection have opened a new era in the study of Śāṅkaranandana, enabling scholars to significantly clarify the picture of this author’s dates, works, and confessional identity. Śāṅkaranandana’s extant works are exclusively Buddhist and cover the whole range of mature Buddhist epistemology: relations in general in the SPAn, identity in particular in the two *Pratibandhasiddhis*; epistemic validity in the three *Prāmāṇyaparīkṣās*; epistemology and logic in the *Viniścaya-* (lost) and the *Vārttikānusāriṇī* (and perhaps in a commentary on the *Vādanyāya*); ontology, concept and language theory in the *Anyāpohasiddhi* and the relevant sections of the *Vārttikānusāriṇī*; momentariness and selflessness in the *Dharmālaṅkāra*; mind-only in the *Prajñālaṅkāra*; refutation of the existence of a creator God in the two *Īśvarāpākaraṇas*; scriptural authority and refutation of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of authorlessness in the *Āgamasiddhi*.⁹ Moreover, allegations concerning both the *Prajñālaṅkāra*’s doctrinal and terminological hybridity (Śaiva-Buddhist) and Abhinavagupta’s eulogy of Śāṅkaranandana could be refuted: whereas the *Prajñālaṅkāra*, Śāṅkaranandana’s *magnum opus*, is an exclusively Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda treatise (see below), Abhinavagupta’s remarks are best interpreted as ironical and sarcastic, certainly not as eulogistic.¹⁰ It appears, then, that Śāṅkaranandana’s socio-religious and religio-philosophical identities are quite accurately portrayed in the above-mentioned colophon of the *Pratibandhasiddhi*: “The *Pratibandhasiddhi* written by the teacher, the great scholar, the honourable Upāsaka Śāṅkarānanda [*sic*] has been completed. [Namely by the teacher Śāṅkarānanda,] born to the Brahmin caste (and) celebrated by the people as a ‘second Dharmakīrti,’ who destroyed the doctrines of the ordinary logicians, who is invincible thanks to his unmatched spirit, which recognises how things really are, and who, since he highly appreciates the teachings of the Sugata, persists with his spirit in concentration of the enjoyment of [his] exquisite utterances.”¹¹

1.4. This is certainly not to say, however, that all aspects of the relationship between the main representatives of the Śaiva Pratyabhijñā tradition (Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta) and Śāṅkaranandana have been elucidated in a satisfactory manner. If Abhinavagupta obviously knew all of Śāṅkaranandana’s major works at the beginning of his literary career, nothing can be said at present concerning the chronological and philosophical relationship between Utpaladeva (925–975) and the “Buddhist” philosopher. In other words, if

the latter's *floruit* certainly predates Abhinavagupta's, i.e., must belong to the period before 975, there is nothing to prevent one from seeing him as a junior contemporary of Dharmottara (740/750–800/810), whom he allegedly criticized.¹² No allusion to Śāṅkaranandana has been identified so far in the works of Utpaladeva.¹³ Does any of the Buddhist philosopher's works betray an awareness of Utpaladeva, or of Pratyabhijñā tenets? To the extent that they deal with topics that attracted much attention on the part of the Śaiva nondualists, some of his works can be regarded as more likely candidates for such an inquiry. I am thinking of the *Anyāpohasiddhi* (and perhaps the relevant sections of the *Vārttikānusāriṇī*), the *Nairātmyasiddhi* chapter of the *Dharmālaṅkāra*, the larger *Īśvarāpākaraṇa*, the *Prajñālaṅkāra*, and the SPAn. The first two works/chapters seem to contain no direct allusion to Utpaladeva or controversy with characteristically Śaiva nondualist ideas; although Helmut Krasser did not rule out the possibility that the shorter *Īśvarāpākaraṇa* may reflect the Buddhist's awareness of Utpaladeva's theology as it is expounded in the *Īśvarasiddhi*, he could point to no explicit reference or allusion to it; as for the larger *Īśvarāpākaraṇa*, which Krasser left entirely unstudied, Tucci's pictures of the *miśraka* are too bad to allow any serious work in a foreseeable future. Provided that only a few stanzas of Śāṅkaranandana's *Prajñālaṅkāra* are currently available, the SPAn must be regarded as one of our surest hopes. Unfortunately, neither Utpaladeva's *Sambandhasiddhi* (SSi) nor Śāṅkaranandana's SPAn have received any attention to date, so that a philologically grounded assessment of their relationships, if any, must be kept for future research.¹⁴ The present paper pursues the much humbler ambition to provide a first preliminary picture of the SPAn, focusing on Śāṅkaranandana's understanding of the purpose of Dharmakīrti's SP, and to collect the Sanskrit fragments identified so far (see Appendix).

2. Dharmakīrti himself remains silent about the aim of his short treatise. This is likely the reason why Devendrabuddhi opens his commentary by presenting the purpose of the SP: “[Dharmakīrti] says [what follows] in order to refute [any] real relation.”¹⁵ This *incipit* is of course well in line with Dharmakīrti's repeated conclusion to the effect that “there is no relation in reality” (*sambandho nāsti bhāvataḥ*, SP 1, 2) and that “things do not combine by themselves; it is conceptual thought (*kalpanā*) that combines them.”¹⁶ Dharmakīrti starts (SP 1–6) by refuting four hypothetical models of relation: dependence (*pāraṅtrya*), fusion (/mergence) of natures (*rūpaśleṣa*), reliance (*parāpekṣā*), and the two relatas' being related by another, third entity called “relation.” None of Dharmakīrti's commentators (Buddhist or Jaina) or opponents (Utpaladeva) attempt to identify the advocates of these different models. In spite of the fact that the Mīmāṃsā, like the Nyāya, explicitly rejects (*saṃ*)śleṣa as a relation,¹⁷ it is in the context of his polemics against the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the authorlessness of the semantic relation (*śabdārthasambandha*) that Dharmakīrti develops this critique, first in PVSV 113,23–25, then in more detail in PVSV 118,27–119,1, and concludes that relations are mere conceptual constructions.¹⁸ The second part of the SP,

i.e., SP 7–18, deals with the causality relationship. Although, as a (non-Mādhyamika!) Buddhist, Dharmakīrti does not negate causality as a physical or psychological process, he denies any kind of real relation between the cause and its effect. SP 7–18 are mainly dedicated to the method for ascertaining causality, i.e., perception and non-perception (*pratyakṣānupalambha*), a topic already dealt with, e.g., in PVSV 21,24–24,7.¹⁹ The last polemical part of the SP (19–22) targets the typically Vaiśeṣika notions of inherence (*samavāya/samavāyin*), conjunction (*saṃyoga/saṃyogin*) and disjunction (*vibhāga*). Here again, Dharmakīrti’s critique, which focuses on *samavāya* understood as an *ādḥārādheyabhāva*, exhaustively relies on the PVSV (69,15–72,11).²⁰ The SP is thus best interpreted as summarizing the PVSV’s main results on and against all types of relations, mainly against Vaiśeṣika/(Nyāya) and Mīmāṃsaka opponents. Taking Devendrabuddhi as a direct (and rather ungifted) pupil of Dharmakīrti, as (Indian and) Tibetan bio-hagiographical legends have it,²¹ one could hypothesize that the SPV reflects the latter’s oral teaching and/or consists in a purely academic exercise on the part of the former. But one can also very well imagine that anyone setting out to comment on Dharmakīrti’s verses would quite naturally trace their contents to the relevant passages of the PVSV and base his explanations on those earlier, more substantial and better contextualized arguments.

3. Vinītadeva has only very little to contribute concerning the philosophical meaning of the SP and its *Vṛtti*. The two stanzas opening and closing his gloss are purely rhetorical: “Paying homage (*pra√nam-*) to the Teacher of the universe (*jagadguru*) who has revealed (**uktavat*) that the entire universe (*jagat*) is devoid of relations (**asambandha*), [I] shall [now] comment on [Dharmakīrti’s] *Sambandhaparikṣā*.²² What the Buddha’s teaching on the absence of relations was – presumably dependent origination –, Vinītadeva does not say. Nor does he tell us anything about the nature of the living beings’ connection with *samsāra* that he mentions in the final verse of his commentary: “Thanks to the abundant merit (*puṇya*) that [I have] obtained by glossing (**vi√vr-*) upon the commentary (**vyākhyā?*) on [Dharmakīrti’s] *Examination of relations (sambandhaparikṣā; *sambandhavicāra?)*, may [all] living beings (*sattva*) obtain thoughtless (**abuddhi*) tranquillity (*śānti*), which is the antidote (**prati-/vi-pakṣa[bhūta]*) to [their] connection (*sambandha*) with *samsāra*.²³ No less rhetorical is Vinītadeva’s initial statement concerning the subject matter, the purpose, and the relation of the treatise he is about to comment, an *exercice obligé* for most Buddhist commentators.²⁴ Here again, however, his contribution does not go beyond Devendrabuddhi’s initial statement, which he comments upon in the following way: “‘In order to refute [any] real relation (*vastubhūtaṃ sambandhaṃ nirākartum*).’ With this initial statement, [the author of the *Vṛtti*] indicates this treatise’s (*prakaraṇa*) relation (*sambandha*), subject matter (*abhidheya*), and purpose (*prayojana*), [for] otherwise [i.e., if he did not indicate them at the very beginning,] one would [certainly] not adopt (*upā√dā-*) [such] a treatise that is devoid of any relation, subject matter, and purpose. Among them, with the word ‘real’

(*vastubhūta*), he indicates the subject matter [of the treatise]; with the word 'in order to refute' (*nirākartum*), he indicates its purpose, for refuting a real relation is here the purpose. [Finally,] with '[Dharmakīrti] says' (*āha*), he states the relation [between the two], for this treatise is taught in order to refute a real relation. In this way, this [very] treatise is presented as the means (*upāya*) for refuting a real relation, for it is by studying ($\sqrt{śru-}$) this treatise that one will ascertain (*niś√ci-*) that there are no real relations. Therefore the treatise is the means. As for the refutation of a real relation, it is the end (*upeya*). The treatise and its purpose are in a means-end relationship (*upāyopeyalakṣaṇasambandha*). This is, to begin with (*tāvat*) the general (/overal) meaning (*sāmānyārtha*).²⁵

4.1. Interestingly enough, the Jaina authors Prabhācandra and Vāḍidevasūri connect their almost *in extenso* quotations of the SP to the general topic of the gross (*sthūla*) vs. subtle (*sūkṣma*) forms/aspects of perceptual objects, i.e., to the discussion of atoms (*aṇu*, *paramāṇu*), a topic that is conspicuously absent in Dharmakīrti's, Devendrabuddhi's and Vinītadeva's treatments of relations. Prabhācandra's *Sambandhaparīkṣāvvyākhyā* (SPVy) opens with the following statement, which is meant both as a general introduction to the treatise and as a specific introduction to the first two hypothetic types of relations discussed by Dharmakīrti in SP 1–2: "Since [our] cognition of [something] gross, etc., is an error because atoms, like iron bars (*ayaḥśalākā*),²⁶ are not related to each other, how could [any] entity consist of those [atoms?] on the basis of such a [relation?]?²⁷ For a relation could consist either in the [mutual] dependence of things or in the fusion (/mergence) of [their] natures. In the first hypothesis, would there be [a mutual dependence] of two already existing (*niṣpanna*) correlates, or of two nonexisting (*aniṣpanna*) correlates? To begin with, [there could be] no [mutual dependence] of two already existing [correlates], for their very nature does not exist, like a rabbit's or a horse's horn. But since two already existing [correlates] do not depend [on anything any longer], there is strictly no [such] relation [between them]. And [the following] has been said [by Dharmakīrti]..."²⁸ Prabhācandra's commentary on SP 2 also points to difficulties concerning the aggregation of atoms/parts.²⁹

4.2. The context of Vāḍidevasūri's quotation of SP 1–22 is exactly the same. The Jaina philosopher concludes the epistemological discussion that precedes with the following remark: "By thus conforming to cognition, rational [persons] therefore have to admit that a [real] entity consists of [both] a subtle and a gross form (/aspect)."³⁰ Immediately after this, Vāḍidevasūri targets his Buddhist opponent with a *ad hominem* argument: "Though defeated hundreds of times, the Buddhist, his heart filled with love for his own doctrine, still resists the [idea of a] gross object and speaks [as follows] on this point."³¹ His introduction to SP 1 was likely borrowed from Prabhācandra: "Since [those of our] cognitions with a gross form (/aspect) are an error because atoms are not related to each other, how could

[any] entity consist of those [atoms²] on the basis of such a [relation²]? For, to begin with, a relation is not possible by its very nature. To explain, [such a relation] could consist either in the [mutual] dependence of things or in a fusion (/mergence) of [their] natures, which is synonymous with identity. In the first hypothesis, would there be [a mutual dependence] of two already existing correlates, or of two nonexisting correlates? To begin with, [there could be] no [mutual dependence] of two already existing [correlates], for their very nature does not exist, like a horse's or a donkey's horn. But since two already existing [correlates] do not depend [on anything any longer], there is strictly no [such] relation [between them]. This is what [Dharma] kīrti says [in the following]."³²

4.3. As we can see, the Jaina philosophers' interest in Dharmakīrti's critique of real relations is connected with their "perspectivistic" defense of gross, macroscopic entities as real objects of perceptual cognitions. According to them, the Buddhists argue for the impossibility of such entities, and accordingly for the erroneous character of gross cognitional appearances, *by denying the very possibility of any relation between atoms*. This is of course clearly reminiscent of the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* in which Dignāga refutes the existence of external, material objects of cognition by showing that single atoms, which are (supposedly) real, are not isomorph with the gross form appearing in cognition, and that aggregates of atoms, which are isomorph with it, are unreal. Dignāga's denial of an external object of cognition relies on Vasubandhu's well-known critique of atomism in the *Vimśikā* (Vś). There, Vasubandhu attempts to demonstrate that those things which are the objects of our sensory cognitions (*rūpādivijñapti*) do not exist. Here is the gist of his argument: "Whatever sense-field, consisting of visible form and the rest, would be the corresponding sense object of the manifestations of visible form and the rest, would be either unitary – as the Vaiśeṣikas imagine material form as a part-possessing whole – or it would be atomically plural, or it would be compounded of those very atoms themselves. First of all, the sense object is not unitary, because there is no apprehension anywhere at all of a material form as a part-possessing whole separate from its parts. Nor is it plural, because there is no apprehension of atoms individually. Nor would those [atoms], compounded, come to be the sense object, since the atom is not proved to be a singular substance."³³ According to Vasubandhu, the aggregation of atoms is contradictory with their indivisibility/partlessness, i.e., with the very concept of an atom as the ultimate, not further analysable/divisible constituent of corporeality. In other words, either the atoms aggregate with each other, and they cannot be partless, or they are indivisible, but they cannot build up composite, macroscopic entities. On the one hand, "if there were simultaneous conjunction with six atoms from the six directions [of possible orientation], this would result in the atom having six parts, because where there is one thing another cannot arise."³⁴ Or else, "it is not reasonable that something with spatial differentiation be singular. If there were spatial differentiation of an atom – namely, the front part is different [and so are all

the other sides] including the bottom part – how would the singularity of an atom with that [multiple] nature be reasonable?”³⁵ If, on the other hand, the atoms are partless, then “the place in which there are six atoms would be precisely the same as the place of the single atom. For this [reason], because all of them would be in a common location, the entire cluster would be the extent of a [single] atom, because they would not exclude one another.”³⁶ The arguments Prabhācandra and Vādidevasūri put in the mouth of their Buddhist opponent criticizing a real relation understood as a fusion of natures are clearly reminiscent of Vasubandhu's critique. More generally, however, the impossibility, for atoms, to *relate* or to *connect* with each other is at the very basis of Vasubandhu's critique of atomistic accounts of external reality, as his vocabulary (*yoga, saṃyoga*) amply testifies, e.g., in Vś 13a: “If the atom [itself] has no connection [with another], whose [connection] is this when they are aggregated ?”³⁷ But contrary to Dharmakīrti, Vasubandhu did not provide any refutation of relations in general, and of inherence in particular. This is what the Jaina philosophers sought for while quoting and commenting upon the SP.

5.1. There are good reasons to believe that the Jaina authors' overall interpretation of Dharmakīrti's SP owed much to Śāṅkaranandana's SPAN. As early as 1934, Erich Frauwallner remarked that Vādidevasūri's SVR was indebted to Śāṅkaranandana's commentary on the SP.³⁸ He wrote: “Zu beachten ist allerdings, daß Devasūri ziemlich frei verfährt, die Vṛttiḥ stellenweise nur ungenau wiedergibt, vielfach eigenes hinzufügt, vor allem aber ganz willkürlich bald der Vṛttiḥ Dharmakīrtis folgt, bald wieder an den Anusāraḥ Śāṅkaranandanans anschließt, so daß seine Darstellung denjenigen, der die Originalquellen nicht kennt, häufig in Verwirrung bringt.”³⁹ In a footnote, Frauwallner also reported that “Z.B. bei Vers 12, 16, 17 und 21 sind die Erklärungen des Anusāraḥ wörtlich wiedergegeben.”⁴⁰ And while I cannot make any pronouncement concerning Prabhācandra's indebtedness to Śāṅkaranandana, it seems at least likely that the SPAN was accessible to the author(s) of the marginal/interlinear annotations(?) represented in at least part of the footnotes of Shastri's and Jha's editions of the SPVY.⁴¹

5.2. Śāṅkaranandana's philosophical program while composing the SPAN can easily be read between the lines of its “*maṅgala*”: “[I] pay reverence to the Omniscient One (*sarvajña*) who revealed that the universe (*jagat*), which is devoid of relations, is without self and one's own (*ātmātmīya*) and subject-object [relationship] (*grāhyagrāhaka*).”⁴² As is well known, the dichotomies between self and one's own and between subject and object of cognition are the two basic dualities the Buddhist path (or, rather, paths) is expected to overcome. Let it be reminded that according to Dharmakīrti, the personalistic wrong view (*satkāyadrṣṭi*) is to be equated with nescience/ignorance (*avidyā*), the root cause of all defilements and moral faults (*kleśa, doṣa*) including desire (*rāga*, etc.) and attachment (*sneha*, etc.). The innate or “natural” (*sahaja*) belief in a self accounts for the basic dichotomy between

self and other, what is other being the object of desire and appropriation (*upādāna*). Eradicating this personalistic belief is thus tantamount to ridding oneself of any defilement and achieving liberation from suffering in *saṃsāra*. Uprooting the self-one's own duality can be described as Dharmakīrti's "realistic" (basically Sautrāntika) account of the path and liberation.⁴³

5.3. Selflessness was the subject matter of Chapter 2 of the *Dharmālaṅkāra*, entitled *Nairātmyasiddhi* (*Proof of Selflessness*). There, Śāṅkaranandana declared that "momentariness results in selflessness, [which is nothing but] the fact that action, enjoyment [of its fruit] and control [over the body, the senses, and the mind] are other-dependent, the fact that there is nothing left to be clung to, the supreme tranquillity; one [thus] takes possession of the self-supported *nirvāṇa*, the secure, the highest."⁴⁴ Commenting on this, Śāṅkaranandana provided the following (Nyāya/Vaiśeṣika) definition of the self to be refuted: "The self could be that whose agency is made possible (/effected) by the inherence of action, that which would be an enjoyer thanks to [its] relation with the fruit of this action, and that which is the controller of the body, the sense organs and the mind inasmuch as it causes them to act."⁴⁵ Although the relative chronology between the SPAn and the *Dharmālaṅkāra* cannot be established in the present state of our knowledge, the two works are in perfect agreement on self(lessness) and the role played by relations (*samavāya*, *abhisambandha*) in this doctrinal complex. In the introductory part of his commentary on SP 1, Śāṅkaranandana distinguishes between those of Dharmakīrti's treatises (*prakaraṇa*) whose incipit (*ārambha*) focuses on *pramāṇa* and those whose incipit deals with *prameya*. Contrary to the *Hetubindu*, the *Vādanyāya* and the *Santānāntarasiddhi*,⁴⁶ the SP's *ārambha* is concerned with the analysis of (an aspect of) reality (**vastuvicāra*), viz. relations. One of the benefits of this method is that "this [aspect of] reality can also be analyzed as ancillary (**aṅgatvena*) to the analysis of the most important (*pradhāna*) *prameya*."⁴⁷ Śāṅkaranandana explains this as follows: "To wit (**tathā hi*), the purpose (*prayojana*) of expounding the nonexistence/unreality (**abhāva*, **avastutā*) of relations is none other than demonstrating ($\sqrt{sād}$ -) the two types of selflessnesses (**nairātmyadvaya*, **dvidividhanairātmya*). For (*hi*) selflessness consists in the other-dependence (*paratantra[tā]*) of action (*kriyā*), enjoyment [of the fruit of action] (*bhoga*) and control [over the body, the senses, and the mind] (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*).⁴⁸ Because if this [very] relation (*sambandha*) does not exist,⁴⁹ there is no inherence of action (*kriyāsamavāya*), [the pseudo-self] has no autonomy with regard to action (**kriyāyām asvātantryāt*), and therefore an agent (*kartṛ*) is discarded. For the very same reason (**[t]ata eva*), a nature (*rūpa*) with no inherence of pleasure and pain (**sukhaduḥkhasamavāya*) is not an enjoyer (**bhokṛ*).⁵⁰ And if there is no inherence of what is controlled [i.e., the body, the senses, and the mind, this pseudo-self] is not a controller (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*) either. Therefore, if there is(/are) no relation(s), the selflessness of the person (*pudgalanairātmya*) is established (*siddha*)."⁵¹ As we can see, refuting relations undermines all possible connections between the (pseudo-)self and what supposedly

relies on it, and deprives it of all the functions (agency, enjoyment, control) that made it autonomous, i.e., constituted it as a self. It is worthy of note that Śāṅkaranandana regarded the dismissal of the six (Nyāya/Vaiśeṣika) categories (*padārtha*) as an important outcome of the rejection of relations. Immediately after presenting the two types of selflessnesses, Śāṅkaranandana adds, in a passage that still partially resists my understanding, that, “as a consequence (*[t]ata eva), the six categories (*ṣaṭ[-]padārthāḥ*) are discarded. [For] if, because there is neither conjunction (*[saṃ]yoga*) nor inherence (*samavāya*), the atoms (*aṇu, paramāṇu*) have no [mutual] conjunction (*saṃyoga*), there is no aggregation of substances (*dravyārambha*). And since these [atoms] do not have existence (*bhāva*, i.e., *sattā*) if they have no inherence, they are not inherence causes (**samavāyikāraṇatva*) for it and thus are not substances (*dravya*). And since there is no inherence, the atoms are devoid of the properties of substances (**dravyadharmā*) such as actions (**kriyā, *karman*) and qualities (*guṇa*) [and are thus] also not substances. The atoms[, which are undivided, may well] be just color (*rūpa*), but [they are] not substances because something different possessing qualities (*guṇin*) such as color is many in number (**bahu*). And similarly, if it does not occur (*vṛtti*) in a quality-possessor (*guṇin*), an agent (*kartr*), similar (*samāna*) and ultimate[ly different] substances (*antyadravya*) substances, inherence does not exist, [and] therefore qualities, motions (*karman*), universals (*sāmānya*) and particularities (*viśeṣa*) do not exist.”⁵²

5.4. In (apparent) contrast to the *Dharmālaṅkāra*, the SPAn also briefly dealt with the second type of selflessness, the selflessness of the factors of existence (*dharmanairātmya*): “Similarly, if [something] that merely abides in its own nature (**svātmastha*) lacks [any type of relation such as] dependence (*pāraṭantrya*), connection⁵³ with another (**anya[saṃ]yoga*), and reliance (*apekṣā*) [on another], there is no subject-object relationship (*grāhyagrāhakabhāva*) [and thus] the selflessness of the factors of existence [is established as well].”⁵⁴ *dharmanairātmya* is thus proven in a purely idealistic manner by dismissing the subject-object dichotomy. This is hardly surprising, for, as I hope to have demonstrated elsewhere,⁵⁵ Śāṅkaranandana championed mind-only in his *magnum opus*, the *Prajñālaṅkāra*, where he defended Dharmakīrti's second, “idealistic” account of Buddhist soteriology. According to this model, ignorance can be described in terms of subject-object duality, and the path, in terms of mental cultivation of its antidote, non-duality (*advaya*) and non-conceptual cognition (*nirvikalpapakjñāna*), leading to the destruction of the mental impression of duality (*dvayavāsanā*).⁵⁶ In the *Prajñālaṅkāra*, Śāṅkaranandana claims that mind-only, which he pretends to have demonstrated, is nothing but the refutation of an external object,⁵⁷ and Abhinavagupta situated Vasubandhu's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhis*, Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, and Śāṅkaranandana's *Prajñālaṅkāra* on the same doctrinal level.⁵⁸ This is tantamount to claiming that Śāṅkaranandana's treatise attempted to demonstrate mind-only by refuting atomistic theories of the external world and objects, which is precisely what he is seen to suggest

in the SPAn, where echoes of, and dialogues with, Vasubandhu's Vś, can be easily identified.⁵⁹ And if the alleged object (*grāhya*) is proven not to exist, the subject (*grāhaka*) that relies on it—this is Dharmakīrti's third candidate, *parāpekṣā*—ceases to exist as well.⁶⁰

6. The SPAn can by no means be regarded as a genuine Yogācāra treatise in that it nowhere attempts to demonstrate key idealistic doctrines such as mind-only or the store-consciousness, whose terminology Śāṅkaranandana does not even allude to in this commentary. But as the Jaina authors rightly pointed out, Dharmakīrti's critique of relations provided a welcome systematic addition and consolidation to Vasubandhu's arguments in the Vś. Śāṅkaranandana, who was deeply versed in Vasubandhu's *viññaptimātratā* treatises, likely was the Buddhist authority that provided the impetus for this novel interpretation of the SP, inspiring both Prabhācandra and Vāḍidevasūri. According to him, Dharmakīrti's critique of relations was ancillary to the demonstration of the two types of selflessnesses. On the one hand, the refutation of real relations *ipso facto* made any *grāhyagrāhakabhāva* impossible, thus establishing *dharmanairātmya*, hence mind-only. On the other hand, the critique of the Vaiśeṣika concepts of inherence and conjunction undermined all attempt, on the part of the "realist" schools, to provide a satisfactory account of external, physical, atom-based physical reality, and therefore lent decisive additional support to idealistic metaphysics.

Appendix : Sanskrit fragments of the SPAn

The present appendix provides a first collection of Sanskrit fragments from Śāṅkaranandana's SPAn. All of them are extracted from the SVR, a fact that fully confirms Erich Frauwallner's 1934 remark to the effect that Vādidevasūri at times quoted verbatim from Śāṅkaranandana's commentary.⁶¹ It is to be noted that the Jaina author, who, as we have seen, alludes several times to Śāṅkaranandana by name, never presents the passages here regarded as fragments as quotations from the Buddhist teacher. In other words, the Tibetan version of the SPAn must remain our only authoritative guide to, and representation of, Śāṅkaranandana's commentary. As indicated above,⁶² the Sanskrit footnotes of Shastri's and Jha's editions of Prabhācandra's SPVy likely contain occasional borrowings from the SPAn. And although I cannot exclude that some shorter passages of Vādidevasūri's SVR are in fact quotations from Śāṅkaranandana's commentary, I am not aware of any other source of possible fragments. I have little doubt, however, that the discovery of a hypothetical commentary on Utpaladeva's SSi would significantly enrich this preliminary harvest.

1. SPAn D *že* 31b2–32a2/P *ze* 40a2–8 on SP 11cd–12⁶³ (complete except initial words):

<gal te phyogs gžan yañ> rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i dños po ñid du gnas pa na de'i tshe rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i dños po žes 'brel pa 'phañs pa yin la 'ga' žig yod na yod pa gañ yin pa de med na yañ med pa ni rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i no bo yin la de khyad par du gyur pa 'di 'brel pa ni rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i dños po yin no // gal te de la 'di 'dod par 'gyur že na / de'i tshe 'brel pa'i khyad par du byed pa ñid kyis gañ žig yod pa dañ med par 'dod pa de dag ñid rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i dños por 'gyur mod / 'brel pa ci rgyu dañ 'bras bu la gžan rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i no bo'i 'brel pas ci yin / rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i dños po thob pa dag la gžan 'brel pas de sñed pa ñid kyañ dños po mthar thug pa las ci yin / de lta bu'i rnam pa 'di rañ bžin thob pas ni 'brel pa spañs pa žes (em.: par šes DP) pa ni rigs pa yañ ma yin la ñams su myoñ ba yañ ma yin pas 'di mi rigs so // gal te rgyu dañ 'bras bu dag la 'brel pa žes pa ni tha dad pa las rtogs par bya ba yin la / de ltar gyur pa dag la yañ 'brel pas yin no že na / de ni mi rigs te / gañ gi phyir 'di ni sgra yin gyi ñams su myoñ ba ni ma yin la de yañ tha sñad sbyor ba po'i gžan gyi dbañ gi don la brten (D: P rten) pa yin pas de lta bu la sogs pa'i dños po rnam par gnas pa ma yin no // de dag kho na rgyu dañ 'bras bu ñid yin no žes rigs kyi gžan 'brel pa ni ma yin te |.

SVR 815,14–25: ¹sthite kāryakāraṇarūpatve tadākṣiptaḥ sambandhaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāva itī / kasmimścīti sati bhāvas tadabhāve cābhāvaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvo yas tadviśiṣṭaḥ sambandhaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvo bhavati / tad etad yadiṣyate tadā sambandhasya viśeṣaṇatayā yāv abhīmatau bhāvābhāvau tāv eva kāryakāraṇabhāvo bhavatu / kim² kāryakāraṇayor apareṇa kāryakāraṇabhāvena³ sambandhena /⁴ pratilabdhakāryakāraṇarūpayor hi kim apareṇa sambandhena / tāvataiva vastuparyavasānāt / tathāvidhena svarūpapratilambhena tu sambandha ākṣipyata itī na⁵ nyāyo nāpy anubhava itī / na yuktam etat / nanu kāryakāraṇayoḥ sambandha itī bhedād bhavitavyaṃ tathābhūtayor api

sambandheneti cet / tad ayuktam / yataḥ śabda 'yaṃ nānubhavaḥ / so 'pi ca saṅketaprayoktṛparatanthro nārthāśraya iti naivamāder vastuvyavasthethi tāv eva kāryakāraṇateti yuktam / na tv aparāḥ sambandhaḥ / (tathā hi – ...)

¹SVR starts with *asyārthaḥ* – ..., SPAn with *gal te phyogs gžan yañ*. ²*kiṃ* conj. (ci Tib.): *kintu* Ed. ³*kāryakāraṇabhāvena* em.: *kāryakaraṇam bhāvena* Ed. ⁴/ om. Ed. ⁵*na* (*nāpi?*) conj. (*[rigs pa] yañ ma yin*): *na* om. Ed.

2. SPAn D *že* 32b6–33a1/P *ze* 41a8–42b3 on SP 16⁶⁴ (complete):

mñon sum dañ mi dmigs pa dag las ni rgyu dañ 'bras bu ñid rtogs par bya'i de yod pa dañ med pa dag las ni ma yin no // de dag ni yod pa dañ med pa kho na yin te / 'di ltar me la sogs pa'i dños po yod pa na du ba yod pa ni mñon sum gyis rtogs par 'gyur la me la sogs pa de dag yod pa ñid na yañ du ba yod par 'gyur yin gyi śnar ñid (P: D om. ñid) yod pa ñid (D: P om. ñid) ni ma yin pas mi dmigs pas rtogs par 'gyur ba yin te / me yod pa las śnar du ba dmigs pa'i rig byar gyur pa'i dños po rtogs pa med pa'i phyir ro // gañ kho na yañ yod pa na yod pa dañ med pa na de med (em.: DP yod) pa 'di ni de ñid rgyu dañ 'bras bu dag gi rgyu dañ 'bras bu ñid yin no //.

SVR 816,22–817,2: *pratyakṣānupalambhato hi kāryakāranate pratīyete na tu tadbhāvābhāvāt¹ / tadbhāvābhāva² eva tu te / tathā hi – bhāve 'gnyādau bhāvini dhūmasya bhāvaḥ pratyakṣāvagataḥ / bhāva eva ca tasyāgnyāder bhāvītā dhūmasya na tu pūrvam eva bhāva ity anupalambhato 'vagatam / prāg agnisannidher³ upalabdihilakṣaṇaprāptasya dhūmasya bhāvasyānavagamāt⁴ / ya eva cāsau bhāve tadbhāve⁵ 'bhāve cābhāvas tad eva kāryakāraṇayoḥ⁶ kāryakāraṇatvam /.*

¹*tadbhāvābhāvāt* em. (*de yod pa dañ med pa dag las* Tib.): *tadbhāvābhāvāt* Ed.

²*tadbhāvābhāva* em. (*yod pa dañ med pa* Tib., no *tad*-): *tadbhāvābhāva* Ed. ³*prāg agnisannidheḥ* Skt.: *me yod pa las śnar* Tib. (**prāg agnibhāvāt* ?). ⁴*dhūmasya bhāvasyānavagamāt* conj. (*du ba [dmigs pa'i rig byar gyur pa'i] dños po rtogs pa med pa'i phyir ro* Tib.): *dhūmasyābhāvāvagamāt* Ed. ⁵*tadbhāve* Skt.: *yod pa* Tib. (*bhāve*). ⁶*kāryakāraṇayoḥ* conj. (*rgyu dañ 'bras bu dag gi* Tib.): *kāryakāraṇatayoḥ* Ed.

3. SPAn D *že* 33a2–4/P *ze* 41b3–6 on SP 17⁶⁵ (complete):

mñon sum dañ mi dmigs pa tsam gyis rtogs par gyur pa yod pa dañ med pa don dam pa pa rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i spyod yul can rnam par rtog pa de ltar gyur pa yañ de rnam ni don yod pa ma yin pa'i don gyi rañ gi ño bo rnam ston par byed / yañ de rnam kyi yod pa ma yin pa'i dños po'i ño bor gyur pa gañ yin že na / gañ gi 'di 'brel par gyur pa rnam kyi snañ ba dañ 'dra bar 'di'i 'di rgyu yin / 'di'i 'di 'bras bu yin no žes pa'i 'brel pa yañ mi bden pa ñid yin te / 'di ltar /

SVR 817,5–8: *pratyakṣānupalambhamātrāvagatabhāvābhāva-paramārthāḥ kāryakāraṇaviśayā vikalpāḥ / tathābhūtā api te 'rthān asatyārtha'svarūpān darśayanti / kā punas teṣāṃ asatyavasturūpatā / yad idaṃ ghaṭitānām iva pratibhāsanam² asyedaṃ kāryam asya cedaṃ kāraṇam iti / ghaṭānā cāsatyatvam / tathā hi*

¹*rthān asatyārtha-* em. (*don yod pa ma yin pa'i don*): *'rthā na satyārtha-* Ed.

²*pratibhāsanam* em. (*snañ ba* Tib.): *pratibhānam* Ed.

4. SPAn D *že* 33b2–4/P *ze* 42a6–8 on SP 19⁶⁶ (complete; one sentence added SVR):

gañ gi phyir rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i dños po ni 'brel pa ma yin te / de'i mtshan ñid mi mthun pa'i phyir / 'di ñid kyi phyir sbyor ba can nam 'du ba can rgyu yin pa bkag ste / rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i gnas skabs dag ni phan tshun phan (P: D pan) 'dogs pa la gžan gyi dbañ ñid kyi sam 'dres pas sam ltos pas kyañ ma yin pa'i phyir te / gcig ñe ba na gžan ma grub pa'i phyir ro // de ltar gañ yañ dños po las phan 'dogs par byed pa dañ bral bar gyur pa de ni 'brel pa can ma yin no //.

SVR 817,20–24: *yataścakāryakāraṇabhāvo na sambandho dviṣṭhatvābhāvena sambandhāvilakṣaṇatvāt¹ / ataḥ saṃyogisamavāyādi² kāraṇam apākṛtam / kīdrśam anyonyānupakārātma parasparam upakāraśūnyasvabhāvam³ / kāryakāraṇāvasthatve parasparam upakārasya pāratantryeṇa saṃśleṣeṇā⁴pekṣayā cābhāvād ekasannidhāv aparasyāsiddheḥ / yataś caivaṃ bhāvād upakārarahitaḥ sa sambandhī na bhavatīti /.*

¹*dviṣṭhatvābhāvena sambandhāvilakṣaṇatvāt* Skt.: *de'i mtshan ñid mi mthun pa'i phyir* Tib. ²-*ādi* Skt.: -*ādi* missing Tib. ³*kīdrśam anyonyānupakārātma parasparam upakāraśūnyasvabhāvam* / Skt.: *kīdrśam anyonyānupakārātma parasparam upakāraśūnyasvabhāvam* / missing Tib. ⁴*saṃśleṣeṇā*- em. ('*dres pas sam* Tib.): *saṃśleṣaṇā*- Ed.

5. SPAn D *že* 34a2–3/P *ze* 42b7–43a1 on SP 21⁶⁷ (incomplete, one sentence missing SVR [n. 3]):

'brel pa can dag gi phan par byed pa ma yin pa la yañ yañ dag par sbyor ba'am 'du ba la yañ gal te 'brel par 'dod na de'i tshe sna tshogs pa yañ 'du ba can du 'gyur ba (f) 'di ni ñe bar mtshon pa yin te / de'i sbyor ba can du yañ 'gyur ro // sbyor bas sam 'du bas 'brel pa brjod pa'i phyir 'brel pa can du 'gyur ro žes brjod pa yin no //.

SVR 818,8–10: *sambandhinor anupakāre 'pi samavāye saṃyoge vā sambandho yađiṣyate tadā viśvam api samavāyi / upalakṣaṇam caitad asti / saṃyogī¹ ca syāt / saṃyogena samavāyena vā viśvaṃ² sambandhi syād ity uктаṃ bhavati* β.

¹*saṃyogi* Skt.: *de'i sbyor ba can* Tib. ²*viśvam* Skt.: *'brel pa brjod pa'i phyir* Tib. ³Final sentence in Tib. (SPAn D34a4/P43a1): *'brel pa med pa la yañ gal te 'brel par 'gyur na thams cad la 'gyur ro //.*

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- P = Daisetz T. Suzuki: *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, Kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto*, Tokyo and Kyoto, 1957, Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute.
- PDhS = *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, ed. Johannes Bronkhorst and Yves Ramseier: *Word Index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya, A Complete Word Index to the Printed Editions of the Praśastapādabhāṣya*, Delhi, 1994, Motilal Banarsidass.
- PV(SV) = *Pramānavārttika(svavṛtti)*. See Gnoli 1960.
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- ŚBh = *Śābarabhāṣya*, ed. Subbah Śāstrī/Śrī Vaidyanāthasāstrī: *Śrīmajjaiminipraṇīte mīmāṃsādarśane prathamādhyāyasya tarkapādanāmā prathamapādaḥ*, Pune, 1976, Ānandāśrama.
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- SPAN = *Sambandhaparīkṣānusāriṇī*. D no. 4237, *že* 24b4–35a3 ; P no. 5736, *ze* 27a1–44a3.
- SPT = *Sambandhaparīkṣātikā*. D no. 4236, *že* 1b1–21b3 ; P no. 5735, *ze* 1–26b8.
- SPV_{Tib} = *Sambandhaparīkṣāvṛtti*, Tibetan version. D no. 4215, *ce* 256a2–261a7; P no. 5714, *ce* 358a7–364b8. See SP(V).
- SPVy = *Sambandhaparīkṣāvīkhyā*, ed. Dwarikadas Shastri: *Vadanyayaprakaraṇa of Acharya Dharmakīrti with the Commentary Vipāñchitārthā of Acharya Śāntirakṣita and Sambandhaparīkṣā with the Commentary of Prabhāchandra*, Varanasi, 1972, Bauddha Bharati.
- SSi = *Sambandhasiddhi*, ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri: *The Siddhitrāyī and the Pratyabhijñā-kārikā-vṛtti of Rajanaka Utpala Deva*, Srinagar, 1921, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies.
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- SVR = *Syādvādaratnākara*, no editor mentioned: *Śrīmadvādidēvasūriviracitaḥ pramāṇayatattvālokālaṅkāras tadvīkhyā ca syādvādaratnākaraḥ*, Puṇyapattana, 2454 (vīrasaṃvat ≈ 1927 CE).
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- TS(P) = *Tattvasaṅgraha(pañjikā)*, ed. Embar Krishnamacharya: *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla*, vol. I, Baroda, 1926, Central Library.
- VN = *Vādanyāya*. See Much 1991, Vol. I.
- VSū = *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, ed. Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji: *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda*, Baroda, 1961, Oriental Institute.
- VśV_L = *Viṃśikāvṛtti*, ed. Sylvain Lévi: *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, deux traités de Vasubandhu: Viṃśatikā et Triṃśikā*, Paris, 1925, Librairie ancienne Honoré Champion.
- VśV_s = *Viṃśikāvṛtti*, ed. Jonathan Silk. See Silk 2016.

Notes

- 1 SBhV I, 127, 6–7.
- 2 SPV_{Tib} 89,16–17: ...*smra ba'i seṅ ge slob dpon Chos kyi grags pas mdzad pa...*
- 3 SPV 35,14: *kr̥tir ācāryadevendrabuddheḥ*.
- 4 As we shall see below (§4.1–2), two Jaina commentaries have come down to us in their Sanskrit original, Prabhācandra's (980–1065) *Sambandhaparīkṣāvākyā* (SPVy) and Vālidevasūri's (1080–1170) *Syādvādaratnākara* (SVR), both of which only comment on SP 1–22 and preserve significant parts of the SPV (the relevant passages appear in the footnotes of Frauwallner's 1934 edition of SPV_{Tib}) and, though to a lesser extent, the SPAn (see below, Appendix). Fragments of an early Western Tibetan, “non canonical” translation of the SPV and the SPT have been identified, carefully described and edited by Helmut Tauscher (1994).
- 5 The title of the work as it appears in Tibetan transcription is *Sambandhaparīkṣānusāra* ('*Brel pa brtag pa'i rjes su 'braṅ ba*, SPAN D *že* 21b4/P *ze* 27a1–2). As far as I am aware, the treatise is never referred to by name in works preserved in Sanskrit. However, the recently (re)discovered Sanskrit manuscripts reveal that Śāṅkaranandana referred to at least two of his commentaries on treatises by Dharmakīrti as *Anusāriṇīs* (*Pramāṇaviniścayānusāriṇī*, *Pramāṇavārtikānusāriṇī*). I am thus inclined to believe that the original title of the work was *Sambandhaparīkṣānusāriṇī*. See Eltschinger 2015, 315–318.
- 6 The Tibetan translation of the stanzas in the SPAn appears to be largely independent from their translation in SPV_{Tib}. The SPAn stanzas have been edited by Frauwallner (1934).
- 7 From SP 5 onward, Śāṅkaranandana's commentary becomes increasingly short.
- 8 See Krasser 2001, 494–505, Eltschinger 2015, 305–311, and *passim*, and Eltschinger 2019, 378–379.
- 9 See Eltschinger 2015, 329–347, and, for a summary, Eltschinger 2019. Earlier research on Śāṅkaranandana's works includes Bühnmann 1980 and Krasser 2001. The only work edited to date is the short *Īsvārapāraṇa*, otherwise known as *Īsvārapāraṇasaṅkṣepa*; see Krasser 2002. Krasser's monumental edition and translation was based on two Sanskrit manuscripts and an incomplete anonymous Sanskrit commentary. The situation of Śāṅkaranandana's other works is incomparably less favorable, however, so that (partial) editions are not expected before several years. I have published a synoptic diplomatic edition of the stanzas of the large *Sarvajñāsiddhi* (Eltschinger 2008); a similar edition of the complete stanzas is under preparation, as well as a critical edition and translation of the *Anyāpohasiddhi*.
- 10 See Eltschinger 2015, 347–355 and Ratié 2020.
- 11 D *že* 303a5–7/P *ze* 326a6–8, as edited in Krasser 2001, 499: '*Brel pa grub pa slob dpon mkhas pa chen po bram ze'i rigs su sku 'khruns pa Chos kyi grag pa gñis pa zes 'jig rten na gam du grags sñi rtoḡ ge pa phal pa'i gzuñ 'jig pa dañ // thogs pa med pa don gyi de kho na rnam par 'jog pa'i blo'i mthu stobs kyiś 'gran zla dañ bral pa // bde bar gśegs pa'i bstan pa la gces spras su 'dzin pas legs par bśad pa'i ro myañ ba la sems rtse gciḡ la gzol ba dge bśnen dam pa śaṅka rā nandas mdzad pa rdzogs so //*. Translation Krasser 2001, 499.
- 12 See Gnoli 1960, xxiii–xxiv, and Eltschinger 2015, 306, n. 11.
- 13 See Eltschinger 2015, 310–311 and 353, n. 143.
- 14 The only study of the SSi I am aware of is MacCracken 2017, whose author announces a forthcoming English translation. As far as I can tell, Utpaladeva seems not to quote from Śāṅkaranandana's SPAn. Besides frequent cross-references to the *Pratyabhijñā* treatise, Utpaladeva mainly quotes from Dharmakīrti's PV (PV 1.87 [SSi 4,3–4], PV 3.428 [SSi 6,17–18]) and SP – SP 5cd (*ity amīśrāḥ svayaṃ bhāvās tān miśrayati kalpanā*), the very heart of the treatise and, by way of consequence, of Utpaladeva's reply (Ratié 2011, 298–299, n. 85), is quoted no less than three times (SSi 3,23–24, 5,1, and k. 4cd). The quotations I was not able to identify are not from the SPAn. As for Śāṅkaranandana, he only seldom quotes from or refers to other texts – and then almost exclusively from/to Dharmakīrti's works. The SPAn is no exception to this. Śāṅkaranandana refers once to dpal Chos kyi grags pa (Śrīdharmakīrti, D *že* 25b7/P *ze* 32b5), once to Dharmakīrti's *rNam 'grel* (*[Pramāṇa]vārtika*, D29b2/P37a7), and once to his own commentary on it (*rNam 'grel gyi rjes su 'braṅ ba*, **Vārtikānusāriṇī*, D27b6/P35a5). Given the polemical targets of the treatise (see above, and below), it is not surprising that, beside one reference to Vaiyākaraṇa (Va ya kar, D30a1/P37b8), Śāṅkaranandana only refers to the author of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (gZegs ma zos pa, Kaṇabhakṣa/Kaṇabhuj, D25b7/P32b5 ; gZegs zan, Kaṇāda, D29a1/P36b4). That the Vaiśeṣika was his main target can also be deduced from his frequent criticism of characteristically Vaiśeṣika doctrines such as those of the “whole” (*avayavin*; see, e.g., around D23b3/P29b3–4), the “categories” (*padārthas*, see below, §5.3),

the atoms (*aṇu*, *paramāṇu*, see below, §5.3), and of course various types of relations such as inherence (*samavāya*) and conjunction (*saṃnyoga*).

- 15 SPV 1.1: *vastubhūtaṃ sambandhaṃ nirākartum āha – pāratantryam ityādī*.
- 16 SP 5cd: *ity amiśrāḥ svayaṃ bhāvās tān miśrayati kalpanā //*. On SP 5cd, see also above, n. 14.
- 17 See ŚBh on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5/1, 52,1–7, ŚV *sambandhākṣepa* 6–9, and NSū 2.1.53. Like Bhartṛhari, the *Mīmāṃsā* accepts a relation of mutual assistance (*upakāryopakāritā*) that can be subsumed under dependence; see Eltschinger 2007, 126, n. 53 for references.
- 18 See Eltschinger 2007, 248–249 and 273–275. It is to be noted that in the PVSV, Dharmakīrti does not distinguish between *pāratantrya* and *parāpekṣā*, his commentators trying to read the SP triad into the PVSV dyad.
- 19 See Lasic 2003, and more generally Kajiyama 1963, Inami 1999 and Lasic 1999.
- 20 See Frauwallner 1933, 68–71.
- 21 See, e.g., Frauwallner 1961, 145.
- 22 SPT D *že* 1b1–2: */'gro ba thams cad 'brel med par/ /'gro ba'i bla ma gañ gsuñs pa/ /de la rab tu 'tshal' nas/ /'brel pa brtag bśad par bya/*. ¹tshal em.: 'chal D.
- 23 SPT D *že* 21b2–3: */'brel pa dpyad pa'i bśad rnam phy'e ba la/ /dge ba rgya chen thob pa gañ yin des/ /'khor ba'i 'brel pa'i mi mthun phyogs gyur pa/ /blo med ži ba sems can gyis thob śog/*.
- 24 On this literary *topos*, see Funayama 1995.
- 25 SPT D *že* 1b2–2a3: *'brel pa dños por gyur pa bsal bar 'dod nas žes bya ba'i tshig dan po 'dis rab tu byed pa 'di'i 'brel pa dan brjod par bya ba dan dgos pa rñams stion to // gžan du na 'brel pa dan brjod par bya ba dan dgos pa rñams dan bral ba'i rab tu byed pa ni blañ bar bya ba ma yin par 'gyur ro // de la 'brel pa dños por gyur pa žes bya ba'i tshig 'dis ni brjod par bya ba bstan to // bsal bar 'dod nas žes bya ba'i tshig 'dis ni dgos pa bstan te / 'di ltar 'brel pa dños por gyur pa bsal ba ni 'dir dgos pa yin no // smras so žes bya ba 'dis ni 'brel pa smos te / 'di ltar 'brel pa dños por gyur pa bsal ba'i phyir rab tu byed pa 'di bstan to // de lta bas na 'brel pa dños por gyur pa bsal ba la rab tu byed pa ni thabs kho nar bstan pa yin te / 'di ltar rab tu byed pa 'di thos pas 'brel pa dños por gyur pa med do žes bya bar nes par 'gyur ro // de nas rab tu byed pa ni thabs yin no // 'brel pa dños por gyur pa bsal ba ni thabs las byuñ ba ste / rab tu byed pa dan dgos pa 'di gñis ni thabs dan thabs las byuñ ba'i mtshan nūd du 'brel to // 'di ni re žig spy'i don to //*.
- 26 On *ayaḥśalākā*, see also SSi 1,12–13 and k. 3b. TSP 38,9 on TS no. 42 (where *ayaḥśalākās* are an example of all individuals being combined/mixed/related by conceptual construction, *vyakṛtayaḥ sarve kalpanāmiśritātmikāḥ*) explains *ayaḥśalākā* as *ayomayāḥ śalākāḥ parasparam asaṅgatāḥ*, “bars made of iron that are mutually unconnected.”
- 27 SPVy 139, n. 1 (marginal/interlinear note? see below, n. 41): *rūpasagandhasparśaparamānūnām sajjāṭṭiyavijāṭṭiyavyāvṛttānām parasparam asambaddhānām ity arthaḥ /*. “The meaning is that atoms of visible form, taste, scent and tangible [things], which are excluded from [both] similar (homogeneous) and dissimilar/(heterogeneous) [ones], are not mutually related.”
- 28 SPVy 139,1–7: *nanu cānūnām ayaḥśalākākālpatvenānyonyam sambandhābhāvataḥ sthūlādipratīter bhrāntatvāt kathaṃ tadvaśāt tatsvabhāvo bhāvaḥ syāt / tathā hi sambandho 'rthānām pāratantryalakṣaṇo vā syād rūpaśleṣalakṣaṇo vā syāt / prathamapakṣe kim asau niṣpannayoḥ sambandhinoḥ syād anīṣpannayoḥ vā / na tāvad anīṣpannayoḥ svarūpasyaivāsattvāc chaśāsvaviśānavat / niṣpannayoḥ ca pāratantryābhāvād asambandha eva / uktaṃ ca...*
- 29 See SPVy 139,15–140,4.
- 30 SVR 812,4–5: *tad ithaṃ pratīyanurodhena sūkṣmasthanūlākārātmakaṃ vastu prekṣāvadbhīḥ pratīpattavyam //*.
- 31 SVR 812,6–7: *śātaśaḥ parākṛto 'pi svamatapṛtīyākūlikṛtasvāntaḥ / sthūlārtham asahamāṇaḥ kimapi brūte 'ra sugatasutaḥ //*.
- 32 SVR 812,8–13: *paramānūnām anyonyam sambandhābhāvataḥ sthūlākārapratīter bhrāntatvāt kathaṃ tadvaśāt tadātmakaṃ vastu syāt / sambandho hi svarūpeṇaiva tāvan na sambhavati / tathā hy arthānām pāratantryalakṣaṇo vā syāt tadātmayāparaparyāyaruṣaśleṣalakṣaṇo vā / prathamapakṣe kim asau niṣpannayoḥ sambandhinoḥ syād anīṣpannayoḥ vā / na tāvad anīṣpannayoḥ svarūpasyaivāsattvāt turaḡakaraviśānavat / niṣpannayoḥ ca pāratantryābhāvād asambandha eva / tad āha kīrtiḥ... ¹-rūpaśleṣa- em. : -rūpāśleṣa- Ed.*
- 33 VśV_L 6,27–7,2/VśV_S 85,1–7: *yat tad rūpādīkam āyatanam rūpādīvijñaptīnām pratyekam viśayaḥ syāt tad ekaṃ vā syād yathā 'vayavirūpaṃ kalpyate vaiśeṣikair anekaṃ vā paramāṇuśaḥ saṃhatā vā ta eva paramāṇavaḥ / na tāvad ekaṃ viśayo bhavaty avayavebhyo 'nyasyāvayavirūpasya kvacid apy agrahaṇāt / nāpy anekaṃ paramānūnām pratyekam agrahaṇāt / nāpi te saṃhatā viśayībhavanti / yasmat paramāṇur ekaṃ dravyam na sidhyati /*. Translation Silk 2016, 85.
- 34 VśV_L 7,4–5/VśV_S 87,1–6: *śaḍbhyo digbhyāḥ śaḍbhīḥ paramāṇubhir yugapadyoge satī paramāṇoḥ śaḍaṅśatā prāpnotī / ekasya yo deśas tatrānyasyāsambhavāt /*. Translation Silk 2016, 87.

- 35 Vś 14ab and VśV_L 7,19–21/VśV_S 93,2–4: *digbhāgabhedo yasyāsti tasyaikatvan na yujyate / anyo hi paramāṇoḥ pūrvadigbhāgo yāvad adhodigbhāga iti digbhāgabhedo sati katham tadātmakasya paramāṇor ekatvam yoksyate /*. Translation Silk 2016, 93.
- 36 VśV_L 7,7–9/VśV_S 89,2–8: *ya evaikasya paramāṇor deśaḥ sa eva śaṇṇām (I) tena sarveṣāṃ samānadeśatvāt sarvaḥ piṇḍaḥ paramāṇumātraḥ syāt parasparāvvyatirekāḍ iti na kaścit piṇḍo drśyaḥ syāt / naiva hi paramāṇavaḥ saṃyujyante niravayavatvāt /*. Translation Silk 2016, 89. Note also VśV_L 7,23–8,1/VśV_S 95,1–7: *yady ekaikasya paramāṇor digbhāgabhedo na syād ādityodaye katham anyatra pārśve chāyā bhavaty anyatrātapah / na hi tasyānyah pradeśo 'sti yatrātapo na syāt / āvaraṇaṃ ca katham bhavati paramāṇoḥ paramāṇvantareṇa yadi digbhāgabhedo neṣyate / na hi kaścīd anyah parabhāgo 'sti yatāgamanād anyenānyasya pratighātaḥ syāt / asati ca pratighāte sarveṣāṃ samānadeśatvāt sarvaḥ saṅghātaḥ paramāṇumātraḥ syād ity uktaṃ /*. “If no single atom were to have spatial differentiation, how is it that when the sun rises in one place, there is shadow in one place, sunshine in another? For that [atom] does not have another portion on which there would be no sunshine. And how is an atom obstructed by another atom if spatial differentiation is not accepted? For [an atom] has no other separate part whatsoever, from contact with which one [atom] would be resisted by another. And if there were no resistance, then because all of them would share a common location, the entire compound would be the extent of a [single] atom, as has [already] been discussed [in verse 12cd, above].” Translation Silk 2016, 95.
- 37 Vś 13ab: *paramāṇor asaṃyoge tatsaṅghāte 'sti kasya saḥ /*.
- 38 Although in a different context, Vāḍidevasūri refers several times to Śāṅkaranandana by name, e.g., at SVR 783,21–22, SVR 787,12 and 787,13–21; see Bühnemann 1980, 194 and Krasser 2001, 492.
- 39 Frauwallner 1934, 262.
- 40 Frauwallner 1934, 262, n. 3.
- 41 As far as I can see, Dvarikadas Shastri is silent about the origin of these Sanskrit footnotes. V.N. Jha (1990, xxxvi), who reproduces Shastri's 1972 edition, says that he is “thankful to the editor for providing Sanskrit paraphrases in the footnotes. This helps with grasping the text [...]” I am seriously doubting that these footnotes, at least all of them, are in Shastri's hand. To take but one example, footnote 4, p. 139: *anyonyasvabhāvānupraveśa(lakṣana)* obviously reflects SPAn D *že* 24a3/P *ze* 30a6–7: *phan tshun bdag nīd rjes su 'du ba*; this, in my opinion, cannot be a coincidence.
- 42 SPAn D *že* 21b4–5/P *ze* 27a2–3: */gaṇ gis 'brel pa spaṅs gyur pa/ l' gro ba bdag daṅ bdag gi min/ / gziṅ 'dzin med pa can gsuṅs pa/ /kun mkhyen de la phyag 'tshal lo/*. On this stanza, see also Eltschinger 2015, 336.
- 43 See Eltschinger 2005, 180–197, 2009, 62–76, 2010, and Eltschinger/Ratié 2013, 4–36.
- 44 *Dharmālaṅkāra* 2.1–2ab, as edited in Eltschinger 2015, 333, n. 77: *kṣaṇikatvāt kriyābhogādhiṣṭhānaparatantratā / nirātmatānupādeyaśeṣatvam śāntir uttamā // hastikṛtanirāmbananirvāṇam abhayaṃ param /*. For an excerpt of Śāṅkaranandana's commentary on this, see Eltschinger 2015, 333–334.
- 45 *Dharmālaṅkāra* MS 1a1–2 (= MS D in Eltschinger 2015, 313): *yo hi kriyāsamavāyād āsādītakartṛbhāvaḥ, tatkriyāphalābhisambandhād bhoktā bhavet, pravartakatayā ca śārīrendriyamanasām adhiṣṭhātā sa evātmā syāt*.
- 46 SPAn D *že* 21b6–22a2/P *ze* 27a5–b2: *rab tu byed pa gsum ni 'jug pa sna tshogs pa nīd la yaṅ tshad ma kho na rnam par gžag¹ par 'dod pas brtsams pa yin no // gTan tshigs thigs pa yaṅ gtan tshigs kyi mtshan nīd rjod par byed pas² tshad ma rnam par 'jog pa'i don can kho na yin no 'zes ni 'nag daṅ pos bstan to // rIsod pa'i rigs pa yaṅ mñon sum daṅ rjes su dpag pa'i raṅ bžin nīd kyi rjes su dpag pa'i tshad ma rnam pa gñis las gžan gyi don gyi rjes su dpag pa lhag mar gyur pa nīd kyi yaṅ dag pa ma yin pa'i rnam par gžag¹ pa sun 'don par byed pa'i tshad ma ñe bar ston par byed pa'i don can kho na yin no // de bžin du rGyud gžan sgrub pa ni rjes su dpag pa'i khyad par rams la phyi rol gyi don du smra ba las don dam pa'i rigs pa mtshan nīd mi mthun pa can yin na yaṅ³ gžan gyi sems rjes su dpag pa la mtshan nīd mi mthun pa med pa nīd yaṅ dag par ston par byed pa'i don can nīd kyi⁴ tshad ma yaṅ dag par ston par byed pa'i don can kho na yin no // ¹gžag D: bžag P. ²pas D: pa yis P. ³na yaṅ P: no // yaṅ D. ⁴kyi P: kyi D. “Three [of Dharmakīrti's] treatises (*prakaraṇa*) are, from among several [other] functions² (**vṛttinānāṭve* 'pi), undertaken (*ārabdha*) with a desire to establish (*vyavasthā*) a *pramāṇa*.¹ [Its] initial statement indicates that the *Hetubindu* aims at establishing the *pramāṇa* [‘inference’] by stating the [proper] definition of a logical reason (*hetulakṣaṇa*).² The *Vādanyāya* aims at presenting (**upaś diś-*, **upaś drś-*) as having the nature of perception and inference (**pratyaḥśānumānasvabhāvatayā*) the *pramāṇa* that enables one to dismiss (*niśidh-*) the wrong rules (*asadvavasthā*) [stated by deceivers in debates, a *pramāṇa* consisting in a type*

of] inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*) that supplements the two types of the *pramāṇa* ‘inference’ (**dvivīdhānumānapramāṇa*).³ Similarly, the *Santānāntarasiddhi* aims at pointing (**sanf dr̥s-*) to the *pramāṇa* whose purpose is to show that, even though the reasoning/(method) (**nyāya*, **yukti*) concerning the ultimate’ (**paramārtha-*, **pāramārthika*) is dissimilar to [that of] the realist (*bāhyārthavādin*) in specific inferences (**anumānaviśeṣa*), the inference of other minds is not dissimilar (**paracittānumānavailakṣaṇya*) [to that of the realist].⁴⁷ “I take *kho na* (in *tshad ma kho na*) to mean *eva*, but it is to be noted that in both SPV_{Tib} and SPT, *kho na* is often used to render an abstract noun, much like the more frequent *ñid*.³ Cf. HB 1,2–3 (see Steinkellner 1967, II, 33 and 81–82) : *parokṣārthapratipatter anumānāśrayatvāt saikṣepatas tadvyutpādanārtham idam ārabhyate* /. “Since [our] cognition of a [hic et nunc] imperceptible object relies on an inference[, the main element of which is the logical reason], the [present treatise] is undertaken with a view to briefly explain it [i.e., inference].”³ Cf. VN 1,2–3 (see Much 1991, II, 1–2): *nyāyavādinam api vādeṣv asadvyavasthopyāsaiḥ śathā nigrhṇanti, tanniśedhārtham idam ārabhyate*. “In debates, deceivers [are seen to] defeat even a [trained] logician by edicting wrong rules; this [treatise] is undertaken in order to dismiss them.” I cannot make sense of the segment *mñon sum dañ rjes su dpag pa’i rañ bžin ñid kyijs rjes su dpag pa’i tshad ma rnam pa gñis las gžan gyi don gyi rjes su dpag pa lhag mar gyur pa ñid kyijs*.⁴ Cf. SAS 1 : *gal te bdag ñid la bya ba dañ brjod pa sems kyi g.yo ba sñon du ’gro ba can dag mthoñ nas / gžan la de dag mthoñ bas g.yo ba rjes su dpog par byed na / tshul ’di ni sems tsam la yañ mthsuñs pas / sems tsam du smra bas kyañ gžan gyi sems rjes su dpag par nus te* /. “If, having observed (*dr̥ṣṭvā*) in one’s self (*ātmani*) that [physical] action and speech presuppose (*kriyāvacanapūrvaka*) a mental impulsion (**cittasamīhā*), one infers [such] an impulsion from observing those [very things] in others (**paratra*), [then,] this method (**nyāya*, **vidhi*) being the same in mind-only (*cittamātra*) as well, the idealist (*cittamātravādin*) is also able to infer other minds (**paracitta*).”

- 47 SPAn D *že* 22a3–4/P *ze* 27b3–4 : ...*gžal bar bya ba gtso bo rnam par dpyod par byed pa’i yan lag ñid kyijs kyañ dños po ’di brtag par bya ste* /. On the self as a *prameya*, see the *locus classicus* at NSū 1.1.9.
- 48 Cf. above, n. 44, and PVSV 154,13: *kriyābhogādhiṣṭhānāsvatantro hy ātmā nīrātmā* /. See Eltschinger/Ratié 2013, 30–31, and n. 107 for an analysis of the compound *kriyābhogādhiṣṭhāna* (not a *dvandva*, but *kriyābhoga* [*dvandva*] – *adhiṣṭhāna* [*tatpuruṣa*]). Dharmakīrti’s commentators explain “action” as the performance of good and bad deeds (*śubhāśubhakarāṇa*), “enjoyment” as the experience of pleasure and pain (*sukhaduḥkhānubhava*), and “control” as appropriation (*svīkāra*). The SPAn seems to favor a *dvandva* analysis of the whole compound.
- 49 Understanding *la* in *’brel pa de med pa la bya ba ’du ba med pa’i phyir* in the sense of *na*. More literally with *la*, one could perhaps understand : “Because this relation does not exist and [therefore] there is no inference of action...” For such a “locative” use of *la*, see below, Appendix, fragment no. 5.
- 50 Understanding *loñs spyod par byed pa as loñs spyod par byed pa po*.
- 51 SPAn D *že* 22a4–6/P *ze* 27b4–7: *’di ltar ’brel pa’i dños po med par ston par byed pa la dgos pa ni bdag med pa rnam pa gñis sgrub par byed pa kho na yin no // bya ba dañ loñs spyod dañ byin gyis rlob¹ pa la rañ dbañ med pa ni bdag gi bdag med pa yin te / ’brel pa de med pa la bya ba ’du ba med pa’i phyir bya ba la rañ dbañ med pa’i phyir byed pa po bsal to // de ñid kyi phyir yañ bde ba dañ sdug bsñal dañ ’du ba med pa’i ño bo ni loñs spyod par byed pa ma yin no // byin gyis brlab pa dañ ’du ba med pa na yañ byin gyis rlob¹ pa po ma yin no // de’i² phyir ’brel pa med pa na gañ zag gi bdag med pa grub³ pa’o // .¹rlob D: brlab P. ²de’i P: ña’i D. ³grub P: sgrub D.*
- 52 SPAn D *že* 22a6–b2/P *ze* 27b8–28a4 : *de ñid kyi phyir tshig gi don drug kyañ bkag pa yin te / sbyor ba dañ ’du ba med pa’i phyir rdul phra rab rnam la yañ dag par sbyor ba med pa na rdzas rtsom pa ma yin no // de rnam la ’du ba med pa na yañ de’i dños po med pa’i phyir de dañ ’du ba can gyi rgyu ñid ma yin na ni rdzas ma yin no // rdul phra rnam kyañ ’du ba med pa’i phyir bya ba dañ yon tan la sogs pa’i rdzas kyi chos dañ bral ba rnam kyañ rdzas ma yin no // rdul phra rnam ni gzugs kho na yin gyi gzugs la sogs pa’i yon tan can gžan cuñ žig ni mañ bas rdzas ma yin no // de bžin du yon tan can dañ¹ byed pa po dañ ’dra ba dañ mthar gyur pa’i rdzas la mi² jug pa na yañ ’du ba med pa’i phyir yon tan dañ las dañ spyi dañ khyad par rnam med pa yin no // .¹dañ D : P om. dañ. My translation of this difficult passage is purely tentative.*
- 53 In the SPT and the SPAn, both *saṃyoga* and *yoga* can be translated with Tib. *sbyor ba*, *yañ dag par* (*sam-*) being apparently prefixed to *sbyor ba* when *saṃyoga* as technical term is to be emphasized.

- 54 SPAn D *že* 22a6/P *ze* 27b7–8: *de bžin du ran gi bdaq nīd tsam la gnas pa gžan gyi dbaṅ nīd dan gžan dan sbyor ba dan ltos¹ pa nīd la sogs pa med pa na gzuñ ba dan 'dzin pa'i dños po med pa ni chos kyi bdaq med pa yin no //*. ¹ltos D: *btos* P.
- 55 See Eltschinger 2015, 339–344.
- 56 See Eltschinger 2005, 162–175.
- 57 *Prajñālaṅkāra* 3.71cd, as edited in Eltschinger 2015, 341, n. 105: *vijñaptimātratā siddhā sā bhāyārthanirākṛtiḥ //*.
- 58 ĪPVV II, 144,11–12; see Eltschinger 2015, 340, n. 99.
- 59 This is the case, e.g., in SPAn on SP 2 (*rūpasleṣa*), where Śāṅkaranandana clearly alludes to Vś(V) 12ab. Note SPAn D *že* 24a4–6/P *ze* 30a8–b3: *gal te ran gi ño bo tsam la gnas pa na 'dres pa ma yin no žes rdul phra rab rnam la yañ mi 'gyur na / des na ji ltar drug gi cig car sbyor ba'i rnam par brtaḡ par bya že na / ma yin te / bar ma chad pa tsam la brten pa phan tshun reg pas¹ de'i thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // de nīd 'brel pa can du gyur pa yañ ma yin te / dños po'i khyad par ma grub pa'i phyir ro // phan tshun bdaq nīd khoñs su 'dus pa na ni de nīd gcig ma yin pa las gcig tu gyur pa'i dños po'i khyad par du gyur na 'di ni yod pa ma yin te / gñis nīd ma yin² pa'i phyir ro //*. ¹pas D: *pa yis* P. ²yin P: *sparis* D. “Objection: If[, as you Yogācāra Buddhists are claiming, things] that merely abide in their own nature (**svarūpamātrāvasthita*) do not merge [with one another] (**ślis-*), there will be no [fusion (/mergence) of natures] either for atoms (**paramānu*), which abide in their own specific natures;] how is it therefore (**tat katham*) that [an atom's] simultaneous conjunction (*yugapadyoga*) with six (**ṣaṭka*) [atoms] has to be critically examined (**vicārya*) [as it has been done by Vasubandhu]? [Answer:] No, because the [undesirable] consequence (*prasaṅga*) of the [seven atoms becoming just one] results from the mutual [physical] contact (**anyonyasamsparsa*) [of atoms aggregating] without intervals². Now these cannot be correlates (*sambandhin*), for no difference among [such] entities (**vastubheda*) [can] be established. [Indeed,] if [their] natures are co-included (**antarbhū-*), how can [such] an entity that has become one (**ekābhūta*) out of numerous (**aneka*) [entities] differ, since there is no duality (**dvaita*) [any longer].” ²Cf. Vś 12ab and VśV_L 74/VśV_S 874.
- 60 Note, e.g., SPAn D *že* 25a1–2/P31b2–3: *de'i phyir gzuñ ba dan 'dzin pa'i dños po gsal bar bya ba dan gsal bar byed pa'i dños po la sogs pa yañ med do // gzuñ ba la ltos pa ni 'dzin par byed pa nīd yin na / gzuñ ba med na 'dzin pa'i nus pa 'di cuñ žig kyañ med de /*. ¹na P: *no //* D. “Therefore[, since, as Dharmakīrti demonstrates in SP 3, there can be no relation of mutual reliance], there are no subject-objekt (*grāhyagrāhakabhāva*) and manifester-manifested (*vyāṅgyavyañjakabhāva*) relationships either, for if being a subject (*grāhakatva*) relies on an object (**grāhyāpekṣa*), there [can] be no capacity to grasp (**grahaṇasakti*) in the absence of [something] to be grasped (**grāhyābhāve*).”
- 61 See above, §5.1. Gudrun Bühnemann (1980, 191, and n. 3), who was aware of Frauwallner's observations, attempted neither to locate nor to edit these fragments.
- 62 See above, n. 41.
- 63 SP_{An} 11cd–12: *[yod dan med pa'i khyad par can / sbyor ba gal te rgyu 'bras nīd / sbyor ba'i khyad par de dag nīd / rgyu 'bras nīd du 'dir cis min / tha dad phyir žes gal te 'di / sgra yin sbyor ba po la brten /*. SP 11cd–12: *bhāvābhāvopādhir yogah kāryakāranatā yadī // yogopādhi na tāv eva kāryakāraṇatātra kim / bhedāc cen nanv ayaṃ śabdo niyoktāraṃ samāśritāḥ //*.
- 64 SP_{An} 16: *[dños po yod na de yod pa / yod pa nīd na'an yod gyur pa / mñion sum mi dmigs pa dag las / rgyu 'bras nīd du rab tu grags /*. SP 16: *bhāve bhāvini tadbhāvo bhāva eva ca bhāvītā / prasiddhe hetuphalate pratyakṣānupalambhataḥ //*.
- 65 SP_{An} 17: *[de phyir de tsam yañ dag don / rgyu dan 'bras bu sbyor yul can / rtoḡ¹ pa rnam ni log don rnam / 'brel pa 'dra ba'i don ston byed /*. *rtoḡ* P: *rtogs* D. SP 17: *etāvanmātratattvārthāḥ kāryakāraṇagocarāḥ / vikalpā darśayanty arthān mīthyārthā ghaṭitān iva //*.
- 66 SP_{An} 19: *[dis ni sbyor ba can dag dan / 'du ba can sogs kun dpyad de / phan tshun phan 'dops med pa'i phyir / de ni de 'dra'i 'brel can min /*. SP 19: *saṃyogisamavāyādi sarvam etena cintitam / anyonyānupakāraḥ ca na sambandhī ca tādrśaḥ //*.
- 67 SP_{An} 21: *[de dag phan min pa la yañ / 'du ba'am ni gžan pa la / gal te sbyor yin sna tshogs pa / phan tshun 'du ba can du 'gyur /*. SP 21: *tayor anupakāre 'pi samavāye paratra vā / sambandho yadī viśvaṃ syāt samavāyi parasparam //*.

Other Aspects of the Buddha's Knowledge (2): The Buddha's Eye (*Cakkhu/Cakṣu*)

Toshiichi ENDO

The Buddha is said to possess 'five eyes' (*pañcacakkhūni*); namely, *maṃsacakkhu*, *dibbacakkhu*, *paññācakkhu*, *buddhacakkhu*, and *samantacakkhu* according to the *Niddesa*,¹ notwithstanding emphasis on this aspect is generally overshadowed by the Buddha's other attributes. All these eyes are individually referred to in the canonical texts. For instance, *samantacakkhu* (Vin I 5,6; D II 39; M I 168; S I 137 It 33; etc.), *Buddhacakkhu* (D II 38; etc.), *paññācakkhu* (A IV 292; A II 144; etc.), *dibbacakkhu* (D II 20, 176; M III 175; S II 276; etc.) which is one item of the *tevijjā* (threefold knowledge), and *dhammacakkhu* (D I 86; M I 380; etc.) are found in the Canon. The concept of 'five eyes' is clearly visible in the *Niddesa*, and texts like the *Sangūti-sutta* where a group of three (*tīṇi cakkhūni*, *maṃsacakkhu*, *dibba-cakkhu*, *paññācakkhu*: D III 219) is found, appeared to have played an intermediary before reaching the more matured and detailed stage of development in the Theravāda tradition. While some commentaries,² thus, give the identical classification of five eyes as in the *Niddesa*, most of the commentarial texts, while conceptually following the idea of the Buddha's five eyes, provide new classifications and descriptions of them, not found in the Canon.

While the Pāli commentarial exposition on 'eye' (*cakkhu*) will be shortly discussed, the Sanskrit tradition together with its Chinese translation provides a consistent list of five eyes (*pañcacakṣu*). For instance, the *Mahāvastu* has the following five:

*katamāni pañca // māṃsacakṣuḥ divyacakṣuḥ prajñācakṣuḥ
dharmacakṣuḥ buddhacakṣuḥ // (Mvu I 158).*

The *Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā* also lists *māṃsacakṣus*, *divyacakṣus*, *prajñācakṣus*, *dharmacakṣus*, and *buddhacakṣus* (17). In the Chinese translations of the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, the list is often given, for instance, as follows: 肉眼, 天眼, 慧眼, 法眼, 佛眼 (*māṃsacakṣu*, *divyacakṣu*, *prajñācakṣu*, *dharmacakṣu*, and *buddhacakṣu*) in 大智度論: **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sāstra*) (T25 347a) by Kumārajīva 鳩摩羅什 402-405³; so are in 大般若波羅蜜多經: *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra*) (T5 15b) by Xuanzang 玄奘 659⁴ and 放光般若經: *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*) (T8 9a) by Mokṣala 無叉羅 or 無羅叉, 291.⁵ 佛說普曜經: T 3 532b, a Chinese translation of the *Lalitavistara* by Dharmarakṣa 法護 308⁶ also gives the same list: 肉眼, 天眼, 慧眼, 法眼, 佛眼.

As a comparison above shows, both the Sanskrit and Chinese translations list somewhat differently from the one in the *Niddesa*: the *Niddesa* has ‘*samanta-cakkhu*’ in place of ‘*dharma-cakṣus*’ (法眼). This different tradition seems to continue unabated in both traditions. However, this ‘*dharma-cakṣus*’ (*dhamma-cakkhu*) came to be incorporated in the Pāli commentaries’ list when a distinct separation of the ‘*maṃsacakkhu*’ (physical eye) from the list of ‘five eyes,’ which were counted to describe spiritual and flawless attainments of the Buddha (*nānacakkhu* or *paññācakkhu*), became standardized and effected. This separation seems to be a fundamental difference between the two traditions, with the Sanskrit tradition not including ‘*samanta-cakkhu*’ in its mainstream.

Then, an intriguing question in this context is: When was ‘*samantacakkhu*’ of the *Niddesa* replaced by ‘*dhammacakkhu*’ of the Sanskrit tradition? In the Pāli exegetical tradition the list we have now is to include ‘*dhammacakkhu*’ to make up the list of five after *maṃsacakkhu* was removed and separated from the list. Concerning this list, another question can be raised: 1) When did the separation of *maṃsacakkhu* from the list occur? and 2) Why was ‘*dhammacakkhu*’ chosen for the list? Based on these observations, it seems that both traditions in Sanskrit or Chinese translation and in Pāli had separate purposes in adopting their own tradition, though both seemingly originated in the older sources.

The word ‘*samantacakṣu*,’ it is interesting to note, is also found in the Sanskrit *Lalitavistara* of P.L. Vaidya’s edition: ‘*samantacakṣu*’ (71 & 307) and ‘*samantanetra*’ (309). They are, nonetheless, not mentioned in relation to the ‘five eyes’ of the Buddha. Similarly, we find a likely translation of ‘*samanta-cakkhu*’ in Chinese as 普眼 (universal or all round eye) in the *Da-cheng yi-zhang* (*Da-cheng yi-zhang*) of Hui-yuan (慧遠: A.C. 523-592) where a list of ‘ten eyes’ (十眼) is given, perhaps as an expanded version:

十眼如彼華嚴中說。一是肉眼。見一切色。二是天眼。見諸衆生死此生彼。三是慧眼。見一切衆生諸根差別。四是法眼。見一切法真實之相。謂見諸法第一義相。五是佛眼。見佛十力。六是智眼。分別了知一切種法。七是明眼。謂見一切諸佛光明。八出生死眼。見涅槃法。九無礙眼。見一切法無有障礙。十是普眼。謂見法界平等法門。十中初一是前肉眼。亦兼天眼。見細遠色是天眼故。第二天眼是前天眼。第三慧眼第五佛眼第六智眼第七明眼第八出生死眼第九無礙眼。此之六種是前法眼。第四法眼是前慧眼。見真諦故。第十普眼是前佛眼。佛眼普見平等眞法故名普眼。五眼之義辨之略爾 (T 44 855a)

If this assumption is literally interpreted, then the ‘ten eyes’ (十眼) are explicated in the 華嚴 (Huayan) tradition including *大方廣佛華嚴經* (*Dafanguang fo huayan jing*) translated by Buddhahadra (410–421). The list contains: 1) flesh eye (肉眼) which sees all types of forms (見一切色), 2) divine eye (天眼) which observes rise and fall of all sentient beings

(見諸衆生死此生彼), 3) wisdom-eye (慧眼) which sees the distinction of characteristics of all sentient beings (見一切衆生諸根差別), 4) *dharma-eye* (法眼) that sees the true characteristics of all things (見一切法真實之相), 5) Buddha-eye (佛眼) which sees the ten powers of the Buddha (見佛十力), 6) knowledge-eye (智眼) which distinguishes and perfectly comprehends all kinds of *dharmas* (分別了知一切種法), 7) eye shining with Buddha-light (明眼) which sees radiances of all Buddhas (見一切諸佛光明), 8) immortal eye (出生死眼) which sees universality or principle of *nirvāna* (見涅槃法), 9) unhindered eye (無礙眼) which sees non-hindrances of all *dharmas* (見一切法無有障礙), and 10) universal or all round eye (普眼) which sees that in the *dharma*-realm [all] teachings are equal (謂見法界平等法門).

In the Huayan (華嚴) tradition, the item number (10), universal or all round eye (普眼), is replaced by 'omniscient eye' (一切智眼).⁷ This tradition is also seen in the Yogācāra school of Buddhist thought.⁸ This replacement is justifiable as it is also seen in the Pāli tradition: "*Samantacakkhu nāma sabbaññutaññāṇaṃ*" (Pts I 133; Nd II 359). The classification of eyes into ten categories, however, seems to be of late origin. It is certainly not seen in the Pāli tradition or in the Sanskrit tradition and Chinese translation before this work (i.e., the 6th century). It is also important to point out that Huiyuan (慧遠) seems to have been quite aware of the mainstream or traditional classification of the Buddha's eyes into five (五眼). Thus, he analyzes them accordingly: Of the ten [eyes], the first is the previous flesh eye (十中初一是前肉眼), it is also the same as divine eye (亦兼天眼) – one sees subtle or distant forms because of this divine eye (見細遠色是天眼故) – [therefore] the second divine eye is [the same as] the previous divine eye (第二天眼是前天眼), the third wisdom eye, the fifth Buddha-eye, the sixth knowledge-eye, the seventh eye shining with Buddha-light, the eighth immortal eye and the ninth unhindered eye – these six kinds are previously the *dharma-eye* (第三慧眼第五佛眼第六智眼第七明眼第八出生死眼第九無礙眼。此之六種是前法眼), the fourth *dharma-eye* is [equivalent to] the previous wisdom-eye – because it sees the real truths (第四法眼是前慧眼。見真諦故), and the tenth universal or all round eye is the previous Buddha-eye – the Buddha eye sees the real *dharmas* all round indiscriminately, therefore it is called universal or all round eye (第十普眼是前佛眼。佛眼普見平等眞法故名普眼) – the meanings of the five eyes are a summary of divisions (五眼之義辨之略爾). This suggests that a classification of eyes into five is the basic concept in Indian Buddhism of different traditions with some deviations upon which a later division of them into ten was initiated – for instance, the Theravādin tradition came to have two kinds of flesh (physical) eye, separating this from the list of five eyes which is centred on the Buddha's knowledge.

Historically speaking, however, tracing the origins of this concept of five eyes is difficult and ambiguous. In the Pāli tradition, texts such as the *Niddesa* and *Paṭisambhidāmagga* have a list of five eyes; texts in the Sanskrit tradition

like the *Mahāvastu* also has it; the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature also thrives on this. Although the Theravādins might think that this concept appeared within their own tradition because of the canonicity of the *Niddesa* and *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, these texts have not reached a consensus as to the dates of composition. The only clear case is 放光般若經 (*Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*) (T8 9a) by Mokṣala (無叉羅) translated in the late 3rd century. In short, this concept of the Buddha's five eyes would have become prominent at least before the late 3rd century A.C.⁹ If tracing into its origins is possible, it is more likely that the Pāli tradition in the *Niddesa* and *Paṭisambhidāmagga* would have been the first to put together what were found scattered in the early texts into a list of five eyes. The determination on the date of its origins therefore depends upon the *Niddesa* and *Paṭisambhidāmagga*. Though it is elusive to fix a reasonable date of their composition, scholars working on the Pāli textual tradition suggest the various theories. K.R. Norman, for instance, states: "... the beginning of the third century B.C. would seem to be quite suitable as the date of its [*Niddesa*'s] composition."¹⁰ On the other hand, Oscar von Hinüber seems to endorse the view that the *Niddesa* was composed "...not later than 1st century B.C."¹¹ Kogen Mizuno believes that both the *Niddesa* and the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* can be considered as the pioneering works for the early *Abhidhamma* literature and infers that they would have been composed in and around the time of King Asoka.¹² These arguments point to a period of their composition certainly before the 3rd century A.C. which, or at least the late date of the same century, appears to be a known date of translation of 放光般若經 (*Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*) (T8 9a) by Mokṣala (無叉羅) as seen above.

The Pāli commentarial tradition of 'five eyes'

The Pāli commentarial tradition distinctly separates the Buddha's physical eye (*maṃsa-cakkhu*) from his wisdom-eye (*paññā-cakkhu*) in the classification of five eyes.¹³ This development is probably a result of placing more emphasis on the aspect of the Buddha's spiritual attainments in the process of his deification. Thus, while the classification found in the *Niddesa* includes the physical eye as one of the five eyes as in other traditions, though 'samanta-cakkhu' is already in the list, the commentarial texts, first of all, divide *cakkhu* into two types; namely, *maṃsa-cakkhu* (physical eye) and *paññā-cakkhu* (wisdom-eye). Buddhaghosa appears to prefer *ñāṇa-cakkhu* to *paññā-cakkhu*.¹⁴ These two terms are interchangeable,¹⁵ as can be seen in the chart given below.¹⁶ The *paññā-cakkhu* is further classified into five types. The list of five is found at (A) DhsA 306, (B) PṭṣA I 77, (C) ItA I 99, (D) SA II 354, (E) ItA I 167, (F) BvA 33, etc.

1. *Buddha-cakkhu* (Buddha-eye) [A, B, C, D, E, F]
2. *Samanta-cakkhu* (eye of all round knowledge) [A, B, C, D, E, F]
3. *Ñāṇa-cakkhu* (knowledge-eye) [A, B, C] or *Paññā-cakkhu* [D, E, F]
4. *Dibba-cakkhu* (divine-eye) [A, B, C, D, E, F]
5. *Dhamma-cakkhu* (Dhamma-eye) [A, B, C, D, E, F]

The physical eye (*maṃsa-cakkhu*) is also divided into two; viz., *sasambhāra-cakkhu* (compound organ) and *pasāda-cakkhu* (sentient organ) in the Theravāda commentarial tradition.¹⁷ The *pasāda-cakkhu* is independently referred to as DA I 183 as well. The *sasambhāra-cakkhu* is explained as constituting 40 elements (*cattārīsa sambhārā honti. Idaṃ sasambhāracakkhu nāma*) (SA II 354-5). The *pasāda-cakkhu* is defined as: *Yaṃ pana setamaṇḍalaparicchinna kaṇhamaṇḍalena parivārite diṭṭhamaṇḍale sanniviṭṭhaṃ rūpadassanasamatthaṃ pasādamattaṃ, idaṃ pasādacakkhu nāma* (BvA 35). Or, *Yo pana ettha sito ettha paṭibaddho catunnaṃ mahābhūtānaṃ upādāya pasādo, idaṃ pasādacakkhu nāma* (NdA I 159).

The *Da-cheng yi-zhang* (大乘義章) also divides ‘flesh eye’ (肉眼) into two kinds:

肉眼中有其二種。一者是報。二者長養。宿業所得是名為報。或以飲食醫藥等力得勝眼根名為長養 (T 44 852b) (In the flesh eye there are two kinds: one is [due to] retribution and the other is excellent nourishment (growth). Retribution gets its name from karmic actions. Or, by the power of drinks, food, medicine, etc. excellent eye-faculty is gained. Because of this, it is named excellent nourishment (growth)).

Of the five eyes mentioned in the above list, the *dhamma-cakkhu* is a new addition which had emerged by the time of the commentarial literature. However, it is a familiar occurrence in the *Nikāyas* where such expressions as ‘...*dhammacakkhuṃ udapādi*’ (the eye of the Dhamma arose), etc., referring to one’s realization of the truth, are often met with. Following such usages in the Canon, Buddhaghosa explains the term (i.e. *dhamma-cakkhu*) in relation to the path (*magga*) and fruit (*phala*). It is, for instance, explained as the three paths and three fruits (*tayo maggā tīni ca phalāni dhamma-cakkhu nāma hoti*);¹⁸ or simply the lower three paths (*heṭṭhimāmaggattayasāṅkhataṃ dhammacakkhu nāma*);¹⁹ or as the four paths and four fruits (*cattāro maggā cattāri ca phalāni dhammacakkkhun ti*).²⁰ Buddhaghosa’s *Sumaṅgalavilāsini* also interprets it to mean insight into *dhammas* (*dhamma-cakkhun ti dhammesu vā cakkhun*) or the eye made of *dhamma* (*dhammamayaṃ vā cakkhun*).²¹ These examples indicate that the word *dhamma-cakkhu* is given different meanings in different contexts in the commentarial texts.

The above survey also reveals that the interpretations of *dhamma-cakkhu* in the commentaries do not go beyond its canonical connotations.²² This fact gives rise to a question as to why *dhamma-cakkhu* is then included in the list of five eyes of the Buddha. *Dhamma-cakkhu*, according to both canonical and commentarial traditions, can be shared by anyone, and therefore cannot be called the province of a Buddha alone. If we go by this assumption of *dhamma-cakkhu* being common to or shared by anyone, then it may be pointed out that *dibba-cakkhu*, which too is shared by the

disciples, is also included in the list of five eyes. But its inclusion in the list is justified, because the Buddha is said to be foremost in the ability of clairvoyance,²³ and for the same reason is included in the list of *dasabala* of the Buddha. Therefore, it may be the case that the commentaries brought in *dhamma-cakkhu* in the list of five eyes for the following reasons: First, the commentators were aware that there was a classification of the five eyes of the Buddha or Buddhas which they found to be of miscellaneous nature. Then, an attempt was made to separate physical endowments of a Buddha from his spiritual attainments; the latter, in fact, came to be more emphasized in the commentarial literature. This trend in the commentaries gave impetus to the eventual classification of *cakkhu* of a Buddha into the physical or fleshy eye (*maṃsa-cakkhu*) and wisdom-eye or knowledge-eye (*paññā-cakkhu* or *ñāṇa-cakkhu*). Once *maṃsa-cakkhu* is taken away from the list of five eyes, the commentators are compelled to fill the vacuum in order to conform to the generally accepted number of five. Second, the term *dhamma-cakkhu* is often found in the Canon. Thus, the commentators simply included it in the list.

The *Mahāvastu* has a list of five eyes of a Buddha and includes in it *dharmā-cakṣu* (Mvu I 159). However, the interpretation given there is to identify it with the *dasabala* of a Buddha.²⁴ The Buddha's eighteen unique qualities/attributes are also described under '*dharmā-cakṣu*' in Mvu (I 160). The Pāli commentaries do not subscribe to this view in any way, as seen above. It can rather be said that the commentators were not aware of such a view, which implies that it may be a later development.

Buddha-cakkhu, according to Buddhaghosa,²⁵ is both *indriyaparopariyatta-ñāṇa* and *āsayānusaya-ñāṇa*, which are regarded as the province of a Buddha alone (*asādhāraṇa-ñāṇa*). This is the knowledge the Buddha makes use of for finding out whether beings are amenable to taming or not. Because of the nature of its function, he also uses this knowledge when he surveys the world (...*buddhacakkhunā lokam volokento*...).²⁶

Samanta-cakkhu in the Pāli commentarial texts is equated with omniscient knowledge (*samanta-cakkhu nāma sabbaññuta-ñāṇam*).²⁷ The *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, on the other hand, states that *samanta-cakkhu* is the fourteen kinds of the Buddha knowledge (*cuddasa Buddhañāṇāni*).²⁸ However, a comparison between the items of *cuddasa-Buddhañāṇa* and those of *sabbaññuta-ñāṇa* reveals that they are inclusive of each other. It must be emphasized that the Pāli tradition consistently maintains the inclusion of *Samanta-cakkhu* from the *Niddesa* and *Paṭisambhidāmagga* to the commentaries. It is also important to note that the word '*samanta-cakkhu*' is used to point to the Buddha (*bodhisatta*) in some of the canonical texts – *pāsādam āruyha samantacakkhu* (e.g., S I 137, etc.) indicating the antiquity of its origin before Nd and Pṭṣ.

Ñāṇa-cakkhu or *paññā-cakkhu* is explained by Buddhaghosa to mean the determining knowledge of the four truths (*paññācakkhu nāma catu-sacca-paricchedaka-ñāṇaṃ*).²⁹ Dhammapāla also gives the same explanation for it at ItA II 27. This interpretation seems to refer to the knowledge of the Four Noble Truths gained by the Buddha on the night of his Enlightenment.³⁰ Buddhaghosa in another context explicates it as the knowledge such as that of former births (*pubbenivāsādiñāṇaṃ paññā-cakkhuṃ*).³¹ This explanation is also followed by Buddhadatta in his *Madhuratthavilāsinī* (BvA 33).

Ambiguity of the real implications of the term *ñāṇa-cakkhu* or *paññā-cakkhu* can be cleared by the explanations found in the *Mahā-niddesa*.³² The text includes such epithets denoting the Buddha's spiritual attainments as *catuvesārajappatta*, *dasabaladhārī*, etc. in the category of *paññā* of the Buddha.³³ This shows that *ñāṇa* or *paññā* of the Buddha is conceived of as a sum total of the Buddha's spiritual achievements in the context of the classification of the Buddha's five eyes.

Dibba-cakkhu does not require any further explanations. It is one of the *tathāgatabala*.³⁴ In passing, it also constitutes one of the 'incomparable' (*anuttara*) abilities of the Buddha which Sāriputta praises in the *Sampasādanīya-sutta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya* (D III 108 ff.). Buddhaghosa states that there is no one more distinguished for special qualities than the Buddha himself; no one to compare with him. He is therefore 'incomparable.' In this *dibbacakkhu-ñāṇa* (the knowledge of divine-eye) is included.

The other traditions

The *Mahāvastu*, a work generally ascribed to the Lokottaravāda of the Mahāsaṅghika group, also has some descriptions for the Buddha's five eyes. Some passing references have already been made on the differences between Mvu and the Pāli tradition. In some contexts Mvu has a more detailed and deified elucidation of them. On the other hand, the Sarvāstivādin *Lalitavistara* refers to 'the Exalted One with five eyes' (*bhagavān pañcacakṣuḥsamanvāgataḥ: Vaidya 2*). The *Prajñāpāramitā* literature also has five eyes as in 肉眼, 天眼, 慧眼, 法眼, 佛眼. For instance, (放光般若經: *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*) (T8 9a), one of the earliest works, has the five eyes. Kumārajīva's (鳩摩羅什) *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sāstra* (大智度論 T25 347a) also lists: 肉眼, 天眼, 慧眼, 法眼, 佛眼. The 6th century author Hui-yuan (慧遠) in his 大乘義章 (*Da-cheng yi-zhang*), summarizes the various ideas of the 'Buddha's five eyes,' perhaps those prevalent during his time in different schools of Buddhist thought. This work, as already noted, gives a list of 'ten eyes,' which Hui-yuan mentions as the list advocated in the Huayan school of Buddhism (十眼如彼華嚴中說).

Concluding Remarks

The notion of the Buddha's 'five eyes' was never in the mainstream of thought in various Buddhist traditions even in Theravāda Buddhism. These five eyes are mentioned in the canonical texts under different categories, indicating that the Buddha has different eyes. Some items appear to be commonly applicable to any enlightened person, and terms like *dibbacakkhu* and *dhammacakkhu* are frequently met with. If these five eyes are applied to the Buddha, they are treated as part of the Buddha's 'knowledge power' (*Buddhañāna*). The notion, nonetheless, was inherited in different schools as the Buddha's attributes. In this sense, the Buddha's 'five eyes' became as important as any other attributes of the Buddha.

Abbreviations

Pāli texts are all PTS editions unless otherwise stated.

A	: <i>Āṅguttara-nikāya</i>
AA	: <i>Āṅguttara-aṭṭhakathā (Manorathapūraṇī)</i>
BvA	: <i>Buddhavamsa-aṭṭhakathā (Madhuratthavilāsini)</i>
D	: <i>Dīgha-nikāya</i>
DA	: <i>Dīgha-aṭṭhakathā</i>
DhpA	: <i>Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā</i>
Dhs	: <i>Dhammasaṅgani</i>
DhsA	: <i>Dhammasaṅgani-aṭṭhakathā</i>
ItA	: <i>Itivuttaka-aṭṭhakathā</i>
M	: <i>Majjhima-nikāya</i>
MA	: <i>Majjhima-aṭṭhakathā (Papañcasūdanī)</i>
Mvu	: <i>Mahāvastu</i>
Nd	: <i>Niddesa</i>
NdA	: <i>Niddesa-aṭṭhakathā</i>
Pts	: <i>Paṭisambhidāmagga</i>
PtsA	: <i>Paṭisambhidāmagga-aṭṭhakathā</i>
S	: <i>Saṃyutta-nikāya</i>
SA	: <i>Saṃyutta-aṭṭhakathā</i>
T	: <i>Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō</i>
ThagA	: <i>Theragāthā-aṭṭhakathā</i>
UdA	: <i>Udāna-aṭṭhakathā</i>
VA	: <i>Vinaya</i>
VibhA	: <i>Vibhaṅga-aṭṭhakathā (Sammohavinodanī)</i>
Vin	: <i>Vinaya-piṭaka</i>

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Notes

- 1 Nd I 45: *Passāmi ti maṃsacakkhunā pi passāmi, dibbacakkhunā pi passāmi, paññācakkhunā pi passāmi, buddhacakkhunā pi passāmi, samantacakkhunā pi passāmi*; 354: *Vivaṭacakkhū ti Bhagavā pañcahi cakkhūhi vivaṭacakkhu, maṃsacakkhunā pi vivaṭacakkhu, dibbacakkhunā pi vivaṭacakkhu, paññācakkhunā pi vivaṭacakkhu, buddhacakkhunā pi vivaṭacakkhu, samantacakkhunā pi vivaṭacakkhu*; 448: *Bhagavā pañcahi cakkhūhi cakkhumā; maṃsacakkhunā pi cakkhumā, dibbena cakkhunā pi cakkhumā, paññācakkhunā pi cakkhumā buddhacakkhunā pi cakkhumā, samantacakkhunā pi cakkhumā*; II 235; etc. Here an adjective ‘vivaṭa’ (open or clear) is used to describe the Buddha’s eye as in the Blessed One [has] open- or clear-sight because of the five eyes.
- 2 E.g., ThagA II 177.
- 3 See Guang Xing 2005: 237 for Kumārajīva’s time of translation.
- 4 Ibid., 237.
- 5 Ibid., 238.
- 6 Ibid., 238.
- 7 E.g., 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔卷第二十七: 言十眼者。離世間品說。謂一肉眼。二天眼。三慧眼。四法。五佛。六智。七光明。八出生死。九無礙。十一切智。[T 36 208c].
- 8 E.g., 瑜伽論略纂: T 43 89b.
- 9 Sanskrit texts like the *Lalitavistara* and the *Mahāvastu* also mention the Buddha’s five eyes, their origins, however, are uncertain since these texts can be estimated for their composition before the 4th century. The fact that a Chinese translation of the *Lalitavistara* (佛說普曜經: T 3 532b) by Dharmarakṣa 法護 308 is said to be in the early 4th century also indicates that the concept was in vogue by about the late 3rd century.
- 10 Norman K.R. 1983: 86 fn.372 and 87.
- 11 Oscar Von Hinüber 1996: § 118 (p. 59)
- 12 Mizuno, Kogen 1997: 117.
- 13 E.g., DhsA 306; PtsA I 77; ItA I 99; etc.
- 14 SA II 354.
- 15 Cf. SA III 91.
- 16 When one is used for the classification of two types of ‘cakkhu,’ then the other tends to be used in the classification of five types.
- 17 DhsA 306; ItA I 99; PtsA I 77–78. See also Pe Maung Tin 1920:, 402–403.
- 18 SA III 298. Cf. MA V 99; SA II 354 (*heṭṭhimā tayo maggā tīni ca phalāni*).
- 19 DhsA 306. Cf. DA I 183 (*ariyamaggattāya*), 237 (*tinnam maggānam*), II 467 (*tinnam maggañānaṃ*); MA I 179; SA I 200; UdA 207; NdA II 383; etc.
- 20 MA V 99.
- 21 DA I 237.
- 22 See also *Encyclopedia of Buddhism*, Vol. IV, Fascicle 3, 478 ff: s.v. *dhammacakkhu* for its canonical use.
- 23 See de Silva, Lily 1987: 40.
- 24 Cf. *Encyclopedia of Buddhism*, Vol. IV, Fascicle 3, 481.
- 25 DA II 467; MA II 179; SA II 354; VA V 963; Cf. BvA 33.
- 26 DhsA 309; PtsA I 77; ItA I 99; DA I 183; etc.
- 27 SA II 354 = BvA 33. See also MA II 179; DhsA 306; PtsA I 77; ItA I 99; etc.
- 28 Pts I 133.
- 29 SA II 354.
- 30 Vin I 11 = S V 422.
- 31 DA I 183.
- 32 Nd I 356 ff.
- 33 Nd I 356.
- 34 See for a discussion on ‘*tathāgatabala*,’ Endo, T. 2019: 77–92.

Yamāri on the Relationship between Absolute and Relative Means of Knowledge¹

Eli FRANCO

In his foundational book *Buddhist Logic*, Stcherbatsky divides Dharmakīrti's commentators into three groups (p. 39ff.). "The school of direct meaning" or the "philological school," initiated by Devendrabuddhi, explained the literal meaning of the text without going into its deeper implications. The Kashmiri or "philosophical school" founded by Dharmottara presents Dharmakīrti's philosophy as a critical system of epistemology and logic and avoids metaphysical and religious issues. The third school, the "religious school," interpreted the *Pramāṇavārttika* as a commentary on "the whole of the Mahāyāna Scripture which establishes the existence, the omniscience and other properties of the Buddha, of his so called Cosmical Body" (p. 43). According to Stcherbatsky, Prajñākaragupta² was the founder of this school. Even though it is doubtful whether one can really speak of "schools" here, Stcherbatsky's characterization of the three types of commentaries is appropriate. The author of the most extensive and most important surviving commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* is Prajñākaragupta, and indeed his work highlights the religious dimension of Dharmakīrti's work. Prajñākaragupta's commentary is sometimes called *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* ("Ornament of the *Pramāṇavārttika*"), sometimes *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* ("Commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika*").³ Both titles seem to be abbreviations of the full title *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkārabhāṣya* (hereafter PVABh) as seen in the colophon of the single complete manuscript of the work: *samāptaṃ cedam pramāṇavārttikālaṃkārabhāṣyam iti*.⁴

- 1 I thank my friends Phyllis Granoff, Hiroko Matsuoka and Tyler Neill for very helpful remarks. Concerning the word 'relative' in the title, there is no commonly accepted translation for the term *sāṃvyaḥārika*; literally it can be rendered as 'used in common/together (*sam-*) in everyday practice (*vyavahāra*).' This literal translation is obviously too cumbersome and several other translations were proposed in the last decades. The word 'conventional' is probably the one most widely used for *sāṃvyaḥārika*, but it is not opportune inasmuch as it could be taken to be related to some convention; sometimes the word 'relative' has been used, it has the advantage of being a clear antonym to 'absolute' and it can also be understood as relative to several agents (*sam-*); the term 'empirical' is used more rarely; it conveys that the means of knowledge in question are given to our everyday experience (in contradistinction to the absolute ones). Some proposed 'transactional' for *sāṃvyaḥārika*, a suggestion which has merit, but reminds (me at least) too strongly of a financial transaction. I use the term 'relative' in the title only for the sake of brevity; throughout this paper I will use 'in common practice'. I render the noun (*sam*)-*vyavahāra* as "everyday practice." This practice, as is well known, does not include only acting, but also thinking and speaking.
- 2 On Prajñākaragupta's date, the works attributed to him, see Franco 2019.
- 3 Accordingly, in Sanskrit and Tibetan sources Prajñākaragupta is called Bhāṣyakāra (also Bhāṣyakṛt) and Alāṃkārakāra, *Alāṃkāropādhyāya, etc.
- 4 See the facsimile in Watanabe 1998, fol. 314b7.

Although the PVABh has been widely recognized to be a foundational work in the history of Buddhist philosophy and of utmost importance both to the Indian and Tibetan traditions, it has been rarely translated and studied, at least in European languages.⁵ The reasons for this relative neglect are well-known. The work is vast,⁶ difficult and, except for some parts,⁷ not edited with enough care. And even though two commentaries on the PVABh survive, the *Pramānavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā* by Jayanta and the *Pramānavārttikālaṅkāranibandha* (more widely known as *Pramānavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā Suparīśuddhā*⁸) by Yamāri, they were available until recently only in a Tibetan translation that often pose severe problems of understanding.

Only recently, or relatively recently, has it become known that a Sanskrit manuscript of the first chapter of Yamāri's work is preserved in Lhasa, and that a photocopy of it is kept at the China Tibetology Research Center (CTRC), Beijing. The manuscript consists of 204 large leaves⁹ and covers the commentary on the *Pramānasiddhi* chapter of the PVABh. A team of scholars at Leipzig University is currently engaged in editing the text both diplomatically and critically.¹⁰ The evidence of the manuscript will not only allow us to study the work of the important Buddhist commentator and philosopher for the first time in its original language, but will also significantly add to the evidence for the text of the PVABh.

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- 5 Except for my attempt in *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth* (Vienna 1997). The only other extensive translation and study I am aware of is Shinya Moriyama's *Omniscience and Religious Authority* (Berlin 2014); Iwata 1993 contains the reedition of PVABh 481.17–483.26 with German translation. One should also mention the German translation of Motoi Ono of the section on general validity, which remains, unfortunately to this day unpublished (Motoi Ono, *Prajñākaraguptas Erklärung der Definition Gültiger Erkenntnis*. An unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Vienna 1993; the part of the dissertation that consists of the edition was published in 2000). Numerous important papers on Prajñākaragupta were written in Japanese and I regret that I am unable to read them. Recently, Prof. Inami and others have founded a journal dedicated entirely to Prajñākaragupta's work. See also n. 7.
- 6 In his preface to Saṅkṛtyāyana's edition of the text (PVABh), Altekar says that Prajñākaragupta's commentary has more than 16,200 *ślokas* and that this amounts to almost one sixth of the size of the Indian epic *Mahābhārata*.
- 7 Iwata 1993 contains the reedition of PVABh 481,17–483,26 with German translation; Ono 2000 has reedited the beginning of the work which deals with the topic of general validity (PVABh 3,5–32,15 ad PV II 1–7); Watanabe 2000 edited PVABh 3,20–4,16 and 25,1–29,31 ad PV II 1abc and 2,4d–2,5ab; Inami et al. 2002 reedited portions dealing with twofold *pramāṇa* and *prameya* (PVABh 169,3–175,9) with Japanese translation; Inami et al. 2005 reedited portions dealing with *vṛvaccheda* (PVABh 579,31–589,20 ad PV IV 189–194) with Japanese translation; Moriyama 2014 has reedited portions dealing with the refutation of *īśvara* (PVABh 32,19–42,18 and 50,19–53,5 ad PV II 8–10 and 29–33) and translated them into English; Kobayashi 2005 dealt with the *svasamvedana* theory and reedited PVABh 349,7–373,4 ad PV III 320–332 with a Japanese translation.
- 8 This title is based on the transliteration in the Tibetan canon. The Sanskrit manuscript, however, suggests *Pramānavārttikālaṅkāranibandha*.
- 9 Each side contains approximately 850 *aṅśaras*. If multiplied by the number of leaves we reach 346800 *aṅśaras*, or 21675 *ślokas*.
- 10 Our team currently consists of Dr. Junjie Chu, Dr. Hiroko Matsuoka and myself; in an earlier stage Dr. Xuezu Li of the CTRC was part of our team. We wish to express our gratitude to the German Research Foundation (DFG) for its generous financial support of this project.

The project thus aims to fulfil several purposes: 1) it will provide a new basis for understanding the oeuvre of an important Buddhist commentator and philosopher through the editio princeps of the Sanskrit original of the PVAN; 2) it will be the first attempt to recover significant parts of Yamāri's thought through a translation and study of selected passages where Yamāri digresses considerably from the literal explanation of the PVABh; 3) it will provide a much needed, long-missed tool for understanding one of the most important works of the Buddhist epistemological tradition, the PVABh; 4) it will present some significant improvements to the Sanskrit text of the PVABh, especially in the part that is available only in Saṅkṛtyāyana's edition, but also in the part that has been re-edited by Ono and others. As an ancillary purpose 5), the project will also contribute to a better understanding of the PVABh's earlier commentary by Jayanta, who is often quoted, paraphrased and criticized in the PVAN.

The present paper is connected to the second of the purposes mentioned above.¹¹ It deals with Yamāri's digression on the relationship between the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) in common practice (*sāṃvyaavahārika*) and the absolute ones (*pāramārthika*). It is modest in scope, for it has been prepared under severe time constraints. Nevertheless, I hope it will find favour with the jubiliarian of this volume, K.L. Dhammajoti, a much admired senior colleague, and if I may dare say so myself, also a friend, although we were able to meet only a few times in the past decades. Scholars of the Buddhist epistemological tradition will certainly be interested to read Yamāri's short remarks on the possible circularity (*cakraka*) and mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) between the worldly means of knowledge and the Buddha as *pramāṇabhūta*, or here, as omniscient. The topic has been discussed several times by leading scholars such as Masatoshi Nagatomi, John Dunne,

11 It comes in addition to a few other papers that deal with Yamāri's work. Xuezhū Li and Junjie Chu, "A Diplomatic Edition of the Introductory Section of Yamāri's Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā Supariśuddhā, Folios 3a1-10a1," *China Tibetology*, 2016, no. 1: 3-20. Hiroko Matsuoka, "A Study of the Opening Section of Yamāri's Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandha (P phe 208a7-210b8; D phe 174b1-176a6)" [In Japanese], *South Asian Classical Studies* 11 (2016): 75-126. Xuezhū Li, Junjie Chu, and Eli Franco, "A Diplomatic Edition of the Introductory Section of Yamāri's Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā Supariśuddhā, Folios 10a1-14b2," *China Tibetology*, 2017, no. 1: 78-87. Xuezhū Li, Junjie Chu, and Eli Franco, "A Diplomatic Edition of the Introductory Section of Yamāri's Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā Supariśuddhā, Folios 14b2-20a5," *China Tibetology*, 2018, no. 1: 40-52. Junjie Chu, Eli Franco, and Xuezhū Li, "Introductory Notes to Yamāri's Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā Supariśuddhā," in: Proceedings of the 6th Beijing International Seminar in the Panel on "Sanskrit Manuscripts in Tibet," August 3-4, 2016, forthcoming. Eli Franco, "Yamāri and the Order of Chapters in the Pramāṇavārttika," in Silvia D'Intino and Sheldon Pollock (ed.), *L'espace du sens: Approches de la philologie indienne/ The Space of Meaning: Approaches to Indian Philology*, with the coll. of Michaël Meyer, Publications de l'Institut de civilisation indienne 84 (Paris: Collège de France and Diffusion De Boccard, 2018), 247-269. Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz, "On the Unreliability of Tibetan Translations for the Reconstruction of Sanskrit Works," in *Festschrift in Honor of the 80th Birthday of Prof. George Cardona*, forthcoming. Eli Franco, "Prajñākaragupta on Pramāṇavārttika II.1 and Yamāri's commentary thereon," in *Festschrift in Honor of Raffaele Torella*, forthcoming.

Tillman Vetter, Ernst Steinkellner, Tom Tillemans, and my humble self.¹² None of us, however, was aware of Yamāri's comments on the subject.

The context of the digression is formed by the very last paragraph¹³ of PVABh on PV 2.1:

To begin with, perception does not operate on the other world and so on because it [consists in] only the apprehension of its own form. We shall show that later on. As for inference, it does not exist without the apprehension of the [concomitant] relation. And a relation cannot be apprehended as concomitant by someone who is not omniscient. Indeed the relation is not apprehended by something which has the nature of perception and is based on awareness of its own form. If [it is maintained that] the relation is apprehended by inference, [there would be] a fault of mutual dependence. By mere everyday practice, however, perception and inference are a means of knowledge by helping to prove [that the Buddha is] omniscient, not in any other way. We shall show that later on.¹⁴

Yamāri expands on the compound *sarvajñasādhanānugūṇatvena*, “by helping to prove [that the Buddha is] omniscient.” The putative opponent's view is that an investigation into the nature of the *pramāṇas* in common practice, perception and inference, is useless because an error at this level, namely, in everyday practice, is not of great importance, for “it does not hurt much” (*na ... suṣṭhu pīdayati*). And concerning the other world, the *pramāṇas* in common practice are entirely useless. Quoting Prajñākaragupta, Yamāri replies that the *pramāṇas* in common practice are useful because they help to establish the absolute *pramāṇa*, namely, the omniscient Buddha. Yamāri's digression on this point involves further clarifications of the relation between absolute *pramāṇa* and those in common practice, how the one is said to produce and to prove the other. The basic position is that the means in common practice prove the omniscience of the Buddha, the Buddha determines the path to attain the aims of *paraloka* (good fortune such as rebirth in heaven [*abhyudaya*] and liberation [*niḥśreyasa*]), which leads, through the appropriate practice, to realisation of all human aims.¹⁵ Yamāri's discussion, however, cannot be

12 One should not stumble on the different terminology; although the circularity has so far been discussed in relation to the Buddha being *pramāṇabhūta* and Yamāri discusses the Buddha's omniscience, it is clear that he understands the former term as implying the lesser kind of omniscience called *upayuktasarvajñatva*. See also the quotation of Ratnakīrti in n. 64 below.

13 I must add, however, that my esteemed colleagues, Junjie Chu and Motoi Ono, consider this paragraph as the beginning of the commentary on the second *kārikā*. The PVABh itself does not contain divisions according to the *kārikās* of the PV.

14 PVA_o 12.16-13.4: *na tāvat pratyaṅgaṃ paralokādau pravartate, tasya svarūpamātragrahaṇād iti pratipādayiṣyate. anumānaṃ tu sambandhagrahaṇam antareṇa nāsti. na ca sambandho vyāpy asarvavidā grahītuṃ śakyaḥ. svarūpasamvedananiṣṭhena hi pratyaṅgātmanā na sambandhagrahaṇam. anumānenaiva sambandhagrahaṇe itaretarāśrayaṇadoṣaḥ. samvyavahāramātreṇa tu pratyaṅgānumāne pramāṇaṃ sarvajñasādhanānugūṇatvenaiva nānyatheti paścād etat pratipādayiṣyate.*

15 The structure of this argument has already been proposed by Dharmakīrti; see Franco 1997, chapter one. Dharmakīrti, however, does not limit the function of the *pramāṇas* in common practice to proving the authority or omniscience of the Buddha.

reduced to this relatively simple formulation. It unfolds in the well-known form of objections/questions and replies. The main points are the following:

Objection 1: The first objection is based on the ambiguous position of the *pramāṇas* in common practice. Are they capable (i.e., valid) or not? If they are capable, they can also be used for determining the other world and the omniscient Buddha is superfluous. If they are not capable, they can also not prove that the Buddha is omniscient.

Objection 2: The second objection is closely related to the first. The Buddhist position contains a contradiction. It is impossible to prove omniscience without proving the other world (in this case, life before birth). Even if one assumes the lesser form of omniscience (*upayuktasarvajñatva*), which involves only omniscience about what is useful to liberation, the proof of omniscience presupposes practice during many lifetimes (see also PV 2.34ff., translated in Franco 1997: 159ff.). Therefore, it is contradictory to say that the *pramāṇas* in common practice prove omniscience, but not the other world. As long as the former is not established, the latter is not established and vice versa. There is a mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) between the two.

Reply: Yamāri answers both objections together. The word “other world” refers to a special *karma* which leads to pleasure and pain, especially in the next lives. This kind of *karma* can only be known from the communication by an omniscient person. Omniscience is known from practicing (i.e., studying, reasoning and meditating) momentariness, selflessness, etc., which can be proved by inference. The sequence is as follows: perception and inference prove *kṣaṇikatva*, *nairātmya* etc. -> the practice of *nairātmya* etc., proves the Buddha’s omniscience -> the omniscient Buddha establishes the function of special *karma*. Therefore, there is no mutual dependence.

Objection 3. One can give up the distinction between absolute *pramāṇa* and those in common practice because everything, including the other world, is established by the *pramāṇas* in common practice. Because omniscience is said to be established by the *pramāṇas* in common practice, the other world can also be considered to be established the means in common practice.

Reply: Yamāri concedes the point to some extent. As far as liberation is concerned, the inference of momentariness, selflessness, etc., can be considered as part of the proof of the other world. Therefore, one can forego the search for an omniscient person (*vyarthatā sarvajñānveśaṇasya*). (This statement should be qualified, however, because Yamāri immediately adds that without the instruction of the Buddha, the theory of momentariness, selflessness etc., would not be known, would not even occur to people; see objection 4. However, once revealed, they can be proved independently of the Buddha by the *pramāṇas* in common practice.) As for rebirth in heaven and so on, it is clear that inference cannot establish it.

Objection 4: Even if the Buddha is proved to be omniscient, it is his teaching (not the person) that prompts to action. Why is it said that all aims are realized or fulfilled by the Buddha?

Reply: Yamāri quotes an unidentified verse (perhaps from a lost work by Jñānśrīmitra) which states that all aims are fulfilled by the Buddha, but not without (relying on) the *pramāṇas* (in common practice).¹⁶ He distinguishes two kinds of objects: Those that are common to the Buddha and other religious teachers, such as the other world, and those that are unique to the Buddha, such as momentariness and selflessness. The former can be proved without an omniscient person, but without the teaching of the Buddha, even the desire to know momentariness etc., would not arise and its proof will not be examined by “deductive reasoning” (*abhyūha*)¹⁷.

Objection 5: One can observe deductive reasoning (*ūhā*) about momentariness and so on also in other religious traditions, notably when they criticize them.

Reply: Yamāri denies the possibility of such discussions independently of the teachings of the Buddha.

Objection 6: The opponent claims that the Buddhist position involves a vicious circle (*cakraka*). The teaching of momentariness etc., arises from the Buddha, who has been proved to be omniscient; from the Buddha’s teaching, *pramāṇa* (notably inference) about momentariness etc., is obtained; because of this *pramāṇa*, momentariness etc., are practiced; and from this practice (when proved successful), the Buddha is proved to be omniscient. Put more succinctly, proven/established Buddha → teaching of momentariness etc. → *pramāṇa* of momentariness etc. → practice of momentariness etc. → proof of the Buddha (as omniscient).

Reply: Yamāri answers that this is true, but not a fault. Establishment (*siddhi*) is of two kinds, causal and logical, or more literally production (*niṣpatti*) and determination (*niścaya*). If the Buddha in general (i.e., without any individual traits) is proved from the teaching of a past or present Buddha by the method used in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, there is no fault. Here Yamāri refers to Dharmakīrti’s proof of the reliability of the Buddha that rests, according to Dharmakīrti, on the four noble truths (that are independently proven by inference), from which the epithets enumerated by Dignāga in the *maṅgalaśloka* of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* are proved. Only if one would argue that the Buddha arises/is produced from his teaching, that would be a faulty or circular argument. However, the production of the Buddha from the Buddha’s teaching is also meant inasmuch as a Buddha arises from the teaching of a previous Buddha, who arises from the teaching of a previous Buddha, and so on, for samsara is beginningless.

Objection 7: How can someone be determined as a teacher (*upadeṣṭṛ*)?

16 This statement is certainly formulated against NB 1.1, at least as interpreted by Dharmottara, which claims that all human aims are accomplished/realized (*sarvapurūṣārthasiddhi*) by a valid cognition, understood in that context to arise from perception and inference. See also PVA_o 12.12-13.

17 Yamāri does not define this not commonly used term (or its synonym used in the next line, *ūhā*). My tentative hypothesis is that he uses it more or less as an equivalent to *tarka* (as used in Navya Nyāya, not in the *Yogācārabhūmi*); that is, formal reasonings that are not themselves *pramāṇas*, but are helpful in supporting or refuting a proof by inference; typical examples would be the arguments of vicious circle, infinite regress, and self-reference. My translation of the term as “deductive reasoning” is only tentative; Bagchee (1953), in his pioneering work, prefers “inductive reasoning”.

Reply: Yamāri distinguishes between two kinds of teachers, a special person (*puruṣaviśeṣa*) and an omniscient person. If one looks for a teacher as being a special person (i.e., having special qualities), then, if he is still alive, he can be directly perceived to possess these qualities. If he lived in the past, by an inference from the teaching to the person. The teaching is thus used as a *kāryaliṅga* or *kāryahetu* to prove its cause, the teacher one seeks. If, however, one seeks to determine that the teacher is omniscient from the quality of his omniscience, this cannot be done directly, i.e., as Prajñākaragupta says elsewhere, the quality of omniscience cannot be grasped by someone who is not himself omniscient.¹⁸ In this case, one attains first a means of knowledge (in the form of a proof that the person is omniscient) from the deductive reasoning that is based on the teaching of the statements that are capable of (empirical) consideration by means of a multitude of good qualities, of supernatural capacities and miracles that destroy proponents of other teachings. Here Yamāri seems to part with Dharmakīrti who, to my knowledge, never considers supernatural capacities (*ṛddhi*) and miracles (*prātihārya*) to prove that the Buddha is a reliable authority or omniscient. One has to note that the word *bhagavat*, or any other word equivalent to “Buddha,” is not used in these sentences which are discussing a teacher (*upadeśṭṛ*), but the quality of omniscience points quite clearly at a Buddha. Whatever the case may be, the inference presupposed here seems rather doubtful. One would have to conclude that someone is omniscient (at least in the narrower sense concerning the way to liberation) because he possesses superhuman qualities and is able to perform miracles.

Objection 8: If the teaching of the Buddha is accompanied by *pramāṇas*, why do they (the *pramāṇas*) need a separate establishment?

Reply: One has to prove the nature of the *pramāṇas* in common practice. Here Yamāri delves into the nature of absolute reality. The *pramāṇas* that accompany the teaching of the Buddha imply Non-Duality (*advaita*), and the nature of Non-Duality cannot be proved without relying on everyday practice. Indeed, the entire practice of the Buddhist *mārga* can only be done on the *vyavahāra* level, harbouring certain illusions (*abhimāna*) about the reality and truthfulness of the practiced path. From the *advaita* point of view, even the omniscience of the Buddha belongs to everyday practice. Thus, the borderline between the absolute *pramāṇas* and those in common practice shifts. We started the discussion thinking that perception and inference belong to everyday practice, and the omniscient Buddha is the absolute *pramāṇa*. It now turns out that he too is merely on this lower level. As far as the absolute is concerned, the Buddha is nothing but self-awareness. It/ he does not make known even a tiny grain (*kaṣa*). His power (*ādhipatyā*), however, causes false images (of a Buddha as omniscient person and his teachings) to appear in the minds of those who practice the path. Thus, the omniscience of the Buddha belongs only to conventional reality. Further studies would be needed in order to determine whether *advaita* here is

18 See PVABh 321.28: *nāsarvajñāḥ sarvajñam jānīte*.

a mere synonym of the *tathatā* of the Yogācāra, whether it points to an influence of the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, or has perhaps other connotations.

Objection 9: If both the omniscient Buddha and the *pramāṇas* in common practice are on the same level, why is it said that perception and inference help (*anugūṇa*) to prove the omniscient Buddha? If they all are on the same level, why are they subordinate (*anugūṇa*) and he the principal (*pradhāna*)?

Reply: Yamāri points out a certain circularity. Omniscience is proved by perception and inference, which arise from this very omniscience. Nevertheless, the Buddha is the principal. Something is called principal because it is helpful. And the Buddha is helpful for the determination of a future object (such as heaven and liberation). Perception and inference, on the other hand, are only indirectly helpful.

Objection 10: If this is the case, a human *Āgama* is helpful. Why are both human and non-human *Āgamas* criticized?¹⁹

Reply: Yamāri concedes that a human *Āgama* is helpful, but adds that such an *Āgama* is only helpful if it is supported (“helped”) by *pramāṇas*. An *Āgama* cannot determine directly an external object, as a *pramāṇa* does. And only the *Āgama* of the Buddha is substantiated by *pramāṇas*; his statements about liberation are substantiated directly (as is done in the PV), and about heaven indirectly because they have the same source (have the same speaker) as the statements about liberation.

Conclusion: Even the lesser form of omniscience, called *upayuktasarvajñā(tva)*, is principal in comparison to the *pramāṇas* of simple people like us. However, the actual object of the Buddha, in view of his tremendous accumulation of knowledge and merit, cannot be measured. The tenet of complete omniscience (*sarvasarvajñā*) cannot be known by simple people like us, but only by the Great Selves or Great Souls (*mahātman*), that is, those disciples of the Buddha who are also omniscient. It is clear that in comparison to the *pramāṇas* in common practice, as well as the Veda and *Īśvara*, the Buddha is vastly superior, but the actual deliberation on the greatness of the Buddha is beyond our reach.

In the following I offer the text and a translation for the above discussion in honour of the venerable K.L. Dhammajoti. The text is reproduced from a forthcoming critical edition prepared by Junjie Chu, Hiroko Matsuoka and myself on the basis of a preliminary transcription by Dr. Xuezhu Li.

PVAN 31b1-33a2:

nanu²⁰ samvvyavahāro ’paramārthaḥ. tadāśrayaṃ pramāṇaṃ kenopayogenocyate?
na hi tatra skhalanam api suṣṭhu pīḍayati.²¹ na ca tadartham etāvato

19 This is presumably a reference to the criticism of *Āgama* in PV I.

20 nanu (gal te ... ma yin nam) : na ms.

21 na hi tatra skhalanam api suṣṭhu pīḍayati ms. : n.e. T.

granthasandohasya²² sāphalyam ity āha—**sarvajñasādhanānugūṇatvene**_(13,3)ti. ayam abhiprāyaḥ—saṃvyavahāraṃ evā_{31b2}śritya vyāptigrahapurāḥsarānumānasādHITE bhagavati tadvāreṇa paralokādīniścayād uttarapurūṣārthasiddhir iti sāmṃvṛtapāramārthikapramāṇayor ubhayor apy anusaraṇam upaṇnam iti.

atredam ālocyate—tat sāmṃvṛtaṃ pramāṇam adhyavasitārthaprāpaṇasamartham asamartham vā. sāmārthye paralokādāv api tad eva pramāṇam a_{31b3}stu, kiṃ bhagavatā prārthitena, sarvatra trairūpyapariśuddheḥ sādhanānavenaikajātīyatvāt? athāsamartham, tadā sarvajñasādhanē 'py asamartham eva. kathaṃ tatsiddhasarvajñadvāreṇābhhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ?²³

vyāhataṃ caitat—sarvajñasādhanam anumānam, na paralokāder iti paralokādisiddhināntarīyakatvāt²⁴_{31b4} sarvajñasādhanasya. upayuktasarvajñapakṣe 'pi hi naikabhavasambhavī mārgābhyaśas tatsambhavānumānāya prabhavatīti²⁵ paralokanairātmyādīniścayo 'vaśyāpekṣaṇīyaḥ, anyathā bhāvanāyām abhiyogāyogāt. tato yāvan na paralokasiddhis tāvan na sarvajñasiddhiḥ, yāvac ca na sarvajñasiddhis tāvan na paralokasi_{31b5}ddhiḥ.

atha paralokaśabdēna sukhaduḥkhasaṃvartanīyakarmaviśeṣo²⁶ vivakṣitaḥ. tatra ca na sāmṃvṛtapramāṇavṛttiḥ. tad asau sarvajñād eva veditavyaḥ. sarvajñas tv anumānasiddhanairātmyābhyaśād²⁷ iti netaretarāśrayaḥ.²⁸

evaṃ tarhi vyāpisambandhabodhavaidhuryādyupanyāsasya ka upayogaḥ? pratyutaivaṃ vyāpisamba_{31b6}ndhabodhavaidhuryāt²⁹ sarvajñasyāpi siddhir uddhūtetī sthāne phalito doṣaparihāraḥ.³⁰

atha sarvajñasiddhiḥ saṃvyavahāramātreṇa. nanv evaṃ sarvajñasiddhau taduddiṣṭamārgānuṣṭhānād abhyudayaniḥśreyasaprāptir ity asmin prabandhe³¹ dṛḍhe 'pi *yadi*³² saṃvyavahāreṇa sarvajñasiddhir ucyate, tadā paralokādisiddhir api tathaivāstu. na cādyā saṃ_{31b7}vyavahāraśabdasyopayogaḥ, niḥśreyasātmano 'pi sarvajñatāyāḥ saṃvyavahāratve³³ 'nyasya paramārthasyābhāvāt.

22 °sandohasya ms. : dgos pa T.

23 °niḥśreyasa° : °niḥśraya° ms.

24 °nāntarīyakatvāt : °nāntarīyatvāt ms.

25 prabhavatīti ms. : n.e. T.

26 °saṃvartanīyakarma° (sgrub bar byed pa'i las T) : °saṃvartanīyaṃ karma° ms.

27 °siddha° (grub pa'i T) : °siddhi° ms.; °nairātmyābhyaśād (cf. bdag med pa la sogs pa goms pa las yin pa'i phyir T) em. : °nairātmyā××d ms.

28 netaretarāśrayaḥ ms. : phan tshun bsten pa nyes pa med do zhe na T.

29 °sambandha° ms. : rtogs pa T.

30 doṣaparihāraḥ (skyon spong T) : doṣa | parihāraḥ ms.

31 prabandhe ms. : don T.

32 *yadi* (gal te T) : om. ms.

33 saṃvyavahāratve ms. : tha snyad tsam yin na T.

tathāpi tatsādhanasya yadi sāmṣṛtatvam eva vaktavyam, ucyatām. svasādhanasāktis tu durapahnāvā. tathā ca sati niḥśreyasaparikare kṣaṇikatvādāv apratibaddhasāktikam anumānam eveti vyarthatā sarvajñānveṣaṇa^{32a1}sya. anumānāviṣaye³⁴ tv abhyudaye vyaktam asāmarthyam. siddhe³⁵pi hi sarvajñe³⁵ tadupadeśa eva pravartako 'bhyudayasādhane.³⁶ upadeśaś ca nirastaviparyayāśaṅkaḥ sādhitō yatnena.

tat katham pramāṇavyāpāram avadhūya sarvajñād bhagavataḥ sarvapuruṣārthasiddhiḥ? iti. atrocyate—

sarvajñād eva sarvārthasiddhir mānam ṛte na tu |
tathāpi sāmṣṛtaṁ mānaṁ sarvajñena sa^{32a2}heṣyate ||

tathā dvividho viśayaḥ pramāṇasya — sādharmaṇaś ca paraiḥ paralokarūpavedanādiḥ, asādharmaṇaś ca nairātmyakṣaṇikatvādiḥ. tatra prathame sarvajñam antareṇāpi³⁷ pramāṇalābhaḥ sambhavī. na tu dvitīye, bhagavata upadeśam antareṇa kṣaṇikatvādau saṅkalpasambhavasya durāpatvāt, jijñāsānudayena tatra sādhanē 'bhyūhapravṛtter³⁸ abhāvāt. ādye tu na tāvad rū^{32a3}pādisannidhāv adhyakṣavāraṇam, rūpādīvyavahāraś ca loke siddhaḥ. paralokasya ca cārvākavarjitair udghoṣaṇā, jijñāsāsambhave sati 'bhyūhapravṛtteḥ sulabhatvāt.

yat punar uktam—na paralokādāv^(12,16) iti tatra paralokaśabdena sopāyo 'bhyudayabhāga uktaḥ. ādiśabdāt kṣaṇikatvādir niḥśreyasaparikaro gr̥hyate. kṣa^{32a4}ṇikatādāv api parair dūṣaṇārtham ullikhitatvād³⁹ ūhāpravartanam anivāryam. naivam. bhagavato vacanam antareṇa teṣāṁ api dūṣaṇābhīprāyābhāvāt. tasmād bhagavadvacanam eva prakṛtīviśeṣasahitam sādhanadūṣaṇodbhedau prayojayati.⁴⁰ atha kathamcij janmāntarānurodhād evam eva paryavasyati tadabhyūhaḥ. na hy atra bādhakam astīti^{32a5} cet. na. janmāntarābhyāso 'pi tādr̥gvacanam anāsādyeti kuta etat?

nanu tathāpi siddhasya bhagavata upadeśaḥ,⁴¹ upadeśāc ca nairātmyādiṣu pramāṇalābhe tadabhyāsād bhagavataḥ siddhir iti cakrakam. naiṣa doṣaḥ. dvidhā hi siddhiḥ—niṣpattir niścayaś ca.⁴² tatra vṛttasya bhagavato vartamānasya vā yady upadeśād vārttikoktaprabandhena⁴³ sā^{32a6}mānyato bhagavanniścayaḥ syāt, kīdr̥ṣo doṣaḥ? yadi hi svopadeśādes tasyotpattir eva vivakṣitā syāt, syād doṣaḥ. utpattir api vivakṣitaiva, kiṁ tv anyasya svalakṣaṇāntarasya

34 anumānāviṣaye ms. : de'i yul ma yin pa T.

35 vyaktam asāmarthyam siddhe pi hi sarvajñe ms. : n.e. T.

36 bhyudayasādhane ms. : n.e. T.

37 antareṇa- (med T) : anantareṇa- ms.

38 'bhyūha° : bhyuha° ms.

39 ullikhita° ms. : brtags pa T.

40 prayojayati ms. : sgrub par byed pa T.

41 upadeśaḥ ms. : n.e. T.

42 ca (dang T) : om. ms.

43 °prabandhena ms. : tshul du T.

bhagavataḥ. upadeṣṭuḥ tarhi katham utpattiḥ? sarvajñāntaropadeśāt tasyāpi⁴⁴ tadanyata iti. anāditaiva saṅkleśavyavadānapakṣasyāpi. evam niṣpādyasarvajñāpara^{32a7} mparāpi boddhavyā.

niścayaś tarhi katham upadeṣṭuḥ?⁴⁵ yadi puruṣaviśeṣarūpatayā prārthyate, tadā vartamānāvasthāyām pratyakṣāt, atītasya ca pravacanalakṣaṇakāryaliṅgajānumānāt. atha sārvaññyaguṇena niścayaś cintyate, tadāpātatas tadaniścaye 'pi paravādinirdalanarddhiprātihāryaguṇasandohadvāreṇāsthāyogyavacanasyo padeśād abhyū^{32b1} hataḥ pramāṇalābhas⁴⁶ tāvad āyāṭṭi⁴⁷ siddham samīhitam.

tad evaṃ pramāṇasahāyād⁴⁸ eva bhagavadupadeśāt sārvaññyam nāma niḥśreyasalakṣaṇam phalam upapāditam. na caikārthatve dvayaṃ vyartham āśaṅkanīyam. bhagavato hi pramāṇajanādvāreṇa vyapārah, pramāṇayoś tu tattvaniścayadvāreṇa. ata eva cakṣuḥpradīpādīsthānīyo⁴⁹ bhagavān iṣyate. abhyudayo 'pi^{32b2} pramāṇasahāyād bhagavata eva, yathoktam ādivākye.

yadi pramāṇasahāyād eva bhagavataḥ,⁵⁰ kimartham vyāpārapratipādanam⁵¹ pramāṇasya? sāmvyavahārikatvapratipādanārtham. tad eva hi pramāṇam advaitākaraṇān na sāmvyavahārikatvam ātmano 'nāsthāya sthātum prabhavati. tathā ca vakṣyate—tasmān mārgabhāvanādīprabandhadraḍhīmābhīmāne 'pi sarvaḥ sāmvyavahāra^{32b3} evāsāv iti. advaitam antarnīyānyatra sāmvyavahāravypadeśaḥ sādhuḥ eva.⁵² advaite tarhi sarvajñatvam api sāmvyavahārikam, svarūpātirikṭasya kaṇasyāpy avedanāt. kevalam tadādhipatyenopadeśanirbhāsād anuṣṭhāninām tattadarthasiddheḥ, sarvajña iti vyavasthāmātrān⁵³ na sāmvyavahārikatvam atikrāmati.

tataḥ katham ubhayor api sām^{32b4} vyavahārikatve **sarvajñasādhanānugūṇatve**^(13,3) ti pramāṇāpekṣayā prādhānyaprasūcīkā rītiḥ? satyam. sādhyatvāt sarvajñatāyāḥ, sādhanasya ca pramāṇasya tata eva lābhāt. evaṃ yadi puruṣasyopakāratayā cakṣurādayo 'pi pradhānam ucyante, tadā na kṣatiḥ.⁵⁴ viṣayaparichedāpekṣas tu pramāṇavyavahāras teṣu niṣidhyate. bhagavām^{32b5} ś copakāratayaiva bhāvīrūpaṃ prati pradhānam. pramāṇam api hi paramparayāvopakārakam.⁵⁵ atas tadepekṣayā tasyāpi prasavitā⁵⁶ bhagavān eva pradhānam.

44 tasyāpi ms. : n.e. T.

45 upadeṣṭuḥ : upedeṣṭuḥ ms.

46 pramāṇa° ms. : rjes su dpag pa T.

47 tāvad āyāṭṭi ms. : de tsam gyis T.

48 pramāṇasahāyād ms. : n.e. T.

49 °pradīpa- ms. : gzugs T.

50 pramāṇasahāyād eva bhagavataḥ ms. : n.e. T.

51 vyāpāra° (byed pa 'jug pa T) : avyāpāra° ms.

52 advaitam antarnīyānyatra sāmvyavahāravypadeśaḥ sādhuḥ eva ms. : n.e. T.

53 °mātrān ms. : n.e. T.

54 kṣatiḥ ms. : tshad ma T.

55 paramparayā- : paramparā- ms.

56 prasavitā ms. : n.e. T.

yady evaṃ pauraṣeya āgama upakāraka eva, katham pauraṣeyāpauraṣeyayor api dūṣaṇaṃ purastāt? satyam. upakārakaḥ pauraṣeyaḥ, kiṃ tu pramāṇopakṛtaḥ,^{32b6} na tu bahirarthaniścayaḥ śakyaḥ⁵⁷ pramāṇatayeti darśayitum.⁵⁸ pramāṇopakṛtāś ca bhagavadāgama eva niḥśreyasaparikare sākṣāt,⁵⁹ abhyudaye paramparayā, tadvacanena sahaitadvacanasya ekayonitvenādarāt.⁶⁰ tad evaṃ sādhyatvāt, niḥśreyasaparikare prasūtapramāṇadvāreṇa svargāpavargopāye pravartanāc cāsmadādīpramāṇāpekṣayā pra^{32b7}dhānam upayuktasarvajñākhyaṃ pramāṇam ādarśitam. nirāvaraṇapuṇyajñānasambhāropacayāc ca gocaro 'py asya kiyān iyān? iti na niścetum śakyam. sarvasarvajñapakṣe tu gocarāpekṣe mahātmanaiveti⁶¹ vyaktam. vyaktā ca tadapekṣayātinikṛṣṭatā pramāṇayoḥ,⁶² vedeśvarādeś tu pramāṇād api nikṛṣṭateti. tadapekṣayā kīdṛṣī bhagavanmāhā,^{33a1} tmyacintā? iti abhiprāyaḥ.

Translation

[Objection:] Everyday practice is not absolute reality. For what use do [Dharmakīrti and Prajñākaragupta] teach a means of knowledge that rests on it? [None!] Because even if one stumbles in it (i.e., in everyday practice), this does not hurt much. And consequently, the entire treatise (i.e., the PV with PVABh), aiming at that [everyday practice], is useless (i.e., even if one errs in everyday practice, this is of little consequence; therefore a treatise that teaches how not to err in everyday practice is basically useless.).

[Reply:] For this reason [Prajñākaragupta] says: **[The means of knowledge of everyday practice are useful] because they help the proof of [the Buddha being] omniscient.** The intention is this: When the Buddha is proved/established by inference, which is preceded by the grasping of concomitance (*vyāpti*) on the basis of everyday practice, the ultimate purpose of man is established by the determination of the other world⁶³ and so on by means of that [omniscient Buddha]. Therefore, pursuing both absolute means of knowledge and those in common practice is established [as useful].

On this, [the opponent] explains: (1) The means of knowledge in common practice are either capable of making [the cognizer] obtain the determined object, or they are not capable. If they are capable, let them alone be the means of knowledge for [the determination of] the other world etc., too. For what purpose is the Buddha required? [He is not required] because, in all cases, [proofs] are

57 śakyaḥ: taḥ ms. : n.e. T.

58 -iti darśayitum ms. : n.e. T.

59 sākṣāt (dngos su yin la T) : 'sākṣāt ms.

60 -ādarāt ms. : n.e. T.

61 mahātmanaiveti : ma| -i-x-naiveti ms. : bdag nyid che ba chen po yod pa'i phyir T.

62 vyaktā ca tadapekṣayātinikṛṣṭatā pramāṇayoḥ ms. : n.e. T.

63 As will be seen below, the term *paraloka* is used in two ways; sometimes for both "good fortune" such as rebirth in heaven (*abhyudaya*) and liberation (*niḥśreyasa*), sometimes for the former alone. For the more limited use, see e.g., PVAN 32a3: *yat punar uktam—na paralokādāv iti tatra paralokaśabdena sopāyo 'bhyudayaabhāga uktaḥ.*

of the same kind by having in common the purification (i.e., substantiation or validation) by the three characteristics [of a valid reason] (*trairūpya*). If, on the other hand, [the means of knowledge in common practice] are not capable [of making the cognizer obtain the determined object], then they are also not capable of proving [the existence of] the Omniscient One. How could good fortune [such as rebirth in heaven] and liberation be established by means of an omniscient [Buddha] who is established by these [incapable means of knowledge]?

(2) And the following is contradictory: Inference proves an omniscient [Buddha], but not the other world etc. [The two statements are contradictory] because the proof of omniscient [Buddha] is invariably accompanied by (i.e., is impossible without) the proof of the other world etc. Even according to the position that [the Buddha is] omniscient about what is useful [for liberation]⁶⁴, the repeated practice of the path (*mārgābhyāsa*) possible during a single lifetime is not enough for an inference of the possibility/arising of that [omniscient Buddha] (i.e., even this lesser kind of omniscience requires practice during many lifetimes and thus cannot be established if the other world, or rebirth, is not established). Therefore, [for the establishment of omniscient Buddha] one must necessarily depend on the determination of the other world, Selflessness (*nairātmya*), etc., because otherwise the intensive application in meditation [for developing the Buddha's properties such as omniscience, which requires many lifetimes] would be impossible. Therefore, as long as the other world is not established, the omniscient [Buddha] is not established, and as long as omniscient [Buddha] is not established, the other world is not established.

[Reply:] Well, by the word 'other world' a special *karma* that leads to pleasure or pain (*saṃvartanīya-karma*)⁶⁵ is meant. And the means of knowledge in common practice do not operate on this [special *karma*] (i.e., do not make it known). Therefore, this [kind of special *karma*] can be known only from [the communication by] an omniscient person. However, an omniscient person is [established] by repeated practice of Selflessness proved by inference. Therefore, there is no mutual dependence.

(3) [Objection:] In this case, then what is the use of the statement about the deficiency in understanding the concomitant relation [between the special *karma* and its result] etc.? [None!]

[Reply:] On the contrary [it is useful], in this manner, when one holds the position that because of the deficiency in understanding the relation of concomitance [between the special *karma* and its result], the establishment of the omniscient person is also tossed aside, the rejection of [this] fault is fruitful.

64 In contradistinction to omniscience of everything, *sarvasarvajña*. See Ratnakīrti's SS 1.16–18: *heyopādeyatattvasya sābhyupāyasya vedakaḥ / yaḥ pramāṇam asāv iṣṭo na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ // (PV 2.32) ityādi. tad idānīm upayuktasarvajñam eva tāvat prasādhayāmaḥ. paryante tu sarvasarvajñadohadam apy apaneṣyāmaḥ.*

65 In this translation, I follow Edgerton.

[Objection: You maintain that] the proof of omniscient [Buddha] is [established] by everyday practice alone. But surely, in this way when the omniscient person is proved, good fortune [in heaven etc.] and liberation are obtained by practicing the way taught by that [person]. Thus, even though this sequence [of proofs] is firm (firmly established), if the proof of the omniscient person is said to be established by everyday practice, then let the proof of the other world etc., too be so. But now, the word ‘everyday practice’ [in the statement that everyday practice helps to prove omniscience] is not useful because if omniscience which has the nature of liberation⁶⁶ also belongs to everyday practice, there is no other [object] which belongs to absolute reality.

[Reply:] Even so, if the proof [of the other world] can be said to belong to everyday practice, let it be said (or: so be it). But the power of its own proof can hardly be rejected [because of that]. And when this is the case, inference has unobstructed power in [proving] (i.e., there is nothing to prevent inference from proving) momentariness etc., which help (Tib: which are part of) [the proof of] liberation. Therefore, the search for an omniscient person is not necessary [in the case of *kṣaṇikatva* etc.]. But concerning good fortune [in the next life], which is not the object of inference, it is clear that [the means of knowledge in common practice are] incapable [of proving it]. For even if the omniscient person is proved, only his teaching [and not the person] prompts one to activity towards the realisation of good fortune. And the teaching is established painstakingly to be free of the suspicion of error.⁶⁷

(4) [Objection:] Then how is it possible that after discarding the activity of means of knowledge [in common practice], the realisation of all aims of man is established from the omniscient Buddha?

[Reply:] On this, it has been said:

All aims are established from an omniscient person, but not without the means of knowledge [in common practice]. Even in this way, the means of knowledge in common practice are admitted together with an omniscient person.⁶⁸

Thus, the object of the means of knowledge is twofold: what is common to others (i.e., to teachers of other religious traditions) such as making known the nature of the other world, and what is not common such as Selflessness and momentariness.

Between these two, in the first case, the obtainment of a means of knowledge is possible even without an omniscient person, but not in the second, because without the teaching of the Buddha, the resolve [to know the theory of]

66 Feminine words ending in *-an*, such as the *bahuvrīhi* compound here, take the same endings as the masculine.

67 By checking for instance that the person has no motivation to lie, examining the part of the teaching that is accessible to perception and inference, and so on. See Franco 1997 chapter one.

68 I was unable to identify the quotation.

momentariness and so on can hardly arise⁶⁹ because [without the instruction of the Buddha] the desire to know [momentariness etc.] does not arise and consequently there is no activity of deductive reasoning/logical deliberation about the proof of that [momentariness etc.] But in the first case, to begin with, perception is not restrained when visible forms etc., are in proximity,⁷⁰ and [further] everyday practice of the visible forms etc., are established among people. And the other world is proclaimed by everybody except the Cārvākas because when there is desire to know [about it] the activity of deductive reasoning is easily obtained.

(5) Concerning [Prajñākaragupta's] statement that [perception] does not [operate] on the other world and so on,⁷¹ in this [statement] the word 'other world' expresses the part of good fortune (*abhyudayaabhāga*) together with the means [that lead to its attainment], [not the part of liberation]. The word "and so on" includes momentariness and so on, which are helpful for liberation.

[Objection:] Others (i.e., non-Buddhists) have written about momentariness, [Selflessness] etc., too in order to criticize [the Buddhist theory about them]; therefore, undertaking deductive reasoning (*ūhā*) [about them] is unavoidable. (Therefore, momentariness etc., cannot be said to be unique to the teaching of the Buddha, for they are discussed independently of him.)

[Reply:] This is not so because without the teaching of the Buddha, they would not intend to criticise [them]. Therefore, only the teaching (or speech, see also Tib: *gsung*) of the Buddha, which is accompanied by a special nature (*prakṛti*), motivates the appearance/development of proof and criticism [of topics such as momentariness].

[Objection:] Because it somehow depends on another (i.e., previous) life, the deductive reasoning about that [momentariness and so on] is determined precisely so (and not in dependence on the teaching of the Buddha). There is nothing to prevent this [assumption].

[Reply:] No. How is it known that the repeated practice in another life [is done] without depending on such teaching [of the Buddha about momentariness and so on]?

69 So there are three kinds of "religious" knowledge: one e.g. of the other world, which can be obtained without instruction of the Buddha (from other religious traditions); one e.g. of momentariness, which can be obtained only with the help of the Buddha's instruction but which is still provable by the means of knowledge in common practice; and the one e.g. of absolute reality and *karma* and so on, which is accessible only to an omniscient person and not by other means of knowledge.

70 One can take this statement at its face value that the object of perception in everyday life is common to the Buddha and others. Considering the context, however, it may also refer to the visible or perceptible part in other religious traditions. A common example for the visible efficacy of religious teaching is the curing of poisonous snake bites by *mantras* and so on.

71 PVA_o 12.16: *na tāvat pratyakṣaṃ paralokādau pravartate.*

(6) [Objection:] Even so, the teaching is of the Buddha who has been established [to be reliable], and because of [his] teaching, when his being a means of knowledge in relation to Selflessness and so on is obtained, these [Selflessness and so on] are repeatedly practiced, and from this [practice] the Buddha is established. Thus, there is a [vicious] circle.

[Reply:] This is no fault, for there are two kinds of establishment: production/arising (*niṣpatti*) and determination (*niścaya*). In relation to these two, if there would be a determination of the Buddha in general (i.e., without individual properties of a person) from the teaching of a past or present Buddha by the sequence/method taught by the [*Pramāṇa*] *vārttika*, what would be the fault? Indeed, if the arising of the Buddha from his own teaching and so on were meant, there would have been a fault [of circularity]. Arising is also actually (*eva*) meant, but of a different Buddha, i.e., who is a different individual (lit., particular, *svalakṣaṇa*).⁷²

[Objection:] Then how does the teacher (i.e., the Buddha) arise?

[Reply:] From the teaching of another omniscient [Buddha], and the latter too from yet another [Buddha]. The [opposing] sides of defilements and purifications⁷³ are indeed beginningless. In this manner, an [infinite] succession of omniscient [Buddhas] who are to be produced [each from the previous one] should be understood.

(7) [Objection:] Then how does one determine a teacher?

[Reply:] If one seeks [a teacher] as someone who has the nature of a special person, then, in the present state, by perception, and for a past [teacher] by an inference which arises from a sign/reason that is an effect and is characterized by the teachings (*pravacanalakṣaṇakāryalingajānumāna*).

If the determination [of a teacher] is examined by the quality of the omniscience, then even if it is not determined directly, one attains first of all a means of knowledge (i.e., an inference of the Buddha's omniscience) from the deductive reasoning that is based on the teaching of the statements that are capable of [empirical] consideration [and substantiation] by means of a multitude of good qualities such as supernatural capacities and miracles that are destroying proponents of other teachings. Thus, our position is established.

Thus, from the teaching of the Buddha, which is accompanied by (i.e., substantiated by) means of knowledge, what is called omniscience [which is actually] the fruit [of omniscience] that is characterized as liberation has been proved. And it should not be suspected that when there is one aim/purpose

⁷² I think this is a rare usage of *svalakṣaṇa* to refer to a particular person.

⁷³ I follow Tib in taking this compound as a dvandva and understand *pakṣa* as including *pratipakṣa*.

(namely, liberation), the two (i.e., the means of knowledge and the omniscient Buddha) are pointless. For the activity of the Buddha is [accomplished] by means of producing the means of knowledge, whereas [the activity of] the two means of knowledge [is done] by the determination of reality/the true states of things (*tattva*). Precisely for this reason the Buddha is accepted to be similar to a sense of vision or a lamp and so on. Good fortune [such as rebirth in heaven] too [is known] only from a Buddha who is accompanied by means of knowledge, as stated in the initial statement.⁷⁴

(8) [Objection:] If [knowledge about the other world comes] from the Buddha who is accompanied by means of knowledge, what's the use of the proof of the activity (or function) of the means of knowledge [in common practice]? [Reply:] For the sake of proving that they belong to everyday practice. Precisely this *pramāṇa* [which accompanies the Buddha], because it implies Non-Duality, cannot stand by itself without relying on [the means of knowledge] in common practice. And [Prajñākaragupta] will explain this [later]: All this is everyday practice even though there is an illusion about the firmness of the continuous practice of meditation on the path [to salvation] etc. Except within the framework of Non-Duality, the designation of everyday practice is indeed correct. Consequently, omniscience in relation to Non-Duality is also on the level of everyday practice because it does not know even a tiny grain beyond its own form. But because the teaching appears under the supremacy/power/influence [of omniscience], it is established for the practicing persons who have this or that aim. Therefore, [the notion that the Buddha is] omniscient does not go beyond everyday practice because it is a mere preliminary/relative position.

(9) [Objection:] Consequently, given that both [the omniscient Buddha and the *pramāṇas*] belong to everyday practice, how is it possible then that the method indicating the principality⁷⁵ [of the Buddha] is said to depend on means of knowledge [in common practice], for it has been said that [perception and inference] assist the proof of omniscience?

[Reply:] True. Because omniscience has to be proved, and the means of knowledge, which is the proving factor, is attained precisely/only through that [omniscience].

In this manner, if by helping a person, the sense of vision and so on are also said to be the principal, then there is nothing wrong. However, the appellation of means of knowledge, which depends on determination of the object [correctly], is denied in respect to them (i.e., sense of vision and so

74 That is in the initial statement of the PV, but according to Yamāri, the statement is supplied by Prajñākaragupta, that is, in the first verse of the PVABh. There is a long discussion in the PVAN, where Yamāri argues that the initial statement does not have to be made by the author himself, but can be supplied by a commentator.

75 In my understanding, *pradhāna/prādhānya* here stands in opposition to *anugūṇa*. The question is, if both the Buddha and the *pramāṇas* are on the same level, then why are they subordinate to him.

on). And the Buddha is principal only by being helpful in relation to a future form (or object). A means of knowledge too is helpful [but] only indirectly. Therefore, in dependence on that, inasmuch as the Buddha brings it forth, he is the principal [and the other two means of knowledge are subordinate].

(10) [Objection:] If so, a human *Āgama* is helpful, why were both human and non-human *Āgama* criticized above?

[Reply:] True. A human [*Āgama*] is helpful, but it is helped by means of knowledge. However, a determination of an external object cannot be shown [by it] as a means of knowledge. And the *Āgama* of the Buddha alone is assisted by means of knowledge, in matters of liberation directly and in matters of good fortune [such as rebirth in heaven] indirectly because the [Buddha's] statements about the latter are regarded as having the same source as [his] statements about the former. Therefore, because they are to be established in this manner, and because it sets in motion means for [attainment of] heaven and liberation by means of an arisen means of knowledge in matters of liberation, the main means of knowledge, called omniscience of what is useful [for the way of liberation], has been shown in dependence on [simple] means of knowledge for people like us. And because of the [infinite] increase in the accumulation of a meritorious cognition that is free from obstacles, it cannot be determined how extensive is his (the Buddha's actual) scope of knowledge (*gocara*) (i.e., it could well be of each and every detail). As for the position/tenet that [the Buddha is] omniscient of every single detail, which depends on the scope [one's knowledge?], it is clear that [it can be determined] only by a Great Self (i.e., a disciple of the Buddha who is also omniscient). And in relation/comparison to that, the extreme vileness of the two means of knowledge is clear. The vileness of the Veda, God and so on is also [clear] on the basis of the means of knowledge [in common practice]. The intention is that in relation to that, of what kind is the deliberation on the Great-Selfness of the Buddha? [Such deliberation cannot be undertaken by simple human beings like us.]

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The Place of *Bhakti* in Buddhism

Pradeep P. GOKHALE

Introduction: Hindu conception of *bhakti*:

Bhakti is an important concept in Hindu religious philosophy. Generally translated as devotion, *bhakti* is the relationship of love and attachment that a devotee feels towards God¹ or towards another object of devotion such as a deity or a guru (spiritual teacher).² In aphoristic texts on *bhakti*, namely the *Nārada bhaktisūtra* and the *Śāṅḍilya bhaktisūtra*, *bhakti* has been defined as the utmost love³ or the utmost attachment⁴ towards God.

Bhakti has been graded into higher and lower types. In the *Gītā* (7.16) four types of devotees are acknowledged. The one in distress (*ārta*), the one desirous of realization (*jijñāsu*), the one desirous of wealth (*arthārthī*) and the one who has realized the truth (*jñānī*). Among them, the one who has realized the truth (in a theistic context, the one who has realized God) is regarded as the highest. In the Indian religious tradition, 'realization' has a metaphysical overtone. For example, in the non-dualistic metaphysical framework, realization of God (or Brahman) amounts to identity with God. Hence 'Lord Krishna' in the *Gītā* proclaims, "In my opinion, the one who realizes me is the same as myself."⁵ In this ideal situation the distinction between the devotee and the devotional object collapses. A question can now be asked whether '*jñānī bhakta*' can be called a devotee proper.⁶ The reason for this question is that the dualistic relationship between the devotional object and the devotee ('*bhajya-bhajaka-bhāva*') is one of the basic presuppositions of *bhakti*. Hence, non-dualistic devotion can be called a limiting case of devotion.⁷

So, the relationship of 'devotional object and devotee' is a necessary condition of *bhakti*. What are the salient features of this relationship?

1. For *bhakti* to be possible, the devotional object is to be regarded as real and ideal. Even if the devotional object is physically non-existent, it is supposed to be existent in its transcendent form, so that the devotee can address devotional acts towards it and so that it can respond to them. In this sense, the reality of the devotional object is a necessary presupposition of *bhakti*. Similarly, the devotional object is to be regarded as an ideal or perfect being. The ideal nature of the devotional object is understood in the sense that it possesses ideal qualities such as omnipotence and omniscience, as well as other good qualities such as beauty, wealth and kindness. These ideal qualities are supposed to be operative in saving the devotee from all types of calamities and in fulfilling the devotee's wishes by performing miracles.

Here a question can be asked whether it is necessary that the devotional object is actually existent and actually ideal. The answer is in the negative. What is

- necessary is that the devotee should have a strong belief or faith – generally an uncritical faith – in the existence and the ideal nature of the devotional object.
2. The second important feature of *bhakti* as a relationship is its reciprocity. Though the acts of *bhakti* are offered by the devotee to the devotional object unilaterally, they are presented with the hope and belief that they will be reciprocated by the devotional object. Different acts of devotion are acknowledged in the Hindu tradition. A popular verse refers to the nine-fold devotion to Lord Viṣṇu: (1) hearing about him (2) reciting his prayers, (3) remembering him, (4) serving his feet, (5) worshipping him, (6) prostrating before him, (7) being his servant (8) having a friendship with him and (9) surrendering oneself to him.⁸ Most of these acts are ‘communicative acts’ addressed to the lord. They are performed with the hope that the lord will take note of them and adequately respond to them.⁹ There are different forms in which the devotional object is expected to reciprocate the acts of *bhakti*. These vary from the fulfillment of mundane wishes to the granting of liberation, which is the highest form of reciprocation.
 3. The third important feature of *bhakti*, which distinguishes it from other paths leading to liberation, is its celebration of emotions. Other well-known paths to liberation – the path of knowledge (*jñānayoga*), the path of action (*karmayoga*) and the path of meditation (*dhyānayoga*) - involve controlling and reducing emotions. *Bhaktiyoga*, on the other hand, welcomes the emotional dimension of a person and tries to channel it and transform it into the vehicle leading to liberation. Similarly, whereas other paths recommend restricting or eliminating attachment, *bhaktiyoga* recommends intense attachment to the devotional object.

Given the essential features of *bhakti*, as stated above, a question can be raised whether *bhakti* can have a place in Buddhism in the way that it has in Hinduism. The question can be considered from two angles - the factual and the doctrinal. From the factual angle it can be asked whether devotion has been practiced in Buddhism during its various historical stages and, if so, in what way. From the doctrinal angle it can be asked whether the philosophical position of Buddhism can give doctrinal support to the practice of *bhakti*, and, if so, what kind of support that is. Studies from the first angle have revealed that *bhakti* has been practiced in Buddhism since its early stage. B. G. Gokhale (1980) for instance, shows how Buddhism as a religion has contained different elements of *bhakti* from its early stage until today. Although his factual description of Buddhism as a religion can be accepted, the suggestion in his deliberations that *bhakti* is a core aspect of Buddhism can be doubted. His deliberations suggest that Buddhism is just like any other religion, like any devotion-oriented sect of Hinduism. In this depiction of Buddhism, the other side of the picture gets ignored or underemphasized, namely that there have been counter-currents in Buddhism which do not allow a central status for *bhakti* in Buddhism, or which allow a place for *bhakti* only with certain qualifications or reservations. In this short paper I will try to highlight that other side, which is less factually oriented and more doctrinally oriented.

The place of *bhakti* in Buddhism can be studied with reference to three different manifestations of Buddhism. The first manifestation can be called early Pāli Buddhism, which is largely a rational-moral-spiritual way of life that the Buddha presented through his teachings and through his own example. The second manifestation is the later Pāli Buddhism, popularly called Theravāda Buddhism, which found its articulation in works like the *Milindapañho*, *Visuddhimaggo* and *Abhidhammatthasamṅgaho*. In Theravāda Buddhism we have an institutionalized or organized religion in which *bhakti* tries to find a place alongside rational aspects. The third manifestation is Mahāyāna Buddhism, which promotes *bhakti* in its full form with respect to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. In what follows I will give a brief descriptive account of the three manifestations with special reference to the place of *bhakti* in them, and also make some critical remarks.

Early Buddhism

Thought it can be said that the Buddha had a great following and that the followers of the Buddha were devoted to him in the broad sense of the term, *bhakti* in its classical sense does not seem to have played any role in the Buddha's teachings. The Buddha's message consisted of the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path. According to the doctrine of Four Noble Truths, suffering is the problem of life and is rooted in misconception (*avijjā*), attachment or clinging (*upādāna*) and craving (*taṇhā*). The Noble Eightfold Path leading to *nibbāna* cultivates freedom from attachment and craving. Accordingly, it has no place for *bhakti*, the essential nature of which is attached love for the devotional object. That said, *Bhakti* involves focused attention and concentration towards the devotional object through recitation (*kīrtana*) and remembrance (*smaraṇa*). As a result, one might identify the analogues of *bhakti* in the Noble Eightfold Path as the two limbs, namely *sammā-sati* and *sammā-samādhi*. However, these two limbs actually have no connection to *bhakti*. *Sammā-sati* indicates mindfulness or awareness of normal, natural happenings of our life. *Sammā-samādhi* indicates concentration on gross as well as subtle objects, where the objective is the development of equanimity and detachment towards those objects.

Did the Buddha require that his followers have attached love towards him? Ubeysekara (2016) in this context gives two contrasting examples from the disciples of the Buddha. One was Vakkali, who was “overwhelmed by the Buddha's noble appearance,” and who “endeavored to remain close to the Buddha but, in doing so, neglected his religious duties including meditation.” The Buddha criticized Vakkali's approach of loving his foul body and neglecting his thought. He said to Vakkali, “Enough, Vakkali! Why do you want to see this foul body? One who sees the Dhamma sees me; one who sees me sees the Dhamma. For in seeing the Dhamma, Vakkali, one sees me; and in seeing me, one sees the Dhamma.”¹⁰ At the other extreme is the example of Dhammārāma, who did not accompany the other monks who

went to visit the Buddha and to pay their last respects to him, but preferred to practise meditation more rigorously in order to attain arhat-hood. The Buddha praised Dhammārāma for attaching more importance to the Buddha's teaching than to the Buddha as a person. The Buddha said, "Oh bhikkhus, any other bhikkhu, who too has affection for me, should behave exactly like Dhammārāma. For, garlands, perfumes etc. do not really honour me. Rather those who practice Dhamma in accordance with the Dhamma, honour me in the true sense."¹¹ A common feature of the Buddha's response in both these cases is that one who knows the Dhamma knows the Buddha; the practice of the Dhamma is the true way of honoring the Buddha. Moreover, as reported in the *Mahāparinibbāṇasutta*, when the Buddha was asked by Ānanda whom the bhikkhus should follow after the Buddha's demise, he advised the bhikkhus to be islands unto themselves, to be refuges unto themselves. Similarly, he advised them to make Dhamma their island and Dhamma their refuge. All these instances suggest that the Buddha did not demand from his followers any attachment towards himself as a person, and that he attached equal or even greater importance to Dhamma (his teachings) than to himself.

Devotion in a Hindu religious framework presupposes uncritical acceptance of the object of devotion. Now, given that the Buddha attached greater importance to his teachings than to himself as a person, a question can be asked whether the Buddha desired that his teachings should be accepted by people without critical examination. The answer is in the negative. The *Kālāmasutta*¹² from the *Anguttaranikāya* clearly demonstrates that the Buddha desired his followers not to accept anything merely on the basis of hearsay, rumours, tradition or scriptures. He asked them not to accept anything on the basis that its author was a respected ascetic, but to accept or reject things when they knew for themselves the rightness or wrongness of those things. The notion of *śraddhā* (Pāli: *saddhā*) in early Buddhism should be interpreted in this context. Ubeysekara (2016) refers to two types of faith: *amūlikā saddhā* (blind, irrational, baseless or rootless faith) and *ākāravatī saddhā* (confidence based on reason and experience). The Buddha advocated faith in the second sense.

In the religious framework of *bhakti*, the object of devotion is often regarded as an ideal object, a divine object. The Buddha probably did not give divine status to himself, although he was described by his followers as someone superior to all gods and men. He did not provide his followers with the fruits of their actions, in the form of reward or punishment. Nor did he give emancipation to them as a result of their faith and devotion. His role was that of a moral-spiritual teacher. He could show the way but his followers had to strive for themselves.¹³ The Buddha in this sense was only the demonstrator of the path (*mārgadātā*) and not the endower of liberation (*mokṣadātā*). Hence, faith in the Buddha was not a devotional relationship in the classical sense of the term.

The Buddha has been described as omniscient (Sanskrit: *sarvajña*, Pāli: *sabbaññu*). However, whether he can be called omniscient in the literal sense of the term is open to doubt. According to the *Śiṃśapāsutta*, the Buddha compared his knowledge with the leaves in the Śiṃśapā (Pāli: *Siṃsapā*) forest. He said that the knowledge he imparted to people was comparable to a handful of Śiṃśapā leaves, whereas the knowledge he possessed was comparable to the Śiṃśapā leaves overhead in the Śiṃśapā forest. The knowledge that the Buddha imparted was related to emancipation as the goal of life, but the things he knew with direct knowledge were far more numerous than what he taught.¹⁴ In this passage the Buddha did not claim that he knew literally everything. Buddha's 'omniscience' should arguably be understood in the sense that he knew everything that was worth knowing with regard to the problem of suffering.¹⁵

All the above considerations indicate that the relationship between the Buddha and his followers as prescribed in early Buddhism was neither like the one between a master and his servants nor like the one between God and his devotees, but like the one between a teacher and his students.

Bhakti in a religious framework is understood as the utmost love for God. God's reciprocation of *bhakti* takes the form of his great compassion. So, can *bhakti* be traced in Buddhism in terms of love and compassion? It is indeed true that the Buddha taught love and compassion. Loving kindness (Sanskrit: *maitrī*, Pāli: *metta*) and compassion (Sanskrit and Pāli: *karuṇā*) were two of the immeasurable sublime attitudes (Sanskrit: *brahmavihāra*, *apramāṇa*) that he asked his followers to develop. However, these attitudes were supposed to be developed with reference to all living beings. Therefore, they cannot be identified with *bhakti* because they do not have anything like God as their object. Here it can be pointed out that, although *bhakti* is essentially a kind of love, not every case of love is a case of *bhakti*. In theistic frameworks one loves all living beings because they are creatures or expressions of the common divine principle, which is the basic object of devotional love. In early Buddhism one is supposed to love all living beings because they are equally made of the everchanging five aggregates and are equally sharers in mundane experiences of pleasure and pain. So, one should extend love and compassion to all living beings without any intermediate entity like God. For example, the *Dhammapada* has the notion of 'assimilating oneself (*attā*) (with others).'¹⁶ It should be noted that here the word *attā* is a reflexive pronoun; it does not refer to the metaphysical self.

Moreover, although the Buddha himself was an embodiment of perfection in *maitrī* and *karuṇā*, his message for others was not to depend upon *his* love and compassion, but to develop similar attitudes in themselves. This once again underlines that the relationship between the Buddha and his followers was like the relationship between a teacher and his students.

To conclude, it can be said that the Buddha was not only a good instructor but also an ideal example of morality and spirituality to be imitated. However, this did not make him a devotional object in the religious sense.

Theravāda Buddhism

This brings us to the second manifestation of Buddhism, which can be called later Pāli Buddhism, and which is popularly called Theravāda Buddhism. In this phase we find most of the features of early Buddhism but we also find the introduction of devotion to be practiced and recognized in two ways. The first way is found in works like the *Milindapañho*, which reveals how, during the time of its composition, Buddhism was becoming established as an institutional religion and how devotional practices such as the worship of relics and images of the Buddha were being incorporated and rationalized. The second way is found in more systematic works like the *Visuddhimaggo* of Buddhaghosa and the *Abhidhammatthasangaho* of Anuruddhācariya, where a subtler type of devotion is advocated in the form of meditative concentration on Buddha and Devatās.

i. Worship as devotion

In the *Milindapañho* we see many signs of the institutionalization of Buddhism as a religion. Religious authority was being centralized within the order of monks. It was thought that the highest spiritual attainment, namely arhat-hood, should lie only with the monks and not with the laity. For that reason, it was maintained that if a householder attained arhat-hood, he should either attain *parinibbāna* immediately or join the monks' order the next day (Davids, 1999, 96). We have seen in the discussion of early Buddhism that the Buddha did not regard himself as omniscient in the literal sense of the term. In the *Milindapañho* the picture is different: here Bhante Nāgasena presents a series of arguments for the omniscience of the Buddha.¹⁷ This is a sign of the domination of Buddhism by institutional religious elements. Moreover, Buddhism at this time promoted the worship of the relics and images of the Buddha. For example, the *Milindapañho* contains arguments concerning relic-worship which can be extended to image-worship with equal force.

In the Buddhist metaphysical framework, relic-worship poses some dilemmas. Book IV of the *Milindapañho* opens with a dilemma of relic-worship. This goes as follows. Gotama the Buddha is entirely emancipated from life. Since he does not exist now, he cannot accept any gifts. Hence even if we regard relics of the Buddha as symbolizing the Buddha himself, relic worship is the worship of someone that does not exist. If on the other hand the worship is not futile, then we have to grant that the Buddha is not fully emancipated from life, because he is supposed to be capable of receiving worship.

This problem is not peculiar to Buddhism. Similar problems occur in Pātañjalayoga and Jainism. In the Pātañjalayoga tradition, Patañjali introduced *īśvarapraṇidhāna* (the resolve to become like *īśvara*)¹⁸ as a means to attain *samādhi*. Vyāsa, the commentator of the *Yogasūtra*, interpreted *īśvarapraṇidhāna* as a special kind of devotion to *īśvara* or as a surrendering of all one's actions to *īśvara*. It is doubtful whether Vyāsa's interpretation of *īśvarapraṇidhāna* is acceptable in the framework of the *Yogasūtra*, since *īśvara* is described in *Yogasūtra* as a special kind of *purusa*, i.e. as a pure witness-consciousness which is free from all actions and karmic formations. Given this nature, *īśvara* cannot receive devotional offerings nor can he respond to them. In Jainism, too, devotional worship is offered to Lord Mahavira and to other *tīrthankaras*. But *tīrthankaras* are all liberated souls absolutely free from all actions. Such souls cannot accept any worship nor can they respond to them. However, in Buddhism the problem becomes more radical. *īśvara* in Pātañjalayoga and *tīrthankaras* in Jainism at least exist as the intended objects of the unilateral act of worship. In Theravāda Buddhism, the Buddha who is the object of worship is no more.

Now what is the solution in the *Milindapañho* to this dilemma? The text gives justification for the worship of the Buddhas through various metaphors. The Buddha is described as like a great and glorious fire which has become extinct. However, even after the extinction of a great fire people can at least produce a small fire. Worshipping the Buddha is like producing a small fire. Likewise, the Buddha is described as like a great and mighty wind which has died away. However, even after a great wind has died away people can produce a breeze with the help of fans to reduce heat. Worshipping the relics of the Buddha is like producing a breeze. By using many metaphors of this kind Bhante Nāgasena tries to show that worshipping the relics of the Buddha is a meritorious act in itself, even if it does not and cannot amount to any kind of interaction or communication with the Buddha himself given that the Buddha is no more. Buddha exhibited a great moral and spiritual energy. The act of worshipping the relics of the Buddha does not amount to relating oneself to that energy, but it does amount to producing an energy of a similar type, though on a very small scale. This is how the *Milindapañho* justifies the devotional practice of worshipping relics of the Buddha without committing to regarding the Buddha as a metaphysical entity (Davids, 2003, 144-145).

It is important to note, however, that the author of the *Milindapañho* does not relax the core of the Buddhist path to emancipation. Nāgasena, in an answer to one of the dilemmas presented by King Milinda, points out that the practice of relic-worship is meant only for lay followers. It is not the business of the monks. They have more important spiritual practices to perform (Davids, 2003, 246-248). In other words, *Milindapañho* permits lay followers to practise devotion, but it does not make *bhakti* an integral part of the core spiritual practice of Buddhism.

ii. Devotion through meditation

The other context in which we can trace devotion in Theravāda Buddhism is in so-called *anusmṛti* (Pāli: *anussati*,) meditation. It may be interesting here to compare meditation with devotion. In fact, there is a close relationship between the notions of meditation and devotion. In both practices one concentrates on the respective object and avoids the digression or wandering of the mind towards other objects. Devotional concentration however differs from meditational concentration in four respects:

- i In devotional concentration the object must be deliberately chosen. It must be an object of ideal character, such as an image of God, or of a guru or of a sacred syllable. The object of meditative concentration need not be deliberately chosen in the same way. It could be an ordinary object like a patch of colour or the natural course of breathing.
- ii In devotional concentration the devotee is trying to establish a communicative relationship with the object of devotion, with the expectation that the object of devotion will respond. For example, the devotee may contemplate God and pray to him in order that God in return will fulfill his/her desires. Meditative concentration on the other hand is unilateral attentiveness, the purpose of which is to establish the stability or purity of mind without any expected response from the object of concentration.
- iii Devotional concentration generally aims at establishing certain special relationships whereby the devotee becomes one with the object of devotion, becomes similar to it or belongs to it etc. In meditative concentration, however, the main goal is the stability and purification of the mind. The mind becoming one with the object (as in *samādhi* of Pātañjala Yoga¹⁹) or the mind becoming similar to the object (as in *samāpatti* of Pātañjala Yoga²⁰) may constitute the very nature of meditative concentration, rather than being the aim of that meditative concentration.
- iv Lastly, devotional concentration is generally accompanied by love or attachment towards the object. Meditative concentration, on the other hand, is generally accompanied by detachment.

With this background we can consider the Buddhist theory of meditation and see how and where it approximates to the concept of devotion. The theory contains two conceptions of meditation. One is termed concentration meditation and the other insight meditation. The objects of concentration meditation are various natural objects such as earth, water, fire and air, the natural acts like breathing, the mental attitudes like kindness, compassion, joy and equanimity, and certain special objects called *anusmṛti* (Pāli: *anussati*). Insight meditation is a development of what is called *samyaksmṛti* (Pāli: *sammāsati*) or right mindfulness, through which one develops awareness of the impermanence and soullessness of all things.

The distinction between *smṛti* (Pāli: *sati*) and *anusmṛti* is important. *Smṛti* is simple mindfulness of natural objects that one comes across. *Anusmṛti*, on the other hand, is the contemplative awareness of a specially chosen object.

Later Pāli works like the *Visudhimagga* and the *Abhidammatthasangaha* mention different *anusmṛtis* as the objects of concentration meditation. There are ten *anusmṛtis*²¹ which include objects like the Buddha, Dhamma, *Saṅgha* and *Devatā*. The most important one for our purpose is *Buddhānusmṛti*.

In *Buddhānusmṛti* one has to contemplate the virtues of the Buddha as follows: “Such indeed is that Exalted one- Worthy, fully Enlightened, Endorsed with wisdom and conduct, Well-farer, Knower of the world, and Incomparable charioteer for the training of individuals, Teacher of gods and men, Omniscient and Holy (Narada, p. 398).” This implies that *anusmṛti* with regard to the Buddha is not just mindfulness of the Buddha but also involves love or attachment towards the Buddha. In this way *Buddhānusmṛti* does not remain simply meditative concentration, but can be regarded as devotional concentration in some minimal sense. The difference, however, remains that the objective of this meditation is not the establishment of identity with or nearness to the Buddha, but the purification of one’s own mind.

How devotion or devotional concentration can lead to the purification of the mind is an important question. We have noted that the Buddha was not only a great teacher in the sense of an instructor but also a moral exemplar. Concentration on an exemplar amounts to concentration on an ideal (in the form of a concept or an image) that we want to approximate or resemble. Concentration helps the mind assume the form of the object of concentration, and become like that object. The same principle is involved in the Pātañjalayoga concept of *īśvarapraṇidhāna* and the Jain idea of worshipping the *īrthñakaras*. In the same way, *Buddhānusmṛti* can become a means to purify the mind.

In conclusion, Theravāda Buddhism gives some role to *bhakti*, but *bhakti* is still subservient to the more central and essential aspects of Buddhism, namely *silā*, *samādhi* and *prajñā*: conduct, concentration and insight.

Mahāyāna Buddhism

In order to present the role of *bhakti* in Mahāyāna Buddhism it is important to portray the transition of Buddhism from its early stage or Theravāda to Mahāyāna.

According to early Buddhism and Theravāda, Buddha was a mortal being whose Dhamma, that is, teachings, survived him. Indeed, we have seen that the Buddha attached greater importance to his Dhamma than to himself. However, teachings are abstract entities that cannot survive by themselves. Against this background Mahāyāna Buddhism can be regarded as an attempt to re-root Buddhism as a religion based on transcendent metaphysics.

Hence the Buddha in Mahāyāna does not remain a mortal person; he gets transformed into a metaphysical entity, as the ultimate nature of all phenomena. Similarly, his Dhamma/Dharma does not remain an abstract linguistic entity, but under *trikāya* doctrine, it becomes Dharmakāya, the ultimate body of the Buddha.

In this framework, Śākyamuni Buddha is just a mortal manifestation (Nirmāṇakāya) of the ultimate Buddha nature. Hence, although Nirmāṇakāya is not permanently available, Dharmakāya is always available to aspirants. However, the ultimate Buddha nature is an object of realization rather than of devotion.

The common spiritual ideal in early Buddhism and Theravāda Buddhism was arhat-hood, which amounted to the cessation of the cycle of births. In Mahāyāna this ideal was replaced by Buddhahood. Hence in Mahāyāna literature we come across many Buddhas (those who have attained Buddhahood) and Bodhisattvas (those who are on their ways to Buddhahood). Unlike the Arhat ideal, which represents individual liberation, the ideals of Buddha and Bodhisattva embody altruism. Buddhas and Bodhisattvas act for the removal of the sufferings of all sentient beings out of universal love and compassion. They respond to love and devotion and hence they become the objects of *bhakti*. *Bhakti* here assumes the form of reciting their names, bowing before them, remembering them and worshipping them.²² Such devotion is supposed to result directly in rebirth in the higher world called Sukhāvātī (Happy land). This happy land is sometimes identified with *nirvāṇa*.

Sangharakshita in his *Survey of Buddhism* discusses the devotional school as a distinct school of Buddhism with special reference to texts like the larger *Sukhāvātīvyūhasūtra* and the smaller *Sukhāvātīvyūhasūtra*. The difference between the two texts, as he points out is that “the larger sūtra teaches that rebirth in the Happy land is at least partially dependent upon the accumulation of the stock of merits. This its shorter counterpart explicitly denies (Sangharakshita, 362).”

This is an important observation. It indicates that the Mahāyāna texts like the smaller *Sukhāvātīvyūhasūtra* give lesser importance to *karma* relative to *bhakti*. That is, even if a person has not performed good works, but simply hears and keeps in mind the name of Tathāgata-Amitayus, he is born, according to this text, in the Buddha’s country (Sangharakshita, 362-3).

Bhakti is described here not as causing *nirvāṇa* through the purification of the mind, but as causing it directly. This is contrary to the core feature of early Buddhism, which emphasizes voluntary action, *cetanā-karma* as the basis of bondage and liberation. In the Mahāyāna formulation of *bhakti* above, devotion supersedes moral action.

Bhakti in this way forms a core part of Mahāyāna Buddhism as a religion. But it may not be correct to conclude that it is the core of Mahāyāna Buddhism as such. This is because religion is just one dimension of Mahāyāna. The other dimension is purely philosophical. While Buddha nature is an ineffable or mystical reality for Mahāyāna religious seekers, Mahāyāna philosophical schools try to capture it through arguments and analysis. The philosophical dimension of Mahāyāna consists of two schools of philosophy: Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. Hence Nāgārjuna, the Mādhyamika philosopher develops the metaphysics of non-essentiality or emptiness (*niḥsvabhāvatā* or *sūnyatā*) and argues that Tathāgata is as non-essential as all worldly beings and things, and that all of us therefore, in a sense, share Buddha-nature.²³ The Yogācāra philosopher Vasubandhu argues that whatever exists is of the nature of consciousness and that there is nothing beyond consciousness. All living beings are just continua of consciousness. Thus, Buddha nature is pure and ineffable consciousness without subject-object duality. According to these philosophical schools, ultimate reality is grasped in the state of nonconceptual realization. According to Nāgārjuna, reality (*dharmatā*), like *nirvāṇa*, is without origination and destruction. It is realized when all language ceases, when all objects of mind cease.²⁴ Vasubandhu in the *Triṃśikā* describes the liberation-body (*vimukti-kāya*) of the Buddha as the transmudane state of knowledge in which there is no mind, no apprehension.²⁵ This way to liberation represents ‘the path of knowledge’ rather than ‘the path of devotion’.

Concluding Remarks

We have seen that *bhakti* in Buddhism can be studied with reference to three manifestations of Buddhism: early Buddhism, Theravāda and Mahāyāna.

Bhakti is seen with many of its essential features in Mahāyāna religious literature. According to the Mahāyāna model of *bhakti*, the devotee tries to establish a special kind of relationship with the Buddha or Bodhisattva, the relationship of favouring each other. The devotee offers love and the Buddha or Bodhisattava fulfills the devotee’s desires, including liberation. Hence the Buddha does not remain *mārgadātā* but becomes *mokṣadātā*, He becomes similar to God. Moreover, faith in the existence and miraculous power of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas assumes the form of uncritical or dogmatic faith rather than ‘confidence based on experience and reason.’ However, in this context the Mahāyāna religious approach should be distinguished from its philosophical approach. Mahāyāna schools of philosophy, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika, focus on knowledge or realization of non-dualistic reality rather than on devotion.

In the other two manifestations of Buddhism, namely Early Buddhism and Theravāda, many features of devotion accepted in the Hindu religious framework get dropped or remain applicable only with qualifications and

reservations: for example, the belief in the existence, omnipotence and omniscience of the devotional object, the reciprocal relationship between devotee and devotional object of favouring each other, and the emphasis on uncritical faith. In spite of these limitations, the practice of *bhakti* was defended not as a means of establishing communion with the Buddha, but as a means of cultivating the moral-spiritual qualities of the devotional object in oneself.

There is a final point of comparison between the Hindu and Buddhist conceptions of *bhakti*. Despite its questionable aspects, such as the promotion of blind faith, *bhakti* in the framework of Hinduism has played two significant roles. Firstly, as already suggested, it has given an outlet to the emotional dimensions of the followers of various religious sects and channeled them into moral and spiritual development. The second significant role is social in nature. Whereas the other paths to liberation, particularly the paths of ‘knowledge’ and ‘action,’ have served to maintain and strengthen caste and gender discriminations in Hindu society, the path of *bhakti* has relaxed these discriminations to a certain extent.²⁶

Out of these two roles of *bhakti*, the first is applicable in Buddhist religious life as well. However, the second role has not had the same significance in Buddhism, because Buddhism in its ‘knowledge’ and ‘action’ aspects is already critical of the caste and gender discrimination practiced in Brahmanical culture. So, the *bhakti* movement in Buddhism has not had special significance as a path of social emancipation in the same way as it has in Hinduism.

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- Wendy Doniger, "Bhakti", <https://www.britannica.com/topic/bhakti>
- YS: *Yogasūtra* as included in Gokhale (2020) above.

Notes

- 1 The definitions of bhakti in *Nāradabhaktisūtra* and *Śāṅḍilyabhaktisūtra* restrict the scope of bhakti to God.
- 2 A well-known statement in *Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad* includes guru (spiritual teacher) in the scope of bhakti. “*yasya deve parā bhaktir yathā deve tathā gurau | tasyaite kathitā hy arthāḥ prakāśante mahātmanah|*” *Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad*, 23.
- 3 “*paramapremarūpā.*” *Nāradabhaktisūtra* 1.2.
- 4 “*parānuraktir īśvare.*” *Śāṅḍilyabhaktisūtra*, 1.1.2.
- 5 “*jñānī tv ātmaiva me matam*”, *Gīṭā*, 7.18b Here I am not claiming that the *Gīṭā* follows the metaphysics of non-dualism absolutely and consistently.
- 6 Similar questions can be raised about concepts like *mahāmaitrī* and *mahākaruṇā* in the *Mādhyamika* framework. Normally, *maitrī* and *karuṇā* necessarily presuppose the distinction between ‘I’ and ‘the other’ However, this distinction is supposed to have ceased in *mahāmaitrī* and *mahākaruṇā* in the *Mādhyamika* framework.
- 7 In ‘non-dualistic bhakti’ the path of devotion collapses into the path of knowledge because their final goal is supposed to be the same. Terms like ‘*parā bhakti*’ and ‘*paramabhakti*’ are used in the Hindu saint literature in this context.
- 8 “*śravaṇam kīrtanam viṣṇoḥ smaranam pādasevanam| arcanam vandanam dāsyam sakyam ātma-nivedanam ||*” *Bhāgavata*, 7.5.23.
- 9 Interestingly, Wendy Doniger in *Britannica* defines bhakti, (Sanskrit: “devotion”) as a movement emphasizing the mutual intense emotional attachment and love of a devotee towards a personal god and of the god towards the devotee. The definition underlines the reciprocity of bhakti. It should be noted, however, that the reciprocity implied here is not symmetrical. The devotional object is always at a higher level and the devotee at a lower level.
- 10 “*alam Vakkali, kiṃ te iminā pūtikāyena diṭṭhena. yo kho Vakkali dhammaṃ passati so maṃ passati. yo maṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati. dhammaṃ hi Vakkali passanto maṃ passati, maṃ passanto dhammaṃ passati.*” *Vakkalisutta*, PTS, S-3, p. 121.
- 11 “*bhikkhave, aññena api mayi sinehavantena bhikkhunā Dhammārāmasadisen’eva bhavitabbaṃ, na hi mayhaṃ mālāgandhādīhi pūjaṃ karonti nāma, dhammānudhammaṃ paṭipajantā eva pana maṃ pūjenti nāmā’i.*” *Dhammapada-aṭṭakathā*, verse 364.
- 12 The sutta is named as *Kesaputtiyasutta* according to PTS edition.
- 13 “*umhe hi kiccā tatappam akkhātāro tathagatā.*” *Dhammapada*, *Maggavagga*, (276ab). (“Striving should be done by yourselves. Tathāgatas are only the teachers.”)
- 14 “*taṃ kiṃ maññatha bhikkhave, katamaṃ nu kho bahutaram yāni mayā parittāni siṃsapāpaṇṇāni pāṇinā gahitāni yad idam upari siṃsapāvane ti.evaṃ kho bhikkhave etad eva bahutaram yaṃ yo mayā abhiññā anakkhātam. Appamattakam akkhātam.*” *Siṃsapāsutta* p. 437-8.
- 15 This point was brought out emphatically by Dharmakīrti in *Pramāṇavārtika* (I.32-5). For my discussion of the theme, see Gokhale (2017).
- 16 “*attānaṃ upamaṃ katvā*” *Dhammapada*, *Dandavagga* (130c).
- 17 The question can be asked in what sense the Buddha was regarded as omniscient in *Milindapañho*. Here one can distinguish between two senses of ‘omniscience’: episodic and dispositional. ‘Omniscience’ in the episodic sense would refer to the state of consciousness in which one is simultaneously aware of each and every fact. ‘Omniscience’ in the dispositional sense would mean one’s capacity to bring any fact to awareness as and when required. In *Milindapañho* (IV.1.19) Milinda asks a question to Nāgasena about Buddha’s omniscience. Nāgasena answers the question by bringing out the dispositional nature of Buddha’s omniscience. “The omniscience of the blessed one was dependent on reflection. If he did reflect, he knew whatever he wanted to know.”
- 18 YS I.23, II.45 For my discussion of *īśvarapranidhāna*, see Gokhale (2020, 39-40)
- 19 See YS III.3
- 20 See YS I.41
- 21 The ten *anussatis* according to *Abhidhammatthasangaha* are: 1. Reflection on the virtues of the Buddha (*Buddhānussati*), 2. Reflection on the virtues of the Doctrine (*Dhammānussati*), 3. Reflection on the virtues of the pure members of the Order (*Saṅghānussati*), 4. Reflection on virtuous conduct (*Śīlānussati*), 5. Reflection on charitable nature (*Cāgānussati*), 6. Reflection on deities as witnesses of virtue (*Devatānussati*), 7. Reflection on the qualities of *Nibbāna* (*Upasamānussati*), 8. Reflection on death (*Maraṇānussati*), 9. Reflection on the thirty two impure parts of body (*Kāyagatā sati*) and 10. Mindfulness of respiration (*Ānāpānasati*). (Nārada, 398-401)

- 22 Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara as described in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra* (Chapter 24: “Samantamukhaparivartaḥ”, pp. 250-257) is a typical example of devotional object. According to the text, Avalokiteśvara saves his devotees from all calamities and fulfils all their desires, mundane as well as spiritual, when the devotee merely utters his name, carries his name, bows before him and so on.
- 23 “*tathāgato yatsvabhāvas tatsvabhāvam idaṃ jagat| tathāgato niḥsvabhāvo niḥsvabhāvam idaṃ jagat*” MS, 22.16. (“The world has that nature which belongs to Tathāgata. Tathāgata is without own nature, so is the world.”)
- 24 “*nīrvṛttam abhidhātavyaṃ nīrvṛtte cittagocare| anuṭpannāniruddhā hi nīrvāṇam iva dharmatā*” MS, 18.7.
- 25 “*acitto ’nupalambho’sau jñānaṃ lokottaraṃ ca tat|vimuktikāyo’sau dharmākhyo’yaṃ mahāmuneḥ*” *Trīṃśikā*, 29-30.
- 26 A statement from the *Gītā* is well-known in this context: “*māḥi pārtha vyapāśrītya ye’pi syuḥ pāpāyonayaḥ| striyo vaiśyās tathā śūdrās te’pi yānti parāṃ gatim*” *Gītā*, 9. 32. (“For, oh son of Pṛthā, women, vaiśyas as well as śūdras, though they are of sinful birth, attain the highest position by taking refuge in me.”)

A Study of Repaying the Four Kinds of Compassion

GUANG Xing

Introduction

The idea of repaying compassion to four groups of people is a unique feature of the teachings and practices of Chinese and Chinese-influenced Buddhism in East Asia. As a product of assimilating the concept and practices from both Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism and Chinese Confucian ideas by Chinese Buddhists, it has no parallel idea or practice found in either the Theravāda or Tibetan Buddhist tradition. This concept is drawn primarily from Indian texts such as the *Zhengfa nianchu jing* 《正法念處經》 (*Saddharma Smṛtyupasthāna Sūtra*)¹ translated by Gautama Prajñāruci 瞿曇般若流支 in 539 and the *Dacheng bensheng xindiguan jing* 《大乘本生心地觀經》 (Mahāyāna Sūtra on the Concentration of Mind Ground)² and the *Zhufo jingjie shezhenshi jing* 《諸佛境界攝真實經》 (Reality assembly of the attained realm of the Buddhas) both translated by Prajñā 般若 in 790 and 786 respectively.³

Japanese scholars have done extensive research on this topic. Yet as our below review of their main arguments demonstrates, they have neither discussed the idea of the four kinds of compassion in Indian Buddhism nor have they analyzed the historical and political context of the four kinds of compassion in Chinese Buddhism. This paper will concentrate on these two omissions.

Review of scholarship

Tachibana Shundō 立花俊道 was one of the earliest scholars who published on the issue, including “About the Content of the Four Kinds of Compassion”.⁴ For the most part, Tachibana organized the literature found in China and Japan related to repaying the compassion to four groups of people. He has identified that this Buddhist idea first appeared in the *Zhengfa nianchu jing* and the *Dacheng bensheng xindiguan jing*, but the four groups of people are different in these two texts. The *Zhengfa nianchu jing* lists one’s mother, father, the Tathāgata, and one’s monk dharma teacher.⁵ The chapter on “Repaying Compassion” in the *Dacheng bensheng xindiguan jing* notes parents, sentient beings, rulers, and the three treasures (the Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha).⁶ Tachibana states that Daocheng 道誠 (dates unknown, early Song dynasty) summarized the ideas of repaying compassion as discussed in these two texts in his *Shishi yaolan* 《釋氏要覽》 (*Manual of Buddhist Practices*) written in 1019.⁷ From this, he made a new list. “There are four kinds of compassion: first, the compassion of parents; second, the compassion of teachers; third, the compassion of rulers; fourth, the compassion of patrons.”⁸ Daocheng

explained why he added teachers and patrons into the list of four and removed sentient beings and the the treasures.

(The reasons why) rulers and parents (are in the list) are known, but why (are) teachers and patrons (added to the list)?

Answer: The scripture says, “Owing to the compassion of these people, the world has gained extra benefits and abundance.”⁹

The act of teaching the scriptures, classics, skills, business, or to avoid the evil and follow the good, are all done by teachers. Thus, teachers are included for their transmission of the way. For rescuing people from suffering and giving joy by relying on their wealth are all patrons (included). Generosity is of three kinds: the first is to give money to people, the second is to extend one’s mind of loving-kindness and make people joyful, and the third is to give Dharma talks to benefit others.¹⁰

This is perhaps the earliest research on the repayment of the four kinds of compassion.

Naitō Ryūō published “Reconsideration on the Problem of Four Obligations” in 1961.¹¹ He argued that Yuanzhao 元照 (1048–1116) was mistaken about the four kinds of compassion in Daoxuan’s *Sifenliu shanfan buque xing shichao* 《四分律刪繁補闕行事鈔》 (*Commentary on the Dharmaguptaka-Vinaya with Annotations and Additions*).¹² Referring to the sentence “First is to follow Buddhism, second is to repay the four kinds of compassion, and third is to save sentient beings”, Yuanzhao explained that the four kinds of compassion related to “rulers, parents, teachers and patrons”.¹³ Naitō considered that this mistake arose because the concept was not in the tradition of the Vinaya school, of which Daoxuan was an exponent. Naitō pointed out that the four kinds of compassion in Daoxuan’s writings referred to the bodhisattva practice of “the four methods of guidance” (Chin: *sishe* 四攝, Skt: *catuḥ-saṃgraha-vastu*). This was because Dharmarakṣa 竺法護 (229–306) had translated this Sanskrit phrase *catuḥ-saṃgraha-vastu* as *si’en* 四恩 which means “four kindnesses” in his works. For example, the *Achamo pusa jing* 《阿差末菩薩經》 (*Akṣayamatīnirdeśa Sūtra*) states: “Bodhisattva mahasattvas have the practice of the four kindnesses (*si’en xing* 四恩行) which are boundless. What are those four? The first is generosity, the second is loving-kindness, the third is benefiting others, the fourth is equanimity.”¹⁴ Dharmarakṣa used the phrase *si’en xing* not *si’en* in this sentence. It is quite clear that Naitō’s interpretation is not correct as he has got the wrong phrase.

We have also checked Dharmarakṣa’s translations and find out that the phrase *si’en xing* is used more frequently than the phrase *si’en*. For instance, the phrase *si’en xing* is found in all the following texts translated by Dharmarakṣa: the *Puyao Jing* 《普曜經》 (*Lalitavistara*),¹⁵ the *Dushi Pin Jing* 《度世品經》 (Chapter on Crossing over the world Scripture),¹⁶ the *Foshuo huanshi renxian jing* 《佛說幻士仁賢經》 (*Bhadramāyākārapariṣcchā sūtra*),¹⁷ the *Foshuo fangdeng bannihuan jing* 《佛說方等般泥洹經》 (*Caturdāraśasamādhi sūtra*),¹⁸ the

Xianjie jing 《賢劫經》 (*Bhadrakalpika sūtra*),¹⁹ and the *Songquan fangbian jing* 《順權方便經》 (*Sirīvivartavyākaraṇa sūtra*).²⁰ But the phrase *si'en* is found only in one text, the *Sheng jing* 《生經》 (*Jātaka sūtra*) translated by Dharmarakṣa.²¹ However, we do not find the phrase *bao si'en* in any of the texts translated Dharmarakṣa. Hence it is quite clear that both Wang Mingguang and Daoxuan use the phrase *bao si'en* to indicate repaying the four kinds of compassion, not *sishe* 四攝, “the four methods of guidance”.

In fact, Daoxuan used the phrase *bao si'en* 報四恩 (repaying the four kinds of compassion), not *si'en* 四恩 (four kindnesses) in his work. This is perhaps a reference to the essay “Zhouzu tianyuan lidui weiyuansong shangshi” <周祖天元立對衛元嵩上事> (“Report Submitted to Emperor Tianyuan of Zhou against Wei Yuansong”), written by a lay Buddhist Wang Mingguang’s 王明廣 (active in Northern Zhou 557–581). Wang also uses the phrase *bao si'en* not *si'en* in his essay, and clearly states that, “The śramaṇa’s practice of filial piety is first complying to all the Buddhas; second, repaying the four kinds of compassion; and third, saving all sentient beings. It is the greatest filial piety if these three are all accomplished.”²² Both Wang and Daoxuan use the phrase *bao si'en* which is precisely the idea expressed in the *Zhengfa nianchu jing*: “There are four kinds of compassion which are difficult to repay”,²³ but not the phrase either *si'en* or *si'en xing* 四恩行 (the practice of the four kindnesses) used in Dharmarakṣa’s translations. We think that Daoxuan understood the difference of expressions in the phrases *si'en* 四恩 and *bao si'en* 報四恩. Daoxuan mentions the phrase *si'en* 四恩 twice in his *Xu gaoseng zhuan* 《續高僧傳》 (Continuation of the Biographies of Eminent Monks). It clearly refers to the bodhisattva practice of “the four methods of guidance”. The first appears in the biography of Shi Daozong 釋道宗 (dates unknown) that “Daozong specially and extensively practiced the four methods of guidance in order to guide ordinary people and provide them with goods as offerings.”²⁴ The second appears in the biography of Shi Sengchou 釋僧稠 (dates unknown): “[he] often paid respect to the Three Treasures and practiced the four methods of guidance widely.”²⁵

Shunkyo Katsumata argues that the idea of four kinds of compassion is related to the idea of merit-field 福田 in his essay “The various forms of thought for the four kinds of compassion” in 1973.²⁶ Kumazawa Motoo thinks that the contents of the four kinds of compassion in texts translated into Chinese are different.²⁷ Except for the differences in contents of the four kinds of compassion in the *Zhengfa nianchu jing* and the *Dacheng bensheng xindiguan jing*, there are various interpretations of the four kinds of compassion by the Chinese monks during the Song dynasty. Kumazawa groups these variations into the following six groups: 1. parents, 2. sentient beings, 3. rulers, 4. three treasures (Tathāgata, Dharma teachers, monks and all Buddhas), 5. patrons, and 6. teachers. He explains that patrons, *danapati*, donors, teachers and friends can be grouped under ‘sentient beings’.

Among the researches on this topic, Kazuo Okabe's essay "Formation of the theory of the four kinds of compassion" in 1979 is the most detailed one.²⁸ Okabe thinks that there are four stages of development of the four kinds of compassion. The first stage of development is the four kinds of compassion as discussed in the *Zhengfa nianchu jing*. Also called the four kinds of merit-field, they are mother, father, the Buddha, and Dharma teacher. The second stage is the four kinds of compassion as discussed in works written by Chinese Buddhists from the end of Southern and Northern dynasties to the beginning of Tang dynasty. These Chinese Buddhists just used the ideas found in the *Zhengfa nianchu jing*. The third stage of development is that discussed in the *Dacheng benshen xindiguan jing* and the *Zhufo jingjie shezhenshi jing* translated in the ninth century. They are the compassion of parents, sentient beings, rulers and the three treasures. This list has exerted the greatest influence on the later generations. The fourth stage is the one proposed by Yanshou (904–975) in the Song dynasty: teachers, parents, rulers, and patrons.

The Four Kinds of Compassion in Indian Buddhism

The idea of repaying the four kinds of compassion portrayed in Chinese Buddhism originally comes from India, as the above research findings of Japanese scholars clearly demonstrate. But the connotations of the four kinds of compassion are different in these three main source texts of *Zhengfa nianchu jing*, *Dacheng bensheng xindiguan jing* and *Zhufo jingjie shezhenshi jing*.

In early Buddhist literature such as the Chinese translations of the four Āgamas and their counterparts of the five Nikāyas in Pāli, the idea of repaying a debt of gratitude primarily pointed to repaying one's debt for parents' compassion. The four kinds of compassion were not explicitly mentioned. Thus it would appear that the idea of repaying the four kinds of compassion is a later development in Indian Buddhism.

The idea of repaying the four kinds of compassion discussed in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist literature is very likely to have been influenced by the teachings of Brahmanism. According to the Brahman classic *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*,²⁹ every man is born to repay four debts. "Now, whoever exists is born indeed has a debt at his very birth to the gods, to the seers, to the fathers, and to men."³⁰ The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* uses the term "debts" (*ṛṇa*) in regards to these four groups of people. It suggests that Brahmanism emphasizes the duty of everyone to repay their debts to parents as well as the other three groups. By comparison, Confucianism and Chinese Buddhism stress the "compassion" (恩) of parents, so that everyone should repay parents' compassion instead of debts. Indian Mahāyāna Buddhists may have been influenced by Brahmanical teachings, devising the idea of the four kinds of compassion found in the Chinese translations discussed above. The following chart compares the notions of *debts* and *compassion* across the two traditions.

The four debts in the Brahmanical tradition and the four kinds of compassion in Mahāyāna Buddhism

<i>Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa</i>	<i>Zhengfa nianchu jing</i> (T721)	<i>Dacheng bensheng xindiguan jing</i> (T159)	<i>Zhufo jingjie shezhenshi jing</i> (T868)
gods	mother	rulers	rulers
seers	the Buddha	three treasures	patrons
father	father	parents	parents
men	Dharma transmitters	sentient beings	all sentient beings in the Dharma realm

This chart reveals that the idea of repaying the four kinds of compassion discussed in the three Chinese translations of Mahāyāna scriptures could have possibly been inspired by the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, as it is a common belief known to all Indian people who are required to perform by the Brahmin religious tradition. The Indian Mahāyāna Buddhists must be fully aware of this tradition and made a list of four with Buddhist contents. It is marked that these three scriptures only discuss the *four* kinds of compassion – the same number as the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* — instead of three or five.

Even so, the contents of the four kinds of compassion in *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and the three Mahāyāna scriptures are not exactly the same. Except for the parallel listing of the compassion of parents/father, the others are the Tathāgatha (or three treasures or Dharma teachers), rulers, patrons and sentient beings (which could include patrons). If this connection to the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* is true, this implies that the idea of repaying four kinds of compassion had germinated early in the Mahāyāna tradition. We find an evidence in the *Foshuo moheyan baoyan jing* 《佛說摩訶衍寶嚴經》 (*Kāśyapaparivarta Sūtra*) which mentions the phrase *bao si'en* 報四恩 (repaying the four kinds of compassion) as one of the bodhisattva practices without further detailed explanation.

Bodhisattva Mahāsattvas have four ways that include all wholesome deeds. What are the four? First, one should always dwell in mountains without (the idea of) deception in mind. Second, one should always be patient whether others are compassionate or not to oneself. Third, one should always remember repaying the four kinds of compassion and prepare to sacrifice one's life for the sake of sentient beings. Fourth, one seeks the Dharma without tiredness because one has all the wholesome roots. These, Kaśyapa, are Bodhisattva Mahāsattva's four ways that include all good things.³¹

In this passage, it is clearly stated that a Bodhisattva Mahāsattva should practice the repayment of the four kinds of compassion. The date of the translation of the *Foshuo moheyan baoyan jing* 《佛說摩訶衍寶嚴經》 (*Kāśyapaparivarta Sūtra*) is the Jin dynasty (265-420), but the name of the

translator is lost. It is at least 120 years earlier than the year 539 which is the date of Gautama Prajñāruçi's translation of the *Zhengfa nianchu jing* 《正法念處經》 (*Saddharma Smṛtyupasthāna Sūtra*).

But what comprised the four was not fixed, so the list appeared with variations over time. We do not know whether the idea of repaying the four kinds of compassion had been popularized and practiced among Indian Buddhists. However, we have not to date discovered any discussion about it in other existing Chinese translations of Indian Buddhist texts. It is highly likely, then, that the idea of repaying the four kinds of compassion was not widely accepted in Indian Buddhism, and only started to develop and spread in China under the influence of Confucianism.

The Four Kinds of Compassion in Chinese Buddhism

It was due to the influence of Confucian thought and criticisms of Buddhism by Confucians, that Chinese Buddhists began to intentionally promote the idea and practice of repaying the four kinds of compassion.

According to Zhang Peng's study of making Buddha statues during the Northern Wei (386–535), the rulers utilized the idea of "ruling the states by filial piety" and the practice of filial piety was very much a part of the social fabric at that time. Thus perhaps it is not surprising that another very early record in China of a mention of the phrase *bao si'en* (repaying the four kinds of compassion) is found on a stone tablet from Lingyan Temple in Luozhou from 541. This details the intention for making a Buddha statue from the Buddhist monk Canjing 璨敬: "[I] gratefully repay the four kinds of compassion (*bao si'en*), with heartfelt thanks and increased compassion."³² Here "repay the four kinds of compassion" is clearly mentioned as the monk's intention behind making a Buddha statue. This inscription was carved two years after the translation of the *Zhengfa nianchu jing*. This could show how quickly the idea of repaying the four kinds of compassion had spread in China, and how this idea could be used to counter Confucian criticism of the lack of filial piety in Buddhist practice.

In his 570 essay "Erjiao lun" <二教論> ("On Two Teachings"), the Buddhist monk Dao'an of the Northern Zhou (557–581) commented on the virtues of Buddhist monks, saying "Regarding their sincerity for leaving home is the ability to receive (the offer of) the 'four requisites' (clothes, food, appliance and medicine); on account of their noble deeds is the ability to repay the four kinds of compassion."³³ As noted above, the lay Buddhist contemporary of Dao'an, Wang Mingguang, also mentioned the four kinds of compassion. These two statements can be seen as attempts to refute the Confucian criticism on Buddhist monks being unfilial. Although the two writers did not mention the exact content of the four kinds of compassion, from their context, we can deduce that they refer to the four kinds of compassion in the *Zhengfa*

nianchu jing and not the bodhisattva practice of Dharmarakṣa's translation. This is because the two writers used the phrase *bao si'en* 報四恩 (repaying the four kinds of compassion), not the phrase *si'en* 四恩 (four kindnesses) or *si'en xing* 四恩行 (the practice of the four kindnesses) in their works. This demonstrates that the idea of the four kinds of compassion was fairly widespread by that time.

The notion of repaying the four kinds of compassion became more popular during the Sui and Tang dynasties. For example, in his *Poxie lun* 《破邪論》 (*Refuting Heresy*) written in 622, Falin 法琳 (572–640) mentioned the phrase “repaying the four kinds of compassion” twice when he refuted criticism of Buddhist monks. The first reference occurs when he notes that Buddhist monks also practiced filial piety and repaid compassion. He said that the Buddhist monks left their loved ones behind and abandoned the glory of becoming officials, for the sole purpose of seeking the ultimate awakening. “So they practice the way in order to repay the four kinds of compassion and establish virtues in order to benefit (sentient beings in) the three kinds of existence.”³⁴ The second occasion is in his discussion of how Śākyamuni Buddha repaid the four kinds of compassion by preaching the Dharma. Falin argued that Śākyamuni Buddha “spread the Dharma in order to repay the four kinds of compassion and nourish his virtues in order to benefit (sentient beings in) the three kinds of existence.”³⁵

Daoxuan, a contemporary of Falin, also mentioned “repaying the four kinds of compassion” in three books. The first was the *Sifenlü shanfan buque xingshichao*, published in 630. In this influential elaboration on the meanings of various precepts, Daoxuan outlined the path of Buddhist monks: “First is to follow Buddhism, second is to repay the four kinds of compassion, and third is to save sentient beings.”³⁶ This was repeated in the eighth century by Mingkuang 明曠 who studied Tiantai Buddhism under Zhanran.³⁷ Daoxuan's second work that mentions repaying the four kinds of compassion is the *Jiaojie xin xue biqu xinghu liyi* 《教誡新學比丘行護律儀》 (*Regulations and Rituals for Teaching and Regulating New Monks' Travel and Safety*). Here he recommended that Buddhist monks should “constantly have the feeling of shame and dread, remind oneself of repaying the four kinds of compassion, and benefit (the sentient beings of) the three kinds of existence.”³⁸ His third relevant work is the “Jingyingsi shihuiyuan zhuan” <淨影寺釋慧遠傳> (“Biography of Shi Huiyuan in Jingyin Monastery”) in the *Xu gaoseng zhuan* (*Further biographies of eminent monks*). He describes Jingying Huiyuan 淨影慧遠 (523–92): “Before the sermon, he gathered the public and made them chant the Prajñāpāramitā Mantra fifty times in order to repay the four kinds of compassion without negligence.”³⁹

Daoshi 道世 (d 683) dedicated a chapter to “Repayment of Compassion” in his monumental work *Fayuan zhulin* 《法苑珠林》 (*Forest of gems in the garden of the Dharma*) completed in 668. In the second section (“Sources

[of evidence]”) of this chapter, Daoshi explicitly states that the idea of the four kinds of compassion was from the *Zhengfa nianchu jing*, listing the four as “The first one is mother, the second father, the third Tathāgata, and the fourth Dharma teachers.”⁴⁰ This suggests that the idea of repaying the four kinds of compassion had already become a recognized concept in the Chinese Buddhist community. It is quite likely for this reason that Daoxuan advised that the head monk (*Stavira*) should explain “the repayment of the four kinds of compassion” at the fortnightly precepts’ gathering (*uposadha*), and exhort the newly ordained monks to “repay the four kinds of compassion”. Both Falin and Daoxuan mentioned the four kinds of compassion in their works without explicitly indicating the content of this list. We deduce that the idea also comes from the *Zhengfa nianchu jing*, because the *Dacheng bensheng xindiguan jing* was not yet available as it was translated by Prājñā in 790.

New Content in Repaying the Four Kinds of Compassion

According to Yuanzhao’s *Datang zhenyuan xu kaiyuan shijiao lu* 《大唐貞元續開元釋教錄》 (*Newly Edited Buddhist Catalogue during the Zhenyuan Era of Tang dynasty*, completed in 794),⁴¹ Prājñā pleaded with Emperor Dezong of the Tang dynasty (r 742–805) to allow him to translate Buddhist scriptures, describing himself as “proficient in both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna teachings”. He declared that:

I vow to repay the four kinds of compassion. I made my long journey to China and paid my respects as I admired China from abroad. I brought Sanskrit scriptures which are not transmitted in China. For many years I have wanted to offer these scriptures to the court, but there has been no channel to do so.⁴²

After the emperor responded positively to the plea, Prājñā translated the *Dacheng bensheng xindiguan jing*.⁴³ In this scripture, it says, “there are four kinds of compassion in this world, the first one is the compassion of parents, the second the compassion of sentient beings, the third the compassion of ruler, and the fourth the compassion of the Three Treasures.”⁴⁴ And in the *Zhufo jingjie shezhenshi jing* translated by the same translator, a different list of four kinds of compassion is given: the first is the ruler, the second are parents, the third are patrons, and the fourth are all sentient beings in the Dharma realm.⁴⁵ It would appear that the four kinds of compassion in the *Dacheng bensheng xindiguan jing* replaced the four in the *Zhengfa nianchu jing* (mother, the Buddha, father, Dharma transmitters), and became popular among Chinese Buddhists.

What is important to be noticed here is the inclusion in both lists of ‘ruler’, which does not appear in the Indian list. As we shall see, this shows the impact of Chinese culture upon ideas absorbed from India.

Indian society and culture at the time of the Buddha was mainly based on Brahmanism, believing in the four-caste system: *brahmins* (priests specializing in ritual sacrifice and Vedic teachings); *kṣatriya* (royalty, specializing in

managing state affairs); *vaiśya* (farmers and workers); and *sudra* (commoners, slaves). Monks of other religious schools also enjoyed privileges and respect from the rulers. They were regarded as an independent community outside of the secular hierarchy. The *Shamenguo jing* 《沙門果經》 (*Samaññaphala Sutta*) states that even if a person of *sudra* class renounces the world and becomes a monk, he would receive respect from the ruler.⁴⁶ Therefore, rulers also paid their respect to religious medicants, and there was no situation in which rulers would ask monks to pay them respect.

In this regard, the Chinese situation was very different. Here, the emperor was the supreme head and had the absolute political power. The Confucian classic the *Book of Poetry* makes this clear: “Under the wide heaven, All is the king’s land. Within the sea-boundaries of the land, All are the king’s servants.”⁴⁷ The Daoist classic *Daode Jing* 《道德經》 says essentially the same. “Hence the way is great; Heaven is great; Earth is great; The king is also great. Within the realm there are four things that are great, And the king counts as one.”⁴⁸ The Confucians emphasized the five relations, which are Heaven, Earth, emperor, parents and teachers. The *Xunzi* 《荀子》 says as much.

Ritual has three roots. Heaven and Earth are the root of life. Forefathers and ancestors are the root of one’s kind. Lords and teachers are the root of order. Without Heaven and Earth, how could one live? Without forefathers and ancestors, how could one come forth? Without lords and teachers, how could there be order? If even one of these three roots is neglected, no one will be safe. And so, ritual serves Heaven above and Earth below, it honors forefathers and ancestors, and it exalts lords and teachers. These are the three roots of ritual.⁴⁹

After Buddhism spread to China (early 1st century CE), conflict erupted between the sangha community and the Chinese imperial authority as early as the beginning of the fourth century around the issue of Buddhist monks not worshipping kings. As the emperors did not have the real power during Eastern Jin (314–420) (two powerful aristocratic clans in effect controlled the state affairs),⁵⁰ the conflict arose in 340 purely as a political power struggle between the two families. In fact, there was no Buddhist monk who took part in this conflict; it was purely between Regent Yu Bing 庾冰 (296–344) and He Cong 何充 (292–346), representing the Wang clan.⁵¹

The second conflict occurred in 402 when Emperor Huan Xuan (369–404) initiated a debate on this issue, inviting the well-known Buddhist monk Huiyuan 慧遠 (334–416) to participate in this debate. Huiyuan explained that from the Buddhist perspective, although Buddhist monks did not worship the emperor, they still paid their respect in their heart and mind. Huiyuan was supported by Wang Mi 王謐 (360–407) who represented many pro-Buddhist officials. As a result, the conflict around this topic stopped for a period of time.

However, in the Tang dynasty (618–907), imperial authority had grown very powerful through nationwide prosperity and unity. The imperial family, who had the surname Li (李), adopted the policy of “promoting Daoism and rejecting Buddhism”. As Laozi, the founder of Daoism, also had the name of Li Er (李耳), this policy of promoting Daoism aimed to raise the status of the Li family. Thus the founding emperor, Emperor Gaozu (born Li Yuan) (r 566–625) issued an imperial edict “first Daoism, then Confucianism, and the last Buddhism”.⁵² His son, Emperor Taizong (Li Shimin) (r 626–49) commented in this regard, “Now the clan of Li rules the country, so Daoism ranks first.”⁵³ As a result, the Buddhist community had no choice but to submit to the imperial authority. It is for this reason that the four kinds of compassion given in the *Dacheng bensheng xindiguan jing* — which includes ‘ruler’ — quickly became a popular and important idea and practice among Buddhists in China. Repaying the compassion of parents is filial piety, and repaying the compassion of rulers is loyalty. Nearly all eminent monks of later generations developed and promoted “repaying the four kinds of compassion” based on this version, as the compassion of parents and rulers are always included.

For example, Yongming Yanshou 永明延壽 (904–75), an important Chan Buddhist monk of the early Song dynasty, discussed the four kinds of compassion in his *Zhijue chanshi zixing lu* 《智覺禪師自行錄》.

Repaying the four kinds of compassion are, first repaying the compassion of teachers who have guided us, second repaying the compassion of parents who have nurtured us, third repaying the compassion of rulers who have protected us, and fourth repaying the compassion of patrons who have supported us.⁵⁴

Daocheng 道誠 discussed the four kinds of compassion as “The first is the compassion of parents, second the compassion of teachers, third the compassion of rulers, fourth the compassion of patrons.”⁵⁵ Yuanzhao, the above mentioned Vinaya master from the Hangzhou area, also stated, “rulers, parents, teachers and patrons are the four kinds of compassion.”⁵⁶ Ruler is found in all these lists from different eminent Chinese monks.

According to Okabe,⁵⁷ Xingshen 行深 (Ming dynasty) mentioned that Xianshou Fazang 賢首法藏 (643–712), the third patriarch of Huayan school, once said there are two different lists of the four kinds of compassion: (1) rulers, parents, teachers and patrons; (2) all Buddhas, rulers, parents and patrons.⁵⁸ But I think this is unlikely. As discussed above, prior to the translation of the *Dacheng bensheng xindiguan jing* in 790, the *Zhengfa nianchu jing* was the only source of reference for scholastic monks to discuss the four kinds of compassion, and rulers are not included in that list. Therefore, Xingshen’s comment about Fazang (who lived prior to the translation of the *Dacheng bensheng xindiguan jing*) remarking on two lists of four kinds of compassion must be a later addition. In the first list, the compassion of rulers is even put in first place. This is the same as Yuanzhao’s list of four.

This ordering of the four kinds of compassion was probably influenced by the *Zhufo jingjie shezhenshi jing*, which also listed the compassion of the rulers first and replaced the compassion of the Three Treasures and sentient beings with the compassion of patrons and teachers. This may be related to the historical and political context of the Song. Lin Yih-Jing describes the contexts as follows.

Because the founding of the Song Dynasty drew lessons from the mistakes of the Tang Dynasty, imperial policy tended to weaken regional political power and strengthen central government power. They adopted the policy of emphasizing civil administration and curbing military affairs.⁵⁹

Thus, in the Song dynasty, it was a usual practice that a Chan monk would first express his best wishes that the life of the emperor would be as long as the life of the South Mountain and the ministers would stay in their positions forever when he gave a Dharma talk.⁶⁰ This practice has exerted its influence on both Japanese and Korean Buddhism.

The four kinds of compassion then and now: Summary

Even now, Chinese Buddhist monks chant the verse of Dedication of Merits every morning and evening.

May the merit and virtue accrued from this work,
Adorn the Buddhas' Pure Lands,
Repaying four kinds of compassion above,
And saving sentient beings in the three suffering realms below.

From the above discussion, we can conclude that the idea of “repaying the four kinds of compassion” in the Mahāyāna tradition is derived in part from the idea of “four debts” in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* of Brahmanism, but its manifestation in ancient Indian Buddhism is still unclear. While it appeared in the *Zhengfa nianchu jing* in the 6th century, the original list needed to be revised due to the socio-political differences between China and India (i.e., the authority of Chinese emperor was absolute and supreme) by including the ruler as one of the four groups. Therefore, the revised list in the *Dacheng bensheng xindiguan jing* for repaying the four kinds of compassion, which included “repaying the compassion of rulers”, became an important practice for the Chinese Buddhists, as another way of conforming to Chinese conditions.

Notes

- 1 T17, no.721, translated in 538–41.
- 2 T3, no.159, translated in 790.
- 3 T18, no.868, translated in 786.
- 4 Tachibana Shundō, “Shi’on shumoku nitsui te” (四恩の種目に就て, About the content of the four kinds of compassion), *Komazawa University Annals for Humanity Conference* 駒澤大學人文學會年報, Vol.4 (1937), 1-10.
- 5 T17, 359b.
- 6 T3, 297a.
- 7 T54, no.2127.
- 8 T54, 289c.
- 9 This is from the *Dafangguang bushiyi jingjian jing* 《大方廣不思議境界經》 T10, 910c, translated by Śikṣānanda c. 700.
- 10 T54, 290a.
- 11 Naitō Ryūō, “Daihōben butsu hō’on kyō nitsui te” (大方便佛報恩經について), *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 印度學仏教學研究, Vol.9, No.1 (1961), 134-135.
- 12 T40, no.1804, completed in 630.
- 13 *Sifenlü xingshichao zichiji* 《四分律行事鈔資持記》 T40, 235b.
- 14 T13, 602a. The standard list of the bodhisattva practice of the four methods of guidance is: generosity (*dānaśaṃgraha*); kind speech (*priyavādīśaṃgraha*); beneficial and profitable conduct (*arthacaryasāṃgraha*); and consistency between words and deeds (*samānārthatāśaṃgraha*). In fact, this interpretation can be found prior to Dharmarakṣa. Early in An Shigao’s 2nd-century translation *Foshuo zishi sanmei jing* 《佛說自誓三昧經》 fascicle 1, it states that, “There are four kindnesses of propagation: giving, benevolence, benefiting others, equality.” (T15, 345b). Tanguo and Kang Mengxiang also used *sien* in their translation of the *Zhongben qi jing* 《中本起經》: “The four kindnesses and compassion include all sentient beings.” T04, 154c.
- 15 T3, 495c.
- 16 T10, 643c.
- 17 T12, 35b.
- 18 T12, 924a.
- 19 T14, 14b.
- 20 T14, 924b.
- 21 T3, 95c.
- 22 T52, 158c.
- 23 T17, 359b.
- 24 T50, 534b.
- 25 T50, 553c.
- 26 Shunkyo Katsumata, “Shi’on shisō no shokeitai” (四恩思想の諸形態, The various forms of thought for the four kinds of compassion), *Buzan Kyogaku Taikai Kiyō* 豊山教學大會紀要 (Memorirs of the Society for the Buzan Study), Vol.1 (1973): 25-48.
- 27 Kumazawa Motoo “Shi’on setsu no kenkyū” (四恩説の研究, A study on the theory of the four kinds of compassion), *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, No.42-2 (1994): 254-256.
- 28 Fujita Kotatsu, “Shoki daijō kyōten ni arawareta on” (初期大乘經典にあらわれた恩), *Bukkyo shiso* 仏教思想 (*Buddhist Thought*), no.4 (1979): 173-88.
- 29 According to modern scholarship, the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa existed before the rise of Buddhism in sixth century BCE. See Jan C. Heesterman, “Vedism and Brahmanism,” *Encyclopedia of Religion*, ed. Lindsay Jones, 2nd ed. (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005), Vol. 14, 9553.
- 30 Patrick Olivelle, *The Asrama System: The History and Hermeneutics of A Religious Institution* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 48. For a detailed clear explanation of the four debts discussed in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, see 47–53.
- 31 T12, 195b. 三者、念報四恩、棄捨身命為眾生故。
- 32 Zhang Peng, “Beichao Fojiao Zhaoxiangji de Wenxue Yiyi” (《北朝佛教造像記的文學意義》 The literary meaning of the records of information about making Buddhist statues in Northern Wei), *Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University* (social science edition 《西南交通大學學報》) Vol. 8, No.5 (2007): 40.
- 33 T52, 143b.
- 34 T52, 477b.
- 35 T52, 162a, 498b.
- 36 T40, 36b.
- 37 *Tiantai pusajie shu* 《天臺菩薩戒疏》 T40, 597b.

- 38 T45, 870c.
 39 T50, 4921.
 40 T53, 663b.
 41 T55, no.2156.
 42 T55, 756c.
 43 T3, no.159.
 44 T3, 297a.
 45 T18, 284b.
 46 The *Samāññaphala sutta* in both the Theravāda canon and Chinese āgama mention this point. See T1: 109a (Chinese āgama); Theravāda Buddhism, the *Digha Nikāya*, Vol.1: 60–1 (DN2).
 47 James Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Vol. IV, Part 2 (Hong Kong: Lane, Crawford & Co., 1871), 360.
 48 Chapter 25. D.C. Lau (trans.), *Tao Te Ching* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2001), 39.
 49 *Xunzi jijie* 《荀子集解》. (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1983), 349. Eric L. Hutton (trans), *Xunzi: The Complete Text* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014), 202.
 50 There was a saying that “the Wang clan and the Ma (imperial) family share the world”. From Biography of Wang Dun in the *Jin Shu* (History of Jin), fascicle 98.
 51 Gu Weikang 顧偉康 an interesting discussion of the conflict in his “Dongjin Jinwang zizheng Kaoping” (東晉「敬王之爭」考評), *Dharma Drum Journal of Buddhist Studies*, no. 11 (2012), 97–122.
 52 T52, 381a.
 53 T52, 386a.
 54 X63, 159b.
 55 *Shishi yaolan* 《釋氏要覽》 T54, 289c, completed in 1019.
 56 *Sifenli xingshichao zichiji* T40, 235b.
 57 Okabe Kazuo, “The Establishment of Four Kindness” (四恩説の成立), *Bukkyō shisō*, no.4 (1979): 184.
 58 *Zhucheng fashu* 《諸乘法數》 written in 1387.
 59 Lin Yih-Jing 林義正, “The Confluence of Confucian principles and Method of Buddhist Meditation with a focus on the thought of Dahui Zonggō” (儒理與禪法的合流: 以大慧宗杲思想為中心的考察), *Journal of the Centre for Buddhist Studies*, National Taiwan University, Vol. 4, (1999): 147-168, 149.
 60 T47, 811b.

Śrī Siṃha's Ultimate *Upadeśa*

Seven Nails that Strike the Essence of Awakening

Georgios T. HALKIAS

Chanted by Śrī Siṃha in his meditation residence during a feast offering.

ཇི་སྐར་བསམ་ཀྱང་སྐྱོམ་དུ་མེད།
 ཇི་སྐར་སྐྱེས་ཀྱང་དབྱེད་དུ་མེད།
 ཡེ་ཤེས་ཆེན་པོའི་དབྱིངས་ཉིད་ལས།
 བཅོལ་བ་མེད་པར་འོད་ཤར་རྟེ།
 བསམ་དུ་མེད་པའི་ཚོས་ཉིད་ལ།
 ཡེངས་པ་མེད་པར་མཉམ་པར་གཞག
 སྐྱོམ་པ་འདྲི་ལས་མེད་པར་འཁྲུམས།
 རིག་པ་ཡེ་ཤེས་མདུང་རྗེ་ཡིས།
 རྣམ་རྟོག་དག་པོ་རྟུལ་དུ་སྐྱོག།
 རྒྱ་གོ་ས་ལ་ཨ་ནོེ

~ *Vajra Songs of the Eighteen Texts of the Mind Division* ~
Gdams ngag rin po che'i mdzod, f.9a3

The following introduction to *The Seven Nails* is dedicated to a formidable scholar and cherished colleague, Professor Venerable K. L. Dhammajoti, whose academic legacy and ethos served as a guiding light in the Centre of Buddhist Studies at the University of Hong Kong. It is a study on a text from the early corpus of the teachings of Atiyoga or Great Perfection (Tib. *rdzogs chen*). According to hagiographical accounts, Śrī Siṃha delivered it in a jewelled casket to his heart-disciple Jñānasūtra with the purpose of resolving any lingering doubts concerning the ‘nature of mind’ (*sems nyid*), the indivisible union of awareness, clarity, and spaciousness. Even though the origins of *The Seven Nails* (*Gzer bu bdun pa*) are sheathed in the language of symbolism and mystical experience, its pithy contents have a liberating and enduring value that cuts across religious denominations and prescribed dogma. In its present incarnation, our text was transmitted to Tibet by Śrī Siṃha’s Indian disciple Vimalamitra, the fifth and last in a line of early Dzogchen patriarchs that realised the ‘rainbow body’ (*’ja’ lus*) – an esoteric experience of awakening portrayed as the physical body’s dissolution into particles of light.

Śrī Siṃha’s Hagiography

The Nyingma School considers Śrī Siṃha to be the founding father of all Tibetan Dzogchen teachings even though he never set foot on Tibetan soil.¹ Tradition credits him with the diffusion of the Nyingthig (*snying thig*; lit. ‘seminal heart’) lineage, the highest soteriological system of practice for the Ancient School of Tibetan Buddhism.² The Nyingthig corpus, a composite

collection of contemplative instructions, was redacted in Tibet sometime in the early eleventh century and was systematized in the fourteenth century by the Dzogchen luminary Longchen Rabjam (Klong chen rab 'byams, 1308–1363). According to the fundamental tantra of the Pith Division of the Great Perfection teachings,³ the *Realms and Transformations of Sound* (*Sgra thal 'gyur*), Dzogchen was taught in thirteen solar systems including our own (Norbu and Clemente 1999: 22). The precepts of Atiyoga were transmitted by Buddha Vajrasatva to the first human teacher Garab Dorje (ca. 100 BCE–100 CE) from Dhanakośa, a country west of Bodhgaya ruled by King Thor cog can of Oḍḍiyāna. Śrī Siṃha received the esoteric teachings of the Great Perfection from Mañjuśrīmitra, a Singhalese scholar at Nālandā and Garab Dorje's heart-disciple.⁴

A typical account of Śrī Siṃha's life is found in the *Extensive History of the Great Perfection of the Seminal Heart* (*Rdzogs chen snying thig gi lo rgyus chen mo*) (ff.110–119).⁵ As this has been reproduced in several English publications, I will not repeat it here.⁶ A note however concerning Śrī Siṃha's country of birth is in order to clarify conflicting accounts that situate him either in India or in China.⁷ In line with the *Extensive History*, *Padma Karpo's History of Buddhism* (*Chos 'byung padma rgyas pa'i nyin byed*; Padma dkar po 1527–1592), *Dudjom Jigdrel Yeshe Dorje's History of the Nyingma School* (*Rnying ma'i chos 'byung*; Bdud 'joms 'jigs bral ye shes 1904–1987), and more recently, *Nyoshül Kenpo's History of the Great Perfection* (*Rdzogs pa chen po'i chos 'byung*; Smyo shul mkhan po 1932–1999), locate his birthplace in China. On the other hand, in the life-story of his heart-disciple Vairocana, *The Great Image: The Life Story of Vairocana* (*Be ro tsa na'i rnam thar 'dra 'bag chen mo*), and in *Vimalamitra's biographies* compiled from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries (Gruber 2016: 419), Śrī Siṃha's origins are firmly situated in India. In support of this, *Nyangral's Copper Island* (*Zangs gling ma*), *Longchenpa's History of Buddhism* (*Klong chen chos 'byung*), and both *Deü Histories of Buddhism* (*Lde'u chos 'byung*), make no mention of Vimalamitra ever travelling to China to meet Śrī Siṃha.

In the canonical collections of the *Tengyur* (Bstan 'gyur) and the *Collected Tantras of the Ancients* (Rnying ma rgyud 'bum), he is unequivocally listed as the learned master from India (*rgya gar gyi mkhan po*), while Dargyay (1998: 19) rightly notes that Śrī Siṃha can hardly be a Sanskritised Chinese name.⁸ This is further underscored by the Sanskrit titles of texts attributed to Śrī Siṃha. Furthermore, all his teachers bear proper Sanskrit names and should any of them had been among those Indian masters who sojourned to China we would expect some mention in the Chinese records. Germano (2002: 239) contends that the association of Śrī Siṃha with China and Chinese teachers is most probably a fabrication that originated with the Nyingthig chronicles of the 12th century as an apology for the fact that no Indian Dzogchen scriptures have ever been found. The pressure to legitimize Buddhist teachings as authentic by showing an Indian source text meant

that many orally transmitted lineages upheld by the Nyingma School were deemed suspect by the New Schools of Tibetan Buddhism. Citing China as another source for the teachings of Atiyoga only muddles the picture and contradicts both Buddhist and Bön accounts that situate the origins of Dzogchen in adjacent if not intersecting regions: Oḍḍiyāna for the former and Zhang Zhung for the latter.



Śrī Siṃha, Eastern Tibet, 19th century. Courtesy of Rubin Museum of Art.

Early Tibetan Lineages of the Great Perfection

Śrī Siṃha's prominent Tibetan students include Vairocana of Pagor, Legdrüp of Tsang, and Nübchen Sangye Yeshe of Dra.⁹ Among his non-Tibetan disciples we find references to the Indian yogis Jñānasūtra (Ye shes mdo) and Vimalamitra (Dri med bshes gnyen), and to the eminent yogi from Oḍḍiyāna, Padmasambhava. Tradition gives credit to Padmasambhava, Vairocana, and Vimalamitra for propagating Dzogchen in Tibet. According to the *Seminal Heart of the Dākinī* (*Mkha' 'gro snying tig*), Padmasambhava journeyed to the charnel ground Paruṣakavana (Rtsub 'gyur tshal) to meet Śrī Siṃha, led there by a prophesy delivered by Vajravārāhī who instructed him that the “transmission that ensures the goal in a single lifetime...resides in the vajra mind of Shri Simha” (Nyoshul Khenpo 2005: 46). From Śrī Siṃha Padmasambhava received the entire range of Dzogchen teachings of the Mind, Space and Pith Instruction Divisions, the eighteen Dzogchen Tantras, and the empowerment of the *Seminal Heart of the Dākinī*. As related in *The Garland of Precious Jewels: History of the Seminal Heart of the Dākinī* (*Mkha' 'gro snying thig gi lo rgyus rin po che'i phreng ba*), Śrī Siṃha received the *Seminal Heart of the Dākinī* from Garab Dorje

at the Sītavana charnel ground at Rājagṛha and not from Mañjuśrīmitra who curiously does not feature as his teacher. He later transmitted these teachings to Padmasambhava and Vairocana who concealed them as *terma* (*gter ma*) with the mandate of their future rediscovery.¹⁰

In the first Tibetan *terma* biography, the *Copper Island* by Nyangral Nyima Özer (Nyang ral nyi ma 'od zer 1124–1192), we read of the long perilous journey of the Tibetan translators Vairocana and Ledrüp (Legs grub) to India in search of Dzogchen teachings. In the latter half of the eighth century at Dhahena assembly hall (Dha he na ku sha 'du khang) they meet Śrī Siṃha who imparts to them the twenty-five tantras (*rgyud nyi shu rtsa lnga*) and the eighteen scriptures of the Mind Division (*sems sde bco brgyad*).¹¹

The Great Image: The Life Story of Vairocana describes how, before the arrival of the two Tibetans, erupted a heated doctrinal dispute on the 'theory of a single reality' (*thig le nyag gcig*) between the female prostitute Dagnyima (Bdag nyi ma) and the Buddhist nun Kungamo (Kun dga' mo) (Jinba Palmo 2004: 105).¹² Their quarrel over sanctified Atiyoga precepts was perceived by the king as a bad omen and he ordered that all Dzogchen scriptures be hidden from foreign visitors in Bodhgaya.

According to *The Great Image*, under the cover of night and in utter secrecy, Śrī Siṃha instructed them on the eighteen texts of the Mind Division they had previously retrieved from Bodhgaya. Unfortunately, on his return to Tibet, Ledrüp was killed by border guards at the age of forty-four. Vairocana stayed behind and received more teachings, including the sixty *tantrapitaka* along with the White (*klong dkar po*), Black (*klong nag po*), and Variegated (*klong khra bo*) instructions contained in the Space Division of the Great Perfection.¹³ Upon completing his training with Śrī Siṃha and acquiring the siddhi of 'swiftfootedness' (Skt. *pādukāsiddhi*; *rkang mgyogs*),¹⁴ he returned to Tibet soon after it was discovered that he defied the king's orders and stolen precious Indian teachings. The *Great Image* contains a detailed narrative of Vairocana's legendary trials and tribulations.

Śrī Siṃha's third disciple, Vimalamitra, spent thirteen years in Tibet teaching and translating Dzogchen and tantric scriptures.¹⁵ In the *Extensive History* we read that he and his dharma-brother Jñānasūtra had a vision of Buddha Vajrasattva who divulged that in their last five hundred rebirths as *paṇḍitas* they failed to realize the ultimate goal of the Secret Mantra. Should they wish to realize it in this lifetime, they ought to travel to the Chinese Bodhi Tree shrine and request teachings from Śrī Siṃha.

Vimalamitra took heed of Vajrasattva's advise and journeyed to China to study the Nyingthig corpus with Śrī Siṃha. Upon his return to India some twenty years later, he shared his experiences and persuaded Jñānasūtra to study with the master. Gruber (2012) notes that prior to his visit to Tibet,

and for reasons that are unclear in the hagiographical sources, Vimalamitra was the recipient of “a slightly less profound aural lineage.” Between the two, Jñānasūtra received the higher teachings, most notably Śrī Siṃha's last testament, *The Seven Nails*.


The *Extensive History* narrates that Śrī Siṃha conferred the oral transmission of the four sections of the teachings of the Pith Division to Jñānasūtra before passing away in a spectacular manner. Jñānasūtra fainted upon seeing a vision of Śrī Siṃha in a luminous sphere of light only to be revived later holding a jewel casket containing *The Seven Nails*. The apocryphal mode of the master's mortal body dissolving into light amidst unusual sounds, rainbow lights, and in some cases earth tremors,¹⁶ is a leitmotif common to the early lineage of Great Perfection masters. Other shared elements include, the disciple's lamentation at the teacher's unexpected disappearance and the master's return in a light-body to grant his last teaching. The posthumous teachings are enclosed in tiny caskets made of precious jewels with the expressed purpose of inspiring disciples towards ultimate realization. The description of the master's right arm reaching out of a nebulous light to pass on his last testament is another recurrent motif in the hagiographies of the early patriarchs. Here one is tempted to entertain iconographic symbolism with the *dextera domini*, or the ‘right hand of God’ issuing forth from a cloud in Jewish and Christian art.¹⁷

The Seven Nails

The Seven Nails belongs to the *zhelchem* (*zhal chems*) genre of Tibetan religious literature that encompasses the final spiritual instructions of Buddhist masters. It is part in a collection of texts known as the *Four Final Testaments of the Vidyādhara*¹⁸ (*Rig 'dzin gyi zhal chems bzhi*), or the *Four Posthumous Teachings of the Vidyādhara* (*Rig 'dzin gyi 'das rjes bzhi*).¹⁹ It is a summary of ‘key points’ (*gnad*) that clarifies the Dzogchen view (*lta ba*) of self-originated awareness and presupposes experiential familiarity with Dzogchen contemplative designations such as *rig pa'i ye shes* (awareness of primordial wisdom), *gsal ba'i ye shes* (luminosity of primordial wisdom), *shes rab rang grol* (self-liberating knowledge), and *rig pa chos nyid* (awareness of the *dharmatā*).

The use of the term ‘nail’ (*gzer bu*) serves as an apt metaphor in Tibetan as it does in English. To ‘hit the nail on the head’ is to get to the heart of the matter, to fix one's attention on that which is important and essential – or as our text suggests, to be firm in deciding between *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa* and between phenomena as they appear to the mind and as they are in their true nature (i.e., non-established). In the *Commentary on the Intended Meaning of the Six Lamps*, Drugom Gyalwa Yungdrung (Bru sgom rgyal ba g.yung drung 1242–290) offers the following explanation for the metaphorical use of nails: “They are nails for minds that fall apart. A nail fixes something so it does not slip away or separate; in the same way, this advice plants the nail that keeps the mind from slipping to the side of proliferations or separating reality.”²⁰

The Seven Nails is arranged as a series of seven statements focusing on the narrow chasm between juxtaposed terms such as mind and matter, knower and knowable, and so forth. The description of liberation resides in the tension between the limits of language and experience, in the abysmal interval between words and their intended meaning. A tear in the ornate fabric of our belief structures exposes our compulsive tendency to approve and disprove the reality of our thoughts and feelings and reveals the possibility of allowing them to resonate against the radiant background of all-pervasive awareness. Light and its by-products (i.e., luminosity, vision, clarity) occupy a symbolic, metaphorical, and literal place in Dzogchen literature. The fundamental nature of consciousness is the mind of ‘clear light’ (*'od gsal*) and in the context of Dzogchen this entails a direct experience of the mind’s movement reflecting the dynamic inseparability of emptiness and lucidity. Through the mind’s own self-perception binary divides – i.e., the ordinary mind (*sems*) and the mind itself (*sems nyid*), the reflections and the mirror – are liberated in their own state without recourse to additional analysis and further intellectualization. Each of the seven visual similes that follow the seven nails are in fact pointing towards an immediate and unmediated experience of reality—fire running into grass, light entering into a dungeon, a husband meeting his wife, a face in the mirror, and frost touched by the sun. They illustrate the unforced and uncaused unity of image and ideation, form and perception, sense-objects and pristine awareness (Skt. *vidyā*; Tib. *rig pa*). The instructions entwined in metaphor, symbol, and reason are intended for the Atiyoga practitioner who recognizes the underlying sameness between subjective experiences of bondage and liberation and makes a firm decision to gain freedom from all forms of grasping and their associated *dukkha*.



Jñānasūtra, 18th cent. Tibet. Courtesy of Himalayan Arts Resources

The Seven Nails
A Tibetan-English Translation

The following English translation is based on the Tibetan text reproduced by Jamgon Kongtrul ('Jam mgon kong sprul blo gros mtha' yas 1813–1899) in the *Treasury of Oral Instructions* (*Gdams ngag mdzod*, vol. 2, kha, fols. 6a6–7a2). An interlineal commentary to *The Seven Nails* features in Longchenpa's *Collected Works* and in Vimalamitra's *Seminal Heart*, but it is not included in Jamgon Kongtrul's version.²¹ Instead, seven similes (1s–7s) follow the exposition of the seven nails. Section breaks, headings, and brackets are not found in the Tibetan version and are introduced below for the benefit of the reader.

[Title]

The Seven Nails: Śrī Siṃha's Ultimate Upadeśa

[Opening Homage]

Sarvāḥ Śāntika.

[I pay] homage to the perfection of insight, empty and luminous,
 To the primordial, boundless, and uninhibited wisdom that pervades
 and illuminates all.

[Introduction]

As I struck large nails [of awareness] into the unchanging ground,²²
 Seven nails fixed on the narrow divide between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa,²³
 Immutable bliss supreme arose in my mind.

Like the sunrays of the pith instructions that revived you from your faint
 illumine the hidden intent,²⁴

The door to the treasury of luminous insight is unfastened,
 And like a wish-fulfilling jewel the meaning is realized.

[Seven Nails]

[1] Strike the interval²⁵ between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa with the nail of primordial wisdom's unobstructed luminosity.

[2] Strike the juncture between knower and its object with the nail of self-arising light.

[3] Strike the duality between mind and matter with the nail of self-purified essence.²⁶

[4] Strike the division between affirmation and negation with the nail of [gaining] utmost freedom from views.

[5] Strike the juncture between subjects [phenomena] and their nature with the nail of intrinsic awareness of the *dharmatā*.

[6] Strike the interval between dullness and agitation with the nail of the five sense doors [resting] in utter relaxation.²⁷

[7] Strike the distinction between appearance and emptiness with the nail of the primordially perfected dharmakāya.

[Seven Similes]

[1s] *Like fire running into grass* – radiant, self-arising, and undefiled insight liberates itself as it perceives the other.

[2s] *Like light entering a dungeon* – appearances are directly freed through mastery of bare attention.

[3s] *Like a husband meeting his wife* – pristine pure awareness recognizes the state of the ground.

[4s] *Like a face encountering its likeliness in a mirror* – self-essence, impartially arises before itself as the condition of primordial wisdom, beyond measure, being and non-being.

[5s] *Like frost touched by the sun* – diverse thoughts are liberated soon after they appear, free from view and meditation.

[6s] *Like meeting your only child* – with the intention of resting naturally in the phenomenal world as if attached to a wisdom mudrā,²⁸ the sameness of perceiver-subject is realized.

[7s] *Like a pauper discovering a hidden treasure* – since effortless and atemporal dharmakāya is indivisible to itself, the world and its contents are naturally released in their own state.

[Epilogue]

When Śrī Siṃha was about to depart for the original state beyond sorrow [nirvāṇa], he ascended to the sky in a beam of light. Jñānasūtra, crying out in distress *alas, alas*, fell senseless to the ground. Having regained his consciousness from [the experience of] thusness, he heard a familiar loud voice from the sky. He looked up and from the centre of lights a right hand appeared. To wake him from his faint a jewelled casket one inch [long] landed on the palm of his hand. By merely touching him he gained realization. This occurred at the ‘Gate to the Auspicious Throne.’²⁹

[Coda]

This completes *The Seven Nails*, Śrī Siṃha’s last testament that is like a blind man being led [to sight].

Tibetan Text

རྒྱ་མི་ཉལ་ཞུ་ཆེ་མས་གཟེར་བུ་བདུན་པ་བཀུགས་སེལ་སྐྱོང་གསལ་ཤེས་རབ་རྫོགས་ལ་ལུག་འཚལ་ལོལ་ལུན་ཏུ་ལྷུབ་ཅིང་སྐྱོར་གསལ་སྤང་བ་ཡིལ་རིག་བའི་ཡི་ཤེས་རྒྱ་ཡན་ཕྱོགས་མེད་དེལ་མི་འགྱུར་ས་ལ་གཟེར་ཆེན་བཏབ་བའི་ཕྱིར་ལའོར་འདས་འཕང་ལ་གཟེར་ཆེན་བདུན་བཏབ་པས་མི་འགྱུར་བདེ་ཆེན་བདག་གི་རྫོལ་ཤར་དེ་དོན་མན་དག་ཉི་མའི་ཟེར་འདྲ་བལ་བརྒྱལ་བ་བསྐྱང་ཕྱིར་དགོངས་དོན་གསང་བ་འདྲིལ་གསལ་བའི་ཤེས་རབ་མཛོད་གྱུ་རྫོགས་ལལ་ཡིད་བཞིན་ནོར་འདྲའི་དོན་འདི་རྟོགས་པར་གྱིས་ལས་ལ་བའི་ཡི་ཤེས་ཟང་ཐལ་གྱི་གཟེར་གྱིས་འཁོར་འདས་གཉིས་གྱི་མཚམས་ལུ་ཐོབ་ཅིགལ་རྫོགས་མ་རང་སྤང་གི་གཟེར་གྱིས་ལལ་སེམས་གཉིས་གྱི་བར་དུ་ཐོབ་ཅིགལ་ངོ་བོ་རང་དག་གི་གཟེར་རྫོང་དོས་གཉིས་གྱི་བར་དུ་ཐོབ་ཅིགལ་ཉྱ་

བཀོལ་ཡན་གྱི་གཟེར་རྟེན་ཚང་གཉིས་ཀྱི་བར་དུ་ཐོབ་ཅིག། རིག་པ་ཚོས་ཉིད་གྱི་གཟེར་ཚོས་ཅན་ཚོས་ཉིད་ཀྱི་བར་དུ་ཐོབ་ཅིག། རྫོང་ལྷ་ལྷན་གྱི་གཟེར་
 རྱིང་རྫོང་གཉིས་ཀྱི་བར་ལ་ཐོབ་ཅིག། ཚོས་སྐྱེ་ཡོ་རྒྱལ་གྱི་གཟེར་སྣང་སྣང་གཉིས་ཀྱི་བར་ལ་ཐོབ་ཅིག། ལས་ལ་བ་རང་ངོས་མ་སྐྱབ་པ་ཤེས་རབ་རང་
 གྲོལ་གཞན་ངོ་ལ་བཞག་པ་ནི་རྟ་དང་མེ་འཕྲུང་པ་ལྟ་བུ། ལྷང་བ་གཅེར་གྲོལ་དུ་ཤེས་པས་དྲན་བསམ་ལ་བྱུན་ཚུད་པ་ནི་སྤྲོད་ལང་དང་སྣང་བ་འཕྲུང་
 པ་ལྟ་བུ། རིག་པ་ཡི་དག་གི་དགོངས་པ་གཞི་མངོན་དུ་ཤེས་པ་ནི་ཡིད་མཐུན་པའི་ལོ་མོ་འཕྲུང་པ་ལྟ་བུ། རང་ངོ་ལྷོགས་བྲལ་གྱི་ཡོ་ཤེས་རང་གྱུར་དུ་
 ཤར་བས་ཡིན་མེད་ཀྱི་རྣམས་ལས་འདྲའ་བ་བཞིན་དང་མེ་ལོང་འཕྲུང་པ་ལྟ་བུ། ལྷ་སྐོམ་ལས་གྲོལ་བའི་རྟོག་པ་སྣ་ཚོགས་རོལ་བར་ཤར་བས་བ་མོ་དང་
 ཉི་མ་རིག་པ་ལྟ་བུ། ལྷང་སྲིད་སོར་བཞག་གི་དགོངས་པ་ཡོ་རྒྱལ་བཏབ་པས་ལུལ་ཅན་མཉམ་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཤེས་པ་ནི་ལུག་ཅིག་པོ་དང་འཕྲུང་པ་ལྟ་བུ།
 ཚོས་སྐྱེ་འབད་ཚོས་མེད་པར་ཡོ་རྣམ་རང་དང་འདྲ་འབྲལ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་པས་སྣོད་བཅུད་རང་མར་གྲོལ་བའི་དབུ་པོ་གཏིར་མཛོད་དང་འཕྲུང་པ་ལྟ་
 བུ། ལྷེ་སྤྱི་ཉ་དགོངས་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་ལྷ་དཔན་ལས་འདས་པའི་ཚོ་འོད་ཟེར་གྱི་སྤུང་པོ་དང་བཅས་ཉེ་མཚམས་ལ་གཤེགས་པས། ཡོ་ཤེས་མདོ་བརྒྱལ་
 ཞིང་ས་ལ་འབྲེལ་བར་ལྷུར་ཉེ་གྱི་མ་གྱི་དུད་གྱི་སྤྲོ་བསྐྱེད་པས། ཉམ་མཐའ་ལ་སྤྲོ་ཆེན་པོ་གྲགས་ཏེ་ དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་བརྒྱལ་སངས་ནས་བསྐྱས་པས། འོད་
 ཀྱི་དཀྱིལ་ནས་ལྷག་གཡས་པ་ལྷུངས་ཏེ་ ཡོ་ཤེས་མདོ་བརྒྱལ་བ་ལས་བསྐྲང་བའི་དོན་དུ་རིན་པོ་ཆའི་ཟ་མ་ཉོག་མེན་གང་བ་གཅིག་ལྷག་མཐེལ་དུ་བབས་
 སོ། དེ་ཉིད་བབས་པ་ཙམ་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་དང་ཐུན་པར་ལྷུར་ཏེ་ བཤུ་ཤེས་ཁྲི་སྐོར་བབས་པུ། ལྷེ་སྤྱི་ཉའི་ཞལ་ཆེས་གཟེར་བུ་བདུན་པ་ལོང་བའི་སྤྲི་ལྷིང་
 དང་འདྲ་བ་རྫོགས་སོ།

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ཀུན་གསལ་ལྷ་མོ་ལ་བྱིན་ཆེན་ལུང་ལྱིན།

ས་ཕག་ ༢༧༤

བྱི་ཚེ་ ༢༠༢༡

Notes

- 1 Germano (2002:238) notes that the *Lde'u chos 'byung* contains the only known account of his visit to Tibet. Hagiographical accounts of Śrī Simha's life in Dudjom Rinpoche (1991: 497–501); Tulku Thondup (1996: 103–105); Valby (2002: 27–33); Pema Kunsang (2006: 133–143); and Nyoshul Khenpo Jamyang Dorjé (2005: 39–40).
- 2 For Karmay (1988: 216) early Dzogchen lineages may be traced to three principle sources: Tibetan movements of the eight/ninth centuries celebrating the instantaneous nature of enlightenment (*cig car ba*) influenced by Chinese Chan; teachings derived from the *Guhyagarbha Tantra*; and the eighteen series of texts of the Mind Division teachings. Dzogchen is the highest system of contemplative practice in the Nyingma School in the full spectrum of spiritual paths divided into nine successive vehicles (*theg pa rim pa dgu*).
- 3 According to the *A ti bkod pa chen po'i rgyud* and the *Snying thig gi lo rgyus chen mo*, it was Mañjuśrīmitra, Śrī Simha's teacher, who arranged the Dzogchen corpus into three sections (*sde*) – the Mind Division (*sems sde*), the Space Division (*klong sde*) and the Pith Instruction Division (*man ngag sde*). It was Śrī Simha who further subdivided the Pith Instruction Division (*man ngag sde*) into four sections, relegating the Nyingthig teachings to the fourth 'innermost secret unsurpassed section' (*yang gsang bla na med pa'i skor*); see Dargyay (1998: 23).
- 4 See Prats (1984: 201). The early line of Dzogchen succession commonly starts with Garab Dorje (Dga' rab rdo rje). It continuous with Mañjuśrīmitra, Śrī Simha, Jñānasūtra and ends with Vimalamitra. However, there exist alternative lineage histories. In the *Be ro tsa na'i rnam thar 'dra 'bag chen mo*, Buddhagupta is listed as Śrī Simha's teacher and Garab Dorje according to the lineage preserved in the *Mkha' 'gro snying thig*.
- 5 Thereafter, *Extensive History*. This work compiled by Zhang ston bkra shis rdo rje (1097–1167) is now part of the *Vima Nyingthig* (*Snying thig ya bzhi*, vol. 9, Part III). It is said to have been dictated by Vimalamitra to the eminent Tibetan translators Ska ba dpal brtsegs and Cog ro klu'i rgyal mtshan in the middle floor of Samye monastery. According to Erik Pema Kunsang (2006: 422, fn. 34), the story follows closely a version revealed by Sangs rgyas gling pa (1340–1396) in the *Bla ma dgongs 'dus* cycle. According to Padma Karpo's *Chos 'byung*, Śrī Simha taught the Indian scholar Vimalamitra at the Śītavana (Bsil ba'i tshal) charnel ground in Magadha, India.
- 6 This account is reproduced in later Tibetan literature: see Dudjom Rinpoche (1991: 497–501); Tulku Thondup (1996: 103–105); Valby (2002: 27–33); Pema Kunsang (2006: 133–143); and Nyoshul Khenpo Jamyang Dorjé (2005: 39–40).
- 7 See Karmay (2007:22, fn18). Tibetan sources assign his birthplace at Shoshaling (Sho sha'i gling) or Shokyam (Sho khyam). Various theories regarding his country of origin have included: India, China, Chinese Central Asia, Khotan, Burma, and Suvarnadvīpa (Gser ling).
- 8 Variant spellings of his name in Sanskrit read, Śrīsimha, Shri seng ha, Shri Sing nga pra pa ta, Shri sing nga, and in Tibetan, Dpal gyi seng ge, Dpal seng, and so forth. While a sizable number of scriptures in the *Tengyur* and in the *Collected Tantras of the Ancients* are attributed to him along with Atiyoga texts he co-translated with Vairocana, no corresponding Sanskrit texts (or Chinese) have been identified to date. Among Śrī Simha's works in the Gting skyes edition of the *Rnying ma rgyud 'bum*, Germano (2002: 246, n. 62) counts twelve from the Mind Division, ten from the Space Division, and seven from the Pith Instruction Division.
- 9 Concerning Gnubs chen sangs rgyas ye shes there is no further information other than a passing mention that he met Śrī Simha in India and received teachings from him (Esler 2014: 10). Listed as one of the twenty-five disciples of Padmasambhava, he is best known for his *Lamp for the Eye of Contemplation* (*Bsam gtan mig sgron*), a text of historical importance that contains a detailed discussion drawn from Dzogchen scriptures of the Mind Division; see Dalton and van-Schaik (2003).
- 10 The *Mkha' 'gro snying thig* is included in the *Snying thig ya bzhi* compiled by Longchenpa; see Tulku Thondup (1996: 57). Germano (2002: 247) is right to doubt that Padmasambhava had any historical connection with Śrī Simha suggesting that their alleged encounter must have been a later fabrication coinciding with the mythologization of Padmasambhava.
- 11 Karmay (2007: 22) notes that according to some Tibetan sources the name Dhahena refers to a place in Oḍḍiyāna. The titles of these texts seem to vary among sources. See Karmay (2007: 23–24) for a list drawn from the Thimphu edition of the *Rnying ma rgyud 'bum*. The *Pan sgrub rnam kyis thugs bcud snying gi nyi ma* (*Bai ro rgyud 'bum*, vol. 1, pl. 1–172) refers to the meeting between Śrī Simha and the Tibetans who receive six particular teachings; a list and discussion is found in Kapstein (2008: 276–277). The life story of Vairocana is also included in Kun bzang rdo rje's *Snyan bryud rin po che rdo rje zam pa'i gdams ngag gzhung bshad che ba 'dzeng yab sras kyis slob ma slob dpon kun bzang rdo rjes mdzad pa* (93–146).

- 12 Achard (2015: 14, n.59) explains: “This spontaneous absence of duality is due to the fact that the Contemplation of the natural state has no objects except itself. In other words, Awareness (*rig pa*), as the knowledge of the natural state, is simply the knowledge with which that state is spontaneously endowed and which does not differ from it in any way whatsoever. This is why the definition of this state in purely rDzogs chen terms is that of the Single Thiglé (*thig le nyag gcig*).”
- 13 Given that the sources vary widely on the content of these teachings, Germano (2002:239) suggested that they served as a niche for attributing to Vairocana many Dzogchen texts of a later Tibetan origin.
- 14 The *siddhi* of speed-walking is commonly listed among the eight ordinary siddhis (Skt. *aṣṭasādhāraṇasiddhi*; *thun mong gi dngos grub brgyad*).
- 15 These include one hundred ninety *upadeśa* instructions (*man ngag gi yig brgya dgu bcu*), the seventeen tantras of Dzogchen (*rgya che ba rgyud bcu bdun*), and the *Wrathful Black Mother Tantra* (*Bka' srung nag mo khros ma'i rgyud*); see Dargyay (1988: 47). From his teachings, the ‘four great profound scriptures’ were buried as treasures only to be later rediscovered by Lce btsun seng ge dbang phyug (ca. 10th-11th centuries) in the Chimpu caves at a mountain hill some distance away from the Samye compound. Generally known as the *Four Profound Scriptures of Vimalamitra* (*Bi ma la'i zab pa pod bzhi*), they comprise the Golden Letters (*gser yig can*), the Copper Letters (*zangs yig can*), the Conch Letters (*dung yig can*), and the Turquoise Letters (*gyu yig can*). The Ornamented Letters (*phra yig can*) and the Copper Letters are grouped together. These along with the eighteen tantras and the one hundred and ninety *upadeśa* instructions constitute, according to ‘Jam mgon kong sprul’s *Gter rnam*, the complete series of the *Gsang ba snying thig chen mo* ascribed to five treasure revealers (Prats 1984: 207).
- 16 Examples of signs involving lights, *kāya*, sounds, and earth tremors when awareness reaches maturity are mentioned in the *Tantra of Blazing Relics* (*Sku gdung 'bar ba'i rgyud*).
- 17 There are parallels with symbolic references to Jesus as the right hand of God. Curiously, the *Acts of Archelaus* depict a ‘right hand of light’ (*δεξιὰ του φωτός – dextera lucis*) as a luminous power sustaining all souls struggling against evil; see Coyle (2009: 94). For an original exploration in the multireligious milieu of Central Asia and parallels to spiritual trajectories in the Syriac Church of the East, see Tiso (2016).
- 18 In the Jātakas and Jain literature, the term *vidyādhara* designates a crossover between a human/divine sorcerer (Davidson 2017: 17), but in later Dzogchen contexts it has come to represent an accomplished practitioner, often translated as ‘awareness-holder.’
- 19 The other three testaments include: *Three Statements that Strike the Essential Points* (*Tshig gsum gnad du brdeg pa*) granted by the legendary Garab Dorje to Mañjuśrimitra; *Six Meditation Experiences* (*Sgom nyams drug pa*) bestowed by Mañjuśrimitra to Śrī Siṃha; and *Four Methods of Abiding* (*Bzhag thabs bzhi pa*) passed on by Jñānasūtra to Vimalamitra; see the *Golden Letters* (*gser yig can*) section of Vimalamitra’s *Seminal Heart* and Klong chen pa dri med ’od zer’s *Gsung 'Bum*, vol. 1, 213–238. The four testaments are not mentioned in the *Mkha' 'gro snying tig*. The chronology of the transmission lineage of the *Bi ma snying thig* as per the *btsan rtsis* of Kah thog rig ’dzin tsho dbang nor bu (1698–1755) is discussed in Prats (1984: 197–209).
- 20 See Hatchell (2014: 345). The metaphorical use of nails is not uncommon in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist writings. The mahāsiddha Tilopa is said to have given Nāropa a set of key points known as the ‘six nails’ (*gnad kyi gser drug*). At the Tiger Cave Lion Fortress in Yolmo, Milarepa sung about a set of ‘three nails’ relating to view, meditation and conduct. The Bön adept Tapihritsa bestowed the ‘twenty-one nails’ as a companion to the teachings on the *Six Lamps* in the oral transmission of the Zhang Zhung lineage of Dzogchen.
- 21 See the *Collected Works* of Klong chen pa dri med ’od zer, vol. 1, *Shri' sing ha'i gzer bu bdun pa*, pp. 232–235, and *Bi ma snying thig*, pt. 1, vol. ga, 318–325. The interlinear commentary is included in smaller script interspersed between the lines of the main text and may very well be a later addition to the root text.
- 22 The text reads *sa* for ground which in this context refers to the primordial basis (*gzhi*), the basis for all pure and impure appearances.
- 23 According to Gnubs chen, who identified nine views of Dzogchen that were prevalent during the time of the composition of his *Lamp of Meditation* (*Bsam gtan mi sgron*), Śrī Siṃha along with Kukkurāja were proponents of the Dzogchen view of ‘great bliss’ (*bde ba chen por lugs*), see Karmay (2007:117).
- 24 This is reference to Jñānasūtra fainting before receiving the last testament from his teacher.
- 25 The repeated terms *gnyis kyi mtshams* and *gnyis kyi bar* convey different shades of meaning such as, the in-between two states, an intermediate space, an interval, a boundary, duality, division or juncture. Despite my own partiality for choosing a given reading, the reader is advised to alternate between these translations as they best capture the meaning of each sentence.

- 26 One of the aspects of the primordial basis (*gzhi*) is its essence (*ngo bo*) that is fundamentally pure (*ka dag*), where purity in this context refers to its emptiness. It is purified by itself without the need of any extraneous practices or application of methods; hence it is self-purified.
- 27 The five sense doors are in reference to the eyes, ears, mouth, nose, and touch.
- 28 The term *ye rgya*, an abbreviation of *ye shes kyi phyag rgya (jñānamudrā)*, may refer to a visualized consort in higher tantric practices.
- 29 'Bkra shis khri sgo' could be translated as the 'Gate of Myriad Blessings,' 'Auspicious Myriad Gate,' or 'Auspicious Ten-thousand Gate.' It is the place where Śrī Siṃha, following the advice of a *ḍākinī* named Nampar Rolpe Gyen (Rnam par rol pa'i rgyan), hid the innermost esoteric teachings of Dzogchen in a pillar.

The Buddhist Psychology of Philosophy: How Buddhism Looks at Philosophical Views and Theories

Y. KARUNADASA

The final goal of Buddhism is freedom from suffering. From an epistemological perspective, this means freedom from all theoretical views and ideologies, freedom from all forms of philosophy and metaphysics.

It is not through philosophical arguments that Buddhism debunks philosophical speculations. On the other hand, Buddhism seeks to go beyond them through their psychological analysis. This approach to philosophical speculations could be introduced as the “*Buddhist psychology of philosophy*”. This means: Without resorting to logic and dialectics Buddhism seeks to “*transcend*”, rather than reject as false, all views and ideologies through a diagnosis of their psychological mainsprings, the psychological factors responsible for their emergence and prevalence in the world. (This, of course, does not mean that the Buddhist critique of views is confined only to psychology.) What this really means is that Buddhism takes into account the psychological factors that serve as causes for the emergence of ideological positions. The premise for this is that our desires and expectations have a direct impact on what we choose to believe in.

Therefore, from the Buddhist perspective, all philosophical and metaphysical speculations are but externalizations of our deep-seated desires and innate anxieties. Some of these speculative views and ideologies are couched and presented in beautiful language. They could appear to us as very lofty and profound, beautiful and awe-inspiring. Nonetheless, the Buddhist position is that they are but rationalizations of our self-centered desires to satisfy our innermost yearnings and compulsive urges.

The best textual evidence for this comes from the very first Buddhist Discourse of the *Dīgha-nikāya* of the Pali Buddhist Canon, called the *Brahmajāla-sutta*. It mentions some sixty-two religious and philosophical views on the nature of the “self” (*atta*) and the “world” (*loka*). They all have as their epistemological ground “logic and pure reasoning” (*takka-vīmaṃsa*), or experience gained through “mental concentration” (*ceto-samādhi*), or a combination of both.¹ The sixty-two views can be categorized as follows:

- (a) Theism, the belief in a Creator God.
- (b) Eternal-ism, the spiritual view that the physical body is perishable while the metaphysical self is eternal/immortal.

- (c) Annihilation-ism, the materialist view that the self is the same as the physical body and therefore it is perishable at the time of death, with no possibility of post-mortem existence.
- (d) Cosmogony, whether the world is eternal or non-eternal in terms of time, or whether the world is finite or infinite in terms of space.
- (e) Fortuitism, the view that the world has arisen haphazardly, without any rhyme or reason.
- (f) Skepticism, the view that with our limited faculties we cannot fathom the unlimited reality, and therefore the need to suspend all categorical judgments.²

What is most interesting about the Buddhist approach to the sixty-two views is that it is neither argumentative nor confrontational. In point of fact, not a single view is accepted as true nor rejected as false. What we find here is a psychological diagnosis of how these views arise and why they persist in the world at large, and more importantly, how they can be transcended by identifying and eliminating their psychological roots.

The rationale behind this kind of psychology is that our desires and anticipations have a direct impact on what we choose to believe in. We find this idea clearly articulated in the well-known Buddhist formula of dependent arising, where one of the causal statements is “with desire as condition is clinging” (*taṇhā-paccayā upādānam*). This clinging is described as fourfold, viz. clinging to sensual pleasures (*kāmūpadāna*), clinging to views (*diṭṭhupdana*), clinging to rites and rituals (*śīlabbatupādāna*), and clinging to the theory of self (*attavadupādāna*).³ For our present purpose we need to concern only with the second and fourth. What both mean is that if we believe in (speculative) views and in the theory of self (substance), it is because we are impelled to believe in them by our own desires.

Thus Buddhism makes a distinction between two kinds of views. The one refers to the belief in a self or soul (*atta-vāda*), considered as the essence of a human being. And, the other refers to all forms of “speculative metaphysics intended to explain the nature of the self” (*atta-vāda-paṭisaṃyutta*) and “the nature of the world” (*loka-vāda-paṭisaṃyutta*). Of these two kinds of views, the former is primary and the latter derivative, because in the final analysis it is the former that serves as a base for the emergence of the latter. This, in other words, means that all varieties of speculative metaphysics, whatever form they assume, are finally traceable to the belief in a permanent selfhood, the notion of a self-existent subject which is impervious to change.⁴

The idea of self, as we all know, assumes many forms. It appears as “I” in ordinary discourse, as “soul” in religion, and as “ego” in philosophy. Whatever form it assumes, from the Buddhist point of view, it is a fallacious assumption, a conception without corresponding objective counterpart. Its emergence is entirely due to psychological reasons.

This situation becomes further clear from the Buddhist theory of cognition, that is, how we cognize mental and physical objects. According to Buddhism, what we consider to be our apparently continuous psychological experience is analyzable into a series of discrete cognitive acts, or units of consciousness. Each cognitive act, in turn, consists of a number of cognitive events, such as sensory contact, feeling, perception, investigation, all leading up to a complex stage called “conceptual proliferation” (*papañca*).⁵

Depending on the eye and visible forms, eye-consciousness arises. The correlation (union) of the three is sensory contact (impingement). With sensory contact as condition there is feeling. What one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one examines. What one examines, that one conceptually proliferates. What one conceptually proliferates, due to that perceptions and notions born of conceptual proliferation beset a man with respect to past, future, and present visible forms cognizable through the eye.⁶

The whole cognitive process is an entirely impersonal process. There is no self-entity behind the cognitive process that experiences the object. Nor is there an agent that directs the various mental activities. They take place naturally according to the principles of psychological order (*citta-niyāma*), where each stage in the continuum is conditioned by the immediately preceding one.

However, in every cognitive process of the unenlightened person the latent tendency for the ego-consciousness awakens and gradually solidifies, eventually becoming fully crystallized at the final stage called conceptual proliferations (*papañca*). Once the ego-consciousness has arisen it cannot exist in a vacuum; it needs ontological support; it needs concrete form and content. In this regard, the unenlightened person identifies the ego-consciousness in relation to the five aggregates into which Buddhism analyzes the individual being, namely, corporeality, feelings, perceptions, mental formations, and consciousness.

The process of identification takes the following form: “This is mine” (*etaṃ mama*), “This I am” (*eso ham asmi*), “This is my self” (*eso me attā*). This is how the notions of “my”, “I”, and “my own self” intrude into what otherwise is an impersonal and egoless congeries of mental and physical phenomena. Of these, the first is due to “craving” (*taṇhā*), the second to “conceit” (*māna*), and the third to “view” (*diṭṭhi*). What is called “self-conceit” arises at a pre-rational level, whereas the idea of self, although conditioned by craving, arises at an elementary reflective level.⁷

The self-view is also called “the personality-view” (*sakkāya-diṭṭhi*), because it affirms the presence of an abiding self in the psycho-physical organism in one of twenty ways.

If “consciousness” (*viññāṇa*), for instance, is to be assumed as self, such an assumption could manifest itself in four ways: (1) consciousness is the same as self, as in the case of a flame of a lamp which is identical with its visual appearance, (2) the self possesses consciousness, just as a tree has a shadow, (3) consciousness is within the self, just as the scent is in the flower, (4) the self is in consciousness, just as a gem in a casket. This description is extended to the other four aggregates as well. Thus, there are in all twenty possible relations between the five aggregates and the hypothetical self. This is how Buddhism explains “the origin of the erroneous belief in a self-entity” (*sakkāya-ditṭhi-samudaya*).⁸

Once the belief in a self-entity has arisen, it becomes the base for a countless number of metaphysical and theological theories. Hence, we read in *Samyutta-nikāya*, the Connected Discourses of the Buddha:

Now ... as to those diverse views that arise in the world and as to these sixty-two views set forth in the Discourse on the All-Embracing Net of Views it is owing to the self-view that they arise and if the self-view exists not, they do not exist.⁹

The above statement is important from another aspect. Some modern scholars have given many interpretations as to why the Buddha deemed it necessary to observe silence on some ten questions. These questions relate to the nature of the world, whether it is eternal or non-eternal in terms of time, whether it is finite or infinite in terms of space, whether the life-principle and the physical body are identical or not, and whether the postmortem status of the *Tathāgata* (the one who has attained enlightenment) is one of existence, or non-existence, both, or neither. Some scholars maintained that if the Buddha did not answer these questions, it was because he did not know the answers to them. This is an attempt to understand the Buddha’s silence in the light of skepticism or naive agnosticism. Some others maintained that the Buddha’s silence was due to pragmatic reasons: That is, the Buddha knew the answers but for practical reasons he withheld them. This is an attempt to understand the Buddha’s silence in the light of pragmatism. The third is that solutions to these questions go beyond the grasp of intellect, in other words, they transcend the limits of knowledge and, as such, not answerable. This is an attempt to understand the Buddha’s silence within the framework of rational agnosticism. And some other scholars went to the extent of saying that the ten questions belonged to a class of profound metaphysics, bordering on mysticism, that they could be answered only by what is paradoxically called a “thunderous silence”, a silence more communicative than vocal expression through the symbolic medium of language.¹⁰

None of these explanations can be justified on textual and doctrinal evidence. As the above statement clearly indicates, if the Buddha observed silence on the ten questions, it was because they are all inappropriate questions. They are all based on the erroneous self-view, the view that there is an abiding self-entity within the constantly changing psychophysical organism.

According to Buddhism the notion of the self has two varieties. One is the spiritualist version of the self. It is presented in the Buddhist discourses as that which makes a clear distinction between a self-entity, on the one hand, and the physical body on the other. It thus assumes a duality between two basic principles, one spiritual and the other material; a permanent metaphysical self (soul), on the one hand, and the temporary physical body, on the other. Accordingly, a human being's true essence is to be found, not in the perishable physical body but in the permanent metaphysical self. Hence this theory came to be presented in the Buddhist discourses as "eternalism" (*sassatavāda*), or the belief in an eternal self.¹¹ Let us call this theory "the theory of the metaphysical self", while noting at the same time that all religions and philosophies that subscribe to it are, from the Buddhist point of view, different versions of eternalism.

The opposite view is the materialist version of the self. It sees itself as a reaction against the spiritualist view of the self. It is presented in the Buddhist discourses as that which asserts the complete identity of the self and the physical body. According to this theory a human being's true essence is to be found not in an elusive metaphysical principle but in the empirically observable physical body. If the self and the physical body are identical, it logically and invariably follows that with the breakup of the body at the time of death the self itself comes to naught, to complete annihilation. Hence, this theory came to be presented in the Buddhist discourses as "annihilationism" (*ucchedavāda*), or the annihilationist theory of the self.¹² Let us call this theory "the theory of the physical self", while noting at the same time that all materialist views that subscribe to it are, from the Buddhist perspective, different versions of annihilationism.

Early Buddhism presents these two views as occupying a position of binary opposition, while describing its own position as one that sets itself equally aloof from both of them. It is in fact against the background of these two views that Buddhist teachings are often presented. The conclusion suggests itself therefore that from its very beginning Buddhism considered itself as a critical response to the mutual opposition between the spiritualist and the materialist ideologies.

These two views, according to the Buddha, prevail throughout the history of humankind's intellectual thought. Thus, addressing Kaccāna, the Buddha says:

This world, Kaccāna, for the most part depends upon a duality – upon the notion of existence and the notion of non-existence. But for one who sees the origin of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of non-existence in regard to the world. And for one who sees the cessation of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of existence in regard to the world. 'All exists', Kaccāna, this is one extreme. 'All does not exist', this is the

second extreme. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the *Tathāgata* teaches the *Dhamma* by the Middle.¹³

Here, the notions of existence and nonexistence mean the spiritualist and materialist views. For, these two are sometimes introduced as the “view of existence” (*bhava-dīṭṭhi*) and the “view of nonexistence” (*vibhava-dīṭṭhi*). As Buddhism understands, these two views are two versions of the self theory. The first is its metaphysical version and the second its physical version – a position of mutual exclusion to which the Buddha refers thus:

Monks, there are these two views, the view of being and the view of non-being. Any recluses or Brahmins who rely on the view of being, adopt the view of being, accept the view of being are opposed to the view of non-being. Any recluses or Brahmins who rely on the view of non-being, adopt the view of non-being, accept the view of non-being are opposed to the view of being.¹⁴

According to Buddhism’s diagnosis of spiritual eternal-ism (i.e., the belief in a permanent self-entity), its psychological origin can be traced to what is called “the craving for eternal life” (*bhava-taṇhā*), the desire for the immortality of the soul. It is the desire for the eternalization of the self, the desire to perpetuate individual existence into eternity. On the other hand, the psychological origin of materialism (i.e. the belief in a temporary self-entity) can be traced to “the craving for eternal death” (*vibhava-taṇhā*), the desire for self-annihilation. It is the desire to see a complete annihilation of the individual existence at the time of death, without any prospect of postmortem survival. What seems to be assumed here is that materialism resists the belief in survival because of its fear of moral retribution, for this view gives an open license to live our lives without being burdened by a sense of moral accountability.

Thus, the mutual opposition between spiritual eternal-ism and materialist annihilation-ism shows not only the perennial conflict between two mutually exclusive philosophical views but also the human mind’s oscillation between two deep-seated desires.

There is another important aspect of the Buddhist critique of views and ideologies: Buddhism does not endorse dogmatic adherence to views, even if they are right. To be infatuated with “the rightness” of one’s own views and ideologies is called “*sandīṭṭhi-rāga*”. The dogmatic attachment to them is called “*dīṭṭhi-parāmāsa*”. The root cause of both is the belief, “this alone is true and all else is false” (*idam eva saccaṃ, moghaṃ aññaṃ*). It is this kind of warped mind-set that provides a fertile ground for bigotry and dogmatism, what Buddhism calls “*idam-saccābhinivesa*”.¹⁵ Its external manifestations, as we all know, are acts of fanaticism and militant piety, indoctrination and unethical conversion, religious fundamentalism and persecution, not to speak of interpersonal conflicts and acts of terrorism often leading to internecine warfare.

From the Buddhist point of view, therefore, dogmatic attachment to ideologies is very much more detrimental and fraught with more danger than our inordinate attachment to material things. Inter-religious and intra-religious wars are a case in point. The cold war between capitalism and communism, which had nearly brought the world into the brink of nuclear disaster, is another case in point.

If Buddhism does not encourage dogmatic attachment to views, it is because from the Buddhist way of looking at it, a view is only a guide to action. In his well-known Discourse on the “Parable of the Raft” (*Kullūpamā*), the Buddha tells us that his teaching should be understood not as a goal unto itself but as a means for the realization of the goal.¹⁶ Thus, the teaching of the Buddha, as the Buddha himself says, has only relative value, relative to the realization of the goal. It is a thing to be used and not a thing to be ritually adulated. What this clearly implies is that even the right view, like all other views, is a conceptual model serving as a guide to action. If it is called right view, it is because it leads us directly to the right goal. The right goal according to Buddhism is a “right vision” (*sammā dassana*) into the “nature of actuality” (*yathābhūta*).¹⁷

When Vacchagotta, a wandering philosopher, asked the Buddha: “Does the Venerable Good Gotama have a view of his own?” the Buddha replied: “The *Tathāgata*, O Vaccha, has given up all views. However, the *Tathāgata* has viewed thus: This is materiality, this is its arising, this is its cessation; this is feeling ...; this is perception ...; these are mental formations ...; this is consciousness, and so on.”¹⁸ (Here “arising” and “cessation” should be understood in a psychological sense. It means the “arising” and “cessation” of attachment to the five aggregates, the aggregates into which Buddhism analyzes individual existence.)

According to Buddhism, the world of conditioned experience (*saṃsāra*) is a world of “construction” (*saṃkhāra*). *Nibbāna* means its complete “deconstruction” (*visaṃkhāra*). Hence, immediately after his attaining *Nibbāna*, the Buddha says: “My mind has come to a state of deconstruction (*visaṃkhāra-gataṃ cittaṃ*); I have realized the ending of all craving (*taṇhānaṃ khayamaṃ ajjhagā*).”¹⁹

Cessation of suffering (*dukkha-nirodha*) means cessation of craving (*taṇhā-nirodha*)

Cessation of craving means cessation of views (*diṭṭhi-nirodha*)

Cessation of views means that the mind has come, not to “destruction”, but to “de-construction”.

When the mind has reached de-construction, the five aggregates do remain. Yet they are no more constructed, in the sense the *Tathāgata* does not impose on them any kind of craving or clinging.

That which is selfless, hard it is to see;
 Not easy is it to perceive the truth
 But who has ended craving utterly
 Has naught to cling to, he alone can see.²⁰

What takes place when *Nibbāna* is realized is not a change in the nature of reality; it is a change in our perspective of the nature of reality. The fact of impermanence is not a problem in itself. It becomes a problem when it is wrongly perceived as permanence. This is what is called “perception of permanence in impermanence”. In the same way, the fact of non-self is not a problem in itself. It becomes a problem when it is wrongly perceived as self. This is what is called “perception of self in what is not the self”.²¹

Thus for Buddhism, what actually matters is not the nature of the world per se, but the world as interpreted and constructed through the lens of our ego-centric perspectives: our views and beliefs, our speculative theories and dogmatic assertions. What comes to an end when *Nibbāna* is realized is not the nature of reality; rather it is a wrong interpretation of the nature of reality. The final conclusion that is thrust upon us is this: Early Buddhism is not a philosophy. It is a meta-philosophy, a philosophy that explains the very nature of philosophy. Stated otherwise, the ultimate goal of Buddhism is not to have a view, but to view.

It is quite clear that the one and only reason for this whole situation is the Buddhist doctrine of non-self. In point of fact, from its very beginning Buddhism was aware that this doctrine was not shared by any other contemporary religious or philosophical system. The Shorter Discourse on the Lion’s Roar of the *Majjhima-nikāya* says there are four kinds of clinging, clinging to sense pleasures, speculative views, rites and observances, and the notion of a truly existent self. The discourse goes on to say that there could be other religious teachers who would recognize some of the four kinds of clinging. However, what they cannot comprehend is the overcoming of the clinging to a doctrine of self. As clearly articulated here the doctrine of non-self is the unique discovery of the Buddha. It is the crucial teaching that separates the Buddha’s teaching from all other religious and philosophical systems.²²

Again, when it comes to other Buddhist teachings, the teachings on suffering, *kamma*, causality, and so forth, we find Buddhism making reference to parallel teachings on the part of other religious teachers. However, when it comes to the doctrine of non-self, we do not find similar references to parallel doctrines. This also shows that the doctrine of non-self was not shared, in any form, by other religious teachers during the time of the Buddha.

This situation came to be recognized in the subsequent schools of Buddhist thought as well. Venerable Yaśomitra, a celebrity of the Sautrāntika School of Buddhism, categorically asserts that in the whole world there is no other teacher who proclaims a doctrine of non-self.²³ Venerable Buddhaghosa, the

leading commentator of Theravāda Buddhism, says “that the characteristics of impermanence and suffering are known whether Buddhas arise or not; but that of non-self is not known unless there is a Buddha. For, the knowledge of it is the province of none but a Buddha. The Buddha in some instances shows no-selfness through impermanence, in some through suffering, and in some through both. Why is that? While impermanence and suffering are both evident, non-self is not evident and appears impenetrable, hard to illustrate, and hard to describe.”²⁴

There are, however, some modern scholars with a Vedantic orientation, who argue that when the Buddha says that the five aggregates are non-self, this does not mean that there is no Self; it only means that none of the five aggregates can be identified as our true Self, because they are subject to impermanence and are a source of suffering. The true Self, it is contended, has the opposite three characteristics, namely, permanence (*nicca*), happiness (*sukha*) and the fact of being the true Self (*atta*). If one suffers, so runs their argument, it is because of his estrangement from his true Self, and, therefore, in their view attainment of *Nibbāna* means “a positive return of the self to itself”.²⁵

One canonical passage often cited by those who maintain this theory is the passage where the wandering philosopher Vacchagotta asks the Buddha whether the self exists or not. In each case the Buddha remains silent. This silence, on the part of the Buddha, has been interpreted in two ways. According to some, it was because the Buddha did not want “to shock a weak-minded hearer” by saying that there is no self. According to others, “the logical conclusion from this would be that something is, though it is not the empirical self”.²⁶

In point of fact, the correct position can be seen from the same discourse when the Buddha told Ānanda as to why he decided to remain silent:

If, Ānanda, when Vacchagotta asked, ‘is there a self?’, I had said ‘there is a self’, then I should have been one of those who hold the doctrine of eternal-ism. But if I had replied ‘there is no self’, then I would have been one of those who hold the doctrine of annihilation. And if, when Vacchagotta asked ‘is there a self’, I had replied, ‘there is a self’, would it have been in accordance with the knowledge that all things are without self?

‘No, Lord.’

If I had said, ‘there is no self’, the bewildered Vacchagotta would have become still more bewildered, thinking, then did my ‘self’ exist before, and now it does not exist anymore’.²⁷

If any conclusion can be drawn from this, it is that Buddhism does not subscribe to the theory of the self as recognized both in the eternalist and the annihilationist ideologies, not that the Buddha believed in a self.

What is most intriguing is that some modern scholars who quote this dialogue between the Buddha and Vacchagotta, either by design or by accident, bypass the Buddha's own explanation to Ānanda as to why he remained silent when Vacchagotta raised the question whether the self exists or not.

If the theory of the over-self is valid, it raises the very important question why the Buddha was silent on this matter. The teaching of the Buddha is not an esoteric doctrine confined to a select few. The Buddha himself says that he does not have the closed fist of the teacher.²⁸

The theory of the over-self also raises another equally important question: why is it that none of the schools of Buddhist thought belonging to the three traditions of Theravāda, Mahāyāna, and Vajrayāna have arrived at a similar conclusion. It leads to the most improbable situation that they all misunderstood the original teachings of the Buddha.

It is also instructive to note that in the history of Buddhist thought there has never been a Buddhist school that has openly acknowledged a theory of the self. If there was one doctrine which every school was committed to defend, it was the doctrine of non-self. Furthermore, every Buddhist school is very sensitive to the charge of being criticized as upholding some sort of self theory. At the same time, it is of course true some Buddhist schools may have developed certain theories which amounted to a veiled recognition of the self theory. For instance, the Vātsīputrīyas admitted a sort of quasi-permanent self, neither identical with, nor different from the mental states. However, what matters here is the fact that the Vātsīputrīyas themselves vehemently denied that their theory was some kind of self theory in disguise. Despite their protests and denials, they nonetheless came to be rather sarcastically referred to by other Buddhists as “heretics within our midst” (*antaścara-tīrthaka*), outsiders masquerading as insiders.²⁹

The Buddhist teachings on the theory of knowledge and *jhāna* experience are two relevant areas that should be examined here in relation to the issue of the over-self.

It is well known that Buddhism recognizes not only different means of knowledge but also different levels of knowledge. Besides the ordinary sensory knowledge indicated by such cognitive terms as *viññāna* (basic awareness) and *saññā* (sensory perception), Buddhism speaks of a higher non-sensuous knowledge, indicated by such cognitive terms as *abhiññā* (higher knowledge), *pariññā* (comprehensive knowledge), *paññā* (wisdom), and *aññā* (gnosis). As to means of knowledge Buddhism recognizes not only sensory perception and inductive inference but also extra-sensory perception, which enables one to cognize things that do not come within the ken of ordinary sensory knowledge. For our present purpose we need not go into the details of the Buddhist understanding of the means and levels of knowledge. What

matters here is the fact that, although Buddhism recognizes different means and levels of knowledge, it is never claimed that a permanent over-self (the true self) transcending the empirical self (the false self) becomes an object of such knowledge. If anything becomes the object of higher knowledge, it is the five aggregates (the empiric individuality), and not an elusive self which transcends them. In point of fact, one theme that runs throughout the Buddhist discourses is that it is the five aggregates that become the object of higher knowledge.³⁰

The Buddhist teaching on *jhāna* recognizes an experience gained through the higher stages of mind's concentration and unification. The question that arises here is whether one who attains *jhāna* gets a glimpse of his true self which was hidden to him during normal times. Can *jhāna* experience be interpreted as communion or absorption with a metaphysical reality? As Venerable Nyanaponika Thera observes:

A fertile soil for the origin and persistence of beliefs and ideas about a self, soul, god or any other form of an absolute entity is misinterpreted meditative experience occurring in devotional rapture or mystical trance. Such experience is generally interpreted by the mystic theologian as revelation of or union with, a god-head; or it is taken for a manifestation of man's true and eternal Self.³¹

That Buddhism does not interpret *jhāna* experience in a mystical or metaphysical sense is shown by a Buddhist discourse where the Venerable Sāriputta analyses its content. Here the content of each *jhāna* is fully itemized, without leaving any residue for any kind of mystical interpretation. What is significant is the observation made that the mental factors of each *jhāna* is said to arise in full awareness of the person who meditates: "He is fully aware of their arising, their persistence, and their passing away. Then he comes to the conclusion that these mental factors, having not been, come to be (*ahutvā sambhonti*), and having been, they pass away (*hutvā paṭiventi*)." It is further observed that, since the Venerable Sāriputta fully comprehends the constituents of *jhāna* experience, he does not get attracted by them nor does he get repelled by them, nor does he get attached to them, or infatuated by them. Without getting overwhelmed by them, he comes to the conclusion that emancipation is higher than that.³²

This account of the nature of *jhāna* experience establishes three basic facts. One is that its content can be fully analyzed without leaving any residue. The second is that its constituents arise and vanish in full knowledge of the person who meditates. The third is the fact that it does not in itself constitute final emancipation. For, according to Buddhism, the *jhāna* experience too is impermanent (*anicca*), unsatisfactory (*dukkha*), and devoid of a self (*anatta*), conditioned (*saṅkhata*) and dependently arisen (*paṭicca-samuppanna*). In point of fact, Buddhism seems to be fully aware of the possibility of misinterpreting *jhāna* experience on the basis of theological or metaphysical theories. This

seems to be the reason why one who meditates is advised to review the content of *jhāna* experience in the light of the three marks of phenomenal existence (*tilakkhaṇa*), that is, as impermanent (*anicca*), unsatisfactory (*dukkha*), and as devoid of a self-subsisting entity (*anatta*).³³

Another aspect that we need to consider here is the *Nibbāna*-experience. Does it provide evidence for the belief in an Over-Self? For our present purpose, it is sufficient to refer here to the position of the *Tathāgata*, i.e. one who has attained *Nibbāna*, in relation to the five aggregates (*khandhas*). In this connection it is maintained that the *Tathāgata* cannot be comprehended either with reference to the five aggregates or without reference to them. The first shows that the *Tathāgata* does not identify himself with any of the five aggregates. The second shows that he does not identify with anything outside the five aggregates, i.e., something that transcends them, as for example, the Over-Self. Both mean that the *Tathāgata* is free from all forms of self-identification.³⁴

If there is a doctrine which is commonly accepted by all schools of Buddhist thought, it is the doctrine of non-self. If there is a doctrine on the basis of which we can speak of the transcendental unity of Buddhism, it is none other than the doctrine of non-self. If there is any doctrine which while uniting all Buddhist schools, separates Buddhism from all other religions and philosophies, it is again, the doctrine of non-self. Finally, if there is any doctrine on the basis of which Buddhism seeks to explain the psychological genesis of all speculative and theoretical views, it is also the Buddhist doctrine of non-self.

What is most radical about the Buddhist doctrine of non-self is that it is through this doctrine that Buddhism sets itself aloof from the two perennial world-views of spiritual eternal-ism and materialist annihilation-ism. The doctrine of non-self provides a new dimension to the concept of the human personality and laid the foundation for a psychology without the psyche – if by psyche is understood a self-subsisting entity within the recesses of our mind. As Edward Conze observes, the specific contribution of Buddhism to religious thought lies in its insistence on the doctrine of non-self.³⁵

In point of fact, Buddhism's major contributions to psychology and ethics have all flowed from the doctrine of non-self. If Buddhist doctrine shows why the idea of a self-entity is an untenable assumption, Buddhist psychology shows how it comes to be; if Buddhist ethics shows how it can be got rid of, Buddhism's highest goal, which is *Nibbāna*, shows the final state where it is completely eliminated.

Notes

- 1 *Dīgha-nikāya* (PTS) reprinted 1995-2001, *Brahmajāla-sutta*.
- 2 *Ibid. loc.cit.*
- 3 *Majjhima-nikāya* (PTS) reprinted 2002-2004, I, 261.
- 4 *Samyutta-nikāya* (PTS) reprinted 1994-2001, IV, 526 ff.
- 5 See *Madhupiṇḍika-sutta* in *Majjhima-nikāya*.
- 6 *Ibid. loc.cit.*
- 7 For a detailed account, see Ven. Ñāṇānanda, *Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought*, Kandy, 1997.
- 8 See Ven. Ñāṇamoli Thera, Wheel Publication 202-4, Kandy 1984.
- 9 *Samyutta-nikāya* (PTS) reprinted 1994-2001, IV, pp. 526 ff.
- 10 See A.B. Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon*, Oxford, 1923, 63 ff.; Louis de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, Paris, 1923-25, Vol. IV, 68 ff.; T.R.V. Murti, *Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, London, 36 ff.; K.N. Jayatilke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, London 1993, pp. 470 ff.
- 11 *Majjhima-nikāya* (PTS) reprinted 2002-2004, I, 427, 486.
- 12 *Ibid. loc.cit.*
- 13 Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi, *Connected Discourses of the Buddha*, Somerville, USA, 2000, pp. 544, 947.
- 14 Ven. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi, *Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha*, Somerville, USA, 1995, p. 160.
- 15 *Majjhima-nikāya* (PTS) reprinted, II, 170; *Suttanipāta* (PTS), v. 891.
- 16 *Majjhima-nikāya* (PTS) reprinted 2002-2004, II, 134.
- 17 *Samyutta-nikāya* (PTS) reprinted 1994-2001, V, 144.
- 18 *Majjhima-nikāya* (PTS) reprinted 2002-2004, I, 487.
- 19 *Dhammapada*, v. 154.
- 20 *Samyutta-nikāya* (PTS) reprinted 1994-2001, IV, 27.
- 21 *Āṅguttara-nikāya* (PTS) reprinted 1999, II, 52.
- 22 *Majjhima-nikāya* (PTS) reprinted 2002-2004, I, 64 ff.
- 23 *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (Sphuṭārthā) of Yaśomitra*, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo 1932-36, p. 697.
- 24 *Vibhaṅga Aṭṭhakathā* (PTS), reprinted 1980, pp. 49-50.
- 25 S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, London 1948, p. 676.
- 26 *Ibid. loc.cit.*
- 27 *Samyutta-nikāya* (PTS) reprinted 1994-2001, IV, *Abyākata-samyutta*.
- 28 *Dīgha-nikāya* (PTS) reprinted 1995-2001, II, 100.
- 29 *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, IX, p. 60.
- 30 Cf. *pañcakkhandhe abhiññeyya pariññeyya* in *Samyutta-nikāya* (PTS) reprinted 1994-2001, III, 81.
- 31 See Ven. Nyanaponika Thera, 'Buddhism and the God-Idea', *The Vision of Dhamma*, BPS, Kandy, 2006, p. 12.
- 32 See *Anupada-sutta* in *Majjhima-nikāya* (PTS) reprinted 2002-2004.
- 33 Ven. Nyanaponika Thera, *The Vision of Dhamma*, BPS, Kandy, 2006, 294 ff.
- 34 *Majjhima-nikāya* (PTS) reprinted 2002-2004, I, 487-88.
- 35 Edward Conze, *Buddhism, Its Essence and Development: Buddhist Thought in India*, London 1962, p. 18.

Jingying Huiyuan on *Aśubhabhāvanā*¹

Robert KRITZER

Introduction

The Chinese Buddhist author, Jingying Huiyuan 淨影慧遠 (523-592), is well known for his commentaries on major Mahāyāna texts, mostly sutras. Complete works that are extant include: *Da banniepan jing yiji* 大般涅槃經義記 (T1764) on *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (T374); *Weimo yiji* 維摩義記 (T1776) on *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* (T475); *Wenshi jing yishu* 溫室經義記 (T1793) on the *Bathroom Sutra* (T701); *Wuliang shou jing yishu* 無量壽經義疏 (T1745) on the Larger *Sukhāvātīvyūhasūtra* (T360); *Guan wuliangshou jing yishu* 觀無量壽經義疏 (T1749) on the *Contemplation Sutra* (T365).

Huiyuan is also famous for his compendium of Mahāyāna, *Dasheng yizhang* 大乘義章 (T1851). As is clear throughout *Dasheng yizhang*, which Lin describes as a type of Mahāyāna abhidharma (2014, 69), Huiyuan was well read in earlier Buddhist literature—Indian and Chinese, Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna—and has interesting things to say about traditional subjects, including the meditation on the impure (*aśubhabhāvanā* [*bujing guan* 不淨觀] or simply *aśubhā*). *Dasheng yizhang* includes more than a dozen passages that mention *aśubhabhāvanā*. In this article, I examine in detail several of Huiyuan's passages on *aśubhabhāvanā*, with particular attention to his use of sources.

Aśubhabhāvanā

Aśubhabhāvanā, meditation on the impure, is described in a large number of Buddhist texts of various genres, beginning with the *Āgamas* and *Nikāyas*. There are many versions of the meditation, differing considerably in detail. However, the practice of *aśubhabhāvanā* is generally supposed to remove desire by dispelling the illusion that the body is pleasing in any way.

In many texts, the impurity of the body is contemplated in two ways: through an inventory of the parts of one's own living body, all of which are typically described as unclean; and by evoking mental images of a corpse in nine or ten stages of decomposition. Some passages list the body parts; others simply give a number, typically thirty-six. Some passages instruct the meditator to go to the charnel ground to look at corpses, which are described

1 This article began as a presentation together with Elizabeth Kenney at the conference, "From Abhidhamma To Abhidharma," held at Ghent University, July 8-9, 2013. It is much longer and more detailed than the original presentation. The study began as a joint project, and I am grateful to Elizabeth for introducing me to the works of Huiyuan and for helping me to read them. Moreover, she has greatly improved the intelligibility of this article. For their support and advice, I owe thanks to Abe Takako, Anālayo, Florin Deleanu, Dhammajoti, Eric Greene, Keng Ching, Kuo Liying, Lin Qian, Ōtake Susumu, Paul Swanson, and Yamabe Nobuyoshi.

in greater or lesser detail. Other passages do not mention the charnel ground, and in some it seems that the meditator does not have to look at an actual corpse at all.

In addition to describing the meditation, scholastic texts, including abhidharma texts and Mahāyāna *śāstras*, discuss how *aśubhabhāvanā* fits in the scheme of the path to liberation and how it is related to various spiritual attainments. These texts occasionally record doctrinal differences related to the meditation.

A number of texts known as *chanjing* 禪經 (meditation Sutras), generally associated with practitioners belonging to the Sarvāstivāda school (Deleanu 1993, 1-2), are particularly rich sources for accounts of *aśubhabhāvanā*. There are around two dozen *chanjing*, none of which is extant in Sanskrit, and we do not know whether they were composed in India or China or Central Asia. However, as Eric Greene (2006, 13-15), referring to Yamabe (1999), points out, these texts contain features not generally found in Indian texts.

Perhaps the most significant relevant feature of the *chanjing* is the meditation on the “white bones.” Greene (2006) traces the development of the idea that the contemplation of the final stage of the decomposed corpse becomes a meditation on purity. Although there are some intimations of this idea in abhidharma works, particularly *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya* (*Za apitan xin lun* 雜阿毘曇心論 [T1552]), it becomes fully realized only in *chanjing* texts. Greene observes that among fifth-century Chinese *chanjing*, the white bone meditation is explicitly identified with a “pure” meditation, the third of the eight meditations called *vimokṣas* (*beishe* 背捨, *jietuo* 解脫), which immediately follows two meditations on impurity (2006, 95).

The accounts of the white bone meditations in the *chanjing* are noteworthy for their descriptions of light emanating from the bones. Greene mentions a passage in *Nyāyānusāra* (*Apidamo shun zhengli lun* 阿毘達磨順正理論 [T1562]) that contains a “glowing sign of purity,” but he finds no similar feature elsewhere in abhidharma literature (2006, 82-84). In China, however, this feature becomes standard in exegetical texts beginning with *Dazhidulun* 大智度論 (T1509) and including works by Jingying Huiyuan and Zhiyi 智顓 (538-597).

Huiyuan’s sources for *aśubhabhāvanā*

In *Dasheng yizhang*, Huiyuan relies on a wide variety of sources, many of which are major Mahāyāna *sūtras*. However, he also quotes from or refers to *āgamas*, Mahāyāna *śāstras*, and abhidharma texts.² Table 1 includes the important sources mentioned in passages on *aśubhabhāvanā*.

2 For a detailed list of sources, see *Kokuyaku issaikyō* Shoshū bu 13: 365-366.

Table 1. Huiyuan's sources for *aśubhabhāvanā*

<i>Abhidharmavibhāṣā</i> (<i>Apitan piposha lun</i> 阿毘曇毘婆沙論 [T1546] translated in 437 by Buddhavarman) ³
<i>Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya</i> (<i>Za apitan xin lun</i> 雜阿毘曇心論 [T1552] translated in 434 by Saṃghavarman)
<i>Tattvasiddhi</i> (<i>Cheng shi lun</i> 成實論 [T1646] translated in 411-412 by Kumārajīva)
<i>Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa</i> (<i>Dazhidulun</i> 大智度論 [T1509] translated in 402-406 by Kumārajīva)
<i>Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra</i> (<i>Da banniepan jing</i> 大般涅槃經 [T374] translated between 420 and 431 ⁴ by Dharmakṣema)
<i>Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra</i> (<i>Mohe boruo boluomi jing</i> 摩訶般若波羅蜜經 [T223] translated in 404 by Kumārajīva) cited by the short title <i>Dapin jing</i> 小品經
<i>Bodhisattvabhūmi</i> (<i>Pusa dichi jing</i> 菩薩地持經 [T1581] translated between 414 and 421 or in 426 by Dharmakṣema) cited by the short title <i>Dichi jing</i> 地持經 or <i>Dichi</i> 地持

Table 2 indicates the approximate number of times each source is mentioned in passages concerning *aśubhabhāvanā*. Lachaud (2006, 107) points out that Huiyuan's main source for both the five-fold impurity of the body and the nine images of the corpse is *Dazhidulun*, but Table 2 shows that other texts are frequently cited in other passages on impurity. Note especially the frequency of citations to *Tattvasiddhi*.

Table 2. Occurrences in *aśubhabhāvanā* passages

Old <i>Vibhāṣā</i>	3
<i>Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya</i>	4
<i>Tattvasiddhi</i>	12
<i>Dazhidulun</i>	9
<i>Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra</i>	3
<i>Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra</i>	1
<i>Bodhisattvabhūmi</i>	1
Occurrences of the term <i>abhidharma</i> (<i>pitan</i> 毘曇 or <i>apitan</i> 阿毘曇)	14
Occurrences of the term <i>sūtra</i> (<i>jing</i> 經)	6
Occurrences of the term <i>mahāyāna</i> (<i>dacheng</i> 大乘)	7

3 Throughout, I refer to Buddhavarman's translation (*Apitan piposha lun* 阿毘曇毘婆沙論 [T1546]) as "old *Vibhāṣā*" and Xuanzang's translation as "new *Vibhāṣā*" (*Apidamo da piposha* 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 [T1545]).

4 For date, see Blum 2013, xvii.

Notably missing is *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Paramārtha's translation, *Apidamo jushe shilun* 阿毘達磨俱舍釋論 (T1559) could in theory have been available to Huiyuan, since it was translated between 563 and 567 (Hirakawa 1973, i). However, as far as I know, no scholar has suggested that Huiyuan was familiar with it. (Below, I identify a passage that may in fact rely on *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.) Furthermore, Xuanzang's translation of *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, *Apidamo jushe lun* 阿毘達磨俱舍釋論 (T1558), postdates Huiyuan's death by more than fifty years, as do Xuanzang's translations of *Vibhāṣā* (*Apidamo da piposha* 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 [T1545]) and Saṃghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra* (*Apidamo shun zhengli lun* 阿毘達磨順正理論 [T1562]). This is important to keep in mind when considering Huiyuan's use of abhidharma sources.

In addition to Huiyuan's sources, I frequently refer to some works of Huiyuan's near-contemporary, the famous Tiantai monk, Zhiyi. There is no evidence that Huiyuan, from the north of China, ever met Zhiyi, who was from the south, and they do not refer to each other in their works. However, Huiyuan and Zhiyi used the same sources, and Zhiyi wrote at great length on the same aspects of meditation as Huiyuan. Both authors depart from earlier Indian accounts of *aśubhabhāvanā*, Zhiyi perhaps more flamboyantly than the more staid Huiyuan.

Major passages on *aśubhabhāvanā* in *Dasheng yizhang*

I have identified six contexts in which Huiyuan discusses *aśubhabhāvanā* at some length.

- I. The five types of mental stabilization (*wu ting xin* 五停心)
- II. The first three (of eight) liberations (*vimokṣa*, a type or level of meditation)
- III. The nine images of the corpse
- IV. A discussion of charnel grounds in a section on the twelve qualities of an ascetic (*dhūtaguṇa* [toutuo 頭陀])
- V. The reasons why the sixteen superiors (stages of breath meditation, *tesheng* 特勝) are better than *aśubhabhāvanā*
- VI. The characteristics of meditation in a section on the bases of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna* [*nianchu guan* 念處觀, *nianzhu* 念住]) in a longer section on the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment (*bodhipāṅśikas* [*daopin* 道品]).

Below, I provide a translation of each relevant passage, followed by a discussion.

- I. *Aśubhabhāvanā* in a discussion of the five types of mental stabilization

Translation

[Introduction]

Classification of the five types of mental stabilization into four sections: the first explains their names and articulates their characteristics; the second is the differences in the way they counter afflictions; the third is divisions according to the three (roots of) good; the fourth is division according to the stages.⁵

5 五停心義 四門分別 一釋名辨相 二治患不同 三三善分別 四就地分別 (T1851, 697c7-8).

A. [Explanation of names and articulation of the characteristics of the five types]

Consequently, in the first section, we first explain their names and then articulate their characteristics.⁶

1. [The names of the five types]

What are the names? The first is meditation on the impure (*aśubhā*); the second is meditation on compassion (*maitrī*); the third is meditation on conditional arising (*pratīyasamutpāda*); the fourth is an analysis of the elements that comprise the body (*dhātuprabhedā*); the fifth is meditation on inhalation and exhalation (*ānāpānasmṛti*).⁷ In the *sūtra*, these are called the five gates of salvation. They are also called mental stabilization. In the expression “gate of salvation,” “salvation” means “leaving and arriving.” By practicing these five meditations, one can leave behind the five types of *kleśas*, desire, etc., and arrive at *nirvāṇa*. Therefore, it is called “salvation.” And destroying the *kleśas* and crossing over and leaving *samsāra* is also called “salvation.” By means of it, people enter (*nirvāṇa*). Therefore, this is called a “gate.” In the expression “mental stabilization,” stabilization means “calming down and being steadfast.” It is called “mental stabilization” because the practitioner, calming down and abandoning *kleśas* such as desire, etc., is established in the practices of *aśubhā*, etc. The names are like this.⁸

2. [The characteristics of the five types]

What are the characteristics? In brief, there are two types of meditation on the impure: as for the first, becoming disgusted with the body of another, one meditates on another’s impurity; as for the second, becoming disgusted with one’s own body, one meditates on one’s own impurity.⁹

a. [Meditation on the impurity of another]

In meditating on the impurity of another’s body, there are nine images with respect to it: the first is the image of a (new) corpse (*si xiang* 死相¹⁰); the second is the image of a swollen corpse (*vyādhmātakasaṃjñā* [*zhang xiang* 脹相]); the third is the image of a livid corpse (*vinīlakasaṃjñā* [*qingyu xiang* 青瘀相]); the fourth is the image of an oozing corpse (*vipūyakasaṃjñā*

6 就初門中先釋其名。後辨其相 (T1851, 697c9).

7 See *Śrāvakahūmi* 2: 58.8-9 (T1579, 428c18-19). See also *Śrāvakahūmi* 3: 34.17-68.15 (T1579, 452a11-455b8). *Vibhāṣā* mentions the first three: 謂貪無間應常起貪。無時伏貪起不淨觀。若瞋無間應常起瞋。無時伏瞋起慈悲觀。若癡無間應常起癡。無時伏癡起因緣觀 (T1545, 9c14-16).

8 名字是何。一不淨觀。二慈悲觀。三因緣觀。四界分別觀。五安那般那觀。此五經中名五度門。亦曰停心。言度門者。度是出離至到之義。修此五觀能出貪等五種煩惱到涅槃處。故名爲度。又斷煩惱度離生死亦名爲度。通人趣入。因之爲門。言停心者。停是息止安住之義。息離貪等制意住於不淨等法。故曰停心。名字如是 (T1851, 697c9-17). A Japanese commentary by Eiken 英憲, *Kusharon jushoshō* 俱舍論頌疏抄 (T2254), mentions *Dasheng yizhang* in passing, in connection with the five types of mental stabilization (701b15-c19).

9 相狀云何一厭他身。觀他不淨。二厭自身觀自不淨 (T1851, 697c17-18).

10 The image of a new corpse as one of the nine images is not attested in extant Sanskrit texts.

[*nonglan xiang* 膿爛相]); the fifth is the image of a disintegrating corpse (*vipadamakasaṃjñā* [*huai xiang* 壞相]); the sixth is the image of a bloodstained corpse (*vilohitakasaṃjñā* [*xietu xiang* 血塗相]); the seventh is the image of a corpse eaten by worms (*vikhādikasaṃjñā* [*chonggan xiang* 虫噉相]);¹¹ the eighth is the image of a skeleton (*asthisamjñā* [*guosuo xiang* 骨鎖相]);¹² the ninth is the image of scattered bones (probably *vikṣiptakasaṃjñā* [*lihuai xiang* 離壞相]).¹³ In *Dazhidulun*, another is added, (namely,) the image of a burnt corpse (*vidagdhakasaṃjñā* [*shao xiang* 燒相]), (while) the image of a (new) corpse is lacking. The meanings of these are all fully distinguished later, in the chapter on the nine images.¹⁴

b. [Meditation on one's own body]

Five (types of) impurity are included in meditation on one's own body. As *Dazhidulun* says:¹⁵

The first is impurity of seed. This body has past afflicted karma as its seed. In the present (existence), it has the semen and blood of the father and mother as its seed.¹⁶

The second is impurity of dwelling place. Inside the mother's womb, one is established between two environments, below the stomach and above the intestines.¹⁷

The third is impurity of characteristics. This body has a constant flow from nine holes. Eyes emit secretions and tears. Ears emit balled-up earwax. The interior of the nose emits mucus. The mouth emits vomit. Excrement and urine flow out from the anus and urethra.¹⁸

The fourth is impurity of the nature (of the body). This body is endowed with thirty-six things from which it is compounded. As *Dazhidulun* says: 1. head hair, 2. body hair, 3. nails, 4. teeth, 5. skin, 6. flesh, 7. bones, 8.

11 Here I accept the Taishō alternate reading instead of *gan* 敢.

12 Found also in a longer list of *saṃjñās* in *Chan yao jing* (T609, 238a22).

13 Here, Huiyuan uses *lihuai* 離壞 instead of *fensan* 分散, which is found in the later section on the nine images (see Section III).

14 觀他身中有其九相。一者死相。二者脹相。三青瘀相。四膿爛相。五者壞相。六者血塗相。七虫噉相。八骨鎖相。九離壞相。大智論中加一燒相少一死相。此義如後九相章中具廣分別 (T1851, 697c18-22).

15 觀自身中有五不淨。如大智論說 (T1851, 697c22-23).

16 一種子不淨。是身過去結業爲種。現以父母精血爲種 (T1851, 697c23-24). See *Dazhidulun*: 是名生處不淨。種子不淨者。父母以妄想邪憶念風吹淫欲火故。血髓膏流熱變爲精。宿業行因緣識種子。在赤白精中住。是名身種子。如說 是身種不淨 非餘妙寶物 不由淨白生 但從尿道出是名種子不淨 (T1509, 199a2-8; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1153-1154).

17 二住處不淨。在母胎中生藏之下熟藏之上兩界之間安置己體 (T1851, 697c24-26). See *Dazhidulun*: 云何名生處不淨。頭足腹脊脇肋。諸不淨物和合名爲女身。內有生藏熟藏屎尿不淨。外有煩惱業因緣風。吹識種令入二藏中間。若八月若九月如在屎尿坑中。如說是身爲臭穢 不從花間生 亦不從瞻蔔 又不出寶山是名生處不淨 (T1509, 198c24-199a2; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1151-53).

18 三自相不淨。是身具有九孔常流。眼出眵淚。耳出結聾。鼻中出洩。口出涎吐。大小便道流出屎尿 (T1851, 697c26-28). See *Dazhidulun*: 自相不淨者。是身九孔常流不淨。眼流眵淚耳出結聾鼻中涕流口出涎吐。尿道水道常出屎尿。及諸毛孔汗流不淨。如說種種不淨物 充滿於身內 常流出不止 如漏囊盛物是名自相不淨 (T1509, 199a15-21; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1154-55).

marrow, 9. tendons, 10. veins, 11. spleen,¹⁹ 12. kidneys, 13. heart, 14. liver, 15. lungs, 16. large intestine, 17. small intestine, 18. stomach, 19. bladder, 20. excrement, 21. urine, 22. secretions, 23. sweat, 24. tears, 25. balled-up earwax, 26. mucus, 27. saliva, 28. pus, 29. blood, 30. bile, 31. phlegm,²⁰ 32. fat, 33. fat in the bones,²¹ 34. brains, 35. membrane, 36. seed.²²

In this section,²³ only two types are important: first, meditation on the skin, etc.; second, meditation on the white bones with the skin and flesh removed.²⁴

There are three meditations on the bones. As abhidharma says:²⁵

First, the beginner (*ādikarmika*) considers his own body in detail from head to foot. He removes the skin and flesh and produces an image of his bones.²⁶

Second, the one who has done intensive cultivation considers his skeleton, gradually extending it to entirely fill the whole earth. And he considers his bones in order: a large wind blows and turns them into masses of snow. Cultivating the image of these bones very much makes him fully matured, and, without his thinking, (the image) is realized effortlessly.²⁷

Third, the one with surpassing concentration gradually reduces that skeleton and returns to his own body. Pure and calm regarding that object, he sees only one color. This is the fourth (impurity), impurity of the nature (of the body).²⁸

The fifth (impurity) is final impurity. This body, once it dies, (if) it is buried, becomes earth. Worms eat it, and it becomes excrement. (If) it is

19 The Taishō text mistakenly reads *pai* 牌 for *pi* 脾.

20 For various Chinese names for the *doṣas*, bile and phlegm, see Salguero 2010-11, 63-66.

21 The Taishō text reads *tan* 脂, “spoiled skin flesh.” However, in Zhiyan’s *Huayan kongmu zhang* 華嚴孔目章 (T1870, 573c22), *san* 脂 appears in the same context, as it does in *Mohe zhiguan* 摩訶止觀 (T1911, 93b20), where Lachaud understands it to mean “marrow” (2006, 115). On this basis, I emend *tan* to *san*. According to *Hanyu dacidian*, *fang* 肪 is fat located in the spine, while *san* is fat located in the bones (2: 3905). For information on the various forms of fat, see Das 2003, 570-571.

22 四自體不淨。是身具有三十六物所共合成。如大智論說。一髮。二毛。三爪。四齒。五皮。六肉。七骨。八髓。九筋。十脈。十一脾。十二腎。十三心。十四肝。十五肺。十六大腸。十七小腸。十八胃。十九胞。二十屎。二十一尿。二十二垢。二十三汗。二十四淚。二十五結疔。二十六漬。二十七唾。二十八膿。二十九血。三十黃陰。三十一白陰。三十二肪。三十三。三十四腦。三十五膜。三十六精 (T1851, 697c28-698a8).

23 The “section” to which Huiyuan is referring must be the first section of the discussion of the five types of mental stabilization, the explanation of names and the articulation of characteristics. However, it is not clear why he inserts this digression at this point. The remainder of this sentence seems to be based on a passage from *Dazhidulun* at the end of its discussion of the first victorious base (*abhibhāvāyatana*): 不淨觀有二種。一者三十六物等種種不淨。二者除內外皮肉五藏。但觀白骨如珂如雪 (T1509, 216b1-3, Lamotte 1970, 3: 1302).

24 於此門中要唯二種。一皮等觀。二除去皮肉為白骨觀 (T1851, 698a8-9).

25 骨觀有三。如毘曇說 (T1851, 698a9).

26 一者始業觀察自身。從頭至足除去皮肉作其骨相 (T1851, 698a9-11).

27 二已習行觀彼骨鎖。以漸寬廣周滿大地。又觀彼骨展轉相對大風飄搏變為雪聚。修此骨相極令純熟不作心想任運現前 (T1851, 698a11-13).

28 三思惟已度於彼骨鎖。以漸略之還至自身。於其所緣清淨寂靜唯觀一色。此是第四自體不淨 (T1851, 698a13-16).

burned by fire, it becomes ashes. Finally, (if) one investigates it, (one finds that) it has not even a single pure characteristic. This is called final impurity.²⁹

B. [*Aśubhabhāvanā* as an antidote to desire]

Next we explain the differences among the five salvific antidotes to afflictions. As the sutra says, “Beings who have much desire should be taught about and meditate on *aśubhā*.” There are five types of desire, and their antidotes are all different. What are the five desires?³⁰

The first is desire for *varṇa*, the love between men and women. *Aśubhabhāvanā* is its antidote.³¹

The second is desire for one’s relatives. This is also called excessive³² desire. Sympathizing with kinsmen is called “desire for one’s relatives.” Not ceasing from continually thinking about (one’s relatives) with affection and mutual love is called excessive desire, just like calling a many-day rain “excessive rain” or like calling a many-day wind “excessive wind.” It is not the same as the wicked indulgence of ordinary people that is called “excess.” This excessive desire has the *apramāṇa*, *upekṣā* (an “immeasurable” mental state of indifference), as an antidote. Therefore, *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya*³³ says that the *apramāṇa*, *upekṣā*, counters excessive love.³⁴

The third is desire for possessions, being stingy regarding one’s possessions. *Dānapāramitā* is the antidote.³⁵

The fourth is desire for fame, seeking good renown. (Meditation on) the emptiness of the self is the antidote.³⁶

The fifth is desire for good *dharmas*, attachment to good *dharmas*. (Meditation on) the emptiness of *dharmas* is the antidote.³⁷

Now, we explain here only the antidote to desire for *varṇa* as the first gate to salvation. Emphasizing this (desire for *varṇa*), since it is the basis of rebirth, we explain it alone. There are two types of desire for *varṇa*.³⁸

29 五終竟不淨。此身死已埋則成土。虫噉成糞。火燒成灰。究竟推求無一淨相。名終竟不淨 (T1851, 698a16-18).

30 次明五度治患不同。如經中說。多貪衆生教觀不淨。貪有五種。對治各異。何者五貪 (T1851, 698b18-20).

31 一者色貪。男女相愛。以不淨觀而爲對治 (T1851, 698b20-21).

32 *Yin tan* 姪貪 is a translation of *maithunarāga* (see T1588, 150b26-27; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 452.8, where it refers to desire for sex). As I point out in my discussion, Huiyuan here is trying to make sense of the very peculiar statement in *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya*. A homonym of 姪, 淫, also used to translate *maithuna*, can mean “excessive” as well as “a long rainfall,” hence Huiyuan’s explanation and my translation.

33 問捨是貪欲對治。不淨觀亦貪欲對治。何貪以捨對治。何貪以不淨觀對治耶。答色貪以不淨觀對治。姪貪以捨對治 (T1552, 925c27-926a1; Dessein 1999, 1: 453).

34 二親戚貪。亦名姪貪。眷屬相憐名親戚貪。親情相愛尋續不斷名爲姪貪。如多日兩名爲姪雨。多日之風名曰姪風。此亦如是。不同世人姪逸名姪。此之姪貪捨無量心而爲對治。故雜心云。捨無量心對治姪貪 (T1851, 698b21-25). Huiyuan has already explained this in the section on the four *apramāṇas* (T1851, 686b14-22).

35 三者財貪。恪惜身財。檀度爲治 (T1851, 698b26).

36 四名聞貪。求善稱譽。身空爲治 (T1851, 698b26-27).

37 五善法貪。愛著善法。法空爲治 (T1851, 698b27-28).

38 今此偏說色貪對治爲初度門。以此過重受生根本故偏說之。色貪有二 (T1851, 698b28-29).

The first is attachment to one's own body. Meditating on the five (types of) impurity is the antidote.³⁹

The second is attachment to the body of another. The nine images are the remedy. Attachment to the body of another consists of four types of desire: the first is desire for conduct; the second is desire for color;⁴⁰ the third is desire for body parts; the fourth is desire for softness.⁴¹

Desire for conduct is countered by the image of a dead person.⁴²

The second, (desire for) color, is countered by (the images of) livid, oozing, and bloodstained (corpses).⁴³

Desire for body parts is countered by (the images of) swollen, disintegrating, worm-eaten (corpses), and scattered (bones).⁴⁴

Desire for softness is countered by (the image of) a skeleton.⁴⁵

Question: The nine images can counter desire. What is the difference (between them) and those antidotes of the ten notions? The explanation is that the nine images can only impede desire, while the ten notions can destroy it. The nine images can suppress it like binding a thief, while the ten notions can destroy it, like killing a thief. The difference is like that. Afterward, the meaning of the ten notions will be discussed separately.⁴⁶

Discussion

The first of Huiyuan's long explanations of *aśubhabhāvanā* is found in his entry on the five types of mental stabilization. The *Kokuyaku issaikyō* translation refers to *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (*Pusa dichī jing* 菩薩地持經)⁴⁷ and

39 一愛自身。觀五不淨而為對治 (T1851, 698b29-c1).

40 *Xing se* 形色 usually translates *saṃsthāna*, "shape," but the context makes it clear that here it is translating *varṇa*. Hirakawa suggests that *xing se* sometimes translates *varṇa* but provides no citations (1997, 439).

41 二愛他身。九相為治。愛他身中有四種欲。一威儀欲。二形色欲。三處所欲。四細觸欲 (T1851, 698c1-3). For a more detailed explanation of the four types of desire, see my translation of the section on meditation on the nine images.

42 威儀欲者。死相為治 (T1851, 698c3-4).

43 第二形色青淤膿爛血塗為治 (T1851, 698c4).

44 處所欲者脹壞虫食分散為治 (T1851, 698c4-5).

45 細觸欲者骨鎖為治 (T1851, 698c5). For a similar passage, see *Dazhidulun*: 死相多除威儀語言愛。臆脹相壞相噉相散相多除形容愛。血塗相青瘀相膿爛相。多除色愛。骨相燒相多除細滑愛。九相除雜愛及所著人愛。噉相散相骨相偏除人愛 (T1509, 218a24-28; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1323-1324). Note that here *Dazhidulun* includes *si xiang* as one of the images.

46 問曰。九相能治貪欲。與彼十相對治何別。釋言。九相但能遮伏。十相能滅。九相能伏如似縛賊。十相能滅如似殺。賊差別如是。十相之義後當別論 (T1851, 698c5-9).

47 五者隨其所應種種度門。而度脫之。所謂不淨慈心。緣起界分別。安那般那念。是名隨應度門而度脫之 (T1581, 905b21-24). See also *Bodhisattvabhūmi*: [*evaṃ te*] *tathāgatājñānaviśuddhisamādhiḥ* *gotrāc cittaṣyaikāgratā pratilabdā bhaviṣyati* / *sa tvaṃ saced aśubhāṃ manasikaroṣi enaṃ manasikāraṃ mā rñciṣyasi* / *sacen mairīm idaṃpratyayatāpratītyasamutpādaṃ dhātuprabhedam ānāpānasmṛtiṃ prathamam dhyānam vistareṇa yāvan naivasamjñānāsamjñāya* [*ta*] *nam apramānabodhisattva dhyānābhijñāsamādhisamāpatīr manasikaroṣi* / (273.18-22); 汝若如是。當依如來妙智清淨等持種性。獲得無倒心一境性。如是汝等若於不淨作意思惟。於此作意勿當捨離。若於慈愍。若於緣性緣起。若於界差別。若於阿那波那念。若於初靜慮。廣說乃至若於非想非非想處無量菩薩靜慮神通等持等至。作意思惟 (T1579, 572a8-13).

*Śrāvakabhūmi*⁴⁸ for these five (*Kokuyaku issaikyō* Shoshū-bu 12: 84). Ōminami discusses the origin and development of the category *wu ting xin* in depth. He locates a prototype in Aśvaghōṣa's *Saundarananda* and in abhidharma texts, specifically mentioning *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya*, but notes that none of these works either includes an expression equivalent to *wu ting xin* or explicitly mentions five types. Ōminami thinks that the category became fixed in Yogācāra texts such as *Pusa dīchi jīng* and *Yogācārabhūmi*⁴⁹ and that the five types came to be designated by the term *wu men chan* 五門禪 in the *chanjīng*. According to him, it was Chinese authors such as Huiyuan who began to use the expression *wu ting xin* (Ōminami 1977, 87). However, *Wumen chanjīng yaoyong fa* 五門禪經要用法 (T619) substitutes calling the Buddha to mind (*nianfo guan* 念佛觀) for contemplation on the *dhātus* (*jie fenbie guan* 界分別觀),⁵⁰ as does another *chanjīng*, *Zuochan sanmei jīng* 坐禪三昧經 (T614).⁵¹ Clearly, Huiyuan does not follow the *chanjīng* here, and it is quite possible that *Pusa dīchi jīng* is his source since he frequently quotes from it throughout *Dasheng yizhang*.

Of particular interest is Huiyuan's explanation of the characteristics of the meditation, which constitutes the first part of his section on the five types of mental stabilization.

A. Two types of meditation on the impure

Huiyuan begins by explaining that there are two types of meditation on the impure: becoming disgusted with the impurity of others (他不淨) and becoming disgusted with one's own impurity (自不淨). Greene states that this division is standard in the *chanjīng*⁵² and mentions that it also occurs in *Śrāvakabhūmi*⁵³ (2012, 174). Abhidharma texts, such as *Vibhāṣā* and *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* do not explicitly divide *aśubhā* into two types. They generally consider meditation on the body (*kāyagatāsmṛti*, *shen nian* 身念) separately from meditation on corpses.

48 *tatra caritaviśōdhanam ālambanaṃ katamat / tadyathā, aśubhā, maitrī. idaṃpratyayaṭāprāṭīty asamutpādaḥ, dhātuprabhedah, ānāpānasmrīṣ ca ||* (*Śrāvakabhūmi* 2: 58.8-9); 云何名為淨行所緣。謂不淨慈愍緣性緣起界差別。阿那波那念等所緣差別 (T1579, 428c18-19).

49 According to Abe (2015, 56), a number of *chanjīng* are, in fact, the earliest texts in which the five types are found in the same form as in *Śrāvakabhūmi*.

50 坐禪之要法有五門。一者安般。二不淨。三慈心。四觀緣。五念佛 (T619, 325c11-12). See Mochizuki 1973, 2: 1258-1259; Dhammajoti 2009a, 443.

51 若多婬欲人不淨法門治。若多瞋恚人慈心法門治。若多愚癡人思惟觀因緣法門治。若多思覺人念息法門治。若多等分人念佛法門治 (T614, 271c2-8). See Yamabe and Sueki, 2009, 10; Yamabe 2009, 56. See Ōminami 1977, 94; Greene 2012, 44-45 for remarks on the significance of the replacement of *jie fenbie guan* by *nianfo guan*.

52 For example, see *Zuochan sanmei jīng* 坐禪三昧經 (T614, 271c7-12; Yamabe and Sueki, 2009, 10-11).

53 *Śrāvakabhūmi* 2: 58-61.

1. Meditation on the impurity of others

According to Huiyuan,⁵⁴ meditation on the impurity of others consists of contemplating the nine images: 1. the image of a dead person;⁵⁵ 2. the image of a swollen corpse (*vyādhmātakasaṃjñā*); 3. the image of a livid corpse (*vinīlakasaṃjñā*); 4. the image of an oozing corpse (*vipūyakasaṃjñā*); 5. the image of a disintegrating corpse (*vipadumakasaṃjñā*); 6. the image of a bloodstained corpse (*vilohitakasaṃjñā*); 7. the image of a corpse chewed by worms (*vikhādikasaṃjñā*);⁵⁶ 8. the image of a skeleton (*asthisamjñā*);⁵⁷ 9. the image of dispersed (bones) (*vikṣiptakasaṃjñā*).⁵⁸ After listing the images and noting that his list differs from *Dazhidulun*, Huiyuan refers to a fuller explanation that will be found in his chapter on the nine images. I discuss the subject further when I come to that section.

2. Meditation on one's own body—five types of impurity

In contrast to the brevity of explanation of the nine images here, Huiyuan takes this occasion to discuss in detail meditation on one's own body. He refers to *Dazhidulun* in defining five types of impurity (T1851, 697c22-698b12), but in fact the order of his list differs somewhat from *Dazhidulun* (T1509, 198c22-199a28; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1151-1155).

Table 3. Five types of impurity in *Dasheng yizhang* and *Dazhidulun*

	<i>Dasheng yizhang</i>	<i>Dazhidulun</i>
1	impurity of seed (種子不淨)	impurity of birth place (生處不淨)
2	impurity of dwelling place (住處不淨)	impurity of seed (種子不淨)
3	impurity of characteristics (自相不淨)	impurity of the nature (of the body) (自性不淨)
4	impurity of the nature (of the body) (自體不淨)	impurity of characteristics (自相不淨)
5	final impurity (終竟不淨)	final impurity (究竟不淨)

54 一厭他身觀他不淨。二厭自身觀自不淨。觀他身中有其九相。一者死相。二者脹相。三青瘀相。四膿爛相。五者壞相。六者血塗相。七虫敢相。八骨鎖相。九離壞相 (T1851, 697c18-21).

55 Lachaud translates *si xiang* 死想 as *la notion de mort*. However, this seems to be a confusion with the same phrase as it appears as a translation of *marāṇasaṃjñā* in the list of ten notions, e.g., impermanence (*anityatā*), suffering (*duḥkha*), etc., all of which are more abstract than the focus on a dead body. *Si* can translate *mṛta* (dead) as well as *marāṇa* (death). In the context of the nine images, whether or not *si xiang* is included on the list itself, I translate *si xiang* as “the image of a dead person.” For other references to the dead person as one of the images, see my discussion of the meditation on the nine images.

56 I accept the Taishō alternate reading 噉 for 敢.

57 Found also in a longer list of *saṃjñās* in *Chan yao jing* (T609, 238a22).

58 Or so I assume; the Chinese characters, 離壞, are different from those in Huiyuan's later section on the nine images, namely 分散.

Lachaud rightly stresses that Huiyuan follows *Dazhidulun* very closely but translates some Sanskrit terms differently (2006, 107-108). However, Lachaud does not comment on the difference in the order of the lists. Nor does he mention a rather long digression at the end of Huiyuan's discussion of impurity of the body.

Regarding the difference in order, a possible explanation is that Huiyuan rearranged the *Dazhidulun* list to correspond better chronologically with the stages of life: impurity of seed concerns the moments immediately before and after conception, while impurity of dwelling place refers to the fetal environment. However, this does not explain why Huiyuan reverses the order of impurity of characteristics and impurity of the nature of the body. Zhiyi in *Mohe zhiguan* 摩訶止觀 explains the impurities in the same order as Huiyuan (T1911, 93b8-28; Lachaud 2006, 114).⁵⁹

I have found no similar list of five types of impurity in sources earlier than *Dazhidulun*, but Harivarman explains both the impurity of seed and the impurity of birth place in *Tattvasiddhi*. They are mentioned near the beginning of an answer to the question, "How does one practice the meditation on impurity?" In his extended answer, Harivarman also describes what *Dazhidulun* and *Dasheng yizhang* refer to as impurity of characteristics (T1646, 349c4-350a9).

Below, Huiyuan's explanations of the individual types are discussed in relation to his source, *Dazhidulun*, and to a corresponding passage in *Mohe zhiguan*.

a. **Impurity of seed.** Huiyuan simply says this body has past afflicted karma as its seed. In the present (existence), it has the semen and blood of the father and mother as its seed.⁶⁰ *Dazhidulun* explains in more detail, describing how the semen is produced, and then says that the seed of consciousness (*viññānabīja*), caused by past karma, attaches itself to the semen and blood, where (the mixture) is called the seed of the body. A verse⁶¹ then states that it is impure.⁶² Zhiyi similarly describes the moment of the entrance of consciousness into the new mixture of semen and blood.⁶³ Huiyuan omits the important technical term, *viññānabīja*, and, as we have seen, he moves impurity of seed to the beginning of this list. Otherwise, his passage essentially agrees with *Dazhidulun*.

59 Lachaud also translates the parallel section in an earlier work of Zhiyi, *Cidi chanmen* (次第禪門=*Shichan boluomi cidi famen* 釋禪波羅蜜次第法門 [T1916]), in which the order is different from all of the texts mentioned above (2006, 111).

60 一種子不淨。是身過去結業為種。現以父母精血為種 (T1851, 697c23-24).

61 Unlike Huiyuan, *Dazhidulun* ends the explanation of each type of impurity with a verse.

62 種子不淨者。父母以妄想邪憶念風吹煙欲火故。血髓膏流熱變為精。宿業行因緣識種子。在赤白精中住。是名身種子。如說 是身種不淨 非餘妙寶物 不由淨白生 但從尿道出是名種子不淨 (T1509, 199a2-8; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1153-1154).

63 Zhiyi seems to use 託識 as a translation for *pratisamdhivijñāna*: 所謂是身攬他遺體。吐淚赤白二滯和合。託識其中以為體質 (T1911, 93b9-11; Lachaud 2006, 114).

b. **Impurity of dwelling place.** Huiyuan says that, inside the mother's womb, the fetus is established between two environments, below the stomach and above the intestines.⁶⁴ *Dazhidulun* again explains in more detail, stating that the female body is a combination of various impure parts. Again, it mentions *vijñānabīja*, which is blown by a karmically caused, defiled wind into the space between the stomach and the intestines, where it dwells for eight or nine months in a pit of feces and urine.⁶⁵ Zhiyi also describes the dwelling place of the fetus in more detail than Huiyuan, but unlike *Dazhidulun*, he does not explicitly equate the female body with the impure body parts, and he does not mention *vijñānabīja* or karmic winds. He refers to *Dazhidulun*, paraphrasing a portion of a verse that *Dazhidulun* quotes in its explanation of impurity of seed.⁶⁶

We have seen that the term that Huiyuan uses for this type of impurity, “impurity of dwelling place” (*zhuchu bujing* 住處不淨), is different from the term in *Dazhidulun*, “impurity of birthplace” (*shengchu bujing* 生處不淨). In *Mohe zhiguan*, Zhiyi agrees with Huiyuan, but in *Cidi famen*, he uses the same term as *Dazhidulun* (Lachaud 2006, 114). The definitions of impurity of birth place and impurity of dwelling place are the same, although it seems unlikely that 住處 and 生處 could be translations of the same Sanskrit word. It is possible that the original Sanskrit was indeed *upapattisthāna*, “birthplace,”⁶⁷ especially since 生處 occurs in *Tattvasiddhi*, a work translated by Kumārajīva, who was also responsible for the Chinese text of *Dazhidulun*.⁶⁸ Huiyuan and Zhiyi, on the other hand, may have decided to use a term that they considered more appropriate in light of the definition.

A striking difference between Huiyuan's brief definition and the longer discussion in *Dazhidulun* is that *Dazhidulun* stresses the impurity of the female body. Lachaud makes much of this passage, which is a good illustration of the association between meditation on the impure and the female body that is the focus of his book (2006, 103-104). Huiyuan, however, does not call the female body “a name for the collection of impure things” and does not mention excrement and urine. It may well be true, as Lachaud suggests, that Huiyuan does not go into more detail because *Dasheng yizhang* is like a *dictionnaire* (2006, 108). But it may also reflect a difference between Huiyuan's own attitudes and those of the author of *Dazhidulun*.

64 住處不淨。在母胎中生藏之下熟藏之上兩界之間安置己體 (T1851, 697c25-26).

65 云何名生處不淨。頭足腹脊脇肋。諸不淨物和合名為女身。內有生藏熟藏屎尿不淨。外有煩惱業因緣風。吹識種令入二藏中間。若八月若九月如在屎尿坑中。如說是身為臭穢不從花間生亦不從瞻蔔又不出寶山是名生處不淨 (T1509, 198c24-199a2; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1151-53).

66 居二藏間穢濁澆潤。乍懸。乍壓或熱或冷。七日一變十月懷抱。若六胎成就形相具足。日月已滿。轉向產門。大論云。此身非化生亦非蓮華生。但從尿道出。此處卑穢底中斷惡。是名住處不淨 (T1911, 93b11-15; Lachaud 2006, 114).

67 Lamotte reconstructs it as *jānisthāna* (1970, 3: 1151).

68 However, it must be noted that *Dazhidulun* was translated between 402 and 406, earlier than *Tattvasiddhi* (411-412). For dates, see Lancaster 1979, 181, 346.

c. **Impurity of characteristics.** Huiyuan says, “This body has a constant flow from nine holes. Eyes emit secretions and tears. Ears emit balled-up earwax. The interior of the nose emits mucus. The mouth emits vomit. Excrement and urine flow out from the anus and urethra.”⁶⁹ Again, Huiyuan changes the order: in *Dazhidulun*, impurity of characteristics comes after impurity of the nature of the body. Otherwise, Huiyuan follows *Dazhidulun* very closely.⁷⁰

Here, Zhiyi, who adopts the same order as Huiyuan, gives more, and more lurid, details than either Huiyuan or *Dazhidulun*. First, he mentions that the fetus, before being born, sleeps lying in filth and that breast-feeding causes the infant to grow. Then he mentions the ears stuffed up with earwax, the eyes emitting secretions and tears, the nostrils dripping pus, the mouth always having bad breath. This is followed by a description of the head as being fouled as though by a thin layer of excrement-soil. Then he mentions the sour sweat of the thighs and armpits, as though they are dripping with urine, and the clothes plastered to the body, just like being smeared with oil. Zhiyi does not invoke the trope of “constant flow from nine holes.”⁷¹

d. **Impurity of the nature of the body.** Huiyuan says, “This body is endowed with thirty-six items from which it is compounded.” (These items include body parts and body fluids.) Then, referring to *Dazhidulun*, he lists the thirty-six, each item preceded by its number.⁷² In fact, *Dazhidulun* does not contain a similar list of thirty-six components of the body. However, in several places it does mention thirty-six items, most pertinently in its account of the victorious bases (*abhibhvāyatanas*), where it distinguishes two types of *aśubhabhāvanā*, on the thirty-six impure items and on the white bones. According to *Dazhidulun*, the meditation on the thirty-six things is “ugly,” while the meditation on the bones, white like a conch or like snow, is “beautiful.”⁷³ Although lists of thirty-six body parts are common, the only one that I can find that is almost identical to Huiyuan’s (only one item disagrees) is in *Huayan kongmu zhang* 華嚴孔目章 (T1870, 573c15-23)

69 三自相不淨。是身具有九孔常流。眼出眵淚。耳出結聾。鼻中出涕。口出延吐。大小便道流出屎尿 (T1851, 697c26-28).

70 自相不淨者。是身九孔常流不淨。眼流眵淚耳出結聾鼻中涕流口出涎吐。廁道水道常出屎尿。及諸毛孔汗流不淨。如說種種不淨物充滿於身內常流出不止如漏囊盛物是名自相不淨 (T1509, 199a15-21; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1154-55).

71 既生出已眠臥糞穢。乳哺將養自小之大。耳貯結聾眼流眵淚。鼻孔垂膿口氣常臭。頭垢重香如薄糞泥。髀腋酸汗如淋尿灑。衣服著體即如油漆。是名自相不淨 (T1911, 493b15-19; Lachaud 2006, 114-115).

72 四自體不淨。是身具有三十六物所共合成。如大智論說。一髮。二毛。三爪。四齒。五皮。六肉。七骨。八髓。九筋。十脈。十一脾。十二腎。十三心。十四肝。十五肺。十六大腸。十七小腸。十八胃。十九胞。二十屎。二十一尿。二十二垢。二十三汗。二十四淚。二十五結。二十六涕。二十七唾。二十八膿。二十九血。三十黃陰。三十一白陰。三十二肪。三十三脂。三十四腦。三十五膜。三十六精 (T1851, 697c28-698a8).

73 不淨觀有二種。一者三十六物等種種不淨。二者除內外皮肉五藏。但觀白骨如珂如雪。三十六物等觀是名醜。如珂如雪觀是名好 (T1509, 216b1-4; Lamotte 1973, 3: 1302).

by Zhiyan 智儼 (a notable Huayan monk, 602-668).⁷⁴ Zhiyi also includes a similar list of body parts and body fluids, but he does not number them.⁷⁵ After this, Zhiyi says something to the effect that washing with all the water in the seas cannot make the body pure.⁷⁶ This same statement is found in a verse in *Dazhidulun* that concludes its definition of impurity of the nature of the body.⁷⁷ Zhiyi does not give his source here. However, he then states, “*Dazhidulun* says that this body is not like Malaya Mountain, which can produce sandalwood. From (when it is) young to (when it is) grown-up, its nature is impure, just as any amount of excrement stinks.”⁷⁸ I can find no such statement in the section of *Dazhidulun* on the five impurities, but it would not look out of place in the verses included there.

At the end of his enumeration of thirty-six body parts, Huiyuan says, “In this aspect, only two types are important: meditation on the skin, etc., and meditation on the white bones with the skin and flesh removed.”⁷⁹ This resembles the statement in the *Dazhidulun* section on the *abhibhvāyatanas* referred to above, although Huiyuan does not mention the (white) conch or the snow and does not call the meditation on the thirty-six things “ugly” or the meditation on the bare bones “beautiful.”

At this point, Huiyuan inserts a discussion of three levels of meditation that is not found in *Dazhidulun*. He states that there are three meditations on the bones and refers to abhidharma. (The *Kokuyaku issaikyō* translator locates the passage in *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*.)⁸⁰

As we have seen, Huiyuan paraphrases this passage. Greene translates and discusses the passage from *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, showing that the meditation technique it describes differs from the standard Sarvāstivāda description in *Vibhāṣā*. He draws attention to the image of the wind turning the bones into masses of snow.⁸¹ Greene emphasizes the importance of the “flesh-stripping method,” first found in *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, and

74 Item 24 in *Huayan kongmu zhang* is 膽, liver or bile. In *Dasheng yizhang* it is 淚, tears.

75 其中唯有尿尿之聚膿聚血聚膏髓等聚。大腸小腸肪 腦膜。筋纏血塗惡露臭處蟲戶所集 (T1911, 93b19-21; Lachaud 2006, 115).

76 盡海水洗不能令淨 (T1911, 93b21-22; Lachaud 2006, 115).

77 地水火風質 能變除不淨傾海洗此身 不能令香潔 (T1509, 199a4; Lamotte 1973, 3: 1154).

78 論云。此身不如摩羅延山能出旃檀。自小至大性是不淨。譬如糞穢多少俱臭 (T1911, 93b22-24; Lachaud 2006, 115).

79 於此門中要唯二種。一皮等觀。二除去皮肉為白骨觀 (T1851, 698a8-9).

80 *Kokuyaku issaikyō* Shoshū bu 12: 85 n. 22. The passage from *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* reads as follows: 復次不淨觀亦三種修行。謂從足指起乃至頂。除去皮肉肉意解思惟。是名始業。於此骨瑣不作想生周遍大地。又觀骨瑣不作想。彼骨瑣展轉相對大風飄搏消為雪聚。是名已習行。略觀骨瑣還至自身。於其所緣清淨寂靜唯觀一色。是名思惟已度 (T1552, 908a1-7).

81 Greene translates 雪聚 as “a pile of [dust like] snow” and refers to it in his discussion as “a pile of white dust.” But the image of a heap of dust and the image of masses of snow are quite different. As we have seen, *Dazhidulun*, at least, considers snow to be “beautiful.”

its connection to the techniques described in the *chanjing*. In addition, the whiteness of the snow in the *Samyuktābhīdharmahr̥daya* passage might be a precursor of the white bones meditations in the *chanjing*.

By inserting a discussion of the three meditations on the bones at the end of his explanation of the fourth type of impurity, Huiyuan shows an awareness of the pivotal function of the white bones stressed by Greene. *Dazhidulun*, in its discussion of the five types of impurity, does not mention the three types of meditation on the bones. However, Huiyuan, as indicated by his statement regarding the significance of two types of meditation, seems to emphasize the importance of the white bones. This seems to be his reason for paraphrasing the passage from *Samyuktābhīdharmahr̥daya*, the only abhidharma text that describes how the bones in the vision turn into snow.

e. **Final impurity.** Huiyuan says, “This body, once it dies, (if) it is buried, becomes earth. (If) worms eat it, it becomes excrement. (If) it is burned by fire, it becomes ashes. Finally, (if) one investigates it, it has not even a single pure characteristic. This is called final impurity.”⁸² *Dazhidulun* lists what can happen to the corpse in a different order, and it provides one more possibility: if the body is placed in the water, it becomes swollen and rotten, or it is eaten by water insects.⁸³ Again, Zhiyi is more dramatic. Unlike *Dazhidulun* and Huiyuan, he begins his description of final impurity by describing the dissolution of the body into the four elements: “Once someone dies, that which was borrowed returns to its origin. Air departs; fire becomes cold; earth dissolves; water flows away. Worms eat it; birds peck at it; head and arms are separated; it overflows. For three to five *li*, one can smell the stink against the wind. The disgusting evil smell forces its way into people’s nasal breathing. The evil black color stains people’s eyeballs. It is pungent like a dead dog. This is called ‘final impurity.’”⁸⁴

B. *Aśubhabhāvanā* as an antidote to desire

In his explanation of the antidotes for the first two of five types of desire, Huiyuan refers to a passage in *Samyuktābhīdharmahr̥daya* on the *apramāṇas* (immeasurables) that states that *aśubhā* is the antidote for desire for *varṇa* (here equivalent to objects of perception), while *upekṣā* (indifference) *apramāṇa* is the antidote for *maithuna* (connection, usually in the sense of

82 五終竟不淨。此身死已埋則成土。虫噉成糞。火燒成灰。究竟推求無一淨相。名終竟不淨 (T1851, 698a16-18).

83 究竟不淨者。是身若投火則為灰。若虫食則為屎。在地則腐壞為土。在水則臃脹爛壞。或為水虫所食。一切死屍中人身最不淨。不淨法九相中當廣說。如說 審諦觀此身終必歸死處 難御無反復 背恩如小人是名究竟不淨 (T1509, 199a21-28; Lamotte 1973, 3: 1155).

84 一旦命終假借還本。風去火冷地壞水流。蟲噉鳥啄頭手分離盈流於外。三五里間逆風聞臭。惡氣腥臊衝人鼻息。惡色黧瘡污人眼目。劇於死狗。是名究竟不淨 (T1911, 93b24-28; Lachaud 2006, 115).

sexual intercourse).⁸⁵ This must have seemed strange to Huiyuan, as it does to us: surely if *maithuna* means sexual intercourse, *aśubhā* would be its more suitable antidote.

In *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu discusses these two types of desires in his exposition of the *apramāṇas*. Attributing to the Vaibhāṣikas a statement identical to the one quoted above from *Samyuktābhidharmahr̥daya*, he maintains that they are mistaken and asserts that *aśubhā* counters *maithunarāga*, while *upekṣā* counters another type of desire, for mother, father, children, and relatives.⁸⁶ Poussin incorrectly identifies a passage in *Vibhāṣā* as the source of this Vaibhāṣika opinion (1971, 5: 197). In fact, both old and new *Vibhāṣā* say that *aśubhā* counters *maithunarāga*, while *upekṣā* counters *viṣayarāga* (*jingjie tan* 境界貪 or *jingjie ai* 境界愛).⁸⁷

Here, Huiyuan tries to explain the statement in *Samyuktābhidharmahr̥daya*. He understands *varṇarāga* in the sense of desire for sex, i.e., as what the *Vibhāṣās* as well as Vasubandhu call *maithunarāga*. And in a very fanciful explanation of *maithuna*, he interprets *maithunarāga* not as desire for sex but as the longing for one's relatives. This is what Vasubandhu calls desire for mother, father, children, and relatives. Yaśomitra explains that *upekṣā* here means thinking of relatives as though they were not related.

Mātāpitṛputrajñātīrāga does not seem to be attested earlier than *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. However, many sources mention *jñātivitarka* (*qinli jue* 親里覺, *qinli xun* 親里尋).⁸⁸ It is one of the varying number of types of wrong awareness, and it seems to be equivalent to *mātāpitṛputrajñātīrāga*. In any case, it is not paired with *maithunarāga* or in connection with the antidote, *upekṣā*, prior to *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Therefore, it seems that

85 問捨是貪欲對治。不淨觀亦貪欲對治。何貪以捨對治。何貪以不淨觀對治耶。答色貪以不淨觀對治。婬貪以捨對治 (T1552, 925c27-926a1; Dessein 1999, 1: 453).

86 *aśubhopekṣayoḥ kāmaraḡapratīpakṣatve ko viṣeṣaḡ | varṇarāḡasyāśubhā maithunarāḡasyopekṣeti vaibhāṣikāḡ | evaḡ tu yujyate | maithunarāḡasyāśubhā mātāpitṛputrajñātīrāḡasyopekṣeti | (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 452.9-11); 不淨觀及捨無量定。若同對治欲界愛欲。有何差別。毘婆沙師說。色欲對治是不淨觀。婬欲對治是捨無量觀。若執如此則與理相應。婬欲對治是不淨觀。能除色形貌觸威儀欲故。母父及兒親等欲對治是捨 (T1559, 302a4-9); 不淨與捨俱治欲貪。斯有何別。毘婆沙說。欲貪有二。一色二婬。不淨與捨如次能治。理實不淨能治婬貪。餘親友貪捨能對治 (T1558, 150b24-27).*

87 不淨想斷何等愛。捨心斷何等愛。答曰。愛有二種。一婬欲愛。二境界愛。不淨想斷婬欲愛。捨心斷。境界愛 (T1546, 321b2-4); 如契經說。修不淨觀能斷欲貪。修捨無量亦斷欲貪。此二何別。答修不淨觀對治婬欲貪。修捨無量對治境界貪 (T1545, 427c12-14). Like Huiyuan, *Srāvakabhūmi* lists five types of desire. Two of these, the second (*maithunarāga*) and third (*viṣaya*), correspond to the two types in the *Vibhāṣās* (*Srāvakabhūmi* 2: 62.1-20, 64.1-3).

88 I am indebted to Yamabe Nobuyoshi for alerting me to the occurrence of this term (email to author, October 9, 2020). Sources include: *Dharmaskandha* (T1537, 4977c20-24); *Zuo chan sanmei jing* (T614, 274a4-b2; Yamabe and Sueki 2009, 23-24); *Tatvasiddhi* (T1646, 352b16-c1); *Dazhidulun* (T1509, 234b7; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1489). Huiyuan mentions it once, in a discussion of eight types of wrong awareness (T1851, 574c8). He cites *Pusa dichi jing* as his source (see T1581, 911b17-18).

Huiyuan must be relying either on a lost source⁸⁹ or on Paramārtha's translation of *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. As I have mentioned above, it is theoretically possible for Huiyuan to have had access to this translation, although he never refers to it by title, and no citations have been previously identified.

After briefly defining the third, fourth, and fifth types of desire and identifying their antidotes, Huiyuan returns to the first type, sexual desire, which, as we have seen, he calls *varṇarāga* rather than its correct name, *maithunarāga*. According to Huiyuan, there are two types of this kind of desire: attachment to one's own body and attachment to the body of another. Regarding the first type, he simply says that the antidote is meditation on the five types of impurity mentioned above. As for attachment to the body of another, he briefly explains four types of attachment and the images that counter them. Huiyuan explains this again more fully in the long passage on the nine images, in the section on the differences in subduing the afflictions. I discuss the four types and the nine images in detail after my translation of that passage.

II. *Aśubhābhāvanā* and the first three meditations (in a series of eight) called “liberations” (*vimokṣa*)

Translation

A. [First *vimokṣa*]

According to *Dazhidulun*, (in the phrase,) “internally having the idea of *rūpa*, contemplating external *rūpa*,”⁹⁰ one's own body is called “internal.” The body of another is called “external.” As for internal *rūpa* and external *rūpa*, they have not yet ceased and have not yet been destroyed. With the notion of *aśubhā*, one contemplates all internal and external *rūpa* as being impure. This is the first *vimokṣa*.⁹¹

Question: In this (contemplation), neither internal nor external *rūpa* has yet ceased or been destroyed. Why mention only that there is internal *rūpa* (in the first *vimokṣa*)?

Explanation: External *rūpa* exists, undestroyed, in all the first three contemplations. Because it pervades the first three, it is not mentioned in (the description of) the first (*vimokṣa*). Internal *rūpa* is not like this. It exists in the first (*vimokṣa*) and not afterward. To explain that (internal *rūpa*) does not exist afterward, it is said that it exists in the first.⁹²

89 Ōtake Susumu suggests the possibility of Huiyuan's having heard from an Indian missionary that *aśubhā* is the antidote for *maithunarāga*, while *upekṣā* is the antidote for *mātāpitṛputrajñātirāga* (email to author, October 8, 2020).

90 內有色外亦觀色是初背捨 (T1509, 215a7; Lamotte 1973, 3: 1291).

91 依大智論。內有色相觀外色者。自身名內。他身名外。於內外色未滅未壞。以不淨想觀內外色悉皆不淨。是初解脫 (T1851 730c17-20). The passage from *Dazhidulun* is as follows: 不壞內外色。不內外減色相。以是不淨心觀色。是名初背捨 (T1509, 215a11-12; Lamotte 1973, 3: 1291).

92 問曰。是中內外色皆未滅壞。何故偏說之內色為有。釋言。外色初三觀中一向未壞有。通前三故。就初中不偏說有。內色不爾。初有後無。為別後無故說初有 (T1851 730c20-24).

Another question: In this (contemplation), internal and external *rūpa* are both contemplated as being impure. Why does the name (of the *vimokṣa*) say only, “contemplates external”?

Explanation: This is (a case of) concealing and revealing in expressing a name. In (the name of the *vimokṣa*), in (the phrase,) “internal(ly having the idea of *rūpa*),” “having” is revealed, while the meaning of “contemplating” is de-emphasized. In (the phrase, “contemplating) external (*rūpa*),” “contemplating” is stated, while the meaning of “having” is hidden. They both express one side. They are both true. Furthermore, the purpose of *aśubhabhāvanā* is disillusionment with one’s own body. Contemplating the internal is easy to learn. Thus, (internal *rūpa*) is hidden and not discussed. Furthermore, in this contemplation, one first grasps the images of someone else’s dead body and compares it with one’s own body. Because (this is) the method from the beginning, one says, “contemplating external (*rūpa*).”⁹³

B. [Second *vimokṣa*]

As for (the phrase,) “internally not having the idea of *rūpa*, contemplating external *rūpa*,”⁹⁴ one previously grasped the image of one’s own body’s death in the future and the images of its being eaten by insects, its being burned by fire, its destruction, etc., and by comparing it with the present, one constructs the image of its destruction. Therefore, it is said, “internally not having (the idea of *rūpa*).” Furthermore, in the present, (the body) falls apart and breaks down, up to the point of (becoming) minute particles. And it becomes nothing whatsoever. (This) is also called “internally not having (the idea of *rūpa*).”⁹⁵ Contemplating external impurity is called “contemplating external *rūpa*.”⁹⁶

Question: Why does one not contemplate that there is no external *rūpa*?

Explanation: One’s own body is impermanent and imperiled. It is easy to achieve the idea that it does not exist; therefore, it is said that there is no internal *rūpa*. But the external *mahābhūta*s, etc., are stable and difficult to destroy, and it is difficult to contemplate that they do not exist. Therefore, this (that there is no external *rūpa*) is not said. Furthermore, one’s own body is limited and easily destroyed; therefore, one contemplates that there is no internal *rūpa*. (External) *rūpa* is vast and plentiful and difficult to destroy. One must reach *ākāśānantyāyatana* (the sphere of infinite space) to be able to destroy it. Therefore, in this meditation, one does not contemplate that there is no external *rūpa*.⁹⁷

93 又問曰。是中於內外色皆觀不淨。何故名中偏言觀外。釋言。此是隱顯彰名。內中彰有隱其觀義。外中說觀隱其有義。互舉一邊。理實齊通。又不淨觀為厭自身。觀內易知。故隱不論。又此觀者先取他身死尸等相用方已體。從初方便故言觀外 (T1851 730c24-29).

94 內無色外觀色是第二背捨 (T1509, 215a7-8; Lamotte 1973, 3: 1291). This is explained a little later in more detail: 壞內色滅內色相。不壞外色不滅外色相。以是不淨心觀外色。是第二背捨 (T1509, 215a12-14; Lamotte 1973, 3: 1292).

95 See *Dazhidulun*: 行者念未來死及火燒虫噉埋著土中皆磨滅。若現在觀亦分別是身。乃至微塵皆無。是名內無色相外觀色 (1509, 215a22-25; Lamotte 1973, 3: 1291).

96 內無色相觀外色者。預取己身未來死相虫食火燒滅壞等相。以方現在作滅壞想。故曰內無。又於現在: 分離破壞。乃至微塵亦無所有。亦名內無。觀外不淨名觀外色 (T1851, 730c29-731a4).

97 問曰。何故不觀外無。釋言。自身無常危脆。無想易成。故說內無。外大地等安固難壞。難觀為無。故不說之。又復自身狹少易盡故觀內無。色寬多難可滅盡。要至空處方能滅之。故

Question: If it is said that external *rūpa* is extensive and that it is difficult to contemplate that it does not exist, how is one able to contemplate that external *rūpa* is impure?⁹⁸

Explanation: Impurity is indeed capable of being contemplated. Its existence is in accord with the previous object. Since the ability to contemplate (this) is easily gained, one can contemplate external *rūpa* as being impure. It is difficult to contemplate (external *rūpa*) as nonexistent. Therefore, one cannot contemplate that external *rūpa* does not exist.⁹⁹

Question: Why in the first *vimokṣa* does one contemplate both internal and external *rūpa* as impure, while here one contemplates only external (*rūpa* as impure)?¹⁰⁰

(*Dazhidu*)*lun* says that, in the previous *vimokṣa*, the contemplating mind is still not subtle, and it is difficult to direct it to one place. Therefore, one contemplates both internal and external *rūpa*. When this mind becomes subtle, it is easy to direct it to one place. Therefore, one contemplates only external *rūpa*.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, in the previous *vimokṣa*, internal *rūpa* has still not disappeared, so one contemplates both internal and external *rūpa*. Now, in this *vimokṣa*, internal *rūpa* does not exist, so one contemplates only external *rūpa*.¹⁰²

Question: If internal (*rūpa*) does not exist, who contemplates external *rūpa*?¹⁰³

(*Dazhidu*)*lun* says that this is contemplation on a nominal notion; it is not the case that (internal *rūpa*) does not really exist. Therefore, one is able to contemplate external *rūpa*.¹⁰⁴

These first two *vimokṣas* are *aśubhabhāvanā*.¹⁰⁵

C. [Third *vimokṣa*]

The third *vimokṣa* is removing the skin and flesh and only contemplating the white bones. Also, contemplating the light rays from the bones and forming the notions of blue, yellow, red, white, etc., is called the pure *vimokṣa*. What is the method of contemplation? First, the practitioner apprehends the light

此觀中不觀外無 (T1851, 731a4-8). See *Dazhidulun*: 答曰。行者眼見是身有死相。取是未來死相以況今身。外四大不見滅相故。難可觀無故。不說外色壞。復次離色界時。是時亦不見外色 (T1509, 215a27-b2; Lamotte 1973, 3: 1292).

98 問曰若言外色寬廣難觀無者。何故得觀外色不淨 (T1851, 731a9-10).

99 不淨是其有觀。有順前境。為觀易成。故得觀外以為不淨。無觀難就。是以不得觀外為無 (T1851, 731a10-12).

100 問曰。何故初門之中通觀內外以為不淨。此唯觀外 (T1851, 731a12-13).

101 復次行者初心未細攝繫心一處難。故內外觀漸習調柔。能內壞色相但觀外 (T1509, 215a19-21; Lamotte 1973, 3: 1292).

102 論言。前者觀心未細。難攝一處。故觀內外。此心轉細易攝一處。故唯觀外。又前門中內色未無故觀內外。今此門中內色已無故偏觀外 (T1851, 731a13-16).

103 問曰。內無誰觀外色 (T1851, 731a16-18). See *Dazhidulun*: 問曰。若無內色相誰當觀外 (T1509, 215a21-22; Lamotte 1973, 3: 1291).

104 論曰。此是假想之觀。非是實無。故得觀外 (T1851, 731a17-18). 答曰。是為得解道。非實道 (T1509, 215a22; Lamotte 1973, 3: 1292).

105 此前二門是不淨觀 (T1851, 731a18).

rays of gold, silver, all jewels, etc. Then he applies them to the image of the bones. Afterward, he can see them (coming from the bones).¹⁰⁶

Question: A *prthagjana* (ordinary person) who apprehends pureness in the impure is called “mistaken.” This (*vimokṣa*) likewise is contemplation on the impure as pure. Why is it not mistaken?¹⁰⁷

The (*Dazhidu*)*lun* says that the *rūpa* of a woman is truly impure. The *prthagjana* sees pureness in it and grasps at it. Therefore, he is mistaken. This *śubhabhāvanā* (meditation on the pure) consists of seeing only white bones. Bones, in contrast to skin and flesh, are a bit purer in appearance. Therefore, this is not mistaken. And in this meditation, one discards the shape of bones and only sees the brightness of the bones. The brightness of the bones is pure and clean; therefore, this is not mistaken. And when one does this meditation, one first takes the brightness of the *rūpa* of gold, silver, and various jewels and compares it with the *rūpa* of the bones. The perceived *rūpa* of the jewels is truly pure and clean; therefore, this is not mistaken. And even though (the meditator) contemplates something pure, he does not grasp at it. Therefore, he is not mistaken. In *Nirvāṇa(sūtra)*, this is called “liberation experienced with the body.” If one contemplates the pure body and experiences liberation, this is called “liberation experienced with the body.”

These are the three *rūpa* meditations.¹⁰⁸

106 淨解脫者。除去皮肉唯觀白骨。又觀骨光作其青黃赤白等想。名淨解脫。觀法云何。先取金銀諸寶等光用方骨相。後得見之 (T1851, 731a18-21). *Dazhidulun* is more detailed: 攝心實觀無令復錯。心既調柔想身皮肉血髓不淨除却。唯有白骨繫心骨人。若外馳散攝之令還。深攝心故見白骨流光。如珂如貝能照內外諸物。是為淨背捨初門。然後觀骨人散滅。但見骨光取外淨潔色相。復次若金剛真珠金銀寶物。若清淨地若淨水。如無煙無薪淨潔火。若清風無塵。諸青色如金精山。諸黃色如瞻蔔花。諸赤色如赤蓮華。諸白色如白雪等。取是相繫心淨觀隨是諸色。各有清淨光曜。是時行者得受喜樂遍滿身中。是名淨背捨 (T1509, 215b18-c1; Lamotte 1973, 3: 1294-1295). A corresponding passage can be found in *Damoduoluo chan jing* 達摩多羅禪經: 於身起淨想不淨觀對治 不求止貪欲 思惟習厭 更有淨對治 不患作厭思想 方便淨解脫 智者開慧眼 謂於不淨緣 白骨流光出 從是次第起 青色妙寶樹 黃赤若鮮白 枝葉花亦然 上服珠瓔珞 種種微妙色 是則名修行 淨解方便相 (T618, 316b27-c6; Greene 2012, 61). A similar meditation technique, in the context of the method of visualizing Amitāyus, is described in another *chanjing*, *Siwei lüyao fa* 思惟略要法: 觀無量壽佛者。有二種人。鈍根者。先當教令心眼觀察額上一寸。除却皮肉但見赤骨。繫念在緣不令他念。心若餘緣攝之令還。得如是見者。當復教令變此赤骨辟方一寸令白如珂。既得如是見者。當復教令自變其身皆作白骨。無有皮肉色如珂雪。復得如是見。當更教令變此骨身使作琉璃光色。清淨視表徹裏。既得如是見者。當復教令從此琉璃身中放白光明。自近及遠遍滿閻浮。唯見光明不見諸物 (T617, 299c20-29). I am grateful to Yamabe Nobuyoshi for his help in translating the passage in *Dasheng yizhang* and for the reference to *Siwei lüyao fa* (email to author, October 24, 2020).

107 問曰。凡夫於不淨中取淨名倒。此亦觀於不淨為淨。何故非倒 (T1851, 731a21-22).

108 問曰。凡夫於不淨中取淨名倒。此亦觀於不淨為淨。何故非倒。論言。女色實是不淨。凡夫見淨於中染著。所以是倒。此淨觀者唯觀白骨。骨望皮肉少有淨相。所以非倒。又此觀中捨其骨相唯觀骨光。骨光清淨。所以非倒。又此觀時先取金銀諸寶色光以方骨色。所取寶色實是清淨。所以非倒。又雖觀淨。不生染著。是以非倒。此涅槃中名身證解脫。觀察淨身證得解脫。名身證解脫。此三色觀 (T1851, 731a21-b1). Passage from *Dazhidulun*: 問曰。行者以不淨為淨名為顛倒。淨背捨觀云何不顛倒。答曰。女色不淨妄見為淨。是名顛倒。淨背捨觀。一切實青色廣大故不顛倒。復次為調心故。淨觀以久習。不淨觀心厭。以是故習淨觀非顛倒。亦是中不著故 (T1509, 215b12-16; Lamotte 1973, 3: 1294). The *Kokuyaku issaikyō* translator locates the reference to *Nirvāṇasūtra* in the Northern and Southern editions of the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*: 三者淨解脫身證三昧 (T374, 547b16-17; T375, 793a6). However, he mistakenly gives the column reference in the Southern edition [T375] as “b” (Shoshū bu 12: 202 n. 83).

Discussion

In the context of the eight *vimokṣas*, *vimokṣa* is frequently translated as “liberation,” although as Dhammajoti points out, this is not the liberation realized as nirvana (2009b, 264). Rather, the *vimokṣas* are stages of meditation that are interpreted variously in different texts. In his chapter on the *vimokṣas*, Huiyuan generally follows *Dazhidulun*.¹⁰⁹ After explaining the meaning of the term *vimokṣa*, he describes each of the eight in detail. The first three are related to *aśubhabhāvanā*, so I have translated them above.

The remainder of the chapter consists of discussions of various aspects of the *vimokṣas*, in which Huiyuan consistently juxtaposes the positions of *Dazhidulun*, *Tattvasiddhi*, *abhidharma*, and Mahāyāna. Since the rest of the chapter is very long and is not exclusively related to *aśubhabhāvanā*, I do not provide translations. Instead, I summarize some of the interesting contrasts Huiyuan draws between the understanding of the first three *vimokṣas* in the *abhidharma* and *Dazhidulun*, on the one hand, and in *Tattvasiddhi*, on the other:

1. In the *abhidharma* and *Dazhidulun*, the first *vimokṣa* is the contemplation of internal and external matter as impure. In the second *vimokṣa*, only external matter is contemplated as being impure since the first *vimokṣa* has eliminated any further need to contemplate internal matter. Huiyuan’s description of the third *vimokṣa* follows *Dazhidulun* closely. *Abhidharma* texts in general do not describe in detail the transition from the white bones that remain at the end of the contemplation of the corpse to the pure and pleasant vision that constitutes the third *vimokṣa*, *śubhabhāvanā*. However, we have seen that *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya* is somewhat of an exception in its description of the wind turning the bones into a mass of snow. Here, we see an affinity among *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya*, *Dazhidulun*, the *chanjing*, and Huiyuan, who may have *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya* in mind when he states that the first three and the eighth *vimokṣa* are the same in *abhidharma* as in Nāgārjuna, i.e., in *Dazhidulun*.¹¹⁰ Huiyuan points out how different *Tattvasiddhi* is: it states that the first three *vimokṣas* are meditations on the emptiness of *rūpa*, not on impurity and purity.¹¹¹

2. *Tattvasiddhi* also differs in saying that, because the *vimokṣas* all are meditations on emptiness, they are all *anāsrava*. According to *abhidharma*, the first three are *sāsrava*, while in Mahāyāna, they are *sāsrava* until they are mastered, after which they are *anāsrava*.¹¹²

109 Huiyuan also discusses the *vimokṣas* in another text, *Guan wuliangshou jing yishu* (T1749, 185b9-26; Tanaka 1990, 191-192).

110 毘曇法中。初三後一與龍樹同 (T1851, 731b8-9). See my translations of the passages on the first three *vimokṣas*.

111 成實所論與前全別。彼論初三觀察色空名為解脫。不以親察淨不淨等名為解脫。故成實論八解脫品云。有人說言。初二不淨。第三解脫為淨觀者。是義不然。所以者何。無有淨觀及不淨觀得解脫故。又復外道亦能觀察淨與不淨。明非解脫。但以空觀名為解脫 (T1851, 731b21-27).

112 三就有漏無漏分別。毘曇法中。初三後二一向有漏。前三事觀故是有漏。非想邊地聖不居中故是有漏。滅定繫屬非想法故亦是有漏。中間三種通漏無漏。成實法中一切無漏。故彼論

3. According to *abhidharma*, the first three *vimokṣas* are all practiced only in *Kāmadhātu*.¹¹³ According to *Tattvasiddhi*, the first two *vimokṣas* are practiced only in *Kāmadhātu*, while the third *vimokṣa* can also be practiced in *Rūpadhātu*. In Mahāyāna, at first (before they are mastered?) they are practiced only in *Kāmadhātu*, but ultimately (after they are mastered?) they can be practiced anywhere.¹¹⁴
4. In *Tattvasiddhi*, the implication, according to Huiyuan, is that the first three *vimokṣas* are obtained only by abandoning desire. In *abhidharma* and in Mahāyāna, the first three can be obtained by both abandoning desire and birth.¹¹⁵
5. Similarly, the first three *vimokṣas* can be lost by both regression (when one starts again to have desire associated with a lower stage) and rebirth (when one is born into a higher stage), whereas in *Tattvasiddhi* they can only be lost upon entrance into final *nirvāṇa*. In Mahāyāna, *vimokṣas* that are based on conditioned cultivation are lost at the time of realization (of the Noble Truths), while *vimokṣas* based on true cultivation are never lost.¹¹⁶
6. In *abhidharma*, different *vimokṣas* are completed or possessed (*cheng jiu* 成就) in different stages or levels. In *Tattvasiddhi* and Mahāyāna, all *vimokṣas* are possessed in all places.¹¹⁷
7. In *abhidharma*, the first three *vimokṣas*, because they are the most “general,” are the lowest compared to the *abhibhvāyatanas* and the *kṛtsnāyatanas* (bases of totality). According to *Tattvasiddhi*, all eight *vimokṣas*, because they are *anāsrava* (see 2 above), are the highest.¹¹⁸

言。是空性故一切無漏。大乘法中。前之七種始學有漏。終成無漏。第八一種一向無漏。故地持中說滅盡定以為聖住 (T1851, 732a7-14). Passage from *Tattvasiddhi*: 問曰。此解脫幾有漏幾無漏。答曰。是空性故一切無漏 (T1646, 340a27-29; *Kokuyaku issaikyō Ronshū* bu 3: 416).

- 113 依身處者。依如毘曇。初三解脫唯在欲界。三天下人堪任修起。非餘處身。以是欲界貪欲治故。不在上界 (T1851, 733a13-15).
- 114 若依成實。初二解脫唯欲界身而得修起。名欲界身。以為內故。第三欲色皆得修起。後五解脫三界皆起。大乘法中。始同二乘。究竟終成於一切處皆起一切 (T1851, 733b1-4).
- 115 二凡聖通論。凡夫所得通名解脫。於中前三及四空處有漏解脫有二種得。一離欲得。義同前釋。二者生得。凡夫從上退生下時得於下法。良以有漏生上失下故。下生時還復得之。餘如前釋。成實無文。准義論之。前七解脫唯離欲得。所謂永斷下地欲時得彼解脫。第八不定。於中所有有餘涅槃唯離欲得。無餘涅槃或離欲得或方便得。當報不起是離欲得。所謂遠離非想欲時即便得之。現報盡滅是方便得。用邊際智通滅報得故。羅漢滅定亦方便得。大乘法中隨事解脫與毘曇同。觀空解脫與成實同 (T1851, 733c3-14).
- 116 次明捨義先有今失名之為捨。毘曇前三及下三空處有漏解脫有二種捨。一者退捨。所謂退起下地欲時失上解脫。二者生捨。生上地時失於下法。下三空處無漏解脫有三種捨。一者退捨。彼宗無漏有退失故。二轉根捨。轉鈍無漏無利根時失鈍根故。三得果捨。證無學時捨學道故第七第八唯一退捨。成實前七唯入無餘涅槃時捨。第八無捨。大乘法中緣修解脫真證時捨。真實解脫畢竟無捨 (T1851, 733c14-23).
- 117 次明成就。隨所有處名為成就。毘曇法中前二解脫二禪已還隨身何處一切成就。生上不成有漏。生上則失下故。第三解脫四禪已還一切處成。生上不成。下三空處有漏解脫自地及下一切皆成。生上不成。彼三空處無漏解脫及後二種一切處成。然彼宗中前七解脫隨所成處皆得現入。第八解脫在欲色界成而得入。無色雖成而不得入。彼無形色。若復滅心。命則盡故。成實大乘一切解脫一切處成 (T1851, 733c23-734a4).
- 118 第六門中辨其優劣。於中約對八勝處及十一切入以辨優劣。八勝及與十一切入後當具論。毘曇唯就初三解脫望八勝處以辨優劣。初三解脫總相觀故。最以為下。八勝次廣說以為中。

III. Meditation on the nine images

Since all major sections of *Dasheng yizhang* except for the first are arranged numerically, Huiyuan's discussion of the meditation on the nine images of the corpse (九想觀) follows very soon after his section on the eight *vimokṣas*. This entire discussion has been translated into French by Lachaud (125-129). However, I am aware of no English translation, so I provide one here.

Translation

A. Introduction

Classification into eight sections regarding the meaning of the meditation on the nine images: explaining the characteristics is first; establishing the nature is second; the object is third; the differences in subduing the afflictions is fourth; explaining the similarities and differences in relation to the ten notions is fifth; explaining and establishing the order (of the nine images) with respect to the *dhyānas* is sixth; explaining and establishing the roots and branches with respect to the factors of enlightenment (*bodhipakṣika*) is seventh; the purpose of the practice is eighth.¹¹⁹

B. [The eight sections]

1. [The characteristics]

First, explaining the characteristics. What are the nine images?¹²⁰

The first is the image of a (newly) dead person. The practitioner, since he wants to destroy the thief, lust, first meditates on the image of a (newly) dead person. He sees a person at the time of death: (that person's) speech ceases; he exhales, and (the air) does not return; he suddenly dies. (The practitioner) thinks, "I will be like that, as will my loved ones," and he uses (that thought) to attack the *kleśas*.¹²¹

The second is the image of a swollen corpse. (The practitioner) sees the corpse: it is swollen in the way wind in a leather bag changes the shape (of the bag). He thinks, "I will be like that, as will my loved ones," and he uses (that thought) to condemn the *kleśas*.¹²²

十一切人最廣觀故。說以爲上成實不爾。彼論宣說。十一切人假想觀故。最以爲下。八勝處者初是有漏後是無漏。說以爲中。八解脫者唯是無漏。說以爲上。於中下者在於外凡。中者在於內凡已去。上者在於修道已上 (T1851, 734a4-13).

119 九想觀義八門分別 辨相一 定體二 所緣三 治患不同四 約對十想辨其同異五 約對諸禪辨定先後六 約對道品辨定本末七 修起所爲八 (T1851, 735b24-27).

120 第一辨相。九想云何 (T1851, 735b28).

121 第一死想行者。爲欲破婬欲賊。先觀死想。見人死時言語辭別出息不返忽然便死。念我當然所愛亦爾。用呵煩惱 (T1851, 735b28-c2). A similar account is found in a passage in *Dazhidulun* that serves as an introduction to the meditation on the nine images: 觀人初死之日。辭訣言語息出不反奄忽已死。室家驚慟號哭呼天言說方爾。奄便那去氣滅身冷無所覺識 (T1509, 217a13-15; Lamotte 1970. 3: 1315). However, the newly dead body is not included as one of the images, presumably because it does not appear to be impure.

122 第二脹想。見屍臃脹如韋囊中風異於本形。念我當然所愛亦爾。用呵貪欲 (T1851, 735c2-3).

The third is the image of a livid corpse. (The practitioner) sees that dead body: the wind blows on it; the sun scorches it; its color changes, becoming livid; (the wind and sun) break down its original form. He thinks, “I will be like that, as will my loved ones.”¹²³

The fourth is the image of an oozing corpse. (The practitioner) sees that dead body: not long after becoming livid, it is oozing, stinking, putrid, and disgusting. He thinks, “I will be like that, as will my loved ones.”¹²⁴

The fifth is the image of a disintegrating corpse. (The practitioner) observes that dead body changed by wind and sun, greatly broken down, (lying) on the ground with pus and blood oozing out. He thinks, “I will be like that, as will my loved ones.”¹²⁵

The sixth is the image of a bloodstained corpse. That dead body, disintegrated, is smeared with blood and flesh. (The practitioner) thinks, “I will be like that, as will my loved ones.”¹²⁶

The seventh is the image of a worm-eaten corpse. (The practitioner) observes that dead body, unburned and unburied, cast off in a wasteland, devoured by worms and beasts.¹²⁷ He sees his own body as being the same, and (the bodies of) his loved ones, also.¹²⁸

The eighth is the image of a skeleton. The flesh has already disappeared, and (the practitioner) sees only the skeleton, (with its bones forming) mutually connected pillars.¹²⁹

The ninth is the image of scattered (bones). The remaining sinews having been severed, the skeleton is rent asunder. This is called the image of scattered (bones).¹³⁰

In *Dazhidulun*, the image, of the (newly) dead person is missing, and the image of a burnt corpse is added. (The practitioner) sees that the remaining bones are burnt and completely reduced to ashes. He thinks that he will be like that, as will his loved ones.¹³¹

123 三青淤想。見彼死屍風吹日曝色變青淤壞本形色。念我當然所愛亦爾 (T1851, 753c3-5).

124 四膿爛想。見彼死屍青淤已後不久膿爛臭弊可惡。念我當然所愛亦爾 (T1851, 753c5-7).

125 五者壞想。觀彼死屍風日轉大破壞在地膿血流出。念已當然所愛亦爾 (T1851, 735c7-8).

126 六血塗想。死屍壞已血肉塗漫。念已當然所愛亦爾 (T1851, 736c9-10).

127 狩. This word usually refers to hunting. *Kokuyaku issaikyō* suggests that it is equivalent to 獸 here (Shoshū bu 12: 217), and this is supported by an alternate reading of 獸 for 狩 in similar contexts in *Tattvasiddhi*: 見身已死棄之塚間虫(虫=蟲<明><宮>)狩(狩=獸<三><宮>)食等 (T1646, 339b7-8); 又觀身死棄之塚間。火燒滅盡。若鳥狩(狩=獸<三><宮>)食噉虫(虫=蟲<宮>)從中出 (T1646, 343b6-7).

128 七蟲食想。觀彼死屍不燒不埋棄之曠野為諸蟲狩之所食噉。見己身自方亦類所愛亦爾 (T1851, 735c10-12).

129 八骨鑱想彼肉既盡唯見骨鑱共相連柱 (T1851, 735c12-13).

130 九分散想。殘筋既斷骨鑱分離名分散想 (T1851, 735c13-14).

131 大智論中少一死想加一燒想。見彼殘骨為火所燒終成灰燼。付己當然所愛亦爾 (T1851, 735c14-16). The description of the burnt body in *Dazhidulun* is as follows: 行者到屍林中。或見積多草木焚燒死屍。腹破眼出皮色焦黑甚可惡畏。須臾之間變為灰燼。行者取是燒相思惟。此身未死之前。沐浴香華五欲自恣。今為火燒甚於兵刃。此屍初死形猶似人。火燒須臾與本相都失。一切有身皆歸無常我亦如是 (T1509, 217c12-18; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1319).

Question: Why does that *śāstra* omit the (newly) dead person? (Answer:) That (practitioner), because the shape of the just-dead (body) does not change, still clings to the image of purity. Therefore, (*Dazhidulun*) does not mention (the image of the dead person). This is the end of the first section.¹³²

2. [The nature]

Next we explain the essential nature (of the meditation on the nine images). *Dazhidulun* says that these nine have *saṃjñā* (ideation or perception) as their essential nature because they grasp images.¹³³ If one considers the result, they have non-craving as their nature because they counteract craving. This is the end of the second section.¹³⁴

3. [The object]

Next we explain the object (of the meditation on the nine images). The object of these (meditations on) the nine (images) is only impure *rūpa* in *Kāmadhātu* because, taking it as the object, one destroys thoughts of desire in *Kāmadhātu*. This is the end of the third section.¹³⁵

4. [The differences in subduing the afflictions]

Next we clarify the differences in the afflictions that (the meditation on) the nine images counteracts. (The meditation on) the nine images can counteract the ailment of desire. There are two types of desire. One is loving one's own body. It is counteracted by five types of (meditation on) impurity, as analyzed at length above in the section on the five types (of mental stabilization). The second is loving the body of another. (The meditation on the) nine images counteracts (this).¹³⁶

Regarding loving the body of another, the *sūtra* and the *śāstra*¹³⁷ disagree. Based on *Nirvānasūtra*, it is said that there are four (types of) desire. The first is desire for conduct, loving things such as someone's deportment,¹³⁸ speech, etc. The second is desire for color, loving things such as the blue, yellow, red, white, etc., of someone's (complexion). The third is desire for shape/body part, attachment to eyes and ears, or loving nose and mouth, or desiring

132 問曰。彼論何故除死。彼以初死形色未變。猶取淨相。為是不說此一門竟 (T1851, 735c16-17).

133 What *Dazhidulun* actually says is that their nature is grasping characteristics (取相性 [T1509, 218b10; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1325]).

134 次辨體性。論曰。此九是想自性。以取相故。若據終成。是無貪性。貪欲治故 此二門竟 (T1851, 735c17-19).

135 次辨所緣。此九唯緣欲界地中不淨之色。以為境界。為破欲界貪欲心故此三門竟 (T1851, 735c19-21). *Dazhidulun* says the object of the meditations is the *rūpa* of the body in *kāmadhātu*: 欲界身色 (T1509, 218b10; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1325). It does not specify impure *rūpa*.

136 次明九想治患不同。九想能治貪欲之病。貪有二種。一愛自身。五種不淨而為對治。如前五度章中具廣分別。二愛他身。九想為治 (T1851, 735c21-24).

137 Lachaud writes, "Les sūtras et les traités" (2006, 127), but since Huiyuan discusses in detail one particular *sūtra* and one particular *śāstra*, I think it best to translate 經 and 論 in the singular.

138 *Jinzhi* 進止. Literally, "going and stopping."

waistline¹³⁹—everything of that sort. The fourth is desire for smoothness of touch, loving those tangibles that are smooth, soft, moist, etc. These four types of desire are separately counteracted by the nine images.¹⁴⁰ First, desire for conduct is counteracted by the image of the (newly) dead person. Desire for shape and color is counteracted by (images of) livid, oozing, and bloodstained (corpses). Desire for (body) parts is counteracted by (images of) swollen, disintegrating, worm-eaten, and scattered (corpses). Desire for smoothness of touch is counteracted by (the image of) a skeleton.¹⁴¹

Based on *Dazhidulun*, there are seven types of attachment.¹⁴² The first is attachment to conduct, loving someone's deportment. The second is attachment to speech, loving someone's voice, speech, play, or laugh.¹⁴³ These two are like desire for conduct, mentioned above. The third is attachment to color. This is like desire for color in the above four (types of desire). The fourth is attachment to figure, loving someone's bodily figure. This is like desire for shape in the above four (types of desire). The fifth is attachment to tangibles that are smooth, soft, moist, etc. This is like desire for smoothness of touch in the above four (types of desire). The sixth is attachment to all five above. The seventh is attachment to human appearance, namely a man's loving a woman, a woman's loving a man, etc.¹⁴⁴ Among the seven, the first two are counteracted by the image of a (newly) dead person. Attachment to color is counteracted by (the images of) livid, oozing, and bloodstained corpses. Attachment to figure is counteracted by (the images of) swollen, disintegrated, worm-eaten, and scattered corpses. Attachment to smoothness of touch is counteracted by the images of a skeleton and a burnt corpse. The last two types are counteracted by all nine images. These nine destroy desire. All the afflictions, hate, etc., also become slight and thin. This is the end of the fourth section.¹⁴⁵

139 *Yao shen* 腰身. Lachaud translates "les hanches ou le corps" (2006, 127), but I think that this compound probably indicates a single area of the body, as in modern Chinese usage.

140 In fact, *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* mentions only three types of desire: for physical appearance, for deportment, for smoothness of touch (得是觀已即斷三欲。一形貌欲。二姿態欲。三細觸欲 [T374, 434a17-18; T375, 675c1-2]).

141 愛他身中經論不同。依涅槃經。說有四欲。一儀欲。愛其進止語言等事。二形色欲。愛其青黃赤白等事。三處所欲。或著眼耳。或愛鼻口。或貪腰身。如是一切。四細觸欲。愛其細滑柔濡等觸。此四種欲九想別治。初威儀欲死想為治。形色欲者青淤濃爛血塗為治。處所欲者脹壞蟲食分散為治。細觸欲者骨鏤為治 (T1851, 735c24-736a2). Doryun presents an almost identical enumeration of the four types of desire in *Yugaron gi* 瑜伽論記, where he, too, calls the third type *chusuo yu* 處所欲 (T1828, 438b1-5). A somewhat simplified version of this passage also appears in the *Dasheng yizhang* section on the five types of mental stabilization (T1851, 698c1-5). *Kokyaku issaikyō* (Shoshū bu 12: 87 n. 30) identifies *Samyuktābhidharmahdaya* as Huiyuan's source for that passage: 又對治四種貪故復說四種。謂斷威儀貪故修死屍觀。斷色貪故修青瘡等觀。斷觸貪故去皮肉修骨瑣觀。斷處所貪故修骨節分離觀 (T1552, 933c4-7; Dessein 1999, 1: 516). Note that the first antidote is (new) corpse meditation, not death meditation.

142 Note that Huiyuan uses *ran* 染 here instead of *yu* 欲. *Dazhidulun* actually reads *yao zhuo* 染著.

143 Lachaud translates *xiao* 咲 as *floraisons*, which does not make sense here.

144 I follow Lamotte's translation of *renxiang* 人相 as "l'apparence humaine" (1970, 3: 1321), but I wonder whether "a person's sex" might not be better here. *Xiang* 相 can translate Sanskrit words such as *vyañjana* and *liṅga*, in the sense of sex organ or gender.

145 依大智論。染有七種。一著威儀。愛其進止。二著語言。愛其音聲言語戲咲。此二猶前威儀欲也。三著形色。猶前四中形色欲也。四著形容。愛其身形。猶前四中處所欲也。五著細

5. [The nine images and the ten notions]

Next, we explain the similarities and differences between these (nine images) and the ten notions. The ten notions are just as they will all be analyzed in detail later in the chapter on the ten notions. When the nine images are related to those (ten notions), there are similarities and differences. The differences mentioned are as Nāgārjuna says: the nine images are studied at the beginning, the ten notions at the end;¹⁴⁶ that which is studied at the beginning is cause, (while) that which is perfected at the end is result.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, the nine images restrain lustful thoughts in a person who has not attained *samādhi*. The ten notions can destroy them.¹⁴⁸ The nine images can restrain, like binding a thief. The ten notions can destroy, like beheading a thief.¹⁴⁹ The similarities mentioned are that they equally counteract desire and are causes of *nirvāṇa*.¹⁵⁰

Regarding this, positions concerning the inclusion of images differ. Someone explains: The notion of impurity among the ten notions includes all of the nine images.¹⁵¹

Someone else says: The notions of impurity, distaste for food, and impossibility of the world's being pleasurable, include all of the nine images.¹⁵²

Another person says: Those meditations on the nine images include all ten notions.¹⁵³

滑柔濡等觸。猶前四中細觸欲也。六通著前五。七著人相。謂男愛女之女愛男等。七中初二死相爲治。著形色者青淤膿爛血塗爲治。著形容者脹壞蟲食分散爲治。著細觸者骨瑣及與燒相爲治。後之二種九相通治。此九破貪。瞋等諸結皆亦微薄此四門竟 (T1851, 736a2-12). See *Dazhidulun*: 是九相除人七種染著。或有人*染著色。若赤若白若赤白若黃若黑。或有人不著色但染著形容。細膚纖指修目高眉。或有人不著容色但染著威儀。進止坐起行住禮拜俯仰揚眉頓睫親近按摩。或有人不著容色威儀。但染著言語。軟聲美辭隨時而說。應意承旨能動人心。或有人不著容色威儀軟聲。但染著細滑柔膚軟肌。熱時身涼寒時體溫。或有人皆著五事。或有人都不著五事但染著人相。若男若女雖得上六種欲。不得所著之人猶無所解。捨世所重五種欲樂而隨其死。死相多除威儀語言愛。臃脹相壞相噉相散相多除形容愛。血塗相青瘀相膿爛相。多除色愛。骨相燒相多除細滑愛。九相除雜愛及所著人愛。噉相散相骨相偏除人愛。噉殘離散白骨中不見有人可著 (T1509, 218a14-29; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1322-1324).

146 九相爲初學。十想爲成就 (T1509, 217c24; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1320).

147 復次九相爲因。十想爲果 (T1509, 218a9-10; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1322).

148 九相爲遮未得禪定爲淫欲所覆故。十想能除滅淫欲等三毒 (T1509, 217c21-23; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1320).

149 九相如縛賊十想如斬殺 (T1509, 217c23; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1320).

150 次對十想辨其同異。十想如後十想章中具廣分別。九想望彼。有同有異。所言異者。如龍樹說。九想初學。十想終。初學爲因。終成爲果。又復九想遮未得人淫欲之心。十想能滅。九想能遮如似縛賊。十想能滅如似斬殺。所言同者。同治貪欲爲涅槃因 (T1851, 736a12-18). *Dazhidulun* attributes the final statement to "others" (復有人言。十想九相同爲離欲俱爲涅槃 [T1509, 217c26-27; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1320]).

151 於中相攝論者不同。有人釋言。彼十想中不淨想者具攝九想 (T1851, 736a18-19); *Dazhidulun*: 復次是十想中。不淨想攝九相 (T1509, 217c24-25; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1320). In *Dazhidulun*, this statement is not attributed to "others."

152 有人復言。十中不淨食厭世間不可樂想。具攝九想 (T1851, 736a20-21); 有人言。十想中不淨想食不淨想世間不可樂想。攝九相 (T1509, 217c25-26; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1320).

153 復有人言。彼九想觀通攝十想 (T1851, 736a21).

Meditating on those images of a dead body as one transformation after another is the same as the notion of impermanence.¹⁵⁴ If one is attached to these *dharmas*,¹⁵⁵ when impermanence destroys them, misery and trouble are produced. This is the notion of suffering. Due to impermanence and suffering, one does not obtain sovereignty. This is the notion of non-self. One meditates on those images of a dead body. (With) the nine images, one meditates (on the fact that) the body does not have a single pure sign. Since it (the body) is impure, food, even though it is in the mouth, unites with down-flowing mucus (?)¹⁵⁶ and forms nutrient fluid.¹⁵⁷ (From) the gullet it enters the stomach and accordingly becomes impure. One is unable to desire or be attached (to food). This is the notion of hating food. By means of these nine images, one becomes weary of worldly life. This is the notion of being unable to take pleasure in worldly life. (In) the meditation on the nine images, the body is impermanent and (subject to) destruction. This is the notion of death. Knowing these nine images enables one to destroy *kleśas*. This is called the notion of severing (*kleśas*). One uses these nine images to ward off the *kleśas*. This is called the notion of detachment. By means of the meditation on the nine images, one causes the *skandhas* not to be produced. This is the notion of disappearance. It is also called the notion of destruction. The similarities and differences are as above. This is the end of the fifth section.¹⁵⁸

6. [The order of the meditation on the nine images and the *dhyānas*]

Next, we explain the order (of the meditation on the nine images) with respect to the *dhyānas*. As is said in (*Dazhidulun*, (the meditation on) the

154 In this paragraph, the ten notions are underlined.

155 In the corresponding passage in *Dazhidulun*, Lamotte translates *ci fa* 此法 as “ce corps” (1970, 3: 1321). However, it does not seem necessary to take such liberties with the text here.

156 This part of the sentence is difficult to construe. Huiyuan’s 食雖在口。腦涎流下合 seems to have dropped three characters from *Dazhidulun*’s 食雖在口腦涎流下與唾和合 (T1509, 218a3). In his explanation of the notion of hating food in the chapter on the ten notions, Huiyuan says: 胸涎流下與唾和合 (T1851, 739a23). The idea seems to be that food, from the moment it enters the mouth, becomes mixed with mucus and spittle.

157 For this translation of *rasa*, see Das (2003, 578).

158 觀彼死相分分變異即無常想。若著此法。無常壞時則生苦惱。即是苦想。無常苦故不得自在。即無我想。觀彼死想。九想觀身無一淨相。以不淨故。食雖在口。腦涎流下合而成味。咽之入腹即成不淨。無可貪著。即厭食想。以是九想厭離世間。即是世間不可樂想。九想觀身無常敗壞即是死想。知此九想能斷煩惱。即名斷想。用此九想遮諸煩惱。即名離想。以九想觀令陰不生。即是盡想。亦名滅想。同異如是 此五門竟 (T1851, 736a21-b2); *Dazhidulun*: 問曰。無常等十想為滅何事故說。答曰。亦為滅淫欲等三毒。問曰。無常者二相有何等異。答曰。九相為遮未得禪定為淫欲所覆故。十想能除滅淫欲等三毒。九相如縛賊十想如斬殺。九相為初學。十想為成就。復次是十想中。不淨想攝九相。有人言。十想中不淨想食不淨想世間不可樂想。攝九相。復有人言。十想九相同為離欲俱為涅槃。所以者何。初死相動轉言語須臾之間忽然已死。身體臃脹爛壞分數各各變異是則無常。若著此法無常壞時是即為苦。若無常苦無得自在者。是則無我。不淨無常苦無我則不可樂。觀身如是。食雖在口腦涎流下與唾和合而成味。而咽與吐無異入腹中即是食不淨想。以此九相觀身無常變異。念念皆滅即是死想。以是九相厭世間樂。知煩惱斷則安隱寂滅即是斷相。以是九相遮諸煩惱即是離想。以是九相厭世間故。知此五業滅。更不復生是處安隱。即是盡想 (T1509, 217c19-218a9; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1320-1321).

nine images is a means (leading to the attainment of) the *dhyānas*. First one practices (the meditation on) the nine images and subdues the *kleśas*. After that, one enters the *dhyānas*.¹⁵⁹

Question: In the (*Prajñāpāramitā*) *sūtra*, the *dhyānas* are many times mentioned first, the nine images, afterward. Why is it now said that the nine images are a means for proceeding to the *dhyānas*? Nāgārjuna explains: (The *sūtra*) first extolls the *dhyānas* to make people happy. The pleasant *dhyānas* are accomplished due to the nine images. Therefore, one practices the nine images first. This is the end of the sixth section.¹⁶⁰

7. [The sequence of the meditation on the nine images with respect to the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment, *bodhipākṣikas*]

Next, we explain (the meditation on the nine images) with respect to the *bodhipākṣikas* (from) beginning (to) end.¹⁶¹ As Nāgārjuna says, the meditation on the nine images opens (the gate to) *kāyasmṛtyupasthāna*. *Kāyasmṛtyupasthāna* guides one to the three later *smṛtyupasthānas*. With the four *smṛtyupasthānas*, one opens (the gate to) the remaining *bodhipākṣikas*. With the thirty-seven *bodhipākṣikas*, one opens the gate to *nirvāṇa*. This is the end of the seventh section.¹⁶²

8. [The reason for practicing the meditation on the nine images]

Next, we clarify the reason (for practicing the meditation on the nine images). As is said in *Dazhidulun*,¹⁶³ Hīnayāna people practice (the meditation on) the nine images to enter *nirvāṇa*. Bodhisattvas practice (the meditation on) the nine images since they commiserate with all beings and collect all the *buddhadharmas* in order to liberate them.

As for the meaning of (the meditation on) the nine images, its rough gist is like this.¹⁶⁴

Discussion

1. The first and last corpse

In an introduction to his translation of Huiyuan's entry on the nine images, Lachaud mentions how closely Huiyuan follows *Dazhidulun*. However,

159 論問曰。應當先習九相離欲然後得諸禪 (T1509, 217a7-8; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1314).

160 次對諸禪辨定先後。如論中說。九想是其諸禪方便。先修九想折伏煩惱。然後入禪。問曰。經中多先說禪後說九想。今云何言九想是其趣禪方便龍樹釋言。先讀諸禪令人愛樂。所樂禪定由九想成。故先行之。此六門竟 (T1851, 736b2-7). See *Dazhidulun*: 何以故諸禪定後方說九。答曰。先說果報。令行者心樂。九相雖是不淨。人貪其果報故必習行 (T1509, 217a8-10; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1314).

161 本末。Literally, "root and branches."

162 次對道品辨其本末。如龍樹說。九想之觀開身念處。身念處開導後三念處。以四念處開餘道品。以三十七品開涅槃門此七門竟 (T1851, 736b7-10). See *Dazhidulun*: 是九相是開身念處門。身念處開三念處門。是四念處開三十七品門三十七品開涅槃城門 (T1509, 218b14-16; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1326).

163 聲聞人如是觀心厭離。欲疾入涅槃。菩薩憐愍一切眾生。集一切佛法度一切眾生。不求疾入涅槃故觀是九相 (T1509, 218b18-21; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1327).

164 次明所為。如論中說。小乘之人為入涅槃故修九想。菩薩為憐一切眾生集諸佛法而度脫之故修九想。九想之義厥趣相爾 (T1851, 736b10-13).

Lachaud stresses that the compact structure of Huiyuan's writing and certain details of his presentation strongly influenced the treatment of the nine images in Japan (2006, 125). Lachaud refers in particular to the difference between *Dasheng yizhang* and *Dazhidulun* regarding the first image. In the list of the nine images in *Dazhidulun*, this is the image of the swollen corpse, while in *Dasheng yizhang*, it is the newly dead person. The other significant difference between the two texts is that the final image in *Dazhidulun* is the burnt corpse; Huiyuan says that it is the scattered bones.

In descriptions of meditation on corpses, the meditator is variously said to first observe a swollen corpse, a livid corpse, or a new corpse. Lamotte, in his introduction to the *Dazhidulun* chapter on the nine images, summarizes the *nikāya* and *āgama* lists of *aśubhā* images, numbering from three to twenty. He points out that these lists are often incomplete and unenumerated. In the lists in Pali *abhidhamma* texts (*Dhammasaṅgani*, *Atthasālinī*, *Visuddhimagga*, and *Vimuttimaggā*) summarized by Lamotte, the first corpse is the swollen corpse. Lamotte also provides lists of nine images from various *Prajñāpāramitā* texts, all of which begin with the swollen corpse. Naturally, the *Prajñāpāramitā* list that *Dazhidulun* quotes at the beginning of the chapter on the nine images begins with the swollen corpse.

Turning to the lists of images in Sanskrit *abhidharma* texts, Lamotte observes that they are rarely in the same order and are often incomplete (1970, 3: 1312). He cites passages in several *abhidharma* texts, but he does not give details about the lists. Among these texts, *Vibhāṣā* (T1545, 205a9-11) puts the livid corpse first on a complete list of nine. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (455.5; Poussin 1971, 5: 205), *Nyāyānusāra* (T1562, 671c1), and *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (526.8) all suggest that the livid corpse is the first image but without providing a full list. As Lamotte notes, *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* cites from an unnamed sutra a complete list beginning with the livid corpse (54.34-55.2). He also mentions *Bhikṣuṇīkarmavacanā*, where the image of the livid corpse is first in a list of eight *aśubhā* images (1970, 3:1313). Lamotte does not mention the fact that these are all Sarvāstivāda texts. Finally, *Mahāvīyutpātti* lists the livid corpse first (87 [item 1156]). It seems to be standard among Sarvāstivāda *abhidharma* and vinaya texts, as well as early Yogācāra *śāstras*, for the livid corpse to be the first stage mentioned in descriptions of the deterioration of the dead body.¹⁶⁵

165 Some other examples include: *Jñānaprasthāna* (*Apidamo fazhi lun* 阿毘達磨發智論 [T1544, 926c5]); *Samyuktāgama* (*Za ahan jing* 雜阿含經 [T99, 198a22]); *Mūlasarvāstivāda vinaya* (*Genben shuoyiqie youbu pinaiye* 根本說一切有部毘奈耶 [T1442, 675b4]); *Genben shuoyiqie youbu pichuni pinaiye* 根本說一切有部苾芻尼毘奈耶 [T1443, 926c10]; *Genben shuoyiqie youbu baiyi jiemo* 根本說一切有部百一羯磨 [T1453, 481c21]; *Sarvāstivāda vinaya saṃgraha* (*Genben shuoyiqie youbu lü she* 根本說一切有部律攝 [T1458, 539c12]); *Śrāvakabhūmi* (1: 214.4); *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* (*Yuqie shidi lun* 瑜伽師地論 [T1579, 865b11-12]); *Abhidharmasamuccaya vyākhyā* (*Dasheng apidamo zajilun* 阿毘達磨雜集論 [T1606, 769a11]).

An exception may be a passage in *Samyuktābhīdharmahṛdaya*, which will be discussed again later and to which a similar passage in *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* largely corresponds. Although *Samyuktābhīdharmahṛdaya* does not include a list of corpses, it recommends four of the corpse meditations as antidotes for the four types of *rāga*. The first type of *rāga* is desire for deportment, and the antidote is practice of the meditation on the (new) corpse. Here, *sishi* 死屍 clearly indicates a dead body, and the logic of the passage affirms that the corpse must not be significantly deteriorated.¹⁶⁶ As we have seen above, *Samyuktābhīdharmahṛdaya*, as Greene emphasizes, sometimes varies from standard Sarvāstivāda descriptions of *aśubhabhāvanā*, and this may be a further example. Vasubandhu seems unconcerned about the order of the corpses or the question of the new corpse. In his explanation of the antidotes, he states that the antidote for deportment is meditation on the unmoving dead body (*niśceṣṭamṛtakāya*), which, like *sishi* in *Samyuktābhīdharmahṛdaya*, suggests the new corpse.¹⁶⁷ In a passage on the *vimokṣas*, on the other hand, he says that the first two *vimokṣas* are *aśubhā* in nature because they have the livid, etc., (corpse) as their aspect.¹⁶⁸ Here, Vasubandhu seems to take for granted that the first corpse is the livid corpse.

Texts of other categories associated with Sarvāstivāda, including visualization *sūtras* and *chanjing*, state or imply that the practitioner should first observe the corpse of a person who has died recently.¹⁶⁹ Both translations of the *Yogācārabhūmi* of Saṃgharakṣa (An Shigao's *Daodi jing* 道地經 [T607] and Dharmarakṣa's *Xiuxing daodi jing* 修行道地經 [T606]) describe the practitioner as going to the cemetery to contemplate a dead body. The text seems to say that the practitioner first observes the corpse for a period of seven days, after which it becomes swollen, then livid, etc.¹⁷⁰ Similarly, in *Dharmatrāṭadhyānasūtra* (*Damoduoluo chan jing* 達摩多羅禪經 [T618]), also associated with Sarvāstivāda, the meditator is described as imagining his own corpse for a period until the seventh day, after which it becomes livid, swollen, etc.¹⁷¹ Although these texts do not number the stages of the corpses, they strongly suggest that the practitioner should view or imagine a corpse

166 又對治四種貪故復說四種。調斷威儀貪故修死屍觀。斷色貪故修青瘀等觀。斷觸貪故去皮肉修骨瑣觀。斷處所貪故修骨節分離觀 (T1552, 933c4-7; Dessein 1999, 1: 516).

167 *Tatra punaś caturvidho rāgaḥ | varṇarāgaḥ saṃsthānarāgaḥ sparśarāga upacārarāgaś ca | prathamasya pratīpakṣeṇa vinīlakādyālabhanām aśubhām varjāyanti | dvitīyasya vikhādītakavikṣiptālabhanām trītyasya vipaṭunnā pūyanibaddhāsthyālabhanām caturthasya niśceṣṭamṛtakāyālabhanām |* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 337.14-17; Poussin 1971, 4: 149).

168 *Prathamau dvau vimokṣāv aśubhābhāvāu vinīlakādyākāratvat |* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 455.5; Poussin 1971, 5: 2).

169 An exception is one of the *chanjing*, *Zuochan sanmei jing* (T614), which puts the livid corpse first on the list (271c10-12; Yamabe and Sueki 2009, 11).

170 An Shigao: 是問行者等意念一切人令安隱。便行至父樹便行至觀死屍一日者。至七日者腫脹者。青色者。如盟者。半壞者。肉盡者。血洗者。骨骨連者。筋纏者 (T607, 235c17-21). Dharmarakṣa: 發是心已便到塚間坐觀死人。計從一日乃至七日。或身腫脹其色青黑。爛壞臭處為蟲見食。無復肌肉膿血見洩。視其骨節筋所纏裹。白骨星散甚為可惡 (T606, 212a14-18).

171 當復更觀察死後次第相日日漸變異。乃至於七日無復有來去。視瞻笑語言容止悉已滅。捨離威儀姿死屍漸漸異。其色日毀變青等諸不淨。如是次第現腫脹爛潰流漫極臭處種種諸蟲出 (T618, 316a14-21).

before it begins to decompose seriously. *Guanfo sanmei hai jing* 觀佛三昧海經 (T643), on the other hand, affixes the number one to the image of the first corpse, which is called “newly dead” (*xin si* 新死).¹⁷² *Chan yao jing* 禪要經 (T609) starts an unnumbered list of twelve images with the image of the (newly dead) corpse.¹⁷³ Finally, *Chan miyao fa jing* 禪祕要法經 (T613) has a section entitled “Image of the new corpse” (*xinsi xiang* 新死想), in which the practitioner is instructed to visualize a new corpse and observe that his own body resembles the corpse. After repeating the procedure with several corpses, he is told to see all the people in Jambudvīpa and then see new corpses filling the trichiliocosm (T613, 247b20–c3). This is the eighth of eighteen meditations in a chapter on impurity.¹⁷⁴

Thus, it seems that, in a group of texts associated with Sarvāstivāda but outside of the mainstream abhidharma and vinaya, the image of the livid or swollen corpse as the first of nine corpse images was largely replaced by the image of a newly dead corpse. In *Visuddhimagga*, the fifth-century Theravāda exposition of doctrine and practice, Buddhaghosa warns the practitioner against choosing a corpse of the opposite sex as a meditation object: “If only recently dead, it may even look beautiful; hence there might be danger to the life of purity” (Ñānamoli 1975, 187).¹⁷⁵ Although *Visuddhimagga* is a representative of an entirely separate tradition, this kind of reasoning may help explain why most texts did not recommend meditation on a new corpse, and Buddhaghosa’s logic is similar to Huiyuan’s explanation of why *Dazhidulun* does not include the image of the newly dead corpse as one of the nine.

As Lachaud points out (2006, 129–138), Zhiyi mentions the nine images in several different texts. He lists the bloated corpse first in *Fajie cidi chumen* 法界次第初門 (T1925, 675b27) and in *Shichan boluomi cidi famen* 釋禪波羅蜜次第法門 (T1916, 536a24). In *Cidi famen*, Zhiyi introduces his account of the nine images with a description of a meditation on a beloved person imagined to be lying like a corpse in front of the practitioner. Concentrating on this image, the meditator is terrified and his desire is destroyed (T1916, 536a16–18; Lachaud 2006, 130–131). Zhiyi says, “This is called *si xiang* 死

172 九相觀者。一者新死相。或見死人。身體正直無所復知。想我此身亦當復爾與此無異。故曰新死相 (T643, 652b24–26; for a French translation, see Lachaud 2006, 120).

173 即於我身作死屍想。青瘀想臃脹想膿爛想破壞想血塗想食殘想蟲出想骨鎖想分離想腐敗想世界衆生無可樂想 (T609, 238a20–23). Greene (2006, 179) and Lachaud (2006, 118) take *sishi xiang* 死屍想 as being separate from the other corpse images mentioned in this passage. Greene translates “...the notion of a corpse. [Namely] the notion of the livid, the bloated...” Lachaud says of the list of stages of the corpse: “Celle-ci est précédée de la notion de mort (jp. *shisō* 死想) qui n’est pas, stricto sensu, incluse dans les différents stades du cadavre en décomposition.” Both scholars appear to be swayed by the 句號 *ju hao* (full stop) after 死屍想 in the Taishō edition. Additionally, Lachaud indicates that the text reads *si* 死 when it actually reads *sishi* 死屍.

174 Some of these meditations correspond to the usual nine images, but they are not listed in a logical order, and the corpse meditations are scattered among some other meditations. (Yamabe characterizes *Chan miyao fa jing* as a “very disorganized text” [1999, 100]).

175 *Tad etam adhunā matam subhato pi upatthāti. Ten’assa brahmacariyantarāyo pi siyā* (*Visuddhimagga*, 146).

想 for short. It is regarded as a meditation preliminary to the nine images.”¹⁷⁶ Lachaud notes that this passage functions as an introduction in the same way as the introduction to the nine images section of *Dazhidulun* (2006, 130).

In a third work, *Miaofa lianhua jing xuanyi* 妙法蓮華經玄義 (T1716, often shortened to *Fahua xuanyi*), Zhiyi explains how the nine images can remove six types of desires. Like Huiyuan, in his description of the practice of the image of the new corpse, Zhiyi calls desires “thieves” (*zei* 賊). Here, he includes the new corpse as the first of the nine images and the burnt corpse as the last.¹⁷⁷ Lachaud remarks that this inclusion of the new corpse could be either a vestige of the notion of death (also *si xiang* 死想) or a development similar to Huiyuan’s inclusion of the image of the new corpse in *Dasheng yizhang* (2006, 134).

Finally, Zhiyi in *Mohe zhiguan* 摩訶止觀 (T1911) describes meditation on the corpse in at least two places. In a section on the perfection of *dhyāna*, Zhiyi recommends *aśubhabhāvanā* to the practitioner who cannot abandon his attachment to a woman. The practitioner should contemplate the woman’s characteristics just after death, which are described in considerable detail: cold, changed in color, emitting worms and pus, unclean, smelly, full of filth. Once he recognizes that his desire is mistaken, his lust will be calmed. The other eight images will also counter his lust.¹⁷⁸

In a section on the objects of *dhyāna*,¹⁷⁹ Zhiyi describes two practices of the nine images: one for practitioners who destroy *dharmas* and one for those who do not. The phrase “destroying *dharmas*” refers to the cremation of the corpse: people who destroy *dharmas* (*huai fa ren* 壞法人) are those who meditate on the burnt corpse as the ninth image, while those who do not (*bu huai fa ren* 不壞法人) proceed from the image of the swollen corpse to the image of the bones but stop before the image of the burnt corpse. In the description of those who destroy *dharmas*, the nine images are numbered and correspond exactly to the images in *Dazhidulun*. Zhiyi describes these practitioners as striving for arhatship (*wuxue* 無學, *aśaikṣa*) and as unable to

176 此則略說死想以為九想前方便也 (T1916, 536a18-19).

177 能修九想除此六賊。死想破威儀言語兩欲。脹想壞想噉想。破形貌欲。血塗想青瘀想膿爛想。破色欲。骨想燒想破細滑欲 (T1716, 719b17-20).

178 若緣女色耽湎在懷惑著不離。當用不淨觀為治。觀所愛人初死之相。言語適爾。奄便那去。身冷色變蟲膿流出。不淨臭處穢惡充滿。捐棄塚間如朽敗木。昔所愛重今何所見。是為惡物令我憂勞。既識欲過姪心即息。餘八想亦治姪欲 (T1911, 93a6-12; see Swanson 2018, 2: 1197 for a translation). The phrase *chusi zhi xiang* 初死之相 is problematic. *Xiang* 相 usually translates *lakṣaṇa* or *nimitta*, “attribute,” “characteristic,” “quality,” etc. However, it is also frequently used as the equivalent of *xiang* 想, *saṃjñā*, which I have been translating as “image” in the context of the nine *aśubhasaṃjñās*. Here, I translate *xiang* 相 as characteristic because in the longer description of the corpse meditation that I discuss below, Zhiyi states that the new corpse is not numbered among the nine images. However, Zhiyi’s mention here of the “other eight images” (*yu ba xiang* 餘八想) suggests that *chusi zhi xiang* refers to a first image: the woman’s body immediately after death.

179 The long passage (T1911, 121c12-122a26) that I summarize here has been translated by Lachaud (2006, 134-136) and Swanson (2018, 2:1449-1452).

attain *dhyāna*, supernatural powers (*shentong* 神通, *ṛddhi*), transformations (*bianhua* 變化, *nirmāna*), knowledge resulting from vows (*yuanzhi* 源智, *prañidhiṅāna*), or the highest meditation (*dingchan* 頂禪). They are subject to fall; they have destroyed *kleśas*, but only temporarily, through mundane wisdom. (Perhaps the phrase “destroying *dharmas*” also alludes to this temporary destruction.)

Zhiyi then explains that the person who does not destroy *dharmas* possesses the flowing light, the *vimokṣas*, the *abhibhvāyatanas*, “discernment, refinement, perfuming, and cultivation,”¹⁸⁰ supernatural powers, and transformations, that is, everything that those who destroy *dharmas* lack. This practitioner is instructed to meditate as follows: “When arousing these *dhyāna* meditations, you should know to follow these [instructions]. Suppose you are sitting in meditation and suddenly you see a corpse lying on the ground. Until a few moments ago you were speaking [with this person], but now suddenly he is gone, with his *chi*-breath extinguished and his body cold, his spirit departed and his color changed” (Swanson 2018, 2: 1451). The practitioner is reminded that this happens to everybody, and that it does not matter how many corpses one imagines. Then Zhiyi says, “Although the (new) corpse is not counted among the nine, this is the basis of all the images and therefore is described first.”¹⁸¹ It is quite likely that he is referring here to *Dazhidulun*. Detailed descriptions of the eight corpses beginning with the swollen corpse follow a brief account of the disgusting appearance of corpses in general. The last item is the bones, with pus and fat attached or pure white, either as a complete skeleton or scattered about. After meditating on all these corpses in order, those who do not destroy *dharmas* (i.e., who do not burn corpses) experience an inexplicable joy.¹⁸²

As for the final image (or notion) in the corpse meditation, the basic alternatives are the burnt corpse and the skeleton or bones.¹⁸³ In *Prajñāpāramitā* texts, the last image is usually the burnt corpse.¹⁸⁴ Other texts in which the burnt corpse is the last include *Dazhidulun*, *Fajie cidi chumen*, and *Shichan boluomi cidi famen*, as well as *Mohe zhiguan*, where, as we have seen above, only those who destroy *dharmas* meditate on the cremated corpse. All these other texts seem to be based on *Prajñāpāramitā*.

180 Donner and Stevenson 1993, 123. See also Lachaud 2006, 135 n. 118.

181 死屍雖非九數。是諸想之本。故先說之 (T1911, 122a9).

182 如是諸相轉時定心隨轉。沈寂愉愉靜妙。安快之相說不可贊 (T1911, 122a24-26).

183 Again, I refer to Lamotte’s summary of the nine or ten images (1970, 3: 1311-13; unless noted, references to individual texts are the same as above for the first image).

184 Examples include *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* (I-1 29, I-2 24; T223, 219a10, 242c17), *Śatasāhasrikā* (59:18, 1258.8), *Mahāprajñāpāramitā* (T220 [VII], 59b12, 468c6). Elsewhere in *Mahāprajñāpāramitā*, the burnt corpse is the second to last item, while the last item is clearly not a corpse image, e.g.: T220 (V), 12a15 (last item: *yiqie shijian bukebao xing* 一切世間不可保想); T220 (V), 261c28 (last item: *yiqie shijian bukele xing* 一切世間不可樂想 [Taishō note gives 保 for 樂]); T220 (VII), 7b25 (last item: *mie huai* 滅壞); T220 (VII), 429c19 (last item: *yan huai* 厭壞). Lamotte notes that the Sanskrit texts are unreliable, and he is uncertain about the Sanskrit original on which some of the Chinese texts are based (1970, 3: 1312-13).

There are three variations concerning the bones: the skeleton; the skeleton or bones followed by a meditation on emptiness; the scattered white bones. In the Pāli *abhidhamma*, the final image is the skeleton. The sutra quoted in *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* mentions the complete skeleton (*asthisamkalikā*) last, as does *Vibhāṣā*. According to *Cintāmayībhūmi* of *Yogācārabhūmi*, the last item is the white bones or the complete skeleton (T1579, 372b8-10).

The examination of emptiness (variously *kong xiang* 空想, *guankong xiang* 觀空想, and *guan cha kong xiang* 觀察空想 [*śūnyatāpratyavekṣaṇasaṃjñā*]), is last in another group of texts, many of them mentioned above, including: *Samyuktāgama* (T99, 198a24); *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* (T1442, 675b6); *Genben shuoyiqie youbu pichuni pinaiye* (T1443, 926c11); *Bhikṣuṇīkarmavacanā* (139.15-16);¹⁸⁵ *Genben shuoyiqie youbu baiyi jiemō* (T1453, 481c24); *Sarvāstivādinayasamgraha* (T1458, 539c13); *Śrāvaka bhūmi* (1: 214.7-8; T1579, 417b13); *Vastusamgrahaṇī* (T1579, 862b22); *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* (T1606, 769a13). In all these cases, the corpse meditation comprises the last nine items on lists of eighteen to twenty-one (usually twenty) *saṃjñās* (in this case better translated as “notions” than as “images”), usually beginning with the notion of impermanence (*anityasaṃjñā*). The corpse images follow the notion of impurity and give the impression that they have been added to the well-known lists of ten *saṃjñās* that appear in the Pāli *Nikāyas*, the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, and the Sanskrit *abhidharma* (see Lamotte 1970, 3: 1431-1433 for information about these lists). It should be noted that in all these texts the first corpse is the livid corpse.

I have not found an explanation of the examination of emptiness in this context. One possibility is that it refers to the fact the corpse at this last stage is reduced to powdered bones, as in descriptions of the ninth charnel ground in, for example, *Majjhimanikāya* and *Madhyamāgama*.¹⁸⁶ Thus, the corpse is empty in the sense of having been reduced to nothing. However, the corpse, like the living body, is also empty in the sense of having no essence. Greene emphasizes that, even in early versions of *aśubhabhāvanā*, the ideas of both emptiness and impurity are found, and he says, “In the texts of the northern tradition, which would serve as the basis for the transmission of Buddhism to China, we find an increased emphasis on both impurity and emptiness, not one at the expense of the other.” He goes on to cite the passage on the charnel ground, mentioned above, as an example of how “these two notions of the

¹⁸⁵ This is a text “stemming from a Mūlasarvāstivāda lineage of transmission” but probably “handed down independently, possibly directly extracted from the *Kṣudrakavastu*” (Dhammadinnā 2016, 97).

¹⁸⁶ *aṭṭhikāni pātāni cunnakajātāni* (*Majjhimanikāya* 1: 58-59 [*Satipaṭṭhanasutta*]); 腐壞碎末 (*Zhong ahan jing* 中阿含經 [T226, 556c4]). For these references, I am grateful to Abe Takako (email to author, July 11, 2020), who also points out a description of an elaborate meditation in *Chan miyao fa jing* in which the practitioner begins by imagining his body as powdered bones, has horrific visions of poisonous snakes, and finally is instructed to meditate on emptiness (T613, 261b26-c15).

body are employed together” in *aśubhabhāvanā* (Greene 2006, 28-29). The texts in which we find the investigation of emptiness as the ninth item all are examples of what Greene calls texts of the northern tradition. Specifically, they are related in one way or another to Sarvāstivāda/Mūlasarvāstivāda.

In a third group of texts, the scattered white bones are the final object. In both *Daodi jing* (T607, 235c20-22) and *Xiuxing daodi jing* (T606, 212a17-19), the last thing the meditator contemplates is the white bones, scattered far and wide. In *Dharmatrāṭadhyānasūtra*, the meditation ends as the practitioner imagines his own bones, desiccated and rotten, turned into dust (T618, 316a25-27). *Guanfo sanmei hai jing* has a somewhat different version: the eighth corpse is the disgusting burnt body, while the ninth is the bones that have dried up over a period of fifty to three hundred years. They turn white, and the sun bleaches them. Fire sparks up from the bones, and after they have burnt up, a wind blows them into the ground, and they return to earth (T643, 652c12-19; for a French translation, see Lachaud 2006, 120). *Chan yao jing*, in its description of meditation on one’s own body as a corpse, ends with “the notion of there being nothing worthy of delight in the living beings of this world” (T609, 238a23; translation by Greene [2006, 179]). However, the three images that precede this are all related to the bones: the skeleton, the scattered, and the rotten. *Zuochan sanmei jing* lists the scattered bones and the burnt bones as the objects of the last two meditations on *aśubhā* (T614, 271c12; Yamabe and Sueki 2009, 11). Later in the section on *aśubhā*, *Zuochan sanmei jing* mentions “white bones emitting rays of light like white jade”¹⁸⁷ as a confirmatory sign of success in the meditation on the pure (*jing guang* 淨觀). Two other *chanjing*, while not including the bones on lists of nine corpses, describe elaborate meditations on the white bones. In *Chanfa yaojie* (T616, 292b5-292c4),¹⁸⁸ we find the same statement as in *Zuochan sanmei jing* about the rays of light and the attainment of pure contemplation (T616, 292b19).¹⁸⁹ And at the end of the section, the meditation on the white bones is described as the “gate of pure *samādhi* within the impure” (T616, 292c2-3). In *Chan miyao fa jing*, the meditation is characterized as an “inverse contemplation”¹⁹⁰ that will relieve the dejection resulting from *aśubhabhāvanā* and culminate in a contemplation of emptiness (T613, 244b21-245c1; Greene 2012, 357-365).

To summarize, *Dazhidulun*, while it accepts the order of the corpses in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*, introduces its description of the meditation on the nine images with an account of a practitioner observing a new corpse. Huiyuan, demonstrating his awareness of another tradition, which can be traced back

187 *bai gu liu guan you ru bai ke* 白骨流光猶如白珂. For the translation, see Yamabe 2009, 13.

188 Yamabe argues that the white bone meditation in *Chanfa yaojie* is “almost certainly a later interpolation” (1999, 83).

189 I am indebted to Yamabe (email to author, 20 July, 2020) for pointing out that *Chanfa yaojie* (T616, 292b5-20) corresponds closely to *Zuochan sanmei jing* (T614, 272a8-23).

190 For this translation of *yi guan* 易觀, see Greene 2012, 358.

at least to *Guanfo sanmei hai jing* and probably to *Daodi jing*, incorporates the image of the new corpse as the first of the nine images. Huiyuan ends with the scattered bones and does not include the cremated corpse. However, he goes no further here. Zhiyi, on the other hand, mentions flowing light and inexplicable joy, foreshadowing the marvelous, colorful visions he describes in his section on the *vimokṣas* as accompanying meditation on the white bones.

2. The nature of *aśubhabhāvanā*

The nature of *aśubhabhāvanā* is a matter of controversy in *Vibhāṣā*. The accepted Sarvāstivāda position is that *aśubhabhāvanā* has non-craving (*alobha*) as its nature. However, according to meditators (T1545: *xiuding zhe* 修定者; T1546: *alianruo* 阿練若 [*āraṇyakas*]), “Wisdom (*prajñā*) is its nature. Why? Because sutra is authoritative. As the sutra says, ‘The eye having seen *rūpa*, accordingly one meditates on *aśubha*...’ up to ‘One thinks correctly.’ Therefore, meditation is wisdom.”¹⁹¹

Dazhidulun simply says that the essential nature of *aśubhabhāvanā* is the apprehension of characteristics. This is clearly different from the *Vibhāṣā* position that the nature of *aśubhabhāvanā* is non-craving, and Huiyuan, without referring to *Vibhāṣā*, seems to recognize the difference. First, he rephrases what *Dazhidulun* says: “(The meditation on) these nine corpses has ideation (*saṃjñā*) as its essential nature because it apprehends characteristics.” Then he adds that, if one considers their result, their nature is non-craving. Here Huiyuan seems to be trying to reconcile the position in *Dazhidulun* with the standard Sarvāstivāda position in *Vibhāṣā*.

The relationship, if any, between the position of the meditators (wisdom) and of *Dazhidulun* and Huiyuan (ideation) is unclear. On the one hand, *saṃjñā* (the apprehension of characteristics) and *prajñā* (here, the correct discernment of an object) are different *dharmas*. On the other hand, *aśubhabhāvanā* seems to involve both: first, one recognizes the corpse in its particular state of blueness, etc.; then one discerns its unsatisfactory nature. Dhammajoti suggests that the author of *Dharmatrāṭadhyānasūtra*, like the meditators in the *Vibhāṣā*, thinks that *prajñā* is the essential nature of *aśubhabhāvanā*.¹⁹² This possibly indicates a relationship between the *Vibhāṣā* meditators and the *chanjing* tradition. We can assume that Kumārajīva, who was responsible for the translation of several *chanjing* (although not *Dharmatrāṭadhyānasūtra*), must have been familiar with ideas current among those whom Deleau characterizes as “Śrāvakayāna *yogācāras* from North-West India,” a group he associates with the *yogācāras* of *Vibhāṣā* as well as with the authors of the *chanjing* (1993, 3). Thus, the *Dazhidulun* position may reflect the ideas of this group of practitioners.

191 問不淨觀以何為自性。答以無貪善根為自性。修定者說。以慧為自性。所以者何。經為量故。如契經說。眼見色已隨觀不淨。如理思惟乃至廣說。觀是慧故 (T1545, 206c11-14); 問曰。不淨觀體性是何。答曰。是無貪。若取其相應共有。則體是五陰。諸阿練若。說體是慧。所以者何。佛經說若能善攝諸根。是名見不淨觀 (T1546, 54a21-24).

192 修禪所起慧，不淨觀一智 (T618, 316b19-20; Dhammajoti 2009b, 293 n. 88).

3. The object of *aśubhabhāvanā*

According to abhidharma texts, the object (*ālambana*) of *aśubhabhāvanā* is the *rūpāyatana* of *Kāmadhātu* (*Vibhāṣā* [T1545, 206c24]; old *Vibhāṣā* [T1546, 154b1]; *Samyuktābhidharmahr̥daya* [T1552, 933c12]; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 338.20-22; Poussin 1971, 4: 152).¹⁹³ In *Vibhāṣā* and old *Vibhāṣā*, an unidentified questioner asks whether the object can be all *Kāmadhātu rūpāyatana*. The answer is affirmative, and a story follows to explain why Bhadanta Aniruddha was not able to contemplate four beautiful goddesses and succeed at *aśubhabhāvanā*—because his faculties were not keen enough. The Buddha, Śāriputra, etc., could succeed (T1545, 206c24-207b2; T1546, 154b1-27).

Dazhidulun states that the object is the body in *Kāmadhātu* (T1509, 218b10) but does not specify whether it is all bodies or only impure, that is to say, unpleasant ones. Huiyuan, however, says that meditation on the nine images takes only impure *rūpa* in *Kāmadhātu* as its object, and he explains that it is because the purpose of the meditation is to destroy desire. Huiyuan says no more on this subject, and it is not clear whether he is intentionally contradicting the other sources. Perhaps relevant are two passages in which Zhiyi mentions impure *rūpa*. In *Fahua xuanyi*, Zhiyi says that the practitioner, when meditating on the nine images and the *vimokṣas*, recognizes that the two-fold results of karma (the fact of his personal existence and his particular environmental circumstances) are the impure *rūpa* that is bloated and that rots.¹⁹⁴ This obvious reference to two images of the corpse implies all nine images, and the realization is that the practitioner is like the corpse. In *Cidi famen*, Zhiyi says that (false notions regarding) the impure *rūpa* of the practitioner's skin and flesh are eliminated at some point in *Kāmadhātu*, while (false notions regarding) the white bones of his own body are extinguished after the first *vimokṣa*. After the second *vimokṣa*, (false notions regarding) all external impure *rūpa* have been removed.¹⁹⁵ These passages suggest that Zhiyi, like Huiyuan, thinks that it is specifically impure *rūpa* that is the object of *aśubhabhāvanā*. This seems commonsensical: it is likely that the vast majority of practitioners would resemble Aniruddha in being unable to practice *aśubhabhāvanā* while contemplating a beautiful body. I do not suggest that there was any connection between Huiyuan and Zhiyi; however, it seems as though, on this point, they are both more concerned with a practical aspect of *aśubhabhāvanā* than with its place in the system of *Dhātus*, *dhyānas*, etc.

193 However, in the context of the *vimokṣas*, Vasubandhu says that the first three *vimokṣas* can have pleasing or unpleasing *rūpa* as their object, whichever is appropriate (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 456.9-10; Poussin 1971, 5: 208-209), which Yaśomitra explains as unpleasing in the case of the first two *vimokṣas*, the livid corpse, etc. (i.e., *aśubhabhāvanā*), but pleasing in the case of the third *vimokṣa* (*śubhabhāvanā*) (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* 689.15-16).

194 慧聖行者。者。謂四種四諦慧云云。生滅四諦慧者。選觀九想背捨依正兩報。臃脹爛壞不淨之色是逼迫相。現相三苦相。是苦諦慧以不起迷著依正 (T1716, 720c12-16; see Kanno 2018, 388).

195 行者於欲界後已除自身皮肉不淨之色。初背捨後已滅內身白骨之色。二背捨後已却外一切不淨之色。唯有八種淨色。至第四禪此八種色皆依心住 (T1916, 542c29-543a3).

4. The differences in subduing the afflictions

Huiyuan recognizes that there are different opinions concerning the numbers and types of sexual desire and the images that counteract these desires. In his section on the five stabilizations, as we saw above, he explains *asubhabhāvanā* as an antidote to the four types of desire for the body of another. He takes up the subject again in the section on meditation on the nine images.

The four types of desire in *Dasheng yizhang* are generally similar to those in Sarvāstivāda abhidharma texts and in *Yogācārabhūmi*. Huiyuan claims to rely on *Nirvāṇasūtra*, but in fact, as I mention in a note to the translation, *Nirvāṇasūtra* lists only three types of desire. The text closest to *Dasheng yizhang* is *Samyuktābhidharmahr̥daya*, which includes the same four types, with only the positions of desire for smoothness of touch and desire for body parts reversed. These two texts both mention body parts (*chusuo* 處所) instead of the more usual “shape” (*saṃsthān*, *xingse* 形色, *xingmao* 形貌, *xingrong* 形容). This supports the *Kokuyaku issaikyō* translator’s identification of *Samyuktābhidharmahr̥daya* as Huiyuan’s source for the related passage in the section on the five stabilizations. This is yet another instance of Huiyuan’s reliance on *Samyuktābhidharmahr̥daya* for Indian abhidharma.

Huiyuan then refers to the seven types of attachment described in *Dazhidulun*.¹⁹⁶ His account is faithful except for a change of order among the first four types. Huiyuan endorses neither the list of four nor the list of seven, although the fact that he includes only four in the section on the stabilizations perhaps indicates his preference. Lamotte notes that *Dazhidulun* is influenced by *Chan yao jing*, which lists six, the usual four types and desire for sounds and human appearance (T609, 237c22-27; Lamotte 1970, 3: 1322-1323; Greene 2006, 175-176). The list in *Chanfa yaojie* is essentially the same as in *Chan yao jing* (T609, 237c22-27). *Zuochan sanmei jing*, like *Dazhidulun*, includes seven types, adding “desire for all of the above” (T614, 271c13-21). In *Dazhidulun*, “all of the above” refers to only the first five, while in *Zuochan sanmei jing* it also includes human appearance. Finally, in *Cidi famen*, Zhiyi largely follows *Dazhidulun*. At the beginning of the passage, he enumerates only six types, but after his descriptions of the first five types, he, too, mentions desire for all of the above (T1916, 536c17-537a13).¹⁹⁷

The increase in the number of types of desire thus seems to have occurred among the *chanjing*, where lists of six or seven are found in three texts associated with Kumārajīva. Lamotte notes that *Chanfa yaojie*, which he considers to be Kumārajīva’s original work, was composed during the same

196 In *Yugarongi* 瑜伽論記, Doryun similarly attributes a list of four to *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* and a list of seven to *Dazhidulun* (T1828, 438b2-11). The list of four includes the antidote images, but the list of seven does not. Both the desires and the antidotes on the list of four in *Yugarongi* correspond very closely to *Dasheng yizhang*, including the use of *chusuo* instead of *xingse* or one of its synonyms. The list of seven strikingly agrees with *Dasheng yizhang* in giving the desires in the same order, different from the order in *Dazhidulun*.

197 In *Mohe zhiguan*, Zhiyi lists the same desires but as a woman’s six desires, not in connection with the nine images (T1911, 70a29-b1; Swanson 2018, 2: 961-962).

period as the translation of *Dazhidulun* (1970, 3: 1322-1323 n. 2).¹⁹⁸ *Chan yao jing* was also probably the work of Kumārajīva (Greene 2006, 170-174). The third text, *Zuochan sanmei*, is described by Yamabe and Sueki as “a meditation manual compiled by Kumārajīva based largely on Indian sources” (Yamabe and Sueki 2009, xiii). It seems as though *Dazhidulun* relies on *chanjing* for the seven desires; however, if the tradition is true that Kumārajīva is actually the author of *Dazhidulun*, then we might wonder whether the seven desires are not his own invention, which he has disseminated in several *chanjing*.

Table 4. Types of desire and their antidotes

Text	Type of desire	Antidote
<i>Śrāvakahūmi</i>	1. Color (<i>varṇa</i> , 顯色)	Livid, rotten, destroyed by worms, swollen, eaten
	2. Shape (<i>saṃsthāna</i> , 形色)	Bloodstained
	3. Pleasant touch (<i>sparśa</i> , 妙觸)	Bones, skeleton, bone skeleton ¹⁹⁹
	4. Deportment (<i>upacāra</i> , 承事)	Scattered
<i>Vastusaṃgrahaṇī</i> (<i>Yogācārabhūmi</i>)	1. Beautiful color (美色)	Livid, swollen
	2. Shape (形貌)	Eaten, reddened, scattered
	3. Smoothness of touch (細觸)	Bones, skeleton
	4. Deportment (承事)	Body devoid of thought
<i>Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya</i>	1. Deportment (<i>upacāra</i> , 承事)	The (new) corpse
	2. Color (<i>varṇa</i> , 色)	Livid, etc.
	3. Pleasant touch (<i>sparśa</i> , 妙觸)	Skeleton with skin and flesh removed
	4. Body parts (<i>deśa</i> [?], 處所)	Scattered joints
<i>Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya</i>	1. Color (<i>varṇa</i> , [Paramārtha] 色, [Xuanzang] 顯色)	Livid, etc.
	2. Shape (<i>saṃsthāna</i> , 形貌, 形色)	Eaten, scattered
	3. (Pleasant) touch (<i>sparśa</i> , 觸, 妙觸)	Destroyed by worms, bones held together by purulent tendons
	4. Deportment (<i>upacāra</i> , 供奉, 承事)	Motionless body

¹⁹⁸ Yamabe asserts that *Chanfa yaojie* was “almost certainly a compilation by Kumārajīva,” and not the translation of a single text (1999, 84).

¹⁹⁹ In *Śrāvakahūmi*, a bone skeleton is a real skeleton, as opposed to an image of a skeleton (*Śrāvakahūmi* 3: 38.19-40.2; Greene 2013, 274).

<i>Nyāyanusāra</i>	1. Color (顯色)	Livid and turning red, (skeleton)
	2. Shape (形色)	Eaten, scattered, (skeleton)
	3. Pleasant touch (妙觸)	Destroyed by worms, bones, (skeleton)
	4. Deportment (<i>upacāra</i> , 供奉, 承事)	Swollen, oozing, (skeleton)
<i>Zuochan sanmei jing</i> (translations of the kinds of desires from Yamabe and Sueki 2009, 11)	1. Pleasant colors (好色)	Livid (and other colors)
	2. Beautiful appearances (端正)	Swollen, scattered
	3. Deportment (儀容)	Blood-smearred bones of a new corpse
	4. Voices (音聲)	Someone being strangulated
	5. Smoothness of touch (細滑)	Bones, dry skin disease
	6. People (衆生)	All six
	7. All of these	All six
<i>Chan yao jing</i> 禪要經	1. Color (色)	Horrific impure images, damaged corpse
	2. Shape (形)	Horrific impure images, damaged corpse
	3. Deportment (威儀)	Horrific impure images, damaged corpse
	4. Sounds (言聲)	Horrific impure images, damaged corpse
	5. Smoothness of touch (細滑)	Horrific impure images, damaged corpse
	6. Human appearance (人相)	White bones, damaged corpse
<i>Dazhidulun</i> 大智度論	1. Color (色)	Bloodstained, livid, oozing
	2. Shape (形容)	Swollen, disintegrated, chewed, ²⁰⁰ scattered
	3. Deportment (威儀)	New corpse
	4. Language (言語)	New corpse
	5. Smoothness of touch (細滑, etc.)	Bones, burnt corpse
	6. All five (皆著五事)	All nine
	7. Human appearance (人相)	All nine but especially the chewed, the scattered, ²⁰¹ the white bones

<i>Dasheng yizhang</i> 大乘義章 “sutra”	1. Deportment (威儀)	New corpse
	2. Color (形色)	Livid, oozing, bloodied
	3. Body parts (處所)	Swollen, disintegrated, eaten by worms, scattered bones
	4. Smoothness of touch (細觸)	Skeleton
<i>Dasheng yizhang</i> “śāstra” (<i>Dazhidulun</i> , according to Huiyuan)	1. Deportment (威儀)	New corpse
	2. Language (言語)	New corpse
	3. Color (形色)	Livid, oozing, bloodied
	4. Shape (形容)	Swollen, disintegrated, eaten by worms, scattered
	5. Smoothness of touch (細滑, etc.)	Skeleton, burnt
	6. All five (皆著五事)	All nine
	7. Human appearance (人相)	All nine
<i>Cidi famen</i>	1. Color (色)	Bloodied, livid, oozing
	2. Shape (形貌)	Swollen, disintegrated, eaten
	3. Deportment (威儀恣態)	New corpse
	4. Sounds (言語音聲)	New corpse
	5. Smoothness of touch (細滑)	Bones, burnt
	6. All five	All nine
	6. (7.) Human appearance (人相)	All nine but especially the disintegrated, the chewed, the scattered, and the white bones
<i>Yugarongi</i> (<i>Nirvānasūtra</i>)	1. Deportment (威儀)	Empty
	2. Color (顯色)	Livid, oozing, bloodied
	3. Body parts (處所)	Swollen, devoured, scattered
	4. Smoothness of touch (細觸)	Skeleton
<i>Yugarongi</i> (<i>Dazhidulun</i>)	1. Deportment (進止)	—
	2. Language (語言)	—
	3. Color (形色)	—
	4. Shape (形容色)	—
	5. Smoothness of touch (細觸)	—
	6. All five (六通著前五)	—
	7. Human appearance, male and female (人相男女相)	—

5. The nine images and the ten notions

The ten notions are a set of ten meditations on seven aspects of the unsatisfactory nature of worldly existence and three stages of disengagement from it. *Dazhidulun* and Huiyuan describe an alignment between the nine-image *aśubhā* meditation as a whole and nine of these notions, omitting the seventh of the ten, namely, *aśuci* (impurity). By referring to Nāgārjuna early in the passage, Huiyuan indicates his reliance on *Dazhidulun* concerning correspondences between the nine images and the ten notions. However, there are some differences between *Dasheng yizhang* and *Dazhidulun*. A comparative outline of the structure of the two texts may be helpful at this point.²⁰²

Dazhidulun

A. Differences between images and notions

1. images prevent lust, notions destroy lust [same as *Dasheng yizhang*]
2. images enchain, notions kill [same as *Dasheng yizhang*]
3. images=beginning practice, notions=perfected practice [same as *Dasheng yizhang*]
4. notion of impurity (*aśucisaṃjñā*) includes all images
 - a. First different opinion: Notions of impurity, distaste for food, and impossibility of the world's being pleasurable include all images.
 - b. Second different opinion: Images and notions counteract desire and are causes of *nirvāṇa*. Why? Correspondences between the nine-image meditation and:
 - i. the notion of impermanence
 - ii. the notion of suffering
 - iii. the notion of non-self
 - iv. the notion of being unable to take pleasure in worldly life
 - v. the notion of hating food
 - vi. the notion of death
 - vii. the notion of cutting off
 - viii. the notion of detachment
 - ix. the notion of disappearance
5. images=cause, notions=result
6. images=outer gate, notions=inner gate

Dasheng yizhang

A. Differences between images and notions (Nāgārjuna)

1. images=beginning, notions=end; images=cause, notions=result
2. images restrain, notions destroy
3. images are like binding a thief, notions are like beheading a thief

²⁰⁰ Lamotte omits the chewed (噉) corpse here (1970, 3: 1324).

²⁰¹ Lamotte mistakenly substitutes the burnt (燒相) for the scattered (離散) corpse here (1970, 3: 1324).

²⁰² For *Dazhidulun*, I follow Lamotte's understanding of the structure of the passage. The analysis of the structure in *Dasheng yizhang* is my own.

B. Similarity

1. images and notions counteract desire and are causes of *nirvāṇa*
 - a. First explanation: notion of impurity includes all images
 - b. Second explanation: notions of impurity, distaste for food, and impossibility of the world's being pleasurable include all images
 - c. Third explanation: nine images include all notions

C. Correspondences between the nine-image meditation and:

1. the notion of impermanence
2. the notion of suffering
3. the notion of non-self
4. the notion of hating food
5. the notion of being unable to take pleasure in worldly life
6. the notion of death
7. the notion of cutting off
8. the notion of detachment
9. the notion of disappearance (notion of destruction)

Both texts begin with statements of the differences between the nine images and the ten notions. In *Dazhidulun*, there are six differences, while in *Dasheng yizhang*, there are three. The three differences according to *Dasheng yizhang* correspond to three of the differences in *Dazhidulun*, although the order is not the same.

In *Dazhidulun*, the fourth difference is that the nine *aśubhā* images are included in *aśuci*, one of the ten notions. This seems to be *Dazhidulun*'s approved position regarding the inclusion of images in the notions. *Dazhidulun* then mentions two differing opinions regarding the fourth difference. Some say that three of the notions (*aśuci*, *āhāre pratikūla*, *sarvaloke 'nabhirati*) include the nine images. Others say that the ten notions and the nine images are conducive to both detachment and *nirvāṇa*. Nine reasons are given in support of this opinion.

In *Dasheng yizhang*, Huiyuan first summarizes differences between the nine images and the ten notions. Still saying that he is following Nāgārjuna, Huiyuan mentions the one similarity: the images and the notions equally counteract desire and are causes of nirvana. Next, he states that opinions differ concerning the inclusion of the images in the notions. He then presents three positions, each prefaced by the phrase, "Some people say." The first position in *Dasheng yizhang* is the accepted position in *Dazhidulun*, that the notion of *aśuci* contains all nine *aśubhā* images. However, Huiyuan does not indicate that either he or the author of *Dazhidulun* accepts this: it is just the first of three positions prefaced by the phrase, "Some people say" (*youren yan* 有人言, *youren shiyan* 有人釋言). The second alternate position is that *aśucisaṃjñā*, *āhāre pratikūlasaṃjñā*, *sarvaloke 'nabhiratisaṃjñā* include all nine images. The third position is that meditation on the nine images includes all ten notions.

In *Dazhidulun*, however, the idea that both the ten notions and the nine images are conducive to both detachment and nirvana is, as we have seen, the second differing opinion. This statement is presented by Huiyuan as Nāgārjuna's opinion, as we have seen above.²⁰³

In *Dasheng yizhang*, the correspondences between the images and the notions seem to be given in a section of their own, not connected to the sections on differences and similarities, In *Dazhidulun*, however, they seem to be given as the explanation for the second differing opinion.

The situation here is very confusing. Perhaps Huiyuan has misunderstood *Dazhidulun*. Perhaps the text of *Dazhidulun* has somehow been corrupted. More likely, Lamotte has not understood the structure of *Dazhidulun*. In any case, I have not been able to explain how discrepancies between the two texts arose.

6. The order of the meditation on the nine images and the *dhyānas*

Lamotte, in his translation of the corresponding passage in *Dazhidulun*, suggests it is *Prajñāpāramitā* that mentions the meditation on the nine images after the *dhyānas* (1970, 3: 1314). Passages in which the nine images can be found after the *dhyānas*, etc., can be found in *Śatasāhasrikā* (57.17-59.18) and *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* (PvsP1-1: 29; T223, 219a5-10). In these passages, the *bodhisattva* is being told what practices he must complete. The nine images precede the *dhyānas*, etc., in lists of good, worldly *dharma*s in the same texts (*Śatasāhasrikā* 1058.1-13; *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* PvsP1-2: 24; T223, 242c15-17) and twice in Xuanzang's translation of *Mahāprajñāpāramitā* (T220 [VII], 50b6-16, 468c4-9).

The position in *Dazhidulun*, with which Huiyuan agrees, is fairly standard. For example, Vasubandhu characterizes *aśubhabhāvanā* and *ānāpānasmrīti* as the two gates through which one enters *bhāvanā* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 338.7-8; Poussin 1971, 4: 148). Huiyuan here basically restates what *Dazhidulun* says without adding anything new.

7. The sequence of the meditation on the nine images with respect to the *bodhipākṣikas*

As with the section on the order of the meditation on the nine images and the *dhyānas*, this section follows *Dazhidulun* almost word for word. The only difference is that *Dazhidulun* says "gate of the city of nirvana" (*niepan chengmen* 涅槃城門), while Huiyuan simply says "gate of nirvana." In *Mohe zhiguan*, Zhiyi quotes *Dazhidulun* even more faithfully (T1911, 117c23-25), while Zhanran 湛然, in *Zhiguan fuxing zhuan hongjue* 止觀輔行傳弘決, adds "the three liberations" (*san tuo men* 三脫門) before nirvana (T1912, 369b29-c2).

²⁰³ In *Yugarongi*, Doryun understands *Dazhidulun* in the same way as Huiyuan, namely, that there are three separate differing opinions (一云中不淨想具攝九想。一云中不淨厭食不可樂三具攝九。一云想觀通攝十想 [T1828, 438b12-16]).

8. The reason for practicing the meditation on the nine images

This section corresponds closely to the beginning of the last section on *aśubhā* in *Dazhidulun*. Huiyuan stops after simply stating the different reasons for practicing the meditation on the nine images in Hīnayāna (to enter *nirvāṇa*) and in Mahāyāna (to liberate all beings). *Dazhidulun* goes on to elaborate on the significance of the meditation in Mahāyāna. In a footnote, Lamotte summarizes the passage in *Dazhidulun*: The *bodhisattva*, unlike the *śrāvaka*, is not attached to pleasant *rūpa* and therefore does not need to arouse disgust. Instead, he skillfully teaches the various images to help lesser beings destroy desire for *rūpa* (Lamotte 1970, 3: 1328 n. 2).

IV. *Aśubhabhāvanā* in the discussion of charnel grounds in the section on the twelve *dhūtas***Translation**

Speaking about charnel grounds, (we observe that) charnel grounds have many corpses, rotting, bloated, and stinking. Looking at them, one easily enters the gate of *aśubhabhāvanā*. Therefore, (practitioners) live in charnel grounds. Furthermore, in charnel grounds, corpses are broken, are eaten by worms, are burned by fire, are torn apart, and are scattered. Looking at them, one easily enters the gate of *anityatā*. Therefore, (practitioners) live in charnel grounds. Furthermore, in charnel grounds, skeletons are scattered. Looking at them, one easily enters the meditation on emptiness and *anātman*. Therefore, (practitioners) live in charnel grounds.²⁰⁴

Discussion

Huiyuan's presentation of the practice of living in charnel grounds is found in a section on the twelve ascetic practices (*Shier toutuo* 十二頭陀). Huiyuan begins by saying that, although the sutras and the *sāstra(s)*²⁰⁵ mention twelve *dhūtas* for emphasis, there are altogether sixteen.²⁰⁶ This seems to be Huiyuan's original interpretation.

204 言塚間者塚間多有死尸爛壞腥臭穢。觀之易入不淨觀門。故在塚間。又復塚間死尸破壞蟲食火燒分離散滅。觀之易入無常觀門。故在塚間。又復塚間骸骨分散。觀之易入空無我觀。故在塚間 (T1851, 765b11-15).

Dazhidulun: 塚間常有悲啼哭聲死屍狼藉。眼見無常後或火燒鳥獸所食不久滅盡。因是屍觀一切法中易得無常相空相。又塚間住若見死屍嗅爛不淨易得。九相觀是離欲初門。是故受塚間住法能作不淨無常等觀已得道 (T1509, 538a11-17). *Shier toutuo jing*: 佛說十二頭陀經: 九者若佛在世若滅度後。應修二法。所謂止觀無常空觀。是佛法初門能令厭離三界。塚間常有悲啼哭聲。死屍狼藉眼見無常。又火燒鳥獸所食不久滅盡。因是屍觀。一切法中易得無常想。又塚間住。若見死屍臭爛不淨。易得九想觀。是離欲初門。是故應受塚間住法 (T783, 721b12-18).

205 It is not clear whether *lun* 論 here refers to *sāstras* in general or to *Dazhidulun* in particular. Another *sāstra* that Huiyuan may have been thinking of is *Shizhu piposha lun* 十住毘婆沙論 (like *Dazhidulun*, translated by Kumārajīva), which has a long section on the *dhūtas* (T1521, 111b26-116a26).

206 頭陀之行具有十六。經論隱顯故說十二 (T1851,764b4-5).

Huiyuan does not mention *Dazhidulun* in his explanation of the charnel grounds. Although, in both texts, living in charnel grounds is discussed immediately before sitting under a tree, in *Dazhidulun*, it follows the practice of wearing only three garments, while in *Dasheng yizhang*, it follows the practice of living in the forest. The contents of the passages in the two texts are basically the same, but the elements are organized somewhat differently, and Huiyuan mentions *anātman*, while *Dazhidulun* does not.

The passage in *Dazhidulun* is almost exactly the same as all but the first two columns of a description of the charnel grounds in *Shier tuotou jing* 十二頭陀經. Enomoto Masaaki has examined the relationship between the two texts and argues convincingly that *Dazhidulun* is the earlier, that *Shier tuotou jing* was actually compiled in China, and that passages in the sutra were quoted from *Dazhidulun*. As additional support for his hypothesis, Enomoto points out that portions of Huiyuan's explanation of the *dhūtas* in *Dasheng yizhang* are similar to passages that correspond between *Dazhidulun* and the sutra, but that Huiyuan never cites the sutra by name (1997).²⁰⁷

In any case, although Huiyuan here does not quote directly from other texts, including *Dazhidulun*, his passage on the charnel grounds, as well as most of his explanation of the *dhūtas*, was itself quoted almost word-for-word in *Tae Pirojana kyōng kongyang ch'ajebōp so* 大毘盧遮那經供養次第法疏 (T1797), a commentary by the eighth-century Korean monk, Pulgasai 不可思議, on *Mahāvairocanasūtra* (*Da Piluzhena jing* 大毘盧遮那經).

V. Why the sixteen superiors (*shiliu tesheng* 十六特勝, the sixteen stages of *ānāpānasmṛti*, meditation on breathing) are better than *aśubhabhāvanā*

Translation

Classification of the sixteen superiors into seven sections: explaining the names and articulating the characteristics is first; division according to the four *smṛtyupasthānas* (bases of mindfulness) is the second; differences in achieving that which is sought after is the third; division according to rank is the fourth; division concerning *dhyāna* is the fifth; division according to person is the sixth; division according to meaning is the seventh.²⁰⁸

In the first section, we first explain the name and afterward articulate the characteristics. The sixteen superiors are as mentioned in *Tattvasiddhi*. In *Vibhāṣā* also they are distinguished extensively. As for the expression “superior,” this meditation is called superior because it is better than the method of *aśubhabhāvanā*.²⁰⁹

207 However, an SAT search reveals that, in *Da banniepanjing yiji* (T1764, 831c14), Huiyuan mentions the *sūtra* by its title.

208 十六特勝七門分別 一釋名辨相 二約對四念分別 三所求成差別 四就位分別 五約禪分別 六就人分別 七隨義分別 (T1851, 771a8-9).

209 就初門中先釋其名後辨其相。十六特勝如成實說。毘婆娑中亦廣分別。言特勝者。此觀勝於不淨觀法故名 (T1851, 771a10-12).

What are its excellent characteristics? There are eight types.²¹⁰

The first is superiority in destroying afflictions. *Aśubhabhāvanā* meditation merely destroys desire. This meditation can destroy all *kleśas*. Why is that? All *kleśas* arise due to wrong awareness. *Ānāpānasmṛti* destroys wrong awareness. Because wrong awareness ceases, the *kleśas* do not arise. Therefore, it destroys all.²¹¹

The second is superiority in severing the bonds. That *aśubhabhāvanā* can only suppress the bonds. The sixteen superiors both suppress them and eternally sever them.²¹²

The third is superiority in breadth. That *aśubhabhāvanā* is only meditation on the fact that *rūpa dharmas* are impure. (With) the superiors, one meditates comprehensively on *dharmas*, including *rūpa*, *citta*, etc.²¹³

The fourth is superiority in subtlety. That *aśubhabhāvanā* is only a meditation on bones, etc. (With) the superiors, one subtly can meditate on impermanence, abandoning, separation, cessation, etc.²¹⁴

The fifth is superiority in persistence. That *aśubhabhāvanā* arises in dependence on the body of another. One obtains it and easily loses it. The sixteen superiors arise in dependence on one's own body. One obtains them, and they are difficult to lose.²¹⁵

The sixth is superiority in controlling and stabilizing. As *Tattvasiddhi* says,²¹⁶ (as for) that *aśubhabhāvanā*, (the practitioner) has not yet obtained freedom from attachment. (The practitioner) hates himself. It is like those *bhikṣus* on the banks of the Valgumudā river: due to meditating on the impure, they killed themselves, taking poison, falling from high places, looking for a knife. (*Aśubhabhāvanā*) is like taking too much medicine and contrariwise suffering even more. The superiors are not like this. They can destroy desire without producing (self-)hatred.²¹⁷

The seventh is superiority in what is produced. As *Vibhāṣā* says,²¹⁸ that *aśubhabhāvanā* increases the notion (that) sentient beings (are real) because, by means of that meditation, the bones of men, women, etc., are taken as impure.²¹⁹ The sixteen superiors, (on the other hand,) increase the notion of *dharma*²²⁰ because they are the basis of the *samādhi* of emptiness.²²¹

210 勝相如何。釋有八種 (T1851, 771a12-13).

211 一破患勝。不淨觀門但破貪欲。此觀能破一切煩惱。何故而然。一切煩惱因惡覺生。念出入息除滅惡覺。惡覺斷故煩惱不起。故破一切 (T1851, 771a13-16).

212 二斷結勝。彼不淨觀但能伏結。十六特勝亦伏亦永斷 (T1851, 771a16-17).

213 三寬廣勝。彼不淨觀但觀色法以爲不淨。特勝通觀色心等法 (T1851, 771a17-18).

214 四微細勝。彼不淨觀但觀骨等。特勝微細能觀無常斷離滅等 (T1851, 771a18-20). For *virāgadhātu* (離界) as destruction of desire, *prahāṇadhātu* (斷界) as destruction of the other *kleśas*, and *nirodhadhātu* (滅界) as destruction of the object, e.g., impure *rūpa*, see *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (386.14-20; T1558, 134a23-26; Poussin 1971, 4: 301).

215 五堅固勝。彼不淨觀緣他身起。得而易失。十六特勝緣自身起。得而難失 (T1851, 771a20-21).

216 For references, see discussion.

217 六調停勝。如成實說。彼不淨觀未得離欲。已自厭惡。如彼婆求河邊比丘。由觀不淨服毒墜高求刀自殺。如藥過增反更爲患。特勝不爾。能破貪欲而不生厭 (T1851, 771a21-25).

218 For references, see discussion.

The eighth is superiority in being different. As *Vibhāṣā* says,²¹⁹ that *aśubhabhāvanā* is (practiced) in common with the non-Buddhists. The sixteen superiors are not in common with the non-Buddhists.²²⁰

For all these eight reasons, they are called “superiors.” The meaning of the name is like this.²²¹

Discussion

Near the beginning of a long section on the sixteen superiors (the sixteen stages of *ānāpānasmṛti*),²²² Huiyuan explains why *ānāpānasmṛti* is superior to *aśubhabhāvanā*. As Huiyuan suggests, *Vibhāṣā*²²³ and *Tattvasiddhi* contain relevant discussions of the relationship between *ānāpānasmṛti* and *aśubhabhāvanā*.

In *Vibhāṣā*, the context is an explanation of the status of *ānāpānasmṛti* with regard to the *smṛtyupasthānas*. It is first stated that *ānāpānasmṛti*, although it is not a basic *smṛtyupasthāna*, is a preliminary practice for *smṛtyupasthāna*, and, since it is based on *rūpa*, it can loosely be considered to be *kāyasmṛtyupasthāna*.²²⁴ The question is then asked: Why does the sutra say that *ānāpānasmṛti* is “the four *smṛtyupasthānas*”? The answer is that it is a preliminary practice for all four.²²⁵

It is observed that *aśubhabhāvanā* is also a preliminary practice for the four *smṛtyupasthānas* but is not called “four *smṛtyupasthānas*.”²²⁶ The old *Vibhāṣā* says that if there are beings who need to hear that *ānāpāna* is *smṛtyupasthāna*, the Buddha will say so; if there are beings who need to hear that *aśubha* is *smṛtyupasthāna* to obtain awakening, the Buddha will also say that.²²⁷ Then both *Vibhāṣās* mention that some people cite a sutra that equates meditation on corpses with *smṛtyupasthāna*.²²⁸

219 復有說者。不淨觀能增長衆生想。所以者何。觀時必觀男女身骨故 (T1546, 106a28-29).

220 According to Nakamura, the term “notion of *dharma*” means contemplating the impermanence of the body or impurity, and he refers to *Chanxing faxiang jing* 禪行法想經 (T605), translated by An Shigao (Nakamura 1981, 1234b).

221 七所生勝。如毘婆沙說。彼不淨觀增長衆生想。以其觀察男女等骨爲不淨故。十六特勝增長法想。以空三昧之根本故 (T1851, 771a25-28).

219 六調停勝。如成實說。彼不淨觀未得離欲。已自厭惡。如彼婆求河邊比丘。由觀不淨服毒墜高求刀自殺。如藥過增反更爲患。特勝不爾。能破貪欲而不生厭 (T1851, 771a21-25).

220 八所異勝。如毘婆沙說。彼不淨觀與外道共。十六特勝不共外道 (T1851, 771a28-29).

221 具斯八義故名特勝。名義如是 (T1851, 771a29-b1).

222 These are also referred to as the sixteen practices (*shiliu xing* 十六行) (Deleau 1992, 51). Demiéville remarks that there does not seem to be a Sanskrit equivalent of *te sheng*, “superior” (1954, 415 n. 1).

223 In the following, unless otherwise specified, *Vibhāṣā* refers to both old and new *Vibhāṣās*.

224 非根本念處。是念處方便。若取念處眷屬者。則是身念處。所以者何。以綠色故 (T1546, 106a8-10); 念住者。是身念住加行。非根本念住。若依汎爾四念住說是身念住綠色法故 (T1545, 134b15-17).

225 問曰若然者。何故佛經說阿那般那念是四念處耶。答曰以是念處方便故。名四念處 (T1546, 106a10-12); 問何故契經說。持息念通四念住。答此能引起四念住故作如是說 (T1545, 134b17-19).

226 問曰若然者。不淨觀亦是四念處方便。何故不說名四念處耶 (T1546, 106a12-13); 問不淨觀亦能引起四念住。何故不說四念住耶 (T1545, 134b19-20).

227 答曰若有衆生。應聞阿那般那是念處者。世尊則說。若有衆生。應聞不淨是念處而得悟者佛亦說之 (T1546, 106a13-15).

228 復有說者。如此經中。亦說不淨觀是念處。如此經偈說若能觀青色 亦能觀爛壞 是名身念

However, the new *Vibhāṣā* states explicitly that most sutras say that *ānāpānasmṛti*, not *aśubhabhāvanā*, is *smṛtyupasthāna*. Both texts give reasons, although not in the same order. Below, I follow the order in the old *Vibhāṣa*, since this was the text available to Huiyuan. First, unlike *aśubhabhāvanā*, *ānāpānasmṛti* is firm, dependable, and easy to return to after loss of concentration.²²⁹ Second, even non-Buddhists can practice *aśubhabhāvanā*; only Buddhists can practice *ānāpānasmṛti*.²³⁰ Third, because it is the contemplation of the body and bones of men or women, *aśubhabhāvanā* strengthens the (false) notion of sentient beings; *ānāpānasmṛti* strengthens the (true) notion of dharmas, which is the basis of *sūnyatāsamādhi*.²³¹ Fourth, unlike *aśubhabhāvanā*, *ānāpānasmṛti* has as its object something nearby. It is not a mixed meditation. It is not a gradual meditation. It is not a meditation on sentient beings. It does not require much effort.²³²

The second and third arguments (in the old *Vibhāṣā*) correspond to the eighth and seventh, respectively, in *Dasheng yizhang*.

In *Tattvasiddhi*, the relationship between *aśubhā* and *ānāpānasmṛti* is discussed in a chapter on *ānāpānasmṛti*. The question is asked: If by meditating on *aśubhā* one can become disillusioned with the body and quickly obtain liberation, why should one practice *ānāpānasmṛti*?²³³ Four reasons are given, all comparing the two practices and favoring *ānāpānasmṛti*. Since the explanations are brief, I translate them below:

“One who, contemplating *aśubhā*, still has not renounced desire comes to hate himself and becomes perturbed in body and mind. It is like taking too much medicine and becoming ill again. This type of *aśubhā* delights in causing hatred (for oneself). It is like the monks on the banks of the Valgumudā river, who gave rise to hatred (for themselves) due to *aśubhabhāvanā* and

處觀淨生欲心是中亦有受是名受念處能以無瞋心是名心念處亦斷於愛患是名法念處 (T1546, 106a15-22); 答亦有經說。此不淨觀通四念住。如說若觀青淤膿爛蟲食等事名身念住。又說。若觀此中有受能引淨貪亦令止息名受念住。又說。若觀無損害意憐愍一切遍諸方域名心念住。又說。若觀貪瞋癡斷離染起明得衆苦盡名法念住 (T1545, 134b20-26).

229 復次何故。說阿那般那念是念處。不說不淨觀耶。答曰以阿那般那念觀牢固可恃。不淨觀法則不爾。若行者失念。煩惱現在前時。速能還觀。如人怖恐速走入城。彼亦如是 (T1546a23-26); 問雖此一經說不淨觀通四念住。而無量經說持息念通四念住。非不淨觀有何意耶。答以持息念依處串習牢固可恃。假使失念煩惱現行速可依之伏諸煩惱引四念住。如人怖賊速走歸城處調大種相決定故。若不淨觀非處串習性不牢固。或時失念煩惱現行不能依之速伏煩惱引四念住。言非處者。謂諸造色相不定故。由此多經說持息念通四念住非不淨觀 (T1545, 134b6-c5).

230 復有說者。阿那般那念。不與外道共不淨觀共 (T1546a26-27); 復次以持息念唯內道起不共外道。由此速能引四念住是故偏說。若不淨觀外道亦起。不能速疾引四念住是故不說 (T1545, 134c12-15).

231 復有說者。不淨觀能增長衆生想。所以者何。觀時必觀男女身骨故。阿那般那念。能增長法相。所以者何。以是空三昧根本故。是故說四念處 (T1546, 106a28-b2); 復次以持息念增益法想是空觀本。由此速能引四念住。是故偏說。若不淨觀增有情想。如說此骨爲女爲男障礙空觀。不能速疾引四念住是故不說 (T1545, 134c5-9).

232 復有說者。阿那般那念。緣近法。是不雜觀。非次第觀。非是因衆生觀。不多用功。不淨觀不爾。是故說是念處。不說不淨觀也 (T1546, 106b2-5); 復次以持息念所緣憐近無種種相。無定次第不依有情運而轉。由此速能引四念住是故偏說。若不淨觀與此相違是故不說 (T1545, 134c9-12). Note that old *Vibhāṣā* reads *bu duo yongong* 不多用功, while new *Vibhāṣā* reads “not varied” (*wu zhongzhong xiang* 無種種相).

233 問曰。若觀不淨深厭離身。速得解脫。何用修此十六行耶 (T1646, 356a20-21).

killed themselves in various ways, such as drinking poison and jumping from heights.²³⁴ This (*ānāpānasmṛti*) is not like that. It can enable one to renounce desire but not arouse hatred. Therefore, it is superior.”²³⁵ This corresponds to Huiyuan’s sixth argument.

“Furthermore, (success in) this practice is easy to attain because its object is one’s own body. (Success) in *aśubhā* is easy to lose.”²³⁶ The relation between this and Huiyuan’s argument is discussed below.

“Furthermore, this practice (*ānāpānasmṛti*) is subtle because, with it, one can quickly break apart one’s body. The practice of *aśubhā* is coarse; it is difficult to break the image of bones.”²³⁷ The relation between this and Huiyuan’s argument is discussed below.

“Furthermore, this practice (*ānāpānasmṛti*) can destroy all *kleśas*. *Aśubhā* destroys only sexual desire. Why? It is because all *kleśas* arise due to false conceptualization and *ānāpānasmṛti* destroys false conceptualization.”²³⁸

The second and third arguments in *Tattvasiddhi* seem to correspond with Huiyuan’s fifth and fourth arguments, respectively. However, Huiyuan does not seem to be saying exactly the same thing as *Tattvasiddhi*. Also, there seems to be a problem with the *Tattvasiddhi* text. My translation is based on the Taishō text as it stands (with the exception of reading 疾 for 自). However, in the statement that *ānāpānasmṛti* is easy to obtain, while *aśubhā* is easy to lose, *Tattvasiddhi* does not give the reason why *aśubhā* is easy to lose, and, as Yamabe Nobuyoshi points out, the parallel structure is thus broken. This, he suggests, could indicate that something has been lost (email to author, September 25, 2020).

VI. *Aśubhabhāvanā* in an explanation of the characteristics of meditation in a section on the *smṛtyupasthānas* (bases of mindfulness)

Translation

Next, we explain the characteristics of meditation. Those practitioners are ones who have left home and who first keep the pure precepts. In calming meditation, they consider impurity with respect to inner and outer *rūpa*.²³⁹

234 For references to this story in sutras and the *Vinaya*, see Anālayo, 2014. In *Mohe zhiguan*, Zhiyi also refers to the story in an explanation of the sixteen superiors. He says, “The supreme [meditations] can be accepted as contemplations of reality, but [contemplating] impurity often cannot be tolerated even as a consideration of conventional [reality]” (Swanson 2018, 2: 1440; 特勝是實觀猶可從容。不淨是假想不須可耐 [T1911, 120b25-26]).

235 答曰。不淨觀未得離欲自惡厭。身心則迷悶。如服藥過則還為病。如是不淨喜生惡厭。如跋求沫河邊諸比丘不淨觀故深生惡厭。飲毒墜高等種種自殺。此行不爾。能得離欲而不生惡厭。故名為勝 (T1646, 356a21-26).

236 又此行易得。自緣身故不淨易失 (T1646, 356a26).

237 又此行細微。以能壞壞身故。不淨行能壞壞骨相難 (T1646, 356a27-28). I have accepted the Old Song reading 疾 for the Taishō preferred reading, 自.

238 又此行能破一切煩惱。不淨但破淫欲。所以者何。一切煩惱皆因覺生。念出入息為斷諸覺故 (T1646, 356a28-b1). The same difference is pointed out in a passage in *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* that compares three meditations (*aśubhabhāvanā*, *ānāpānasmṛti*, and *dhatuprabheda*) without ranking them (彼貪欲者以不淨觀度。覺觀者以安般念度。見行者以界方便觀度 (T1552, 908b2-4).

239 次辨觀相。其修行者既出家已先持淨戒。於寂靜定於內外色觀察不淨 (T1851, 782c27-29).

In order to become disillusioned with their own body, they meditate on the *rūpa* of their own body by way of the five impurities.²⁴⁰

First is impurity of seed: this body has past karma and affliction as its seed. In the present (existence), it has the semen and blood of the father and mother as its seed. This is called “impurity of seed.”²⁴¹

Second is impurity of dwelling place: inside the mother’s belly, one is established below the stomach and above the intestines.²⁴²

Third is impurity of the nature of the body: thirty-six things constitute the body.²⁴³

Fourth is impurity of characteristics: There is constant flow from the nine holes. Two eyes, two ears, two nostrils and mouth, anus, and urethra—these are the nine holes. Eyes emit secretions and tears. Ears emit balled-up earwax. The interior of the nose emits mucus. The mouth emits vomit. Excrement and urine flow out from the anus and urethra.²⁴⁴

Fifth is final²⁴⁵ impurity: This body, once it dies, is eaten by worms and becomes excrement. (If) it is burned by fire, it becomes ashes. (If) it is buried, it becomes earth. Finally, if one investigates, there is no pure characteristic at all. Therefore, this is called final impurity.²⁴⁶

If one’s mind becomes distracted, one should think about the impermanence of the body, the suffering of the three bad destinies, and the impending destruction of the Buddha Dharma. Therefore, whip the mind to return it (to the meditative object) and make it stable in *aśubhabhāvanā*.²⁴⁷

In order to become disillusioned with the body of another, one must meditate on external *rūpa*, considering it as the nine images. Namely, the images of a dead person, a swollen corpse, a livid corpse, an oozing corpse, a disintegrating corpse, a bloodstained corpse, a corpse chewed by worms, a skeleton, (and) dispersed (bones) are the nine images. In *Dazhidulun*, one, the image of a (new) corpse, is lacking. Adding one, the image of a burnt corpse, makes nine. The meanings of these have all been fully distinguished earlier, in the chapter on the nine images. Mindfulness of the body is like this.²⁴⁸

240 為厭自身觀自身色為五不淨 (T1851, 782c29).

241 一種子不淨。是身過去業與煩惱而為種子。現在父母精血為種。名種不淨 (T1851, 782c29-783a2).

242 二住處不淨。在母腹中生藏之下熟藏之上安置己體 (T1851, 783a2-3).

243 三自體不淨。三十六物集成己體 (T1851, 783a3-4). This is the fourth type in the earlier passage. Unlike in the earlier passage, here Huiyuan does not enumerate the body parts and does not refer to *Dazhidulun*.

244 四自相不淨。九孔常流。兩眼兩耳兩鼻及口大小便道是九孔也。眼出眵淚耳出結瞤。鼻中出涕口出涎吐。大小便道流出屎尿 (T1851, 783a4-7). This is the third type in the earlier passage.

245 畢竟, not 終竟 as in the earlier passage.

246 五畢竟不淨。此身死已虫食成糞。火燒為灰。埋之成土。究竟推求都無淨相。是故名為畢竟不淨 (T1851, 783a7-9). The order is different in the earlier passage, and there are slight differences in wording.

247 若心散亂念身無常三惡道苦佛法欲滅。以此鞭心還令安住不淨觀中 (T1851, 783a9-11). See *Dazhidulun*: 若心散亂。當念老病死三惡道苦身命無常佛法欲滅。如是等鞭心令伏。還繫不淨觀中 (T1509, 405a14-16).

248 為厭他身須觀外色以為九想。所謂死相臃脹青淤膿爛破壞血塗虫食骨瑣分離是九想也。大智論中少一死想。加一燒想合以為九。此義如前九想章中具廣分別。身念如是 (T1851, 783a11-15).

Discussion

This section largely repeats the explanation of the meditations on the impurity of the body of another and the impurity of one's own body found in the discussion of *aśubhabhāvanā* as one of the five stabilizations (T1851, 697c17-698a18). I have discussed this material in my section on *aśubhā* in the context of the five types of mental stabilization. The main difference is that in this section impurity of one's own body is explained first. The definitions here of the five impurities of one's own body are almost identical to those in the earlier passage. Any differences between the two passages are underlined in the translation.

Conclusion

There are many variations on *aśubhabhāvanā*, the Buddhist meditation on the impure. There was always a tension between the negative message of the meditation—that our cherished bodies are actually disgusting causes of suffering—and the purified awareness that results from the meditation. One pitfall is that the meditator might be overwhelmed by the visualization of corpses. This problem can be counteracted by meditation on the pure (*śubhā*), the third of the eight meditations called “liberations,” or even by the visualization of the white bones, the last of the nine corpse meditations in some versions (Dhammajoti 2009b, 287). Greene shows that this white bone meditation became prominent in the group of texts called “meditation sutras” (*chanjing*) translated into Chinese in the fifth century (2006, 93-128). As this article shows, Jingying Huiyuan, in *Dasheng yizhang*, a sixth-century compendium of Buddhist doctrine, discusses many aspects of *aśubhabhāvanā*. To a large extent, he relies on *Dazhidulun*, a much longer work traditionally considered to be Kumārajīva's fifth-century translation of Nāgārjuna's commentary on *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*. However, Huiyuan also refers to abhidharma, specifically the old *Vibhāṣā* and *Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya*, Sarvāstivāda doctrinal texts translated somewhat later in the fifth century, as well as to *Tattvasiddhi*, another work translated by Kumārajīva (411-412).

Much of what Huiyuan says about *aśubhabhāvanā* is consistent with standard Indian descriptions and classifications. However, at several points his interpretations seem to have been influenced by the white bone meditation, which is so important in the *chanjing*. These interpretations include: Huiyuan's classification of *aśubhā* into two types (standard in the *chanjing* as well as in *Dazhidulun*); his statement of the importance of a meditation on the skinless and fleshless white bones, in which the bones turn into masses of snow; his acceptance of the new corpse as the first image of the nine-image meditation (not found in Indian sources, but common in the *chanjing*); his opposition to *Dazhidulun* in his rejection of the burnt corpse as the final image.

Thus, Huiyuan's *Dasheng yizhang*, although not citing or referring to the *chanjing* by name, probably reflects an awareness of the teachings in those meditation texts. *Dazhidulun*, too, includes descriptions of meditations

on white bones. Kumārajīva was the translator of several *chanjing* as well as of *Dazhidulun*. At this point, we cannot be sure whether Huiyuan knew the *chanjing* directly or whether he knew the *changjing* contents only indirectly through *Dazhidulun*. In any event, it is clear that Huiyuan describes developments in the meditations on the impure and the pure that cannot be found in Indian works.

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Genben shuoyiqie youbu pichuni pinaive 根本說一切有部苾芻尼毘奈耶 (T1443).
Genben shuoyiqie youbu pinaive 根本說一切有部毘奈耶 (T1442).
Guan wuliangshou jing yishu 觀無量壽經義疏 (T1749).
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Evolving Portrayals of Sāriputta and Moggallāna: Psychic Potency vis-à-vis Wisdom and Concentration

Tse-fu KUAN

1. Introduction

As is widely recognized in Buddhism, Sāriputta (Skt. Śāriputra) and Moggallāna (Skt. Maudgalyāyana) were the two chief disciples of the Buddha. According to the *Mahāpadāna Sutta* in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, the Buddha Gotama recounts that each of the six former Buddhas had an excellent pair of chief disciples, and then he refers to himself: “I now have an excellent pair of chief disciples named Sāriputta and Moggallāna.”¹ A similar account appears in the Chinese version of the *Mahāpadāna Sutta* in the *Dīrgha Āgama* (長阿含經, T 1),² which belongs to the Dharmaguptaka.³ The mention of “the two great disciples in the Tathāgata’s community, Sāriputta and Moggallāna”⁴ is also found in the *Samyukta Āgama* (雜阿含經, T 99) in Chinese translation, which is ascribed to the Sarvāstivāda or more specifically the Mūlasarvāstivāda.⁵ In the *Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya* (摩訶僧祇律, T 1425), the expression “great disciples (of the Buddha)” is applied exclusively to Sāriputta and Moggallāna.⁶ Judging from the accounts in the various traditions, these two saints’ supreme status must have been established prior to the split of the Buddhist Order, and may well date back to the Buddha’s time.

First referring to the *Mahāvagga* of the Theravāda *Vinaya* in Pāli and then to the *Mahāvastu* of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin *Vinaya* in Sanskrit, Reginald A. Ray argues:

In the *Mahāvagga* account, Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana are simply mentioned as the two main disciples of the Buddha. It is in the more developed versions of the legends that we find Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana depicted according to their special virtues. Thus Śāriputra is declared to be foremost in wisdom (*prajñā*), Maudgalyāyana foremost in miraculous power (*abhiññā* [sic; it should be *ṛddhi*]⁷) (for example, *Mv* 3:63 ...) and, in some sources, meditation.⁸

This historical perspective deserves our attention, but the stratification of the texts along with their portrayals of the two saints is not conclusive. Whereas some portions of the *Mahāvastu* (referred to as *Mv* by Ray above) were not composed until the 4th century CE or even later, this text enjoys canonical status as part of the *Vinaya* and contains very old material.⁹

Moreover, Sāriputta and Moggallāna are also hailed as eminent for wisdom (*paññā*, Skt. *prajñā*) and for psychic potency (*iddhi*, Skt. *ṛddhi*) respectively by some *suttas/sūtras* in the four main *Nikāyas/Āgamas*, which are usually

regarded as belonging to the earliest stratum of Buddhist literature.¹⁰ For example, *vagga* 14 in the Book of Ones in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* enumerates dozens of the Buddha's important disciples in the form of the Buddha's own words. *Sutta* 1 of this *vagga* begins thus:

Bhikkhus, the foremost of my bhikkhu disciples in seniority is Aññakoṇḍañña.
 [The foremost of my bhikkhu disciples] with great wisdom is Sāriputta.
 [The foremost of my bhikkhu disciples] with psychic potency is Mahā Moggallāna.¹¹

The sequence here also signifies that Sāriputta and Moggallāna are the Buddha's chief disciples. Aññakoṇḍañña tops the list simply because he was the first to become a bhikkhu under the Buddha (Vin I 12). This *sutta* has its Chinese parallel in several *sūtras* of Chapter 4 in the *Ekottarika Āgama* (增壹阿含經, T 125), which is generally ascribed to the Mahāsāṃghika tradition.¹² *Sūtra* 2 also describes Sāriputta and Moggallāna as distinguished by excellence of wisdom (*paññā*) and of psychic potency (*iddhi*) respectively.¹³ *Sūtra* 6 of Chapter 48 in the *Ekottarika Āgama* states unequivocally: "Sāriputta is first for wisdom. Moggallāna is first for psychic potency."¹⁴ Accordingly, the description of Sāriputta as the *paññā* virtuoso and Moggallāna as the *iddhi* virtuoso is common to both the Theravāda and Mahāsāṃghika *suttas*. This fact denotes that such accounts already existed before the first schism which split the Saṅgha into the Sthaviras and the Mahāsāṃghikas in the 3rd century BCE.¹⁵

However, André Migot (1954: 506) observes:

We have seen that Maudgalyāyana is always the master of *ṛddhi* while Śāriputra is the master of *prajñā*. But then, certain texts place value on the supernatural faculties of Śāriputra, sometimes attributing to him magical powers superior to those of the specialist Maudgalyāyana.

Why are there such anomalies? With an attempt to cast light on such phenomena and relevant issues, I examine some significant and correlated textual passages in this research. Steven Collins says: "narrative is as important a cognitive function, a mode of culture-making, and a mode of truth-claiming, as is systematic thought."¹⁶ My study seeks to contextualize both Buddhist narrative and systematic thought in historical development.

In this paper I mainly use proper names and terminology in Pāli because Pāli is the language used by the Theravāda, the only early Buddhist school that is still thriving today while all the other early/mainstream schools have died out. Besides, most readers of this paper will probably be more familiar with Pāli than with Sanskrit.

2. Liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom: concentration vs. wisdom

Sāriputta and Moggallāna represent two different paradigms in terms of the Buddhist path to liberation, which consists in the three trainings: morality,

concentration, and wisdom. As I have demonstrated, concentration (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*paññā*) correspond respectively to serenity (*samatha*) and insight (*vipassanā*),¹⁷ which are two main categories of Buddhist “mental culture” (*bhāvanā*).¹⁸ Below I will show that the Buddhist tradition has tended to associate Moggallāna with concentration or serenity, and Sāriputta with wisdom or insight, and to characterize the former figure along with his outstanding faculty as inferior to the latter.

Let us first look at the close affinity between psychic potency (*iddhi*) and concentration (*samādhi*). A stock formula of the “four bases for psychic potency” (*cattāro iddhi-pādā*) is as follows:

- (1) A bhikkhu develops the basis for psychic potency that possesses concentration due to desire and activities of striving.
- (2) He develops the basis for psychic potency that possesses concentration due to energy and activities of striving.
- (3) He develops the basis for psychic potency that possesses concentration due to mind and activities of striving.
- (4) He develops the basis for psychic potency that possesses concentration due to investigation and activities of striving.¹⁹ (translation based on Bodhi 2012: 125–126, 619)

This formula makes it clear that psychic potency (*iddhi*) always involves concentration (*samādhi*); psychic potency is based on concentration due to any of the four factors. Accordingly, that Moggallāna is foremost in *iddhi* may amount to that he is foremost in *samādhi*. This is corroborated by the fact that in the *Samyutta Nikāya* a chapter devoted to Moggallāna, the *Moggallāna-samyutta* (SN IV 262–280), features *samādhi*. Nine out of the eleven *suttas* in this chapter talk about how Moggallāna overcomes the hindrances and attains nine stages of concentration, including the four *jhānas*, the sphere of infinite space, the sphere of infinite consciousness, the sphere of nothingness, the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception (these spheres are the “four formless attainments”), and signless concentration of mind (*animitto ceto-samādhi*).

The commentarial material (the 5th century CE or earlier) further confirms Moggallāna’s excellence in concentration. In the *Mahā-Māluṅkya Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, Ānanda asks the Buddha why some bhikkhus attain liberation of mind (*ceto-vimuttino*) and others attain liberation by wisdom (*paññā-vimuttino*). The Buddha replies: “The difference here is in their faculties.” (MN I 437) In Buddhaghosa’s commentary on this *sutta*, “liberation of mind” and “liberation by wisdom” are illustrated by Moggallāna and Sāriputta respectively. The commentary runs as follows:

- Among those who proceed by way of serenity, one bhikkhu emphasizes unification of mind (*cittakaggatā*) — he is said to gain liberation of mind (*ceto-vimutto*); another emphasizes wisdom — he is said to gain liberation by wisdom (*paññā-vimutto*).

Among those who proceed by way of insight, one emphasizes wisdom — he is said to gain liberation by wisdom; another emphasizes unification of mind — he is said to gain liberation of mind.

The two chief disciples attained arahantship by emphasizing both serenity and insight, but the General of the Dhamma [i.e. Sāriputta] became one who gained “liberation by wisdom” and Mahā Moggallāna became one who gained “liberation of mind”.

Thus the reason (for the different designations) is the difference in their faculties [, i.e., between the predominance of the concentration faculty and of the wisdom faculty].²⁰ (translation based on Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 1269 note 659)

According to the commentary, Sāriputta exemplifies “liberation by wisdom” and Moggallāna exemplifies “liberation of mind”. The difference lies in their faculties: wisdom versus concentration. While “liberation by wisdom” is naturally attributed to wisdom (*paññā*), “liberation of mind” is linked to unification of mind (*cittakaggatā*) or concentration (*samādhi*). This exegesis was apparently inspired by canonical texts such as a *sutta* in the *Āṅguttara Nikāya*, which states:

These two things pertain to gnosis (*vijjā*). What two? Serenity and insight. When serenity is developed, what benefit does one experience? The mind is developed. When the mind is developed, what benefit does one experience? Passion is abandoned.

When insight is developed, what benefit does one experience? Wisdom is developed. When wisdom is developed, what benefit does one experience? Ignorance is abandoned ...

Through the fading away of passion there is liberation of mind (*ceto-vimutti*). Through the fading away of ignorance there is liberation by wisdom (*paññā-vimutti*).²¹ (AN I 61, translation based on Bodhi 2012: 152–153)

Here “liberation of mind” is ascribed to serenity (*samatha*), i.e. concentration (*samādhi*), while “liberation by wisdom” is attributed to insight (*vipassanā*), i.e. wisdom (*paññā*).

According to this *sutta*, (1) *samatha/samādhi* and *vipassanā/paññā* are equally essential to liberation; (2) there is no disparity between liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom, but they represent two aspects of liberation: release from passion and release from ignorance. Liberation with both aspects is the “single” ultimate goal that a practitioner can achieve. Richard Gombrich points out that when the word *paññā-vimutti* (liberation by wisdom) appears in the texts, it is usually paired with *ceto-vimutti* (liberation of mind). He says: “I do not think that these words originated as technical terms. ... There is only one release: it is a mental event, triggered by insight.”²² In other words, *ceto-vimutti paññā-vimutti* as widely found in the texts should be taken as a single phrase expressing just one thing, namely mental (*ceto*) liberation (*vimutti*) triggered by wisdom (*paññā*).

Gombrich says that the term *paññā-vimutti* came later to be regarded as hierarchically superior to *ceto-vimutti* and “this seems incompatible with AN I, 61”,²³ which refers to the above *sutta*. Likewise, when the forgoing *Mahā-Māluṅkya Sutta* mentions “liberation of mind” and “liberation by wisdom”, the two are meant to be equal in status according to the Buddha’s reply to Ānanda’s question. By inference, Moggallāna and Sāriputta, who exemplify “liberation of mind” and “liberation by wisdom” respectively, should also be equals. In the earliest stratum of Buddhist literature, Sāriputta and Moggallāna are simply mentioned as the two chief disciples of the Buddha. It is in the later tradition that Sāriputta is explicitly said to be preeminent over Moggallāna, and his pre-eminence is typically characterized as stemming from wisdom.²⁴

It is noteworthy that whereas *Dhammasenāpati* (General of the Dhamma) is widely used as an epithet for Sāriputta in the Pāli commentaries, this term is not found in the canonical texts (*Tipiṭaka*) except the *Apadāna*,²⁵ which is a rather late text included in the *Khuddaka Nikāya*.²⁶ Referring to Chinese, Tibetan and Pāli sources, Li (2019: 413) also concludes: “this epithet perhaps appeared in Buddhist literature after the closure of the early canonical corpus.” The later tradition may have employed this term to raise the status of Sāriputta, thereby implicitly downgrading Moggallāna. This was in line with the trend to place “liberation by wisdom” above “liberation of mind”.

As Lily De Silva notes, whereas “liberation by wisdom” (*paññā-vimutti*) alone refers to final liberation, “liberation of mind” (*ceto-vimutti*) alone is hardly ever used in that sense.²⁷ She says: “*Cetovimutti* is repeatedly said to be derived from *samatha* ‘calm, tranquillity’, while *paññāvimutti* is said to be the result of *vipassanā* ‘introspection’.”²⁸ This observation explains why “liberation of mind” is often described as temporary meditative states,²⁹ and is hence inferior to “liberation by wisdom”, which represents final liberation. Deviating from the position expressed in the foregoing *sutta* at AN I 61, the later tradition treats *vipassanā* as the *sine qua non* of liberation and *samatha* as subordinate to it and not essential for liberation.³⁰ Therefore, “liberation of mind”, often ascribed to *samatha*, is liable to be regarded as inferior to “liberation by wisdom”, often ascribed to *vipassanā*. In conformity with this tendency, the evolving tradition gradually elevated Sāriputta above Moggallāna in its depictions of those who were originally “an excellent pair of chief disciples”. Below are examples of the disparity between these two saints as portrayed in *sutta* and *vinaya* literature. Let us first look at one blunt and univocal tale in a *sūtra*.

3. Psychic potency contest between Moggallāna and Sāriputta

Sūtra 2 in Chapter 37 of the Chinese *Ekottarika Āgama* (hereafter EĀ 37.2) is a rather long discourse in this corpus of numerical discourses. The first half of EĀ 37.2 is about a fierce competition in psychic potency (*iddhi*) between Moggallāna and Sāriputta, which seems to be peculiar considering

its occurrence in a collection of supposedly early Buddhist texts. This story was probably composed after the schisms since it is not found in the other *Āgamas* or the Pāli *Nikāyas* extant today,³¹ which belong to the other schools. Below is an abridged translation of the story:

The Buddha was at the Lake Anotatta with a large assembly of five hundred bhikkhus. Sāriputta was absent from the assembly. The serpent king of Anotatta requested the Buddha to send a bhikkhu to call for Sāriputta. The Buddha asked Moggallāna to do this. At that time Sāriputta was sewing and mending old clothes at Jetavana monastery. Sāriputta told Moggallāna twice: “You go there first. I will go later.” Then Moggallāna said: “How could Sāriputta surpass me in the bases for psychic potency (神足, **iddhi-pāda*)? And yet he is now sending a messenger back before [he sets out]? If Sāriputta does not set out in time, I will grab his arms and take him to that lake.” Then Sāriputta took the belt off a robe and put it on the ground, saying: “If you are foremost in the bases for psychic potency, please lift this belt from the ground, and then you can grab my arms and take me to that lake.” Moggallāna stretched out his hand to lift the belt, but could not move it at all. Then Sāriputta fastened this belt to a branch of a rose-apple (閻浮, *jambu*) tree. Moggallāna exerted his psychic potency to lift this belt without being able to move it, but the Jambu-dīpa (閻浮地, name of a continent) shook heavily. Then Sāriputta fastened the belt to two continents (天下, **mahādīpa*) ... three continents ... four continents ... Moggallāna was able to lift the continents just like lifting light clothes. Then Sāriputta fastened the belt to the mountainside of Mount Sumeru. Moggallāna shook Mount Sumeru ... Then Sāriputta fastened the belt to the Tathāgata’s seat. Moggallāna was unable to move it. He thought: “Have I regressed in terms of the bases for psychic potency? Let me go to the Blessed One and ask him.”

Moggallāna went to where the Buddha was by using the bases for psychic potency. He saw at a distance Sāriputta sitting before the Tathāgata. Then Moggallāna asked the Buddha: “Have I regressed in terms of the bases for psychic potency? The reason is that I set out from Jetavana monastery before Sāriputta had set out, but now Sāriputta first sits before the Tathāgata.” The Buddha said: “You have not regressed in terms of the bases for psychic potency, but you do not understand the *samādhi-dharma* (state of concentration, 三昧之法) of the bases for psychic potency which Sāriputta has entered. The reason is that Sāriputta has immeasurable *paññā* (wisdom, 智慧); he masters his mind ...” Then Moggallāna became silent.³²

In EĀ 37.2, Moggallāna is defeated by Sāriputta in the psychic potency contest, which contradicts the generally accepted fact that the Buddha praises Moggallāna as being foremost in psychic potency among his disciples. This embarrassing situation prompts Moggallāna to inquire of the Buddha. The Buddha’s reply is meaningful: “You do not understand the *samādhi-dharma* (state of concentration) of the bases for psychic potency which Sāriputta has

entered. The reason is that Sāriputta has immeasurable *paññā* (wisdom).” As shown in Section 2, psychic potency (*iddhi*) is based on concentration (*samādhi*). Sāriputta wins the contest because his psychic potency is built on such a profound “state of concentration” that his opponent, Moggallāna, cannot fathom. Sāriputta’s profound state of concentration is in turn attributed to his immeasurable wisdom. In summary, wisdom dominates Buddhist practices and attainments. *Paññā* is the key to winning the *iddhi* contest, so to speak.

As this story suggests, a new idea arose in later polemics as follows: If one obtains full wisdom (*paññā*, Skt. *prajñā*), one must also possess concentration (*samādhi*). “Liberation by wisdom”, which comes with the four *jhānas* (Skt. *dhyāna*) as shown below, is consummate in an ultimate sense. By contrast, “liberation of mind”, albeit excellent in concentration, is not perfect in terms of wisdom, and is therefore less valuable. This explains why the later tradition came to regard Sāriputta as superior to Moggallāna. As stated above, according to the MN commentary, Sāriputta became one who gained “liberation by wisdom” and Moggallāna became one who gained “liberation of mind”.

In keeping with the tendency to devalue *samādhi/samatha* and hence “liberation of mind”, those who conceived the category of arahants “liberated by wisdom” (*paññā-vimutta*), including the authors of the *Susīma Sutta* (SN II 119–128), intended to provide a looser criterion for assessing arahants as far as *samatha* meditative attainments³³ are concerned. The divergent accounts in the different versions of the *Susīma Sutta* and the various interpretations of this text lead to disagreement on how loose the criterion can be, i.e. on what is the minimal attainment in *samatha* possessed by an arahant. In the Pāli version some bhikkhus who claim to be “liberated by wisdom” admit that they do not have the first five of the six supernormal knowledges (*abhiññā*), nor do they “touch in person³⁴ those peaceful deliverances that are formless and transcending forms”.³⁵ Bhikkhu Bodhi holds that the compilers of this *sutta* wished to insinuate that arahants “liberated by wisdom” lack the distinguished states of concentration, including the four *jhānas*, but they dare not say this directly.³⁶ However, L.S. Cousins states that the references to arahants “liberated by wisdom” in the earlier texts (including the *Susīma Sutta*) seem mostly to say that they had not developed the formless (*aruppa*) attainments or the first five *abhiññās*, but the later tradition even accepts that there were such arahants who had not developed any of the four *jhānas*.³⁷ In other words, according to the earlier tradition, arahants “liberated by wisdom” lack the formless attainments but still possess the *jhānas*.

Cousins’ view is reinforced by the *Kīṭāgiri Sutta* (MN I 477). This text gives a listing of seven spiritual types, among which the highest two are arahants “liberated in both ways” and “liberated by wisdom”. The distinction between these two types of arahant is this: a person who is “liberated in both ways” touches in person³⁸ those peaceful deliverances that are formless and

transcending forms, whereas a person who is “liberated by wisdom” does not have such experience of those formless deliverances. Apparently “those formless deliverances” refer to the four formless attainments (see Section 2), which transcend the *jhānas* in the sphere of form. By implication, those who are “liberated by wisdom” have experience of the four *jhānas*.³⁹ This corroborates the above new idea that arose sometime during the evolution of the Buddhist Canon: If one obtains full wisdom (*paññā*), one must also possess concentration (*samādhi*).

In AN 6.46 Mahācunda, a disciple of the Buddha, instructs his fellow monks as follows (abridged):

Here bhikkhus who are Dhamma specialists denigrate bhikkhus who are meditators (*jhāyino*): “They meditate (*jhāyanti*) and contemplate (*pajjhāyanti*) [, saying]: ‘We are meditators.’ Why do they meditate? In what way do they meditate? How do they meditate?”

Bhikkhus who are meditators denigrate bhikkhus who are Dhamma specialists: “They [say]: ‘We are Dhamma specialists’, while being restless, elated, vain, unsteady, talkative, loose in speech, of muddled mindfulness (*mutthassatī*), lacking clear comprehension, unconcentrated (*asamāhitā*) ... Why are they Dhamma specialists? In what way are they Dhamma specialists? How are they Dhamma specialists?”

Those who are Dhamma specialists should praise bhikkhus who are meditators because the latter touch in person the deathless element (*amataṃ dhātuṃ*) and dwell therein.

Those who are meditators should praise bhikkhus who are Dhamma specialists because the latter see the profoundly meaningful expression after penetrating it with wisdom (*paññā*).⁴⁰

This *sutta* does not necessarily suggest that there was already some kind of conflict in the Saṅgha between meditators (*jhāyino*) and Dhamma specialists (*dhammayogā*). The text, however, makes it clear that two types of bhikkhus criticized one another.⁴¹ One type adopted or emphasized the intellectual approach to the ultimate goal while the other type adopted or emphasized the meditative approach to this goal. Even if they did not dispute with one another, at least one type of bhikkhus laid stress on the approach they preferred and played down the approach favoured by the other type. The text does not mean that the two approaches are mutually exclusive. But rather, the two approaches can be understood as being orientated respectively towards concentration (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*paññā*), both of which along with morality (*sīla*) constitute the path to liberation, i.e. enlightenment.

What exactly are the two approaches? According to this *sutta*, meditators deserve praise because they touch in person the deathless element. It should be noted that the expression “touch in person”⁴² also appears in the foregoing two statements about arahants who are not liberated by wisdom: they “touch in person” those peaceful deliverances that are formless and transcending forms.

Wynne (2019: 157) points out that in the Pāli *suttas* the notion of “touching in person” is almost entirely concerned with the formless meditative states. As to the “deathless element”, Wynne (2019: 157) suggests: “a passage in the *Itivuttaka* (It 51)⁴³ equates the ‘deathless element’ (*amataṃ dhātuṃ*) with ‘cessation’ (*nirodha*), the culmination of the ‘formless releases’.” Therefore, the meditators’ approach to liberation is orientated towards concentration, which begins from the four *jhānas* through the four formless attainments up to the “cessation of perception and feeling”.

As for the other approach, Dhamma specialists deserve praise because they see the profoundly meaningful expression (*gambhīraṃ attha-padam*) after penetrating it with wisdom (*paññā*). Cousins (2009: 37) states that Buddhaghosa’s commentary on this *sutta* takes this passage as “referring to the kind of understanding (*paññā*) associated with enlightenment as well as to the kind of insight which is close to that” (Mp III 379). He asserts: “This must be correct in the light of the other passages where ‘*atthapada*’ is used.”⁴⁴ Therefore, the Dhamma specialists’ approach to the supreme goal is orientated towards *paññā*, which comprises wisdom associated with enlightenment and insight adjacent to that. It can be inferred that when they reach final liberation, they may be called arahants “liberated by wisdom”, who lack the formless attainments but have experienced the *jhānas* according to the earlier texts as discussed above.

4. Concentration contest between Sāriputta and Moggallāna

The *Saṅghabhedavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* (根本說一切有部毘奈耶破僧事, T 1450) in Chinese translation relates a tale of a competition between Sāriputta and Moggallāna. Although this tale articulates a concentration (*samādhi*) contest, a psychic potency (*iddhi*) contest is also meant here. Just like the story in EĀ 37.2 discussed above, this tale also begins with Sāriputta challenging Moggallāna to a miracle contest and ends with the victory of Sāriputta. The relevant passage reads as follows (slightly abridged):

The venerables (阿瑜宰滿, āyuṣmant) Sāriputta (舍利弗呬囉, Śāriputra) and Moggallāna (毛嗚揭羅演那, Maudgalyāyana) visited the hells from time to time. Then Sāriputta said to Moggallāna: “Can you go with me to the Avīci Hell and visit Devadatta for offering him consolation?” At that time Sāriputta and Moggallāna went to the Avīci Hell. Having arrived there, Sāriputta requested Moggallāna, saying: “Do you know now? This is the Avīci, where the fierce fire is flaming without intermission. The Blessed One has declared that you are foremost amid the virtuous ones (大德, *bhadanta*) who have great psychic [potency]. On watching the beings suffer in the Avīci Hell, you should be able to exert your mind to extinguish the fire disaster.” Then Moggallāna entered such a “concentration of great water”. Having concentrated his mind, he poured rain, with drips as big as pestles, from above into the Avīci, but the water disappeared altogether in the sky. He poured heavy rain again, with drips as big

as ploughs or axles, but the water also disappeared altogether. Then Sāriputta, having seen this, focused his attention and entered the “concentration practised through affirmed insight”. Having entered the concentration, he [created] an immense amount of water, which pervaded the hell, eliminating the sounds of suffering.⁴⁵

Sāriputta compliments Moggallāna on his psychic potency, thereby encouraging him to perform a magical feat to relieve the hell’s denizens of fire. Moggallāna exerts his psychic potency by means of developing a certain concentration. After Moggallāna’s failure to put out the hell’s fire, Sāriputta also develops a certain concentration in order to perform a miracle, which proves to be effective. This accords with the principle elucidated above: concentration (*samādhi*) underlies psychic potency (*iddhi*).

Since Buddhist literature so frequently portrays Sāriputta and Moggallāna as distinguished by wisdom and psychic potency respectively, when this text states: “The Blessed One has declared that you [Moggallāna] are foremost amid the virtuous ones who have great psychic potency”, it also implies that the Buddha declared Sāriputta to be foremost in wisdom amid his disciples. After all, wisdom, represented by *Sāriputta*, surpasses psychic potency, represented by Moggallāna. Although psychic potency (*iddhi*) is induced by concentration (*samādhi*), the power of one’s *iddhi* is in fact contingent on how perfect one’s *paññā* is. Wisdom predominates.

The names of the two kinds of concentration which Moggallāna and Sāriputta are said to have “entered” reveal the different levels of their concentrative attainments. The former is called “concentration of great water” (大水之定), which reflects its magical and *ad hoc* nature. The latter is tentatively translated as “concentration practised through affirmed insight” from 勝解行定, which may well be a rendering of a Sanskrit phrase similar to *adhimukti-caryā-samādhi*.⁴⁶ 勝解 is a typical translation of the Sanskrit cognates *adhimukti*, *adhimokṣa*, *adhimukta*, *adhimucyate*, and so forth.⁴⁷ Ven. Dhammajoti observes that such words basically mean “resolute affirmation”, yet in some contexts they signify “resolute, receptive affirmation of reality based on spiritual insight”.⁴⁸ In our story Sāriputta’s so-called **adhimukti-caryā-samādhi* connotes a sense of insight or wisdom that is integral to concentration. This point becomes clear when we consider the school background of this text. Its title indicates that it belongs to the Mūlasarvāstivāda.

Charles Willemen has made an argument about how the Sarvāstivādins evolved as follows: From the end of the 2nd century CE the Sarvāstivādins were divided into two groups: on one hand the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣika “orthodoxy”, and on the other the majority of Sarvāstivādins. At the end of the 7th century the Vaibhāṣika “orthodoxy” disappeared through being absorbed into the non-Vaibhāṣikas, and thus all were called Mūlasarvāstivādins.⁴⁹ According to Willemen’s argument, Yijing 義淨 (635–713), who translated

the *Saṅghabhedavastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya*, must have acquired this text around the time when the Vaibhāṣika “orthodoxy” and the non-Vaibhāṣikas merged to form the *Mūlasarvāstivāda*. In this connection, let us refer to the *Abhidharma-Mahāvibhāṣa* (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論, T 1545), which was composed by the Vaibhāṣikas, and was presumably passed down to the *Mūlasarvāstivādins*. As Ven. Dhammajoti points out, the following passage in the *Abhidharma-Mahāvibhāṣa* “explicitly states that *adhimokṣa/adhimukti* is the only conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) *dharma* that is liberation (*vimokṣa/vimukti*) in nature”:⁵⁰

Among all *dharmas*, there are only two *dharmas* that are liberation in nature: among the unconditioned *dharmas*, *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* is liberation in nature. Among the conditioned *dharmas*, *adhimokṣa*, subsumed under the *mahābhūmika-dharmas*, is liberation in nature ... If, supported on non-greed (*alobha*), the mind is liberated from passion (*trṣṇā/rāga*),⁵¹ the *adhimokṣa* conjoined therewith is called liberation of mind (*ceto-vimukti*). If, supported on non-delusion (*amoha*), it is liberated from ignorance (*avidyā*) through wisdom, the *adhimokṣa* conjoined therewith is called liberation by wisdom (*prajñā-vimukti*).⁵² (translation based on Dhammajoti 2019: 143–144)

The latter part of this passage is reminiscent of a *sutta* in the *Āṅguttara Nikāya* (AN I 61) discussed above. The *Abhidharma-Mahāvibhāṣa* of the *Sarvāstivādins* designates *adhimokṣa/adhimukti* (勝解) either as “liberation of mind” or as “liberation by wisdom”. These two items constitute one and single liberation, namely mental (*ceto*) liberation (*vimutti*) triggered by wisdom (*paññā*), according to early *sutta* literature (see Section 2). In this way, the *Sarvāstivādins* attached a new sense, “liberation”, to *adhimokṣa/adhimukti*.⁵³ Therefore, the foregoing tale in *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* literature emphasizes that **adhimukti-caryā-samādhi* which Sāriputta attains, unlike the *ad hoc* concentration improvised by Moggallāna, is deeply rooted in his liberation, which is linked to his unsurpassed wisdom. To sum up, even though it is generally acknowledged that Moggallāna is foremost in psychic potency, this tale suggests that Sāriputta’s psychic potency can be much more powerful and effective because Sāriputta is foremost in wisdom. It is wisdom which triggers final liberation, that is *adhimokṣa/adhimukti* in *Sarvāstivādins*’ terminology, and thus Moggallāna’s concentration pales beside Sāriputta’s concentration firmly based on *adhimukti* or wisdom/liberation, when they try to perform a miracle by means of concentration to relieve the hell’s denizens.

5. Wisdom underlies “indestructible concentration and psychic potency”

How does Sāriputta’s and Moggallāna’s psychic potency work when confronted with a lethal attack? The answers reflect how the later tradition evaluated these two “chief” disciples and their acclaimed preeminent faculties, i.e. wisdom and concentration/psychic potency.

Sutta 4.4 of the *Udāna*, which is included in the *Khuddaka Nikāya*, relates a story as follows:

At that time the venerable Sāriputta ... sat in the open air and attained a certain concentration (*samādhi*). Then two yakkhas (goblins), who were friends, were travelling from north to south ... They saw the venerable Sāriputta ... that yakkha, disregarding the other's advice, gave the elder Sāriputta a blow on the head. So mighty was the blow that one might have felled an elephant seven or seven and a half cubits high or cleft a big mountain peak therewith ... Now the venerable Mahā Moggallāna with the divine eye ... saw the blow on the head of the venerable Sāriputta given by that yakkha. At the sight he approached the venerable Sāriputta ... and said: "... I hope you are bearing up! ... I hope you are not in pain!"

"Friend Moggallāna, I am bearing up ... but I do feel a trifling pain in my head."

"It is marvellous ... that the venerable Sāriputta has great psychic potency (*mahiddhiko*), has great power! ..."

"It is marvellous ... that the venerable Mahā Moggallāna has great psychic potency (*mahiddhiko*), has great power ... should see a yakkha at all! But we can't see even a tiny goblin⁵⁴ here."⁵⁵
(translation based on Woodward 1935: 47–48)

A variant version appears in *Sūtra* 6 of Chapter 48 in the *Ekottarika Āgama* (EĀ 48.6). The storyline is largely similar, but it is the Buddha who witnesses the scene and asks how Sāriputta feels, while Moggallāna does not show up. Apart from this, the following three points are worth noting:

- (1) Moggallāna first praises Sāriputta as "having great psychic potency" (*mahiddhiko* = *mahā-iddhika*), and then Sāriputta praises Moggallāna in return with the same phrase. This Pāli phrase *mahiddhika* is equivalent to the Sanskrit *maharddhika* (*mahā-rddhika*), which is applied to Maudgalyāyana (Moggallāna) in the *Mahāvastu* (cf. Section 1).⁵⁶ Interestingly, the focus of psychic potency par excellence is shifted from Moggallāna to Sāriputta. André Migot comments on this *Udāna* tale thus: "Here the two saints are endowed with *ṛddhi*, but there is a difference in quality. Sāriputra has received the telling blow. Maudgalyāyana has witnessed the scene from afar 'with clear vision': the *ṛddhi* of the former is by far the greater because he has not been defeated."⁵⁷ This tale indeed suggests that Sāriputta's psychic potency is superior to Moggallāna's, and it is so mighty and persistent that it helps Sāriputta unknowingly survive a deadly blow. We will refer back to this issue later.
- (2) In EĀ 48.6, one yakkha tells the other yakkha: "Do not intend to strike the ascetic's head. The reason is that this ascetic has great psychic potency (極有神德, **mahiddhiko*) and has great power. This venerable one's name is Sāriputta. Among the Blessed One's disciples, none surpasses him in intelligence and ability. He is foremost amid the disciples of wisdom."⁵⁸

Using the better *yakkha* as a narrator, the Chinese version implicitly ascribes Sāriputta's invincible psychic potency to his unsurpassed wisdom.

- (3) The *Udāna* (Ud p. 39) says that Sāriputta attained “a certain concentration” (*aññataraṃ samādhiṃ*), while EĀ 48.6 (T II 793a) specifies that Sāriputta entered the “Diamond Concentration” (金剛三昧, **vajra-samādhi*). Both versions indicate that Sāriputta's psychic potency arose spontaneously to repel the attack while he was in this concentrative state, thereby suggesting that his indestructible psychic potency was induced by this special concentration. In EĀ 48.6, our story is followed by a sermon by the Buddha, who explained that it was owing to the power of the Diamond Concentration (金剛三昧力) that Sāriputta repelled the *yakkha*'s attack, and that if a *bhikkhu* attains the Diamond Concentration, he is not burnt by fire, nor pierced by a knife, nor carried off by water, nor wounded by someone else.

In this connection, let us refer to the following observation by Andrew Skilton.⁵⁹ The word *samādhi*, “concentration”, was employed by the Mahāyāna in some new senses. Long lists of *samādhi* names came to appear, and a number of specific *samādhis* came to acquire their each own magical potency in the Mahāyāna. These two novel features of *samādhi* are found in EĀ, where the Diamond Concentration in such innovative senses recurs in two other *sūtras* of EĀ besides EĀ 48.6.⁶⁰ The Diamond Concentration is endowed with specific magical potency, an empowerment typical of the Mahāyāna meditative traditions. Étienne Lamotte regards this feature along with others in EĀ 48.6 as “inspired by the Mahāyāna”.⁶¹ I have also identified the three occurrences of “Diamond Concentration” in EĀ as a Mahāyāna element interpolated into this corpus.⁶²

In view of the foregoing, I venture to reconstruct the historical development of this story or *sutta* as follows: Because this tale appears in both Theravāda and Mahāsāṃghika literature, it may date back prior to the first schism which split the Saṅgha into the Sthaviras and the Mahāsāṃghikas in the 3rd century BCE (see Section 1). The pre-schismatic, if not original, version of the tale could be like this: When Sāriputta was sitting in meditation, a *yakkha* attacked him. Being aware of this incident, the Buddha consoled Sāriputta and praised him for his meditative achievement, which is a kind of concentration (*samādhi*) conducive to the psychic potency (*iddhi*) that beats the *yakkha*. After the schism, the Theravādins, derived from the Sthaviras, and the Mahāsāṃghikas developed their own versions of the *sutta* and allocated them to the *Udāna* and the *Ekottarika Āgama* respectively. The Theravāda version replaced the Buddha with Moggallāna in order to highlight the point that Sāriputta is not just one of the two chief disciples of the Buddha, but he reigns supreme among all the disciples, an idea later reified by the epithet “General of the Dhamma” (see Section 2). As to the Mahāsāṃghika version, on the one hand, it added the statement “Sāriputta is foremost amid the disciples of wisdom” to insinuate that wisdom is the very source from which his invincible psychic potency springs. On the other hand, this version

designated the originally unnamed meditation as “Diamond Concentration” and elaborated on this *samādhi* so that it was transformed into a magical power which is characteristic of the Mahāyāna.

In ironic contrast to the foregoing tale of Sāriputta, various Buddhist traditions hold that Moggallāna died from an attack of mankind although he was “foremost” in psychic potency. *Sūtra* 9 of Chapter 26 in the *Ekottarika Āgama* (EĀ 26.9) contains the following episode:

As the time had come, the venerable Mahā Moggallāna, wearing his robes and carrying his bowl, was about to enter Rājagaha for almsround. At that time the staff-holding (**daṇḍa-pāṇi*)⁶³ brahmins saw Moggallāna coming in the distance and talked to one another, saying: “Among the disciples of the ascetic Gotama, none surpasses this person. Let us all surround him and beat him to death.” Then the brahmins surrounded and caught him, each of them striking him with tiles and stones, and left him behind ... Moggallāna returned to the monastery (**vihāra*) by psychic potency and went to where Sāriputta was, sitting at one side. At that time the venerable Mahā Moggallāna told Sāriputta: “The staff-holding brahmins surrounded and beat me [to such a degree that] my bones and flesh are utterly mashed. Pains in my body are unbearable. I am about to attain final Nirvana, so come to take leave of you.” Then Sāriputta said: “Among the Blessed One’s disciples, you are foremost in psychic potency and have great power. Why did you not escape by psychic potency?” Moggallāna replied: “The action (**kamma*) I did in the past was extremely serious and demands retribution, which cannot be escaped after all.”⁶⁴

This passage is followed by a conversation between Sāriputta and the Buddha, which conveys the Mahāsāṃghika concept of Buddhas as I have demonstrated.⁶⁵ This Mahāsāṃghika version of the narrative concerning Moggallāna’s death is rather brief without providing information on what motivated those brahmins to murder him. More detailed or elaborate versions are found in the texts of the other schools. As for the Theravāda, the commentary on *Jātaka* no. 522 (Ja V 125–126) tells a story about Moggallāna’s death, which is partially translated (sometimes paraphrased) as follows:

The Elder dwelt at Black Rock. With the power of his psychic potency (*iddhi*) he went to heavens and hells to see the beings. On returning to the human world he told people how the Buddha’s disciples enjoyed rebirth in heavens, and the disciples of non-Buddhist ascetics (*titthiya*) were reborn in hells or other states of suffering. People believed in [the Buddha’s] teaching (*sāsana*) and rejected non-Buddhist ascetics. Great hospitality was offered to the Buddha’s disciples, while that offered to non-Buddhist ascetics decreased. The latter paid a brigand and asked him to kill the Elder. The brigand went with a large following to Black Rock. The Elder saw him coming, and by his psychic potency (*iddhi*) he flew up and went away. The

brigand, not seeing the Elder that day, returned and went there day after day for six days. The Elder, by his psychic potency, always went away in the same way. On the seventh day an action (*kamma*) did by the Elder in a past life, entailing experience of its result in another life, got its chance. In a past life he struck his parents, intending to kill them. Because of retribution for that action, the Elder was unable to fly up into the air. His psychic potency (*iddhi*), which could subdue [the *nāga* (serpent) king] Nandopananda⁶⁶ and shake the Vejayanta [Palace],⁶⁷ became feeble due to the force of his action (*kamma*).⁶⁸ The brigand crushed all his bones. The Elder, on recovering consciousness, flew to the Master [i.e. the Buddha], saluted him, and died there.

Apart from the above story, the other Theravāda version, which is in the *Dhammapada* commentary, differs in several details.⁶⁹ Some unique features in the latter version are as follows: The non-Buddhist ascetics (*titthiya*) are unequivocally referred back to as “naked ascetics” (*nagga-samaṇaka*),⁷⁰ which may be the Ājīvikas, the Jain (*nigaṇṭha*) ascetics,⁷¹ or even some of the Brahmin ascetics;⁷² the brigands tried for two months before succeeding in their plot; after the fatal assault Moggallāna preached to the Buddha and performed many kinds of psychic potency (*iddhi*) before he returned to Black Rock and died. Despite the divergences, both Theravāda versions explain why the non-Buddhists wanted to kill Moggallāna. The *Dhammapada* commentary, unlike the *Jātaka* commentary, does not mention that Moggallāna’s psychic potency became so feeble that he was unable to fly and escape, but rather states: “The Elder, having felt the pulling force of an action (*kamma*) done by himself [in a former life], did not go away.”⁷³ In this respect, this version agrees with the Mahāsāṃghika version. According to these two versions, Moggallāna did not lose any of his psychic potency, but he purposely waived his ability to wield such power for the sake of bearing his karmic result that he deserved. In the *Jātaka* commentary version, the weakening of his psychic potency as an excuse for his failure to escape must be a rather late interpolation. Moreover, this insertion makes the story incoherent — given that his psychic potency became so feeble that he could not fly and escape from the lethal attack, how could he have flown to the Buddha after this attack?!

A more sophisticated but quite different version appears in the *Kṣudrakavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* (根本說一切有部毘奈耶雜事, T 1451) as follows:

The venerable Moggallāna, with the imminent ripening of his previous karma, came along at a slow pace. Having seen him, the non-Buddhists asked: “Bhikkhu, are there ascetics (*samaṇa*) in the community of the Ājīvikas?” ... He replied: “How could there be any ascetics in your community? As the Buddha says: ‘This is the first ascetic. This is the second ascetic. This is the third ascetic. This is the fourth ascetic. There is no ascetic other than these ...’⁷⁴ Moreover, your teacher Pūraṇa, because of having preached evil doctrine among people to

delude them, was already reborn in the Avīci Hell. He is endowed with a large body, whose tongue is bleeding, being ploughed by five hundred iron ploughs. He suffers extreme affliction. He asked me to pass on this message: ‘Because of having preached evil doctrine among people to delude them, I have now fallen into a bad destination and my tongue suffers from being ploughed. In sum, tell my followers: “Do not make offerings to my stūpa any longer. Each time you make an offering, my body’s pains become more acute. Remember my instruction from now on.”’” On hearing this, the folks turned furious and said thus: “Folks, should know that this bald ascetic is not only finding fault with us, but is also slandering our master. What are we to do now?” Someone replied: “Beat the stuffing out of him! What else should we say? ...” The crowd struck the venerable one with staffs until his whole body was mashed like hammered reeds, and at once scattered in all directions. At that time Sāriputta wondered why Moggallāna was lagging behind, so he went to see, and found that his body was mashed like hammered reeds, spreading on the ground. He asked: “Venerable one, why is it like this?” He replied: “Sāriputta, this is the ripening of my karma. Knowing this, what can I do?” Sāriputta said: “Venerable one, are you not declared by the Master to be foremost in *iddhi* (神通, psychic potency) among his disciples? How could you end up like this?” He replied: “Due to the force of karma, I can’t even recall the syllable *id*, let alone exert *iddhi*!”⁷⁵ Then Sāriputta wrapped that body in a seven-piece robe like a baby and carried him to the monastery.⁷⁶

This passage is followed by a series of episodes irrelevant to my study, which end with Moggallāna’s death shortly after preaching to his relatives. This version of Moggallāna’s tale refers to a specific name of the religious group that killed him, that is the Ājīvikas, who belonged to “naked ascetics” as mentioned above. There is no way for us to find out the “original” account of Moggallāna’s death and whether he was killed by staff-holding brahmins, non-Buddhist ascetics (*tittiya*), naked ascetics (*nagga-samaṇaka*) or more “precisely” the Ājīvikas. The four versions, however, agree that Moggallāna was murdered by a rivalling sect, and that he died as a result of his bad karma in a past life.

A significant point to note here is the emergence of the idea that Moggallāna lost his psychic potency. Of the four versions, the *Ekottarika Āgama* and the *Dhammapada* commentary versions make no mention of any decline in his psychic potency, but depict him as voluntarily complying with the rule of karma and being ready to undergo the retribution. In contrast, the other two versions sound more constrained and artificial. According to the *Jātaka* commentary, Moggallāna’s psychic potency declined so much that he could not fly to escape from the attack, yet after this fatal attack, he flew to the Buddha without any problem! The story in the *Kṣudrakavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* is dramatic and gory. Despite the extreme pains after being mashed like “hammered reeds”, in answer to Sāriputta’s questions,

Moggallāna admitted his failure in psychic potency in a rhetorically humorous way. These depictions of Moggallāna's losing (part of) his psychic potency are certainly later additions to the earlier and simpler versions.

Such modification further plays down Moggallāna's psychic potency in favour of the other "chief disciple". Judging from various strata of Buddhist literature discussed above, Sāriputta is never defeated or seriously injured by anyone, whether Moggallāna or a *yakkha*, owing to his formidable psychic potency (*iddhi*) or concentration (*samādhi*). He is invincible. By contrast, Moggallāna loses his psychic potency before being killed according to the later tradition. This indicates that Sāriputta surpasses Moggallāna not just in wisdom, but also in psychic potency. Sāriputta rather than Moggallāna possesses "indestructible" *iddhi*. Such development of Buddhist literature flatly contradicts the earlier (if not original) and standard portrait of Moggallāna as foremost in *iddhi*. As found in EĀ 48.6 above, Sāriputta's indestructible *iddhi* or *samādhi* presupposes his *paññā* (wisdom), which surpasses that of all the other disciples, including Moggallāna.

6. Conclusion

The earliest Buddhist tradition recognized Sāriputta and Moggallāna as the two chief disciples of the Buddha. No distinction or disparity was made between them in terms of their status as paradigms. The attributes that marked them as paradigms, namely wisdom (*paññā*) and psychic potency (*iddhi*), were likewise deemed to be equally important. Since psychic potency always involves concentration (*samādhi*) and is based on it, that Moggallāna is foremost in *iddhi* amounts to that he is foremost in *samādhi*. This is corroborated by the fact that the *Moggallāna-saṃyutta*, a chapter in SN named after Moggallāna, features *samādhi*. Therefore, what distinguishes them as the pair of chief disciples denotes that the two prominent factors of the path, i.e. wisdom (*paññā*) and concentration (*samādhi*), are equally essential just as Sāriputta and Moggallāna. The two forms of Buddhist "mental culture" (*bhāvanā*), *samatha* and *vipassanā*, correspond respectively to *samādhi* and *paññā*. In early *suttas* "liberation of mind", which is attributed to *samatha*, and "liberation by wisdom", which is attributed to *vipassanā*, are meant to be equal in status. At some point the Buddhist tradition began to characterize *vipassanā/paññā* as superior to *samatha/samādhi*, and hence "liberation by wisdom" as superior to "liberation of mind". In line with this trend, the tradition has developed such that Sāriputta ranks above Moggallāna. Therefore, Sāriputta is reckoned as one who gained "liberation by wisdom" and Moggallāna as one who gained "liberation of mind".

Originally *iddhi* was seen to emanate from *samādhi*, while *paññā* was also seen to be based on *samādhi*. In the end, *iddhi* along with *samādhi* was rendered significantly inferior and subjugated to *paññā*, which became the decisive factor that dominates *iddhi* and *samādhi*. In other words, if a

person has the most powerful psychic potency, it is not because he excels in concentration, but because he has obtained the unsurpassed wisdom. Therefore, in the history of Buddhist literature, there was a tendency to deprecate Moggallāna's achievements in *iddhi* and *samādhi* (concentration) compared to those of Sāriputta, who was foremost in *paññā* (wisdom).

Such ostensible rivalry between concentration and wisdom in Buddhist literature ended up with the overwhelming victory of wisdom. This phenomenon is also attested in Mahāyāna Buddhism, which advocates the six perfections (*pāramitā*) — generosity (*dāna*), morality (*śīla*), patience (*kṣānti*), energy (*vīrya*), absorption (*dhyāna*), and wisdom (*prajñā*). Damien Keown points out that this scheme constitutes a reformulation of the early teachings, notably the three divisions of the Path—morality (*śīla*), concentration (*samādhi*), and wisdom (*prajñā*).⁷⁷ In other words, the Mahāyāna employs the term *dhyāna* in place of *samādhi*. This usage accords with the four *Nikāyas*, which testify to the equivalence between *samādhi* and *dhyāna/jhāna*.⁷⁸ Among the six perfections (*pāramitā*), *prajñā-pāramitā* features in the titles of many Mahāyāna texts. Rupert Gethin says:

The 'Perfection of Wisdom' (*prajñāpāramitā*) literature evolved over many centuries and comprises a variety of texts, including some of the oldest Mahāyāna sūtra material. Edward Conze ... considered the oldest and most basic text to be the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā* ('Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines'), which he dates from the first century BCE. Subsequent centuries saw the production of vast expanded versions, such as those of 100,000 lines, 25,000 lines, and 18,000 lines, as well as shorter versions, such as the *Vajracchedikā* ...⁷⁹

By contrast, neither *dhyāna-pāramitā* (perfection of absorption) nor *samādhi-pāramitā* (perfection of concentration) seems to appear in the title of any text.⁸⁰ This signifies that the victory of wisdom (*paññā/prajñā*) over concentration (*samādhi*) also prevailed in the Mahāyāna, not just in the mainstream Buddhist schools explored above.

It was against this background that Buddhist narratives gradually consolidated Sāriputta's pre-eminence over Moggallāna, and that psychic potency (*iddhi*) came to be regarded as more subject to wisdom than to concentration. In the two tales discussed above, Sāriputta challenges Moggallāna and defeats him in two separate *iddhi* contests. The later versions of the legends devalued Moggallāna's *iddhi* to such a degree that his *iddhi* cannot work when facing the fatal assault of people, which is in stark contrast to Sāriputta's invincible *iddhi* that helps him survive the deadly attack of a mighty *yakkha*. To conclude, wisdom overshadows concentration and hence psychic potency.

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Abbreviations

References to Pāli texts are to the Pali Text Society editions, unless otherwise stated.

- AN *Anguttara Nikāya*
 Ap *Apadāna*
 CBETA *CBETA Chinese Electronic Tripitaka Collection*, Version 2014. Taipei: Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association.
 CST *Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana Tipiṭaka*, Version 4.0 (digital version). Igatpuri: Vipassana Research Institute.
 Dh-p-a *Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā*
 DN *Dīgha Nikāya*
 EĀ *Ekottarika Āgama (Zengyi ahan jing 增壹阿含經)*
 It *Itivuttaka*
 Ja *Jātaka*
 Mhv *The Mahāvastu: A New Edition*, 3 volumes, edited by Katarzyna Marciniak. Tokyo: The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhism, Soka University, 2019–2020.
 MN *Majjhima Nikāya*
 Ps *Papañcasūdanī (Majjhimanikāyaṭṭhakathā)*
 PTS Pali Text Society edition
 SĀ *Samyukta Āgama (Za ahan jing 雜阿含經)*
 Skt. Sanskrit
 SN *Samyutta Nikāya*
 T *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏經* (Taishō edition of the Chinese Tripitaka). Tokyo: Taishō Issaikyō Kankōkai, 1924–1934. (from CBETA)
 Ud *Udāna*
 VH *The Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya*, edited by Henry Clarke Warren. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1950.
 Vin *The Vinaya Piṭakam*, 5 volumes, edited by Hermann Oldenberg. Edinburgh: Williams & Norgate, 1879–1883.

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English titles in parentheses are my translations.

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Notes

- 1 DN II 5: *Mayham bhikkhave etarahi Sāriputta-Moggallānam nāma sāvaka-yugam ahoṣi aggam bhadda-yugam.*
- 2 T I 3: 今我二弟子，一名舍利弗，二名目捷連，諸弟子中最高第一。
- 3 For references, see Kuan, “Some Reflections on Translating the Pali Texts: Literary Conventions, Buddhist Thought, Cultural Background and Textual History”, 18.
- 4 T II 177a: 如來大眾之中，舍利弗、目捷連二大聲聞。
- 5 For references, see Kuan, “Some Reflections on Translating the Pali Texts: Literary Conventions, Buddhist Thought, Cultural Background and Textual History”, 11.
- 6 T XXII 258c: 佛大弟子尊者舍利弗、大目連。T XXII 262a: 大弟子舍利弗、目連。
- 7 This should be *ṛddhi* rather than *abhijñā*. Here Ray refers to “Mv 3:63”, that is Émile Senart’s edition of the *Mahāvastu* vol. 3 p. 63, which reads: *maharddhikānām* (cf. Mhv III 74). This compound is the genitive plural of *mahā-ṛddhika*, *ṛddhika* being an adjective of *ṛddhi*. See Wogihara, *A Sanskrit-Japanese Dictionary with Equivalents in Chinese Translation*, 290 s.v. *ṛddhika*.
- 8 Ray, *Buddhist Saints in India: A Study in Buddhist Values and Orientations*, 133.
- 9 Tournier, “The *Mahāvastu* and the *Vinaya-piṭaka* of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin”, 94–95; Jones, *The Mahāvastu*, vol. I, x–xii.
- 10 Kuan, *Mindfulness in Early Buddhism: New Approaches through Psychology and Textual Analysis of Pali, Chinese and Sanskrit Sources*, 3–4.
- 11 AN I 23: *Etad aggam bhikkhave mama sāvakānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ rattaññūnaṃ yadidaṃ Aññakoṇḍañño ... mahāpaññānaṃ yadidaṃ Sāriputto ... iddhimantānaṃ yadidaṃ Mahāmoggallāno.*
- 12 For references, see Kuan, “Some Reflections on Translating the Pali Texts: Literary Conventions, Buddhist Thought, Cultural Background and Textual History”, 18. I have concluded: “a considerable part of this corpus is likely to be of Mahāsāṃghika derivation, and that the EĀ contains numerous salient features of Mahāsāṃghika doctrine ... the Mahāsāṃghika hypothesis for the school affiliation of the EĀ has been substantially strengthened while the others are shown to be probably untenable.” See Kuan, “Legends and Transcendence: Sectarian Affiliations of the *Ekottarika Āgama* in Chinese Translation”, 629f.
- 13 T II 557b: 智慧無窮，決了諸疑，所謂舍利弗比丘是。神足輕舉，飛到十方，所謂大目捷連比丘是。
- 14 T II 793b: 舍利弗智慧第一，目捷連神足第一。
- 15 The Buddhist Order was first split into the Sthaviras and the Mahāsāṃghikas during the reign of King Aśoka (ca. 270–230 BCE) according to Lamotte, *History of Indian Buddhism: From the Origins to the Śaka Era*, 518, and Hirakawa, “An Evaluation of the Sources on the Date of the Buddha”, 280–282.
- 16 Collins, *Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities: Utopias of the Pali Imaginaire*, 60.
- 17 Kuan, *Mindfulness in Early Buddhism: New Approaches through Psychology and Textual Analysis of Pali, Chinese and Sanskrit Sources*, 57–58.
- 18 Rahula, *What the Buddha Taught*, 68.
- 19 SN V 255 and passim, AN I 39 and passim: *bhikkhu chanda-samādhi-padhāna-saṅkhāra-samannāgataṃ iddhipādaṃ bhāveti, viriya-samādhi-padhāna-saṅkhāra-samannāgataṃ iddhipādaṃ bhāveti, citta-samādhi-padhāna-saṅkhāra-samannāgataṃ iddhipādaṃ bhāveti, vīmaṃsā-samādhi-padhāna-saṅkhāra-samannāgataṃ iddhipādaṃ bhāveti.*
- 20 Ps III 147–148: *Samathavasen’eva hi gacchantesu ekassa bhikkhuno citekaggatā dhuraṃ hoti, so cetovimutto nāma hoti; ekassa paññā dhuraṃ hoti, so paññāvimutto nāma hoti. Vipassanāvasen’eva ca gacchantesu ekassa paññā dhuraṃ hoti, so paññāvimutto nāma hoti; ekassa citekaggatā dhuraṃ hoti, so cetovimutto nāma hoti. Dve aggasāvakā samatha-vipassanā-dhurena arahattaṃ patā, tesu Dhammasenāpati paññāvimutto jāto, Mahāmoggallānathero cetovimutto. Iti indriyavemattam ettha kāraṇan ti vedītabbaṃ.*
- 21 *rāgavirāgā cetovimutti, avijāvirāgā paññāvimuttī ti.*
- 22 Gombrich, *How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings*, 112.
- 23 Ibid. 118.
- 24 Cf. Ray, *Buddhist Saints in India: A Study in Buddhist Values and Orientations*, 133.
- 25 Ap I 29. This information is yielded by searching CST for *dhammasenāpati*.
- 26 von Hinüber, *A Handbook of Pāli Literature*, 61.
- 27 De Silva, “Cetovimutti pannavimutti and Ubbatobhagavimutti”, 120–121.
- 28 Ibid. 121.
- 29 De Silva gives an example of various meditative states being referred to as “liberation of mind”, which implies temporary liberation. Ibid. 122.

- 30 This idea is inferred from MN 140 (III 244) by Rahula, *What the Buddha Taught*, 38 and 68f., and is inferred from MN 26.15–16 (I 163–166) by Nānamoli & Bodhi, *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha*, 38.
- 31 This *sūtra* has no parallels in ancient texts according to SuttaCentral (<https://suttacentral.net/ea37>) and Akanuma, *The Comparative Catalogue of Chinese Āgamas & Pāli Nikāyas*, 142.
- 32 T II 708c–709c. For a more complete translation of the story, see Kuan, “Moggallāna’s Journey to Another Buddha-field: How a Mahāyāna Narrative Crept into the *Ekottarika Āgama* (T 125)”.
- 33 These may include the four *jhānas*, the four formless attainments and the ‘cessation of perception and feeling’. See Kuan, *Mindfulness in Early Buddhism: New Approaches through Psychology and Textual Analysis of Pali, Chinese and Sanskrit Sources*, 60.
- 34 *kāyena phusitvā*, lit. “having touched with the body”.
- 35 SN II 123: *ye te santā vimokkhā atikkamma rūpe āruppā, te kāyena phusitvā ...*
- 36 Bodhi, “The Susīma-sutta and the Wisdom-Liberated Arahant”, 55 and 62.
- 37 Cousins, “The Origins of Insight Meditation”, 57 note 59 mentions MN I 477, SN II 121–123, etc. as examples.
- 38 *kāyena phassitvā*, lit. “having touched with the body”.
- 39 For details, see Kuan, “The *Pavāraṇā Sutta* and ‘liberation in both ways’ as against ‘liberation by wisdom’”, 58–61.
- 40 AN III 355–356: *Āyasmā Mahācundo etad avoca: – Idha āvuso, dhammayogā bhikkhū jhāyī bhikkhū apasādentī ... jhāyī bhikkhū dhammayoge bhikkhū apasādentī ‘ime pana jhāyino ‘mhā, jhāyino ‘mhā ti jhāyanti pajjhāyanti. Kim h’ ime jhāyanti, kint’ ime jhāyanti, katham’ ime jhāyanti’ ti? ... jhāyī bhikkhū dhammayoge bhikkhū apasādentī ‘ime pana dhammayog’ amhā, dhammayog’ amhā ti udhātā unnaḷā capalā mukharā vikīṇāvācā muṭṭhassatī asampajānā asamāhitā ... Kim h’ ime dhammayogā, kint’ ime dhammayogā, katham’ ime dhammayogā’ ti? ... Dhammayogā samānā jhāyīnaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ vaṇṇaṃ bhāsissāmā ti. ... Acchariyā h’ ete āvuso puggalā dullabhā lokasmiṃ, ye amataṃ dhātuṃ kāyena phusitvā viharanti. ... Jhāyī samānā dhammayogānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ vaṇṇaṃ bhāsissāmā ti. ... Acchariyā h’ ete āvuso puggalā dullabhā lokasmiṃ ye gambhīraṃ atthapadaṃ paññāya ativijjha passanti ti.*
- 41 Cf. Cousins, “Scholar Monks and Meditator Monks Revisited”, 36 and 39.
- 42 *kāyena phusitvā* (variants: *phassitva, passitvā*), lit. “having touched with the body”.
- 43 It pp. 45–46.
- 44 Cousins, “Scholar Monks and Meditator Monks Revisited”, 39 says: “in Pali the word *attha*, especially in compounds, tends to have both the sense of ‘meaningful’ and the sense of ‘connected with the goal’. It is then easy to understand *atthapada* as a word which brings one to the goal.”
- 45 T XXIV 150b: 阿瑜窣滿舍利弗呬囉、毛嚙揭羅演那，每於時時往椽落迦而為看行。時舍利弗呬囉告毛嚙揭羅演那曰：「仁可共我往無隙獄觀其天授為慰問耶？」於時舍利弗呬囉與毛嚙揭羅演那往阿毘止。既至其所，時舍利弗呬囉命毛嚙揭羅演那曰：「仁今知不？此即是其阿毘止處，上下四邊無不通徹，一焰猛火，中無間隙。仁於大神大德眾內，世尊記說以為第一。應可運心，觀無隙獄受苦情類，為滅火災。」說是語已，時毛嚙揭羅演那便入如是大水之定。既定心已，從上注雨，滴如杵大，入阿毘止，其水於空悉皆消散。復注大雨，滴若犁轆、或如車軸，然其雨水亦皆消散。時舍利弗呬囉見斯事已，遂便斂念，入勝解行定。既入定已，其水滂沛遍滿獄中，受苦聲除。
- 46 This Sanskrit compound was conjectured by Migot, “Un grand disciple du Buddha: Śāriputra. Son rôle dans l’histoire du bouddhisme et dans le développement de l’Abhidharma”, 508.
- 47 E.g. Nakamura, *A Great Dictionary of Buddhist Vocabulary*, 723 s.v. 勝解; Hirakawa, *Buddhist Chinese-Sanskrit Dictionary*, 208 s.v. 勝解.
- 48 Dhammajoti, “*Adhimukti*, Meditative Experience and *Vijñaptimātrātā*”, 136–137.
- 49 Willemsen, “Kumārajīva’s ‘Explanatory Discourse’ about Abhidharmic Literature”, 45–50.
- 50 Dhammajoti, “*Adhimukti*, Meditative Experience and *Vijñaptimātrātā*”, 143.
- 51 貪愛 may be translated from *trṣṇā* or *rāga*. See Hirakawa, *Buddhist Chinese-Sanskrit Dictionary*, 1109 s.v. 貪愛.
- 52 T XXVII 524c–525a: 一切法中，唯有二法是解脫自性，謂：無為法中，擇滅是解脫自性。有為法中，大地法所攝勝解是解脫自性。...若依無貪故，心解脫貪愛，此相應勝解名心解脫。若依無癡故，慧解脫無明，此相應勝解名慧解脫。
- 53 Originally such cognates were not used as technical terminology, but to convey several shades of meaning. See Kuan, “Tradition and Adaptation: Translating Indic Buddhist Texts into Modern Chinese”, 308–309.
- 54 I render *pāmsupisācaka* as “tiny goblin”. See Cone, *A Dictionary of Pāli, Part III*, 1–2: “*pāmsu*, ... *dust, dirt* ... °*pisācaka*, m. [*BHS* *pāmsupisācaka*], a (most insignificant) kind of goblin, a dirt-imp”.
- 55 Ud pp. 39–40: *Tena kho pana samayena āyasmā Śāriputto ... abbhokāse nisinno hoti aññataraṃ samādhiṃ samāpajjitvā. Tena kho pana samayena dve yakkhā sahayākā uttarāya disāya dakkhiṇaṃ*

disaṃ gacchanti ... Addasaṃsu kho te yakkhā āyasmantaṃ Sāriputtaṃ ... Atha kho so yakkho taṃ yakkhaṃ anādiyitvā āyasmato Sāriputtatherassa sīse pahāraṃ adāsi. Tāva mahā pahāro ahoṣi (CST has Tāva mahā pahāro ahoṣi, which is missing from PTS) api tena pahārena sattaratanamaṃ vā adḍhaṭṭhamaratanaṃ vā nāgaṃ osādeyya, mahantaṃ vā pabbakūtāṃ padāleyya ... Addasā kho āyasmā Mahāmogallāno dibbena cakkhunā ... tena yakkhena āyasmato Sāriputtassa sīse pahāraṃ dīyamānaṃ. Disvā yena āyasmā Sāriputto ten' upasaṅkami, upasaṅkamitvā āyasmantaṃ Sāriputtaṃ etad avoca: kacci te, āvuso, khamaṇīyaṃ ... kacci na kiñci dukkhaṃ ti. Khamaṇīyaṃ me, āvuso Moggallāna ... api ca me sīse thokaṃ dukkhaṃ ti. Accharīyaṃ ... yaṃ tvaṃ mahiddhiko āyasmā Sāriputto mahānubhāvo ... Accharīyaṃ ... yāva mahiddhiko āyasmā Mahāmogallāno mahānubhāvo ... yatra hi nāma yakkhaṃ pi passissati! Mayaṃ pan' etarahi paṃsupisācācam pi na passāma ti.

- 56 Mhv III 74: *maharddhikānāṃ*, which is the genitive plural of *mahā-rddhika*. See note 7.
- 57 Migot, “Un grand disciple du Buddha: Sāriputra. Son rôle dans l’histoire du bouddhisme et dans le développement de l’Abhidharma”, 507.
- 58 T II 793a: 汝勿興此意打沙門頭。所以然者，此沙門極有神德，有大威力，此尊名舍利弗，世尊弟子中聰明高才無復過是，智慧弟子中最為第一。
- 59 Skilton, “State or Statement? *Samādhi* in Some Early Mahāyāna Sūtras”, 56–57, notes 22–28.
- 60 The first novel feature is found in EĀ 42.4, which states: “In my Dharma there are Diamond Concentration, Cessation Concentration, All Light Concentration, Attaining Non-arising Concentration, and various [other] concentrations that are countless.” T II 753b: 我法中有金剛三昧，有滅盡三昧，一切光明三昧，得不起三昧，種種三昧不可稱計。
- 61 Lamotte, “A Composite Sūtra from the Ekottarāgama”, 46.
- 62 Kuan, “Mahāyāna Elements and Mahāsāṃghika Traces in the *Ekottarika-āgama*”, 144–149.
- 63 執杖 may have been translated from *daṇḍa-pāṇi*. See Hirakawa, *Buddhist Chinese-Sanskrit Dictionary*, 296 s.v. 執杖.
- 64 T II 639b: 尊者大目捷連到時，著衣持鉢，欲入羅閱城乞食。是時，執杖梵志遙見目連來，各相謂曰：「此是沙門瞿曇弟子中，無有出此人上，我等盡共圍已，而取打殺。」是時，彼梵志便共圍捉，各以瓦石打殺而捨去...目連即以神足還至精舍，到舍利弗所，在一面坐。是時，尊者大目捷連語舍利弗言：「此執杖梵志圍我取打，骨肉爛盡，身體疼痛，實不可堪。我今欲取股涅槃，故來辭汝。」時舍利弗言：「世尊弟子之中，神足第一，有大威力，何故不以神足而避乎？」目連報言：「我本所造行極為深重，要索受報，終不可避。」
- 65 Kuan, “Legends and Transcendence: Sectarian Affiliations of the *Ekottarika Āgama* in Chinese Translation”, 619.
- 66 This tale is recorded in the *Visuddhimagga* XII 106–116. See VH pp. 335–338.
- 67 A palace of Sakka, ruler of gods. See MN I 252–253.
- 68 Ja V 126: *Thero tassa nissandena ākāse uppatitūṃ nāsakki. Nandopananda-damana-Vejayanta-kampana-samatthā pi ssa iddhi kammabalena dubbalattam pattā.*
- 69 DhP-a III 65–66. For the differences, see Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names*, vol. II, 546 note 48, and Nyanaponika & Hecker, *Great Disciples of the Buddha: Their Lives, Their Works, Their Legacy*, 102f.
- 70 DhP-a III 67.
- 71 Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas: A Vanished Indian Religion*, 107–109.
- 72 Bronkhorst, “Reflections on the Fate of Northwestern Brahmins”, 48.
- 73 DhP-a III 66: *thero atanaṃ katakammaṃ ākadḍhanabhāvaṃ ṇatvā na apagañchi.*
- 74 In AN 4.239 (II 238) the Buddha explains the four kinds of ascetic as the stream-enterer, the once-returner, the non-returner and the arahant; he asserts that the other religions are devoid of ascetics. Cf. also DN II 151.
- 75 A more literal translation is “I can’t even recall the word 神, let alone exert 通!” 神通, which is mentioned in Sāriputta’s question earlier, must have been translated from *rddhi* in Sanskrit, equivalent to *iddhi* in Pāli, the Indic language I opt for in this paper (for the reason, see Section 1).
- 76 T XXIV 287b: 尊者目連前業將熟，緩步而來。外道既見問言：「苾芻！正命眾中有沙門不？」...答言：「汝等眾內寧有沙門？如佛所說：『此是初沙門，此是第二沙門，此是第三沙門，此是第四沙門，除此已外更無沙門...』又復汝師哺刺擊，由在人中說邪惡法誑惑人故，生無間獄。受廣大身，於其舌上有五百鐵犁，耕墾流血，受極苦惱。彼寄我言：『我由人中說惡邪法誑惑眾生，今墮惡趣受耕舌苦。總報徒眾：『汝等更勿供養我塔，每供養時我身苦痛倍更增劇，從此已後憶我言教。』』諸人聞已便生忿怒，作如是語：『諸人當知此禿頭沙門非但於我強論過失，并我大師亦被誹謗，今欲如何？』一人報曰：『直須熟打！餘更何言？...』眾即以杖打尊者身，遍體爛爛，由如搥草，即便四散。時舍利子怪其在後遲晚不來，遂即往看，見其形體碎如搥草而布于地，問言：『具壽！何意如此？』答言：『舍利子！此是業熟，知欲如何？』舍利子言：『具壽！豈非大師聲聞眾中稱說

神通最為第一？何乃至斯？」答曰：「業力持故，我於神字尚不能憶，況發通耶！」時舍利子以七條衣裹襪其身，猶若嬰兒，抱持至寺。

- 77 Keown, *Buddhism: A Very Short Introduction*, 64.
- 78 Right concentration (*sammā-samādhi*) is defined as the four *jhānas* in the *Nikāyas* (e.g. MN III 252, SN V 10). The faculty of concentration (*samādhi'ndriya*) is also defined in terms of the four *jhānas* (SN V 198).
- 79 Gethin, *The Foundations of Buddhism*, 234.
- 80 I am grateful for the following information provided by Dr. Shu-hwa Chao. No *sūtras* extant in Sanskrit or in Chinese translation have a title containing words equivalent to *dhyāna-pāramitā* or *samādhi-pāramitā*, except for the surviving title 內禪波羅蜜經 **adhyātma-dhyāna-pāramitā Sūtra* preserved in the ancient scriptural catalogues (e.g. 出三藏記集T 2145 LV 36a). Some texts in Tibetan translation have a title containing *dhyāna* but not *dhyāna-pāramitā*, such as the *dhyānaṣaḍḍharmavyavasthāna*, *dhyānaṣaḍḍharmavyavasthāna-vṛtti*, and *dhyānadīpopadeśa-nāma*.

An Introduction to Sthiramati's *Tattvārthā*

Chapter I

Nobuchiyo ODANI
(Tr. by Shobha Rani DASH)

In July 2005, Prof. Ernst Steinkellner, the Director of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Wien of the time, entrusted us the editing of the Sanskrit manuscript of the *Tattvārthā* by Sthiramati (ca.480–540). Soon, a study group was formed and the editing work had been held once in a week since 2006. With the help of the Scientific Research Grant for Pioneering Research Work granted by the Ministry of Education and Science of Japan, the study group finished deciphering and editing chapter 1 broadly around the end of 2018. After re-examining the knotty problems for about half a year more, finally the work is now ready for publication.

According to the *Tibet Autonomous District Extant Sanskrit Manuscript Catalogue* (1985) (『西藏自治区現存梵文写本目錄』 popularly known as *Luo Zhao Catalogue*), this manuscript measures 54.3×6.6 cm and contains 137 folios. Each folio has 8–13 lines inscribed on both sides. Prof. Kazunobu Matsuda of Bukkyo University, a member of our research project, deciphers the script of the manuscript as Gilgit/Bamiyan type II script. He opines that originally the present manuscript consisted of three bundles. But the second bundle is missing that supposed to have the annotation of approximately from the middle part of the second chapter to the middle part of the fourth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Pradhan first ed., pp.56–219).¹ This time 45 folios from the first bundle will be published that annotate the first chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

1. Difficulties in Deciphering the *Tattvārthā*

It took a long time to decipher because it was an old manuscript transcribed in between the latter half of the 8th century to the first half of the 9th century, the Tibetan translation was insufficient, and the commentary of Sthiramati was difficult. These are the main causes. Regarding the inadequate Tibetan translation, the late Dr. Yasunori Ejima described the translator priest Dharmapālabhadra (1441–1528) as “not confident enough to understand Sanskrit” and “sometimes the Sanskrit sentence is transcribed as it is, left as it is when it is not understood, and when the meaning is somewhat clear, a Tibetan translation is added in the form of a comment”.²

One of the reasons for the inadequate Tibetan translation is, as we have seen earlier, the lack of ability of the translator Dharmapālabhadra. However, that is not the only reason. It can be inferred from the information on translation stated in the colophon.³ It states that the Sanskrit text was obtained by gŚhon

nu dpal (1392–1481). He attempted to translate but could not complete it. Before this text, the *Sphuṭārthā* of Yaśomitra, and the *Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī* of Pūrṇavardhana, who is considered to be a disciple of Sthiramati, have been translated. The *Tattvārthā*, different from the other two commentaries, is included in the *Khuddaka-nikāya* of bsTan’gyur of the Tibetan Canon. From this fact it is supposed that the translations of the two representative commentaries of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* have been completed before the translation of the *Tattvārthā*. Though Dharmapālabhadra must have referred to these two commentaries, he could not complete the translation. It seems that the abstruse nature of Sthiramati’s commentary itself hindered the translation work. Later, His Holiness Chos kyi grags pa ye Śes dpal bzañ po (1453–1527), the fourth religious leader of the Red Hat School, considered the importance of this book and extended his support to the translation work. It is mentioned in the colophon that with this support Dharmapālabhadra (1441–1528), the translator monk from Sha lu, completed the translation assisted by Yo ga pa sañs rgyas ḥphel.

2. Two Sanskrit texts of the *Tattvārthā*

In this colophon it is mentioned that Dharmapālabhadra used two Sanskrit texts when translating into Tibetan, which is quite interesting. In Ejima’s translation this part of the colophon says:

Obtaining this Sanskrit text itself and the Sanskrit text for editing obtained from sTag luñ, except for the second half of Chapter 2 (*gnas, sthāna*), Chapter 3, and the first half of Chapter 4, he translated at the temple of Ganden Marmo.⁴

Therefore, it is clear that the two Sanskrit texts that Dharmapālabhadra used for the Tibetan translation were the “the Sanskrit text itself that he already owned” and the text obtained from sTag luñ that lacked “second half of Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and the first half of Chapter 4”. It is presumed that the text obtained from sTag luñ was originally containing three bundles. The text which we are currently deciphering, commissioned by Professor Steinkellner, is lacking the second bundle.

In addition to the Tibetan translation above, the Chinese translation, retranslation from it to Uyghur and Mongolian retranslation from the Tibetan translation are included in the translations of Sthiramati’s *Tattvārthā*. The Chinese translation in the Taisho Daizokyo collection is only three pages long, which consists of five volumes, and is a commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* from the first chapter to the third chapter.⁵ Therefore, Dr. Hajime Sakurabe says, “This is not a remaining part of a complete text, but rather a tremendous extract, a part of an extreme excerpt.”⁶

The Uyghur translation is a relatively faithful retranslation of the Chinese one. The beginning part of this Uyghur translation has already been introduced by Dr. Tōru Haneda.⁷ In recent years, a Japanese translation by Dr. Masahiro Shogaito has been published.⁸ From the Japanese translation

of the beginning part of the Uyghur translation of both the scholars it is known that, the Uyghur translation, which is considered to be excerpts from the Chinese translation, includes the title of the text (俱舍論實義書), the total number of verses (28,000 verses), the author's name (悉地羅末底 Sthiramati), homage to the Three Jewels, Vasubandhu, the author of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, and Sthiramati's teacher Guṇamati, prayer to protect Sthiramati for the long duration of the Dharma. Furthermore, the composition of eight chapters of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the outline of the content therein are also explained. On the other hand, the Tibetan translation and the manuscripts we are commissioned this time do not have a corresponding description. What was said in a fairly long sentence at the beginning of the Uyghur translation is not found in the Tibetan translation as well as in the commissioned manuscripts. In particular, it makes me feel uncomfortable that the excerpts of the Chinese translation and the Uyghur translation contain the homage to the commentator Sthiramati himself, but it is not found in the Tibetan translation and in the commissioned manuscript. Regarding this, Ejima says, "According to Indian customs, it is unlikely that the author himself (i.e., Sthiramati: Odani) starts the commentary without the verses of homage". He adds "It is natural to assume that the first one or two folios including this were missing in the manuscript that the Tibetan translation is based on."⁹ In the *Sphuṭārthā* of Yaśomitra, the eulogy to Guṇamati and Vasumitra is recited along with the words of homage to the World Honoured One and the eulogy to Vasubandhu.¹⁰ In light of this fact, in the Tibetan translation and in the commissioned manuscript, as Ejima says, "it is assumed that the first one or two folios are missing."

3. On the establishment of the three commentaries of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*

There are three commentaries on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya – Tattvārthā* by Sthiramati, *Sphuṭārthā* by Yaśomitra and *Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī* by Pūrṇavardhana. There is a disagreement about the order of establishment of these three commentaries. According to Sakurabe, they were established in the order of Sthiramati's *Tattvārthā*, Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthā*, and Pūrṇavardhana's *Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī*. But Ejima placed Pūrṇavardhana before Yaśomitra. According to Bu ston, Pūrṇavardhana is said to be a disciple of Sthiramati.¹¹ Regarding the context of the commentaries of Pūrṇavardhana and Yaśomitra, Sakurabe said that Pūrṇavardhana wrote the commentary of the first eight chapters of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* based on Sthiramati's *Tattvārthā* and the commentary on the final chapter i.e. chapter nine is based on the *Sphuṭārthā* of Yaśomitra. Based on this, he presumed that the *Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī* of Pūrṇavardhana was established after the *Sphuṭārthā* of Yaśomitra.¹² This presumption is largely approved by the subsequent studies.¹³

Regarding the year of Sthiramati and Yaśomitra, Prof. Erich Frauwallner states 510-570 for the former, which is convincing.¹⁴ The latter is assumed of a period after the former.¹⁵ Because he quotes¹⁶ the verses of homage at the

beginning of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, who belongs to almost the same period as Sthiramati (480-540). Many sentences identified in the commentary of Yaśomitra can be seen in the commentary of Sthiramati. If Sakurabe's assumption is justified, then Yaśomitra quoted Sthiramati's commentary but never mentioned his name. Why did Yaśomitra do such a thing? Regarding this, Prof. Takumi Fukuda, a member of our research group, comments as follows examining the *Bhagavadviśeṣa* in the *Sphuṭārthā*, "it corresponds well with the text in Sthiramati's commentary and in some cases is verbatim enough to be considered as a direct quote". Hence, *Bhagavadviśeṣa* is not a personal name, but a "designation" and a "kind of honorific title" used by Yaśomitra while quoting the interpretation of Sthiramati. According to him, Yaśomitra "was referring Sthiramati's *Tattvārthā* specifically". We think it is justified.

4. The *Tattvārthā* and the *Sphuṭārthā*

Under the guidance of Sakurabe, our study group on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, which has been held for more than 30 years, has translated the main text of Vasubandhu and the *Sphuṭārthā* of Yaśomitra. The result has already been published.¹⁷ After that, the study group completed the translation of Chapter 3 of the *Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī* of Pūrṇavardhana, and a part of it was published.¹⁸ It is well known that the *Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī* is "extremely similar" to the *Tattvārthā*,¹⁹ so here I would like to introduce one or two points of the characteristics of Sthiramati's commentary, those are in contrast to the *Sphuṭārthā*, for the reference of future research.

The *Sphuṭārthā* is much easier to understand compared to the *Tattvārthā*. The biggest reason why the *Tattvārthā* is difficult to understand is that the Sanskrit palm-leaf manuscripts are old and difficult to read. Furthermore, the Tibetan translations of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the *Sphuṭārthā* and the *Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī* mention the name of Indian Pundits as co-translator. But in the case of *Tattvārthā*, as any Indian Pundit's name is not given, it is evident that the translation was made by Tibetan translator monks only. Because of this reason, the difficulty in understanding the meaning makes it an arduous task to read and comprehend the *Tattvārthā*. In the Tibetan translation, it is often seen that there are segmental mistakes and even sentences that are affirmative in the original text are negative.

The *Tattvārthā* is more difficult than the *Sphuṭārthā* not only because the manuscripts are old and the Tibetan translation is poor. The characteristic of the commentary in the *Sphuṭārthā* is that it is semantically interpretive. For this reason, grammatical treatise such as the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and the *Gaṇapāṭha* of Pāṇini are often used. In addition, it is a major feature of the *Sphuṭārthā* that the explanation makes it easier to understand the contents of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. For example, verse 1 of chapter 1 says:

I will speak of the treatise *Abhidharmakośa*, paying homage to the True Teacher, one who breaks through the darkness in almost every way and in all respects and rescues the sentient beings from the sludge of rebirth. (1)

In this verse, the compound word *sarvahaatāndhakāra* (one who breaks through the darkness in almost every way and in all respects) is a problem and is discussed in various ways. Here, Sthiramati only touches on the rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, II, 2,35–37, but Yaśomitra quotes the rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, II, 1,40; II, 1,4; II, 1,72 as well as the explanation of the *Kāśīkāvṛtti*, and refers to the *Dhātupāṭha* and the *Gaṇapāṭha* to explain the synthesis method of the word more grammatically. Thus, it can be said that Sthiramati's commentary emphasizes the interpretation of doctrines and ideas, while the commentary of Yaśomitra emphasizes the interpretation of the meaning.

Sthiramati is well-known as a commentator of Yogācāra treatises such as the *Trīṃśikā* and the *Madhyāntavibhāga*. In that case too, Sthiramati's annotations emphasize the interpretation of doctrines and ideas rather than the interpretation of words. For example, in the *Madhyāntavibhāga* it is said that it is important to understand “the self-aspect of delusional discrimination” in order to understand the doctrine of consciousness (*vijñaptivāda*) that “the world is just a representation of consciousness”. However, Sthiramati does not explain what he considers as “common knowledge”. Therefore, we must seek elsewhere for the knowledge he has neglected as “common knowledge”. In that case, the *Trīṃśikāṭikā* and the *Ālambanaparīkṣāṭikā* by Vinitadeva (ca. 645–715), which describe in detail the argument between the realists of the outside world and the Yogācārins over the existence and non-existence of the outside world, are useful.²⁰ The way of Sthiramati's annotation i.e. the interpretation of the terms used in the consciousness-only theory and the lack of explanation of what he considers to be “common knowledge” is recognized too in the commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. However, that does not mean that Sthiramati has interposed interpretations based on the doctrine of consciousness into the commentary on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. He grasps the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* as a critical compilation of Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādins from the standpoint of the Sautrāntikas, and strives to annotate Vasubandhu's Abhidharma not deviating from that standpoint.

The reason why the *Tattvārthā* is more difficult than the *Sphuṭārthā* is that, as mentioned earlier, the *Sphuṭārthā* focuses on the interpretation of words, while the *Tattvārthā* always focuses on criticizing Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādins from the standpoint of the Sautrāntikas. Therefore, the difference in interpretation between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas is annotated as a problem.

5. The *Tattvārthā* and the *Nyāyānusāriṇī*

In Sthiramati's commentary on *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, there are quite a lot of counterarguments to the *Nyāyānusāriṇī* by Saṅghabhadra (ca. 430–490), who criticizes Vasubandhu. Xuanzang's the *Great Tang Records on the Western Region* (大唐西域記) states that this treatise was originally named *Kośakarakā* (俱舍雹論 The Hail against *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*).²¹ According to the description, Saṅghabhadra noticed that the *Abhidharmakośa* deviated from the orthodox theory of Sarvāstivāda. In order to refute it, he wrote the *Kośakarakā* and attempted to expel Vasubandhu from the order of Sarvāstivāda and then visited the residence of Vasubandhu with his friends. However, after hearing the rumor, Vasubandhu thought that long-term discussions were impossible for him because of old age, and headed to central India, where there were wise men who could judge the discussions, to settle it at once. By the time Saṅghabhadra arrived, Vasubandhu had already left. Saṅghabhadra felt that the tensed feeling until then had melted and his energy suddenly diminished. With the weakening energy, Saṅghabhadra recognized his own wrong notion about Vasubandhu and wrote an apology letter regretting his mistakes. It is recorded that Vasubandhu read it, understood the wisdom of Saṅghabhadra, and changed the title to “*Nyāyānusāriṇī*” to convey the intent of the text correctly.

The colophon of the *Tattvārthā* records that this text was already called *Karaka-aśani* (雹雷光 gNam lcags thog zer) before this book was translated.²² gNam lcags and thog zer, the Tibetan translations of hail 雹 and thunder light 雷光, are synonymous. In Sanskrit, the 俱舍雹論 is reduced to *Kośa-karakā*²³ and 雹雷光 is reduced to *Karaka-aśani*.²⁴ Both *karakā* and *aśani* mean hail and thunder. Therefore, both hail and thunder light are considered to mean the texts that cause harm to the opponent. It may be considered that the name of the *Tattvārthā* called 雹雷光 was given having some kind of connection with the tradition as mentioned in *Great Tang Records on the Western Region* that the original title of the *Nyāyānusāriṇī* was *Kośa-karakā* (俱舍雹論).

From the name “*Karaka-aśani*” (雹雷光), one can observe that the main content of the *Tattvārthā* is to criticize the *Nyāyānusāriṇī*. Therefore, in the first chapter of the *Tattvārthā*, the name of Saṅghabhadra appears for a total of 43 times: thirty-three times as ācārya-Saṅghabhadra (軌範師衆賢), four times each as Saṅghabhadra only and as bhadanta-Saṅghabhadra (大德衆賢, 尊者衆賢), two times as sthavira-Saṅghabhadra (上座衆賢). On the other hand, in the first chapter of the *Sphuṭārthā*, it appears only once in the name of ācārya-Saṅghabhadra (軌範師衆賢). Most of the remarks on Saṅghabhadra commented in the *Tattvārthā* can be found in the *Nyāyānusāriṇī*. In addition, there are conspicuous sentences that are supposed to be annotated keeping the *Nyāyānusāriṇī* in mind. From these facts, it is evident that the *Tattvārthā* is a text that attempts to clarify the true meaning (*tattva-artha*) of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* by criticizing the *Nyāyānusāriṇī*. As an example

to show this, I would like to introduce the commentary of Sthiramati²⁵ on the discussion²⁶ about how much of the eighteen elements (*dhātu*) are *seers* (*dr̥ṣṭi*) and how much of them are not *seers* (*adr̥ṣṭi*), which is discussed in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

When asked how many of the eighteen elements are *seers* i.e. what sees, and how many of them do not see, Vasubandhu responds to the question in the following two verses.

The eyes (*cakṣu*) and parts of the *dharma-dhātu* are *seers*. [Parts of the *dharma-dhātu*] are of eight kinds. The wisdom (*dhī*) that arises with the five consciousness (*viññāna*) is not a *seer* because it cannot decide (the object). (41)

The eyes see the form. The eyes with consciousness (*viññāna*) see. Not the consciousness that depends on the eyes sees because the covered form cannot be seen, as the tradition says. (42)

There are two views regarding what is it that sees the form. One view says it is the eye-faculty i.e. the sensory organ. The other view says it is the eye-consciousness i.e. the cognitive function. Hōsen calls the former “organ-see-claimer”(根見家) and the latter “consciousness-see-claimer”(識見家).²⁷

Before entering into Sthiramati's *Tattvārthā*, I would like to take a look at the outline of the commentary on the *Mūla-kārikā* of Vasubandhu by Yaśomitra. Yaśomitra calls the former Vaibhāṣika, and the latter Vijñānavādin.²⁸ It is explained in the above-mentioned two verses that *seer* i.e. that what sees is the eye, not the consciousness. The use of the word “*kila*” (as the tradition says) in the verse shows that the theory that what sees is the eye is actually “the idea of others”²⁹ rather than the idea of Vasubandhu himself. Therefore, it is known that Vasubandhu does not accept the theory of “the eyes see” by the Vaibhāṣikas.

In the commentary of Vasubandhu and the commentary on it by Yaśomitra, the logical contradiction that occurs between the case of “seeing by the eyes” and the case of “seeing by the consciousness” is discussed variously in the form of criticism mainly by the Vijñānavādins to the Vaibhāṣikas. Finally, as a theory-based proof, the Vijñānavādins' view, i.e. “when the light is not obstructed, the eye-consciousness is generated. Hence, the consciousness sees,” is accepted for the time being. However, the Vaibhāṣikas still insist that “the eyes see” on the ground that it is said in the *sūtra* “seeing the form by eyes”.

As opposed to it, according to Vasubandhu, Yaśomitra insists that it is wrong to comprehend the *sūtra* as stating that the eyes see the form, rather the *sūtra* should be understood as stating “the consciousness sees through the doorway called as eye”.³⁰ In this way, Yaśomitra says that the idea of Vasubandhu that “the consciousness sees” is justified from the point of both the theory and the scriptures. The commentary of Sthiramati begins as follows:

Of all the *dharmas*, there are two that have seeing as *svabhāva*: among those that have forms is the eye-faculty, and among those that are formless is the wisdom. The latter has a subtle movement, is guided by inferring knowledge and functions inwardly. (TA, A38b10–12.)

There are *seers* with form and without form. In them, first of all, Sthiramati annotates the eyes, which are *seers* with form as follows:

Among them, first of all the characteristic of eye is described. It is a *seer* because of the accomplishment of the act of seeing, because of the observability, because of the removal of darkness, and because of the sensitivity. (TA, A38b11.)

This part can be found in the *Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī* as follows:

此中眼相、如前已說。世間共了。觀照色故、闇相違故、用明利故、說眼名見。(『正理』 Vol. 6, 363c.18–19)

After this phrase, Sthiramati annotates on the formless *seer*. In that case, he first annotates that although the heretical beliefs in a real personality (*satkāya-dr̥ṣṭi*) etc. are the formless *seers*, they are not explained here as they are explained in the fifth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Then, he begins to annotate that the wisdom of an ordinary person, an *āśaikṣya*-person (無学) and *śaikṣya*-person (有学) are the formless *seers*. All of these wisdoms are considered to be right view (*samyag-dr̥ṣṭi*), but in the wisdom of an ordinary person, an *āśaikṣya*-person and a *śaikṣya*-person there are differences depending on the position or the order in which they occur. Sthiramati annotates on it as follows:

Speaking of “Right View” alone, it is established that all the three of these (the wisdom of an ordinary person, an *āśaikṣya*-person and a *śaikṣya*-person) are [said to be] right view. But, to show the position of an ordinary person, an *āśaikṣya*-person and a *śaikṣya*-person, or to show the order in which the wisdom occurs, [Vasubandhu makes] a distinction of three kinds [stating] to see the form when there is cloud, when there is no cloud, at night and in the daytime and so forth. (TA, A 38b12–13)

This commentary is consistent with the sentence explained in the *Lakṣaṇānusāriṇī* as follows:

一正見言具攝三種。別開三者、為顯異生学無学三見別。又顯漸次修習故。(『正理』 Vol. 6, 363c.23–24)

After that, Sthiramati explains the words as follows:

In that case, because it is covered with darkness at night and lacks light, the *seer* sees in reverse with *satkāya-dr̥ṣṭi* etc. just as it is reversed in steep hills and valleys. After that, it becomes clearer by the right view. [The *seer*] sees the forms just as at the night when the darkness is controlled by the light of the moon away from the clouds. After that, with [the *seer* of] *śaikṣya*-person, one [sees the forms just as] one sees the forms in the daytime under the sun-

covered clouds. [The *seer* of] *āśaikṣya*-person, sees the form in a much better way just as one sees the form in the cloudless daytime. It is just like as one sees when the darkness is removed by the rays of the sun. (TA, A38b13–39a1)

This commentary also appears as it is in the text of *Nyāyānusāriṇī*.

譬如夜分、無月等明、雲霧晦冥、而遊危險阻。所見色像、無非顛倒。五染污見、觀法亦爾。譬如夜分、有月等明、除諸晦冥、而遊險阻。所見色像、少分明淨。世間正見、觀法亦爾。譬如昼分、雲翳上昇、掩蔽日輪、而遊平坦。所見色像、漸增明淨、有學正見、觀法亦爾。譬如昼分、烈日舒光、雲霧廓清、而遊平坦。所見色像、最極明淨。有學正見、觀法亦爾。(『正理』 Vol. 6, 363c.24–364a.3)

After this, Sthiramati continues to annotate on wisdom which is the formless *seer*, but all of them, as we have seen earlier, are quoted from the *Nyāyānusāriṇī*. It is difficult to notice that the annotation is a quotation from the *Nyāyānusāriṇī* because the name of Saṅghabhadra is not mentioned there. Shortly after that annotation, Sthiramati presents Saṅghabhadra's idea that refutes Vasubandhu's view of "the consciousness sees", along with his name. Then he rejects it as follows:

【Saṅghabhadra】 However, Ācārya-Saṅghabhadra says. Since the eye, which is the base for the consciousness and is made by *mahābhūta* that arises together with the consciousness, has the ability to see, the consciousness that depends on it (the eye) does not see. Therefore, it is not correct to say that "perception occurs when there is a cause of perception, and therefore the cause of perception is perception." 【Sthiramati】 That's not the case as it is not an established theory. This is because there is no innate difference (*ātma-viśeṣa*) in the eye on which consciousness relies.

What is said to be the word of Saṅghabhadra here is explained in the *Nyāyānusāriṇī* as follows:

眼識力所住持、勝用生故。如依薪力、勝用火生。若見色用、是識生法、此見色用、離眼而生。由識長益、俱生大種、令起勝根、能見衆色。故不応説、能依識見。誰有智者、当作是言、諸有因縁、能生了別。如是了別、即彼因縁。識是彼因、故非見体。(『正理』 Vol. 6, 364b.2–7)

From this, it is known that the previous series of discussions that makes the wisdom as the formless *seer* was the theory of Saṅghabhadra. Even after this, Sthiramati criticizes the theory that "the eyes see" in three places by mentioning the name of Saṅghabhadra. From this, it is known that Sthiramati holds the view of "the consciousness sees" and is trying to defend Vasubandhu from Saṅghabhadra's criticism against it. If we observe in this way, it may be concluded that the oral tradition about Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra written in the colophons of *Great Tang Records on the Western Region* and the *Tattvārthā* as discussed above conveys historical facts to some extent. When reading the *Tattvārthā*, it is important to know the characteristic of this text that it is an annotation written keeping always the *Nyāyānusāriṇī* in mind.

Abbreviations

- AK : *Abhidharmakośa*
 AKVy, *Sphutārthā* : Unrai Wogihara ed., *Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā*, Tokyo, 1932–1936.
 AKBh : P. Pradhan ed., *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu*, K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1967.
 TA, *Tattvārthā* : *Abhidharmakośaṭīkā-tattvārthā-nāma*.
 『正理』 : 『阿毘達磨順正理論』 (大正29, No. 1562)

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Notes

- 1 Matsuda 2011.
- 2 Ejima 1986: 6.
- 3 Ejima 1986: 23, footnote 4.
- 4 Ejima 1986: 23, footnote 4.
- 5 Taisho 1561, vol. 29.325a–328a.
- 6 Sakurabe 1975: 1.
- 7 Haneda 1925: 779–780.
- 8 Shogaito 1991, 1993a, 1993b; Shogaito 2008.
- 9 Ejima 1986: 7.
- 10 Wogihara 1932–1936: 1,1–18.
- 11 Obermiller 1964: 148.
- 12 Sakurabe 1959: 31.
- 13 Fukuda 2002: 37.
- 14 Frauwallner 1961: 137.
- 15 Fukuda 2002: 53, footnote 3.
- 16 Hattori 1968: 23.
- 17 Sakurabe and Odani 1999; Sakurabe, Odani and Honjō 2004; Odani and Honjō 2007.
- 18 Odani and Honjō 2002; Odani and Honjō 2004; Odani and Honjō 2005.
- 19 Sakurabe 1959: 30.
- 20 Odani 2017: 19–21.
- 21 *Great Tang Records on the Western Regions* (大唐西域記) Taisho vol.51, 891c.18–892b.4; Mizutani 1975: 152–154.
- 22 Pek, No.5875, Tho 564b5. sngar gangs can du mdzad kyi 'grel bshad slob dpon blo gros brtan pas mdzad pa gnam lcags thogs zer zhes bya ba yod do.
- 23 Mizutani 1975: 154, footnote 5.
- 24 Obermiller 1964: 148.
- 25 TA, A, 38b10–41a7; Pek, To, 137b1–147b2.
- 26 AKBh, 29,12–31,17; Pek, 51a5–53a3; Xuanzang, 10c2–11b8; Paramārtha, 170c25–171a27; Sakurabe 1969: 217–222.
- 27 Hosen 1898: 301.
- 28 AKVy, 80,17–30.
- 29 AKVy, 80,16. *kila-śabdaḥ para-matau*.
- 30 AKVy, 81,15–29.

Review Article:
Setting Out on the Great Way:
Essays on Early Mahāyāna Buddhism

Bhikkhu PĀSĀDIKA

With pleasure I have accepted the invitation to contribute an article to this Festschrift in honour of Ven. Prof. Dhammajoti. Although I never had the chance to meet him personally, over the years I have come to admire him as an erudite and conscientious scholar in the field of Buddhist Studies thanks to his excellent publications and through his superb editorial work as editor of the *Journal of Buddhist Studies*, published by the Centre for Buddhist Studies, Sri Lanka & The Buddha-Dharma Centre of Hong Kong. I do hope it may be appropriate to contribute to the present felicitation volume in honour of our much esteemed colleague the following review of published conference papers on Early Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Setting Out on the Great Way: Essays on Early Mahāyāna Buddhism.
Edited by Paul Harrison. Equinox Publishing LTD., Sheffield, Bristol, 2018.

This book contains ten papers (pp. 1-273) presented at a conference on the early Mahāyāna, which was organized at the instance of the United Kingdom Association of Buddhist Studies in honour of the late Sara Boin-Webb. The symposium took place at Cardiff University in 2012. The volume includes 35 plates of Buddhist art and a general index at the end (pp. 303-310). On the back cover of the book it is stated that the authors of the conference papers offer different perspectives on the origins and early history of Mahāyāna Buddhism and probe into selected aspects of its formative period. The Mahāyāna which had spread in its various forms in East Asia and ushered in the later developments of the Vajrayāna, is considered one of the most significant forms of Buddhism whose beginnings have been the focus of scholars' close attention and debate for a long time. The papers in this volume "address the latest findings in the field, including contributions by younger researchers vigorously critiquing the reappraisal of the Mahāyāna carried out by scholars in the last decades of the twentieth century and the different understanding of the movement which they produced." It is claimed that the study of Buddhism as a whole "reorients itself to embrace new methods and paradigms" so that, thanks to fascinating new manuscript discoveries for example, our understanding of Mahāyāna Buddhism continues to change. So the present book aims at presenting "the latest developments in this ongoing re-evaluation of one of Buddhism's most important historical expressions."

1. “Sara Boin-Webb. Translator of Buddhist Texts” is the first contribution to this volume in honour of the late Sara Boin-Webb by her husband, Russell Webb, adumbrating her life story. He is fully justified in saying that “If and when the definitive history of Buddhism in the United Kingdom is written, space should be allocated to an unassuming yet highly competent translator of key Buddhist texts (p. 1).” Her great achievements are her excellent, felicitous translations of the whole corpus of French translations of Buddhist classics and technical Buddhological works by her kalyāṇamitra, Mgr Étienne Lamotte who was full of praise for the British Lo-tsa-ba’s work: “Your translation seems to me to be perfectly finished and meticulous in the last detail: in plenty of places it is more expressive than the French text (p. 3).” Apart from her translation of Lamotte’s magnum opus, the encyclopaedic *Le Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse (Mahāprajñāpāramitāsāstra)* over which she laboured for twenty years, she also rendered Walpola Rahula’s French translation of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* into English as well as the main works by Thich Thien Chau, *The Literature of the Personalists [Pudgalavādins] of Early Buddhism* and André Bareau’s *The Buddhist Schools of the Small Vehicle*. In addition to her numerous translations of papers for felicitation volumes and academic journals, she was of great help to her husband with the publication of the *Buddhist Studies Review*, the official journal of the United Kingdom Association for Buddhist Studies (UKABS), which was initiated by him. Well-known scholars have underlined the importance of her translations for non-francophone scholars and students in the field of Buddhist Studies to whom important publications in French are not easily accessible, if at all.

2. “Early Mahāyāna. Laying out the Field” is the title of the second contribution by Paul Harrison. In his ‘Opening Remarks’ he refers to the younger generation of junior scholars “firing on the positions” of scholars of the twentieth century on the beginning of the Mahāyāna. He ascertains that “our conception of early Mahāyāna of the beginning of the twenty-first century has moved a long way from what it was in the middle of the twentieth century (p 9).” This is certainly due to the fact that in the meantime a steadily growing amount of textual (manuscript discoveries) as well as archaeological/epigraphical evidence (images, inscriptions) from ‘Greater Gandhāra’, for instance, has become available. After his ‘Opening Remarks’, Harrison deals with ‘The Forest Hypothesis’ regarding the Mahāyāna origins, ‘The Role of the Laity’, ‘Mahāyāna Sūtras and the Problem of Periodisation’, ‘Nikāya Affiliation’, ‘Material Evidence’, and then makes his ‘Concluding Remarks’. In his paper he refers to a number of both earlier and contemporary scholars discussing the origins of the Mahāyāna, including the contributors to the present volume and himself, and he succeeds in bringing home the complexities of the topic. One can only agree with him when he concludes that “early Mahāyāna is not a single, sudden turn in a new direction at one particular stage on the

road taken by Buddhism, but a nexus of multiple impulses combining and unfolding in a long historical trajectory which began before the Common Era and continued well into the first millennium (p. 23).” With regard to the problem of periodisation of Mahāyāna discourses as historical evidence, Harrison speaks of a steadily increasing profusion of sources exacerbating this problem. Although he is fully justified to criticise certain ideas of well-known scholars of the last century about the beginnings of the Mahāyāna, for example Edward Conze’s, we should not forget their achievements in terms of textual periodisation that can still be relied upon. Thus, for instance, the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* and its metrical equivalent, the *Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā* – not considering later textual accretion and transformation in the course of their transmission – used to be taken for the earliest known Mahāyāna texts that have come down to us.¹ When comparing the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* with the *Kāśyapaparivarta*, Conze stresses the fact that “an early date for the *Kāśyapaparivarta* may be surmised from the uncomplicated simplicity of the doctrinal statements and also from the almost total absence of polemics against opponents ... adhering to a *prādeśikayāna*.”² Insightful observations are also made by Lambert Schmithausen who suggests that originally instead of voluminous corpora of Mahāyāna discourses as that of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, relatively short texts of the Great Vehicle were compiled in the way of ancient Śrāvakayāna *sūtras*.³ Thus it could be maintained that the *Kāśyapaparivarta* (hereafter KP) and *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* belong to some of the earliest specimens of discourses of the Mahāyāna in the making. In the same section of his paper on the problem of periodisation Harrison refers to the *Sūtrasamuccaya*, traditionally ascribed to Nāgārjuna, the author of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*. The attribution of this anthology of *sūtra* quotations from both Śrāvaka- and Mahāyāna sources arranged in the way of a ‘gradual instruction’ (*anupūrvikā kathā*) to Nāgārjuna should, according to a number of modern scholars, be considered unlikely, if not impossible. Harrison cites some titles of the *Sūtrasamuccaya* sources and concludes that the content of the quotations “is radically at odds with the kind of agenda we see in other works whose attribution to Nāgārjuna rests on firmer grounds (p. 15).” The *Sūtrasamuccaya* could, nevertheless, be of great service for textual periodisation, and it may be advisable to beware of premature conclusions. The pros and cons of a traditional attribution should be cautiously weighed up. Thus also arguments/working hypotheses in favour of the traditional attribution of the “Anthology of [Quotations from] Discourses” to the Mādhyamika Nāgārjuna should duly be taken into consideration. One important message of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* is, after all, the insistence on the interdependence of ‘conventional’ and ‘absolute truth’,⁴ and in them also a term is highlighted that does not often occur in canonical texts, but is to be found in the *Sūtrasamuccaya*: *avipranāśa* (an entity dissociated from the mind, enabling the fruit of action).⁵

3. With extensive quotations from relevant sources in Sanskrit, Pāli and Tibetan Peter Skilling discusses as to “How the Unborn was Born. The Riddle of Mahāyāna Origins”. He concentrates on two ‘distinctive and recurrent themes of Mahāyāna literature and ideology as possible clues to the riddle’, viz. a) the Mahāyāna followers’ advocating the way to buddhahood, the *bodhisattva*⁶ path and b) the Mahāyāna metaphysics according to which all phenomena (*dharmas*) are unborn and unceasing, have no substance or own-being, are empty, unperceivable and unobtainable. An important stage in the *bodhisattva* path, as Skilling points out, is the ‘acceptance that all *dharmas* are unborn’, *anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti*. He also holds that the ‘metaphysics of the unborn’ first circulated in Vaitulya/Vaidalya/Vaipulya circles,⁷ and puts the question as to why and how it was to occupy a central position in the Mahāyāna metaphysics. In his search for an answer to the question “Why Bodhicitta? Why Mahāyāna?”, Skilling amply quotes from a number of discourses and is justified to conclude that “the notion of the continuity or non-disruption of the three jewels was widely used, even pervasive, in Mahāyāna literature, and was a significant motive for the aspiration towards awakening and the bodhisattva path (p. 45).”

Examining the ‘conundrum of *anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti*’ – all *dharmas* are unborn, all phenomena are unceasing –, Skilling ascertains that this term conveying one of the fundamental assumptions of Mahāyāna metaphysics, seems at odds with the thought of the Āgamas of the Śrāvakayāna. The acceptance/insight into the fact that all *dharmas* are unborn, regularly asserted in Vaidalya texts, became a stage in the *bodhisattva* path in the emerging systems of stages, the *bodhisattvabhūmis*. By leading exponents of the Śrāvakayāna such a kind of metaphysics was considered unacceptable, at variance with the fact that ‘all phenomena are impermanent, arise and then cease, and that only *nirvāṇa* is unborn, unarisen and unfabricated’. For the interschool debate Skilling appositely quotes relevant passages in Buddhaghosa, Dhammapāla, Vasubandhu and Śāntideva. The latter brings a passage from the *Dharmasaṃgīti* into the debate, conveying an effort to reconcile in a non-polemical way the different metaphysical standpoints to the effect that the worldly are attached to ‘arising and ceasing’ and that the Buddha – in order to dispel fear – spoke of ‘arising and ceasing’ by way of convention whereas, as a matter of fact, there actually is no arising and ceasing of phenomena. On p. 51 Skilling refers to Nāgārjuna’s *Ratnāvalī* v. 386, according to which the Great Vehicle’s ‘non-arising’ (*anutpāda*) and the *arhat* ideal of ‘extinction’ (*kṣaya*) pertaining to the Śrāvakayāna are both declared to correspond to ‘emptiness’ (*sūnyatā*). This and the following three verses of the *Ratnāvalī* (vv. 387-389) display an ‘attempt to bridge the gap’ between the stances of exponents of both schools. Skilling’s translation of v. 386 reads:

The non-production taught in the Great Vehicle
And the extinction of the other [schools of thought] are in fact the
same emptiness,

Because in reality extinction and non-production are one:
Therefore, you can accept non-production.

Excerpts from the following three verses run:

... How could what is taught in the Great Vehicle and the other
Be unequal for the wise? ...
You should protect yourself through neutrality.
There is no fault with neutrality, but there is fault
From despising it. ...⁸

With reference to the remarks above (section 2) concerning the *Sūtrasamuccaya*, it may be added here that in v. 388 of the *Ratnāvalī* one (*ekayāna*) as well as three vehicles (i.e. *Śrāvaka*-, *Pratyekabuddha*- and *Mahāyāna*) are mentioned regarding which one should remain neutral. In the *Sūtrasamuccaya* one whole section with its quotations is devoted to the theme *ekayāna* from which a brief excerpt from the *Akṣayamatīnirdeśa* may be quoted here, reminiscent of what Nāgārjuna says in his verses:

... His (a *bodhisattva*'s) wisdom is his taking his stand nowhere at all (*anīśrita*) when he meditates. In his meditation his skill in means is his regard for accepting (*parigraha/paryādāna*) all *dharmas*.⁹

Before his lively conclusion, entitled “Inconclusion (The Great Vehicle is not unborn. It is dependently originated... It was born as a congeries of pragmatic, liturgical, and metaphysical innovations in response to the centuries of change...)”, Skilling refers to the KP which, according to him, presupposes ‘a mature bodhisattva system and a hierarchy of ideas expressed in a developed technical vocabulary’ so that he finds it hard to justify its reputation for being one of the earliest Mahāyāna discourses (p. 53). Contrary to his estimation it might seem preferable to confirm the working hypothesis about the antiquity of this discourse mentioned above.¹⁰ Some of the reasons for this confirmation are as follows: The original version on which Lokakṣema’s (Han) translation of the KP is based must have been much shorter than the Sanskrit text that has come down to us (there are no verses in the Han text);¹¹ in its extant Sanskrit version the metaphysical term *anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti* nowhere occurs; instead all phenomena/‘the lineage of the Noble Ones’ are characterized as *anutpanna* etc. in § 63 and § 104 of von Staël-Holstein’s edition. It is a pity that Gómez’s excellent article on “Proto-Mādhyamika in the Pāli Canon” does not seem to have been taken into consideration.¹²

4. David Drewes’ discussion of “The Forest Hypothesis” results from his disagreements with Paul Harrison on this topic which the latter had defined as the thesis that ‘the Mahāyāna ... was the work of hard-core ascetics, members of the forest-dwelling (*araṇyavāsin*) wing of the Buddhist Order’. Apart from Harrison, it was Gregory Schopen and Reginald Ray who also put forward this widely accepted hypothesis. As Drewes shows,

according to Schopen the canonical *Vinaya* texts were compiled between the first and fifth centuries CE, contemporaneous with the composition of most Mahāyāna *sūtras*. Schopen thinks that the *Vinaya* texts evince an increasing secularization of monastic life in Buddhism and that Mahāyāna groups reacted against this development in an attempt to revive the ancient ideal of forest asceticism. In this connection Drewes remarks that “although Schopen often suggests that the textbook monk is a figment of our imaginations, he envisions him as a stable, core ideal for Indian Buddhists and as the primary agent of early Buddhism and early Mahāyāna” (p. 76). The former also observes that the latter ‘generally avoids discussing early Buddhism’ and, regrettably, this certainly is the case. The Pāli *Tipiṭaka* is considered a collection of canonical texts that has been preserved in its entirety, allowing us – in spite of a good number of mythological and other textual accretions – to gain a realistic picture of the ups and downs in the history of early Buddhism: Already in pre-Aśokan and Aśokan times it saw its Saṅgha members’ complex interactions with the laity and early Indian society as a whole, their facing precarious political situations etc. and, above all, the coming into existence of an *Ārya-Saṅgha* (not ‘textbook monks’). This latter stance does not presuppose unquestioning faith, but critical study – advocated by the historical Buddha himself – of relevant canonical discourses replete with detailed descriptions and instructions how to gain insight-knowledge and realize emancipation. After one’s critical study of such descriptions and instructions, these are required to be put to the test by actual practice. On that score the ‘forest hypothesis’ is flawed because of undue generalization and much more so by ignoring or negating the canonical teachings of spiritual training and its effectivity. Regarding the thesis of the early Mahāyāna being an *araṇyavāsin* revival movement, Drewes carefully examines the contents of a number of Mahāyāna discourses and finds the textual material problematic, comparatively scarce and unconvincing that Schopen, Harrison and also Ray quote in support of their theories (‘the decline-and-revival model’). At the end of his discussion Drewes audaciously states that “the idea of Buddhism as a religion or philosophy originally and essentially focused on the quest for religious experience or enlightenment ... is often said to be based on the Pāli canon, but this is not the case. Early Pāli scholars and the learned monks they collaborated with did not see meditation as playing a central role in Buddhism (p.86)”. To some extent one may concede Drewes his final remarks on the decline-and-revival models as depicting just ‘peripheral tendencies without being historically central’. On the other hand, as is manifested in his notes on p. 89, he repeats and also underlines his own belief that meditation did not play a central role in early Buddhism. Here one feels inclined to recommend closer studies of relevant Pāli texts and their parallels¹³ and also one’s taking into consideration the methodologies adopted by renowned scholars of religious history à la Cantwell-Smith.

5. In his paper on “Recruitment and Retention in Early Bodhisattva Sodalities” Daniel Boucher underlines that ‘various single-hypothesis arguments’ to account for the beginnings of the Great Vehicle are not ‘truly compelling’. He proposes that a critical historian’s task should be to situate a ‘polemic’ – in this context Mainstream *śrāvakayānikas* vs. *bodhisattvayānikas* – within a social context enabling us to understand whom the authors of texts are addressing and why. With reference to earlier Mahāyāna texts, Boucher is certainly right when he remarks that “We need ... more refined tools, a more sensitive lens to see social realities behind the rhetoric that attempted to obscure the historicity of these compositions” (p. 97) (i.e. not really canonical works with the assertions of their dating back to the time of the historical Buddha and his disciples). He draws from contemporary research on the sociology of new religious movements and also from Max Weber’s *Essays in Sociology* in order to find ‘some kind of theory of recruitment and retention’ that could throw light on two problems confronting us in early Mahāyāna discourses, viz. (a) “what would draw some monks from the *śrāvaka* orientation to a minority sect on the fringe of ... prestige, and respectability? (b) ... how did bodhisattva fraternities manage to shore up member commitment against the temptation to revert to the Mainstream? (p. 97)” In search for an answer Boucher has carefully studied two early Mahāyāna texts, viz. the *Akṣobhya-tathāgata-vyūha* (hereafter ATV) and the KP. The ATV is a text of the ‘pure land’ genre in which Akṣobhya’s buddha-field Abhirati is described as well as the means by which sentient beings can be reborn in it. What Boucher finds of particular interest about this discourse ‘is the way it appears to actively recruit from the *śrāvaka* ranks’. According to the ATV, aspiring to be reborn in the buddha-field Abhirati will better serve the Mainstream followers of the Śrāvakayāna to realize their own goals culminating in arhatship. Akṣobhya’s teaching the Dharma will benefit the adherents of both the Bodhisattva- and Śrāvaka- Vehicles. Suggestive of typical conversion strategies of new religious movements, the author/authors of the ATV wanted to convey the message that the *śrāvakayānikas* could reach their own highest spiritual goals more efficiently by aspiring to be reborn in Abhirati and by listening to Akṣobhya’s teaching the Dharma. The author’s/authors’ hope seems to have been that Mainstream followers “be open to an opportunity to accelerate their spiritual progress by alternative means” (p. 103). For his treatment of ‘retention’ Boucher has explored the KP which he thinks to have been circulated ‘only internally within one or more bodhisattva sodalities’. The discourse, apart from its teachings of *sūnyatāvāda* / Mahāyāna metaphysics, emphatically stresses the need not to deviate from and steadfastly cultivate *bodhisattva* ethics so as not to lose *bodhicitta*, the ‘core of the conversion experience for the Mahāyāna’. As Boucher notes, there also is some overlap with the strategy of the KP and ATV in that the author/authors of the former discourse claim “that views and practices embraced by the Mainstream can only be properly understood

through the lens of the bodhisattva path (p. 110)". It may be added here that the Han version of the KP (see above n. 11) and its definition of 'the lineage of the Noble Ones' is all the more reminiscent of ATV inclusivism than the later Sanskrit text on which Boucher's observations are based.

6. In his contribution on "Abhidharma in Early Mahāyāna" Johannes Bronkhorst is very cautious about his tackling the problem of the origins of the Great Vehicle. His intention is not to find fault with new insights into the developments in the re-evaluation of these origins, but he wishes to highlight "the dependence of most early Mahāyāna texts on the scholastic developments that had taken place during the last few centuries preceding the Common Era in northwestern India (p. 120f.)" In this connection he refers to two scholars who draw attention to the fact that also non-Mahāyāna texts deal with *dharmanairātmya*, the non-substantiality or emptiness of phenomena. One of the texts mentioned is Harivarman's *Saṭya-siddhi-śāstra*, teaching both the non-substantiality/unreality of the person/personality (*pudgalanairātmya*) and that of phenomena. According to tradition, this treatise by Harivarman was composed in about the third century CE.¹⁴ In his chapter on the Vetullakas¹⁵ Bareau also refers to Harivarman's pre-Mahāyānist teachings which had already been refuted in the *Kathāvatthu*, dating back to the Aśokan era. Apart from these references, what Bronkhorst considers most important is that the question of *dharmanairātmya/dharma-sūnyatā* is based on 'the ontological schemes elaborated in Greater Gandhāra' (Gandhāra and surroundings – Bactria and Kashmir). This ontology of the emptiness of *dharmas* was to exert a decisive influence on Buddhist thought all over India. Although it is a core position of Mahāyāna teachings it could, according to Bronkhorst, also have originated with non-Mahāyāna circles who developed their 'Abhidharmic ontology first in a small corner of north-western India'.¹⁶ Given, hypothetically, that the said ontology originated in Greater Gandhāra, the question remains whether early Mahāyāna thought underwent an influence of this pre-Mahāyānist Abhidharma ontology in Greater Gandhāra itself or did it do so in other parts of India. To find an answer, according to Bronkhorst, one has to rely on chronology, and he meticulously embarks upon his search for an answer by drawing on textual, archaeological, hermeneutical, epigraphical and, last not least, historical pieces of information. His conclusion is that

... early Mahāyāna may have drawn inspiration from the intellectual revolution that had taken place in Greater Gandhāra. It is even possible that it underwent this influence, at least initially, in that very region.

Clearly this proposal does not necessarily tell us much about the origins of Mahāyāna. It does tell us something about the geographical region in which it may have originated, or through which it passed in an early phase. (p. 132)

7. In two parts Shizuka Sasaki deals with “The Concept of ‘Remodelling the World’” by tracing the development of the Great Vehicle, in particular that of Pure Land Buddhism. In great detail he first treats the ‘unique concept of the path of aiming to be a buddha’ and the principles on which it is based as highlighted in the *Ārya-Akṣobhya-tathāgata-vyūha* (ATV).

Then he examines these principles in the historical context of Buddhist thought with a view to clarifying as to how in the history of Indian Buddhism the Pure Land Schools originated. According to the ATV, held to be one of the earliest Mahāyāna *sūtras*, human beings can remodel the world through the power of their own karma. Thus, in the remote past, as a bodhisattva Akṣobhya vowed to attain Buddhahood and ‘create an ideal world where living beings could perform bodhisattva practices as smoothly as possible’ (p. 151). In his bodhisattva career and by dint of his unswerving course of practices he created such a world, viz. Abhirati thanks to whose ideal environment and one’s own efforts Buddhahood can be realized. As Sasaki observes, “original Pure Land Buddhism can be seen as a result of searching for a way to become buddhas without destroying the traditional cause-and-effect rules of karma by using the power of the great buddhas” (p. 152). Regarding the Mahāyāna Buddhist concept of remodelling the world, as Sasaki stresses, “there must have been a generally accepted conception that people using their own karma are capable of changing the situation of the inorganic world around them” (p. 153), being in one way, taken in a negative (*akuśala*) sense, suggestive of present-day gigantic man-made catastrophes, affecting humanity as a whole such as global warming, etc.¹⁷ In the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma literature, as he shows, this generally accepted conception is based on the ‘concepts of a surrounding world of inanimate objects (*bhājana-loka*) and shared karma (*sādhāraṇa-karma*)’ by dint of which ‘special phenomena in the natural realm’ are caused. In this connection the author also refers to the *Lokaprajñapti*, the Theravāda tradition and Vijñānavāda. At the end of his very informative paper, Sasaki refers to Takatsugu Hayashi’s contributions related to the present topics and then draws his own conclusions. À propos of the Theravāda tradition, it may also be mentioned that, with reference to ‘rebirth in the Pure Abodes (*suddhāvāsa*), attested in a Pāli discourse’, the passage in question ‘might have provided a precedent for the aspiration, prominent in later Buddhist traditions, to be reborn in the Pure Land’.¹⁸

8. In his paper on “Altered States and the Origins of the Mahāyāna” Douglas Osto’s approach “is to look at a literary theme – in this case visionary experience – and attempt to connect it to the lived experience of real actors within the social institutions which produced this literature” (p.178). In this context he describes his approach as ‘psychosocial’, deeming it necessary to consider the psychology as well as social circumstances of ‘real historical actors’. Osto further deals with the question “Why Experience

Matters”, expatiates on “Visions and *Samādhis* in some Mahāyāna Sūtras”, “A Neuropsychological Model of Altered States”, “The Early Mahāyāna Context for Altered States”, “On the Production of the Mahāyāna Sūtras”, “Charisma, Hypnosis, and Trance – Induction in the *Gaṇḍavyūha-Sūtra*” and then draws his conclusions. Regrettably, due to lack of time and space in this review article it is not possible to comment on Osto’s contribution in any detail (a special review article would be a desideratum). Just one final remark of this reviewer may suffice with reference to n. 22 (p. 197f.): Concerning the contemporary practice of *vipassanā* meditation, Osto mentions altered states of consciousness, viz. ‘visual hallucinations’, ‘visions’ and ‘other beings’ as ‘non-ordinary’ experiences during meditation. Authentic *vipassanā* masters and teachers will definitely consider such experiences during intensive *vipassanā* courses as possible, but – just in this context – not relevant in view of the aims of *vipassanā* training, viz. various degrees of insight-knowledge and its results.

9. Concerning “Early Mahāyāna in Gandhāra”, Ingo Strauch provides, ‘New Evidence from the Bajaur Mahāyāna Sūtra’, thus addressing the latest findings in the field of textual studies. After giving an overview of Gandhāra manuscript remains, Strauch concentrates on the “by far longest text among the early Mahāyāna *sūtras* in Gāndhārī” (p. 210), i.e. the so-called as yet unidentified Bajaur Mahāyāna Sūtra (MS siglum ‘BajC2’, 1st or 2nd century CE or even earlier). In his ‘General Conclusions’ the author characterises the discourse as being ‘strongly influenced by the concept of emptiness’ even though the terms *śūnyatā* or *śūnya* rarely occur whilst “a kind of ‘rhetoric of negation’” (p. 235) is one of its predominant features. Furthermore, as in the ATV referred to above, not only the *bodhisattvacaryā* is highlighted, but also the path to emancipation to be realized by the *āryaśrāvakas*. As the main motivation for embarking on the bodhisattva path is mentioned the ‘desire to ensure the continuation of the Buddha’s teaching and lineage’.¹⁹ Again, as in the ATV, Akṣobhya’s popularity is brought into focus along with his buddha-field Abhirati in which both *bodhisattvas* and *śrāvakas* are required to practise meditation in order to realize ‘non-apperception’ and reach their goals, whereas references to Amitābha and his Pure Land Sukhāvātī are conspicuous by their absence in the Bajaur Mahāyāna Sūtra. Concerning hints at its antiquity, they are similar to those to be gathered from the KP. “Although the Gāndhārī *sūtra* is very closely related to early Prajñāpāramitā literature, ... the term *prajñāpāramitā* does not occur in any of the preserved portions of the text” (p. 236). Indologists and buddhologists will be very grateful to the author for having felicitously included Gāndhārī quotations from ‘BajC2’ vis-à-vis corresponding text in Sanskrit and Pāli, thus revealing in a number of soteriologically relevant places common ground between Mainstream Buddhism and early Mahāyāna or, diachronically put, Mahāyāna inclusivism.

10. The last of the symposium papers is Juhyung Rhi's "Looking for Mahāyāna Bodhisattvas: A Reflection on Visual Evidence in Early Indian Buddhism". This contribution appositely complements the preceding approaches to the main topic of this book from the angle of art history. In his present assessment of the visual evidence for early Mahāyāna in India, as Rhi states, he takes a more skeptical stance than in his earlier accounts "owing to a more cautious interpretation of the evidence" (p. 262), as he himself says. He concludes 'that there may not be manifest evidence' in terms of the identity of bodhisattvas (see the 35 plates of Buddhist art, appended to this paper), mostly linked to Śākyamuni or Maitreya and thus "reflecting a continuation of the earlier tradition of the pre-Mahāyāna phase and the Mainstream circles of the monastic community" (p. 263). Most of the visual remains from early Mahāyāna art representing bodhisattvas do not appear so much in manifest form as in 'a much more complex manner'. Rather than 'trying to identify explicitly Mahāyāna divinities or themes', as Rhi suggests, we should try to scrutinise the causes and conditions for the interaction of Mainstream ideas, themes, social and art conventions vis-à-vis those pertaining to a new movement, viz. the Great Vehicle in the making.

In sum, one cannot but fully agree with what is printed on the back cover of *Setting Out on the Great Way* and quoted above. So for the buddhologist and interested general reader alike this book is a most valuable mine of information.

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Notes

- 1 See, e.g., Schmithausen 1977: 35.
- 2 See Conze 1968: 302-305.
- 3 Schmithausen 1977: 37f.
- 4 See *Mūlamadyamakakārikās* XXIV, 8-10.
- 5 Re. this term and the *Sūtrasamuccaya* authorship debate, see Pāsādika 1997: 516-523 & n. 5; *id.* 2004: 73-96.
- 6 Skilling throughout writes *bodhisatva/satva*, following the reading of numerous manuscripts, MS remains and inscriptions as well as that of loan words in Central Asian languages and Thai.
- 7 Harrison has qualms about applying ‘Vaidalya’ to the said proto-Mahāyāna phase (pp. 22, 27f., n.41).
- 8 See Hahn 1982: 126f., Hopkins 1989: 146,
- 9 Pāsādika 1982: 57; *id.* 1989: 186: ... *gañ ci la yañ mi gnas par bsam gtan byed pa ‘di ni de’i śes rab bo || gañ sñoms par ‘jug pa na chos thams cad yoñs su ‘dzin pa la lta ba ‘di ni de’i thabs so ||*
- 10 See section 2, n. 1-3.
- 11 Weller 1935: 543-605; *id.* 1970: 57-221.
- 12 Gómez 1976: 137-165. Cf. also in this context Pāsādika 2017: 697ff.
- 13 See, among his numerous publications, Anālayo 2013; see also Dhammadinnā 2018: 23-38. In this paper quotations from discourses on *smṛtyupasthāna* in the *Nikāya* and *Āgama* collections are dealt with. References to and quotations from some principal Mahāyāna texts (such as the *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*) and the chief works by Vasubandhu and Yaśomitra on the topic are given as well.
- 14 Karunaratna 1992: 413f. Note that this author refers to Harivarman’s *sūnyavāda* as a refutation of the Sarvāstivāda view that the *dharma*s are real. He remarks that Harivarman’s position could be regarded as a return to that of the early *suttas*.
- 15 Bareau 2013: 346-348; cf. also n. 7 above.
- 16 Cf. Bareau 2013: 55f., 88f., on the Mahāsāṃghikas and Ekavyāvahārikas.
- 17 Cf. Sasaki, p. 158: “In response to a question about why such world destruction occurs, the explanation reads, ‘Because of the power of the karma of living beings, the surrounding world of inanimate objects occurs as a dominant fruition.’”
- 18 See Anālayo Bhikkhu, “An Ekottarika-āgama Discourse Without Parallels: From Perception of Impermanence to the Pure Land,” in *Buddhist Studies Review* 35, 1-2 (2018), pp. 125-134.
- 19 Cf. above, 1st part of Skilling’s contribution.

Revisiting the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish*

SAERJI

I am very pleased to present this short paper on the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* to the Venerable Professor Dr. Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti on the occasion of his seventieth birth anniversary. He has set an example both as a practicing monk and a diligent scholar. May he enjoy his academic life, and may his studies benefit more students and colleagues.

Introduction

The *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* (賢愚經 [Xian Yu Jing] in Chinese, *mDzangs blun zhes bya ba'i mdo* in Tibetan) is, strictly speaking, a Buddhist story collection according to Chinese sources. It is not directly translated from an Indic language, but more or less looks like a kind of compilation of oral teachings compiled by a group of Chinese pilgrims who happened to sojourn to Khotan, an oasis Buddhist kingdom.

No later than the ninth century, the *sūtra* was translated from Chinese into Tibetan. From a philological point of view, both the Chinese and the Tibetan version contain some textual issues, which include the total number of stories, the arrangement of individual stories, and discrepancies in each story, etc. Based on the different Tibetan versions, Chinese editions, and Dunhuang manuscripts, the aim of this paper is attempt to reveal the complicated process of textual formalization, to show the dynamic interaction between different Buddhist cultures, and to emphasize the importance of textual studies for understanding the Buddhist tradition.

More than one hundred years ago, the Japanese Scholar Takakusu Junjirō (高楠順次郎, 1866–1945) published an article that compared the contents of the Tibetan and Chinese versions of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish*.¹ He showed that the Tibetan witness was a translation of the Chinese version, and pointed out some peculiarities in both versions. His article is probably the first comprehensive study of this text in English. Fifty years ago, the Hungarian scholar József Terjék published his study on the Dunhuang Tibetan manuscript of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish*.² In his article, he not only presented a detailed analysis of the paleographical, orthographic, phonetic, and morphological features of the Dunhuang text, but also offered an edition of the Dunhuang manuscript. In 1993, Victor Mair published a long article that focused on the phonology of proper names and transcriptions of technical terms in the *sūtra*.³ His aim was to determine the immediate source of the Chinese translation of this text. Of course, many

scholars showed their interest in this text, focusing on either the Chinese or Tibetan version, as I just mentioned, and with this article I want to express my respect to my predecessors, for without their studies my paper could not be done.

My paper is divided three sections. In the first part, I will discuss the *sūtra* from a textual editing point of view, then I will analyze the Tibetan version of this *sūtra* offering some case studies. Finally, I want to show the relationship between this *sūtra* and other Buddhist texts, such as the *Jātakastava* and the *Sūtra of the Returned Kindness of Parent* (大方便佛報恩經).

I. Chinese version

Generally speaking, we know that the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* has at least three main Chinese editions, one is the modern Taishō edition (大正新修大藏經, Taishō shinshū daizōkyō), which follows the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions.⁴ It has sixty-nine stories, but the table of contents of the Taishō edition only lists sixty-two story titles; one is the Korean edition (高麗藏, Gao li zang), which has sixty-two stories. According to a note of the Korean edition, we know that the Khitan edition (契丹藏, Qi dan zang) has sixty-nine stories.⁵ For the order of the individual stories, the three editions display great discrepancy. Since the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* is a kind of record of oral dharma teachings compiled by different monks, there is probably no way to trace the original order. Furthermore, we do not know exactly how many stories it should have or how to arrange these stories.

The Taishō edition attempts to give some order, but it is not satisfactory. Some stories are just attached at the end of the individual volumes, and the number series embedded in the title lack correspondence with the actual number. For example, at the end of the sixth volume, the Taishō edition lists four stories numbered from 27 to 30, but there are other stories which have the same series number that leads to confusion.

Comparing the Taishō edition and the Korean edition, we can infer that during the compiling the Korean edition, some sheets of paper has been lost. The scroll, or the sheets of paper used for every volume of the Korean edition is different, but more or less from twenty-five to thirty-seven, among them, the sheets of paper of the sixth and seventh volumes are less than the rest, only have fourteen and nineteen sheets respectively, which indicates some sheets maybe lost.

The sheets of paper used in the individual volumes in the Korean edition

volume	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
sheets	36	37	25	30	31	14	19	30	25	27	27	34	32

Besides this, the sixth volume only has one story, and the seventh volume only has three stories in the Korean edition. This is unusual. For the sixth volume, the Taishō edition adds four stories, it sounds reasonable, but we do not know whether it is right, all of four stories cannot find correspondences in the Korean edition, and the Tibetan version doesn't support such arrangement.⁶

Comparative table of the sixth volume

Korean edition	Taishō edition	Tibetan version
30. 月光王頭施品 King Candraprabha gives his head	月光王頭施品 ⁷ King Candraprabha gives his head	22. Rgyal po zla 'od kyi mgo byin ba'i le'u King Candraprabha gives his head
	27. 快目王眼施緣品 King *Sunetra gives his eyes ⁸	23. Blon po ri dwags kyi bu bdun gyi le'u The seven sons of minister Mrgāra
	28. 五百盲兒往返逐佛緣品 500 blind children follow Buddha	
	29. 富那奇緣品 The child Pūrṇacitta	
	30. 尼提度緣品 A poor man *Nīthī?	

In the seventh volume, the Taishō and Korean editions contain three stories, but these three stories, together with other four stories, are included in the fourth volume of the Khitan edition, and the order of the seven stories of the Khitan edition can be confirmed by the Tibetan version, save of one story.

Comparative table of the seventh volume

Korean and Taishō edition	Khitan edition	Tibetan version
Volume VII	Volume IV	Volume VII
大劫賓寧品 Mahākapphiṇa	大劫賓寧品 Mahākapphiṇa	24. Ka byin chen po'i le'u Mahākapphiṇa
梨耆彌七子品 The seven sons of Li qi mi	微妙比丘尼品 The Bhikṣuṇī Weimiao	25. Dge slong ma ud pa la'i le'u The Bhikṣuṇī Utpalā
設頭羅健寧品 *Sārdūlakarṇa	梨耆彌七子品 The seven sons of Li qi mi	23. Blon po ri dwags kyi bu bdun gyi le'u The seven sons of minister Mrgāra
	設頭羅健寧品 *Sārdūlakarṇa	26. Shu to lag gar ne'i le'u *Sārdūlakarṇa

	阿輸迦施土品 Aśoka offers soil	27. Rgyal po a sho ka'i le'u King Aśoka
	七瓶金施品 Donation of seven gold vases	28. Gser gyi bum pa'i le'u Gold vases
	差摩現報品 Rewards to Kṣemā	29. Bram ze mo bde ba'i le'u Brāhmaṇī Kṣemā

The ninth volume of the Korean edition also has only two stories, but the Taishō edition adds two more stories after these two stories. According to the Tibetan version, it looks like that the added two stories should be inserted before the story “Prince Kalyāṇakārī and his sea voyage” (善事太子入海品), and such order can be partly confirmed by a Dunhuang Chinese manuscript which is kept at the National Library of China (BD 8599). Here the story, “The two brother Good-seeking and Evil-seeking” (善求惡求緣品), is listed as chapter 41, and “The prince Kalyāṇakārī and his sea voyage” is listed as chapter 42.

Comparative table of the ninth volume

Korean edition	Taishō edition	Tibetan version
淨居天請佛洗品 The Suddhāvāsa- devaputra offers a bath to Buddha	淨居天請佛洗品 The Suddhāvāsa- devaputra offers a bath to Buddha	
善事太子入海品 Prince Kalyāṇakārī and his sea voyage	善事太子入海品 Prince Kalyāṇakārī and his sea voyage	33. Rgyal bu dge don gyi le'u Prince Kalyāṇakārī
	摩訶令奴緣品 48. King Mahāreṇu	31. Rgyal po me long gdong gi le'u King Mirror-Face
	善求惡求緣品 49. Good searcher and Evil searcher	32. Legs tshol dang nyes tshol gyi le'u Good searcher and Evil searcher

Based on the above observations, if we set a hypothesis that some sheets of paper of the fourth and ninth volumes of the Korean edition has been lost, then the total number of lost stories is six, and the total number of stories of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* should be sixty-eight.

The total number of stories in the Taishō edition is sixty-nine, because one story is repeated in some ways, that is the story “King Mahāprabhāsa who first aspired to achieve awakening” (大光明王始發道心緣品), which is attached at the end of the third volume of the Taishō edition as the twenty-first

story in the Taishō series number.⁹ The same story also occurs in the tenth volume of the Taishō edition as the forty-ninth story in the Taishō series number.¹⁰ The latter has an introduction (*nidāna*), although the account is brief. By contrast, the former begins with a question, and the narrative detailed. Anyway, the two stories are same story, but their translation is different.

So, we can safely say that the total number of stories of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* is sixty-eight – some stories are absent in the Korean edition, perhaps due to the loss of the scribed sheet, and not because of the editor's intended action.

According to a note in the Korean edition, we know that the story “Upāsikā Mahāsenā” (摩訶斯那優婆夷品, no. 21 in the Korean edition, and no. 22 in the Taishō edition) is not listed in the Khitan edition. Based on this we can infer that the total number of stories in the Khitan edition also should be sixty-eight. This indicates that one more story in the Khitan edition is lost.

II. Tibetan version

The Tibetan version of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* has only fifty-one stories in the mainstream the editions of the Kanjur. When compared with the Chinese version, we know that the Tibetan version lost the whole tenth volume which contains seven stories (no. 45–51 in the Taishō edition); three stories respectively in the sixth volume (no. 33–35 in the Taishō edition); the twelfth volume (no. 57–59 in the Taishō edition); and another four stories (no. 21, 22, 39, 41 in the Taishō edition). It seems that there is no apparent rule to show why these stories are absent from the Tibetan version.

Regarding the stories no. 57–59 which are absent in the Tibetan version, we know the last story in the twelfth volume of the Tibetan version is “Nāgapāla” (象護品, no. 56 in the Taishō edition). On this point, there is at least one Dunhuang Chinese manuscript of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* showing similarity with the Tibetan version. This is P.c 2105, which is incomplete and ends with the story of “Nāgapāla.” Following this story, the Dunhuang Chinese manuscript records that the thirteenth volume ends here, which means that both the Tibetan version and the Dunhuang Chinese manuscript take the story “Nāgapāla” as the last story of a certain volume, although the series number of volumes is different.

There is one story, “Prince Sujāti” (須闍提品, no. 7 in the Taishō edition) need special attention. the main stream of Kanjur editions do not include this story, but we found it in the local Phug brag Kanjur, which was compiled during the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth century (ca. 1696-1706).¹¹ Compared with the Chinese version, it is apparently not a new translation. The context evidence indicates that it was translated in the period of the Tibetan Empire. It is difficult to answer

when, and for what reason it was excluded by the editor(s) of the mainstream Kanjur editions. We only know that it happened as early as the beginning of the fifteen century, since the time of the edition of the Yongle (永樂) Kanjur where this story was already excluded from that edition.

Apart from the Kanjur editions, there also exist independent versions of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* in Tibet. One version is from the Bla brang monastic woodblock printing. Its modern book format was published in 1980, and the postscript explains that the woodblock printing of Phun tshogs gling monastery includes the story “Prince Sujāti” at the end of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish*. Although the editor of the Bla brang version noticed that the contents of this story partly corresponded with the *Sūtra of the Returned Kindness of Parent*, his conclusion that the two stories have only minor discrepancies is wrong.¹² Actually, they are different translations of the same story, one is brief and the other detailed. Since the Tibetan version of the *Sūtra of the Returned Kindness of Parent* is also translated from the Chinese, this makes us to further think about the relationship between the two texts.

Basically, we believe that the Tibetan version of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* was translated from the Chinese, but a closer reading explores that Tibetan translator(s) consulted other sources or oral traditions. For example, when the Buddha relates his former births, the past Buddha mentioned in the Chinese version is Vipāśyin, but the Tibetan version gives Kanakamuni. We know Kanakamuni is the second Buddha of the present *kalpa*, and Vipāśyī is the first Buddha of the past *kalpa*. However, we do not know why the Tibetan lists a different Buddha. Another example is the first part of the story “Submission of six heretics” (降六師品, no. 13 in the Tibetan version, no. 14 in the Taishō edition). Here the Tibetan and Chinese versions display great discrepancy in their accounts, such as the Chinese version not mentioning the name of the six heretics, whereas the Tibetan version does.

Since there are some discrepancies between the Chinese and Tibetan versions, the Tibetan editor(s) of Kanjur editions also have some doubt on the relationship between the two versions. The colophon of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* in the Kanjur editions tell us that it is appeared to have been translated from the Chinese,¹³ but later editors, such as Bu ston rin chen grub (1290–1364) and Si tu chos kyi ’byung gnas (1700–1774) say that it was translated from both the Indian and Chinese texts.¹⁴ These different statements reflect that the Tibetan editor(s) also noticed the textual issues with the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish*.

Another phenomenon in the Tibetan version of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* needs mention: the translation of some proper terms is not consistent in the Tibetan version. For example, Vāraṇasī sometime is

given in transcription, sometimes it is translated as *'khor mo 'jig*; Takṣaśilā sometimes is given in transcription and other times it is translated as *bzang po dpal*. This indicates that the Tibetan version is not translated by one and the same translation team.

III. Dunhuang Tibetan manuscript

As far as the Dunhuang Tibetan manuscript is concerned, we know at least four Tibetan fragments of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish*, among them, the largest fragment, P.t 943, was already published by Terjék. It corresponds with the last part of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* that contains eight stories (no. 42–49 of the Tibetan version). Unfortunately, the final part of the fragment is lost so we cannot get the names of the translator(s).

P.t 2105 contains three texts: the first one is a commentary of the *Śālistambasūtra*; the second one is the story “Eulogizing the merit of renunciation”; and the third one is the *Dharmarājasūtra*.

The Tibetan title *Rab tu byung ba'i yon tan bsngags pa'i le'u* occurs at the beginning of the second part of P.t 2105, and the content of story partly corresponds with story no. 15 of the Tibetan version of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish*. Comparing the Chinese and Tibetan versions, the first impression is that P.t 2105 is incomplete, only the beginning part of the story has been scribed, but the inner evidence in P.t 2105 shows that the text perhaps circulated as an independent text.

The text “Eulogizing the merit of renunciation” preserved in P.t 2105 itself is unique. It doesn't begin with “Thus have I heard” as it is usually done, and doesn't offer the setting of the Buddha's sermon as it is in the Chinese version of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish*. This part is omitted and it directly declares the merit of taking up the homeless life. Such arrangement can be confirmed by the Tibetan version of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish*, and one Dunhuang Chinese manuscript of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* (S. 3693). It is strange that after this declaration, the Chinese version of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* gives again the setting of Buddha's sermon and then relates the main story. Since there are two settings in this story and though the two settings are the same, it seems that the two parts were divided at some time, and the first part was once an independent text. Such a hypothesis can find its trace in the stone *sūtra* of Fangshan Yunju monastery (房山云居寺). There are two stone tables engraved the first part of the story “Eulogizing the merit of renunciation” at Fangshan Yunju monastery. The colophon tells us that one was engraved in the fifth year of Zhenguan (貞觀), namely A.D. 631, and another was engraved in the third year of Changshou (長壽), namely A.D. 694. Both engraved texts have a complete introduction, main part, and conclusion, which suggests that at least in the Tang dynasty, the first part of the story “Eulogizing the merit

of renunciation” was already circulated as an independent text. According to the Dunhuang Tibetan manuscript mentioned above, it seems that the independent text is also popular in Dunhuang.

S.t 217 has only one folio that is a summary of the story “Mahākāpina” (no. 24 of the Tibetan version). S.t 218 has three folia written in Tibetan cursive script (*dbu med*) which is too small to decipher. According to Vallée Poussin’s description, it is an extraction from and summary of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish*.¹⁵

IV. The Story of King Mahāprabhāsa who first aspired to achieve awakening

As we mentioned above, there are two stories about king Mahāprabhāsa who first aspired to achieve awakening in the Chinese version (no. 21 and no. 49 in the Taishō edition). The former is longer (no. 21) and the latter is shorter (no. 49). Since this text is not included in the Tibetan version, we do not know which one is closer to the original story in the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish*. The story itself is very popular, it also occurs at the *Bhaiṣjyavastu* of Mūlasarvāstivāda *vinaya*,¹⁶ the **Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā* (大莊嚴論經),¹⁷ and the **Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāsāstra* (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論).¹⁸

The story of Mahāprabhāsa relates how the king Mahāprabhāsa (Buddha’s former life) first aspired to achieve awakening, so perhaps this is the reason that the Khotanese *Jātakastava* placed it as the first story.¹⁹ From the Tibetan side, it also takes this story as Buddha’s first aspiration to achieve awakening, such as Bu ston’s *History of Buddhism*.²⁰ Bu ston thinks this story is representative of the Hīnayāna tradition, and he also offers other stories of Buddha’s first aspiration to achieve awakening which belong to the Mahāyāna tradition. In the Mahāyāna tradition, Bu ston gives several examples, among them, one story that is taken from *The Sūtra of the Returned Kindness of Parent* that I mentioned above. The *sūtra* has one chapter entitled “First aspired to achieve awakening” (發菩提心品), but the story is the same as the story “Buddha first rising thought of kindness” (佛始起慈心緣品) of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* (no. 63 in the Taishō edition, no. 44 in the Tibetan version).

V. Conclusion

From the above brief discussion, we can get a general idea concerning the different recensions of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish*:

1. The Chinese version of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* should have sixty-eight stories. There are sixty-nine stories in the Taishō edition because one same story representing two different translations. There are only sixty-two stories in the Korean edition, the missing stories perhaps due to the loss of sheet of pages during the transmission of the *sūtra*.

2. At present, we cannot reconstruct the original order of individual texts, but information from the Khitan edition and the Tibetan version can provide some help on this point.
3. The Tibetan version of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* has fifty-one or fifty-two stories on different editions, since one story is omitted in the main stream of Kanjur editions during the transmission of the *sūtra*. Compared with the Chinese version, the rest sixteen stories were perhaps never translated into Tibetan. We do not know the exact reason, but lacking a complete Chinese version for reference during the process of the Tibetan translation is one explanation.
4. Judging from the context, the Tibetan version of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* consulted sources other than the Chinese version, and the Tibetan translation was not done by one team of translators. The practices of writing summary for individual texts, and extracting individual texts as independent texts is also observed.
5. Some stories in the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish* overlapped with *The Sūtra of the Returned Kindness of Parent*. The relationship between the two texts needs further exploration.

Appendix

Comparative table of the titles and volumes of *The Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish*

Note:

1. The number of the first column indicates the number of individual stories in the Chinese editions, except the Tibetan version, its number of individual stories is written together with the story.

2. The title of the Tibetan version refers to the Taishō edition.

Number	Taishō edition	Korean edition	Khitan edition	Tibetan version
Volume I				
1	梵天請法六事品	梵天請法六事品	梵天請法六事品	1. Dpe sna tshogs bstan pa'i le'u
2	摩訶薩埵以身施虎品	摩訶薩埵以身施虎品	摩訶薩埵以身施虎品	2. Sems can chen pos stag mo la lus byin pa'i le'u
3	二梵志受齋品	二梵志受齋品	二梵志受齋品	3. Kun tu rgyu tshul khrim bsrungs pa'i le'u
4	波羅捺人身貧供養品	波羅捺人身貧供養品	波羅捺人身貧供養品	4. Lus btsongs te mchod pa byas pa'i le'u
5	海神難問船人品	海神難問船人品	海神難問船人品	5. Rgya mtsho'i lhas dris pa'i le'u
Volume II				
6	恒伽達品	恒伽達品	恒伽達品	6. Lha'i bu gang gā da ra zhes bya ba'i le'u
7	須闍提品	須闍提品	須闍提品	/
Volume II				
8	波斯匿王女金剛品	波斯匿王女金剛品	波斯匿王女金剛品	7. Rgyal po gsal rgyal gyi bu mo rdo rje'i le'u
9	金財因緣品	金財因緣品	金財因緣品	8. Gser dbyig gi le'u
10	華天因緣品	華天因緣品	華天因緣品	9. Lha'i me tog gi le'u
11	寶天因緣品	寶天因緣品	寶天因緣品	10. Lha'i rin chen gyi le'u

12	羸提波梨品	羸提波梨品	羸提波梨品	11. Bzod pa'i le'u Volume III
13	慈力王血施品	慈力王血施品	慈力王血施品	12. Rgyal po byams pa'i stobs kyis sbyin pa byas pa'i le'u
14	降六師品	降六師品	降六師品	13. Ston pa drug btul ba'i le'u Volume IV
15	鋸陀身施品	鋸陀身施品	Volume IV	14. Gcan zan kun tas lus sbyin pa byas pa'i le'u Volume VII
16	微妙比丘尼品	微妙比丘尼品		25. Dge slong ma ud pa la'i le'u
17	阿輸迦施土品	阿輸迦施土品		27. Rgyal po a sho ka'i le'u
18	七瓶金施品	七瓶金施品	大劫賓寧品	28. Gser gyi bum pa'i le'u
19	差摩現報品	差摩現報品	微妙比丘尼品	29. Bram ze mo bde ba'i le'u Volume XI
20	貧女難陀品	貧女難陀品 Volume IV	梨耆彌七子品	37. Dbul mo bsnyen dga' mo'i le'u
21	大光明王始發道心緣品第十六 Volume IV	摩訶斯那優婆夷品	設頭羅健寧品	
22	摩訶斯那優婆夷品 Volume V	出家功德尸利苾提品 Volume V	阿輸迦施土品	
23	出家功德尸利苾提品 Volume V	沙彌守戒自殺品	七瓶金施品	15. Rab tu 'byung ba'i yon tan bsngags pa'i le'u Volume V
24	沙彌守戒自殺品	長者無耳目舌品	差摩現報品 Volume V	16. Dge tshul gyis tshul khirms bsrungs pa'i le'u

25	長者無耳目 舌品	貧人夫婦疊施 得現報品	金天品	17. Khyim bdag dbang po med pa'i le'u
26	貧人夫婦疊 施得現報品	迦旃延教老母 賣貧品		18. Dbul mos ras byin pa'i le'u
27	迦旃延教老 母賣貧品	金天品	散檀寧品	19. Bran mo dbul mos kātya ya na la dbul btsongs pa'i le'u
28	金天品	重姓品	月光王頭施 品	20. Gser lha'i le'u
29	重姓品	散檀寧品		21. Rigs gnyis pa'i le'u
		Volume VI		Volume IX
30	散檀寧品	月光王頭施品		34. Khyim bdag snyums byed kyi le'u
	Volume VI	Volume VII		Volume VI
31	月光王頭施 品	大劫賓寧品		22. Rgyal po zla 'od kyi mgo byin ba'i le'u
				Volume X
32	快目王眼施 緣品第二十七	梨耆彌七子品		35. Rgyal po mig 'byed kyi le'u
33	五百盲兒往 返逐佛緣品 第二十八	設頭羅健寧品	出家功德尸 利苾提品	
		Volume VIII		
34	富那奇緣品 第二十九	蓋事因緣品	沙彌守戒自 殺品	
35	尼提度緣品 第三十	大施抒海品	長者無耳目 舌品	
	Volume VII	Volume IX		Volume VII
36	大劫賓寧品	淨居天請佛 洗品	貧人夫婦疊 施得現報品	24. Ka byin chen po'i le'u
				Volume VI
37	梨耆彌七子 品	善事太子入 海品	迦旃延教老 母賣貧品	23. Blon po ri dwags kyi bu bdun gyi le'u
		Volume X		Volume VII

38	設頭羅健寧 品	阿難總持品	蓋事因緣品	26. Shu to lag gar ne'i le'u
	Volume VIII			Volume VIII
39	蓋事因緣品	優婆斯兄所 殺品	大施杼海品	
40	大施杼海品	兒誤殺父品		30. Sbyin pa chen po'i rgya mtshor zhugs pa'i le'u
	Volume IX			
41	淨居天請佛 洗品	須達起精舍品		
			Volume IX	
42	善事太子入 海品	大光明始發無 上心品	善事太子入 海品	33. Rgyal bu dge don gyi le'u
				Volume VIII
43	摩訶令奴緣 品第四十八	勒那闍耶品	阿難總持品	31. Rgyal po me long gdong gi le'u
44	善求惡求緣 品第四十九	迦毘梨百頭品	優婆斯兄所 殺品	32. Legs tshol dang nyes tshol gyi le'u
	Volume X	Volume XI		
45	阿難總持品	無惱指鬘品	兒誤殺父品	
46	優婆斯兄所 殺品	檀膩鞞品	須達起精舍 品	
		Volume XII		
47	兒誤殺父品	師質子摩頭羅 世質品	大光明始發 無上心品	
48	須達起精舍 品	檀彌離品	勒那闍耶品	
49	大光明始發 無上心品	象護品	迦毘梨百頭 品	
50	勒那闍耶品	波婆離品		
51	迦毘梨百頭 品	二鸚鵡聞四 諦品	無惱指鬘品	
	Volume XI			
52	無惱指鬘品	烏闍比丘法生 天品	檀膩鞞品	36. Mi gdung [ba] sor phreng can gyi le'u
		Volume XIII		
53	檀膩鞞品	五百鴈聞佛法 生天品	貧女難陀品	39. Khyim bdag dbyig pa can zhes bya ba'i le'u
	Volume XII			

54	師質子摩頭 羅世質品	堅誓師子品	師質子摩頭 羅世質品	40. Bram ze shi tsir gyi le'u
55	檀彌離品	梵志施佛納衣 得受記品	檀彌離品	41. Khyim bdag dan byi li zhes bya ba'i le'u
56	象護品	佛始起慈心 緣品	象護品	42. Glang po skyong gyi le'u
57	波婆離品	頂生王品	波婆離品	
58	二鸚鵡聞四 諦品	蘇曼女十子 品	二鸚鵡聞四 諦品	
59	鳥聞比丘法 生天品	婆世躋品	鳥聞比丘法 生天品	
	Volume XIII			Volume XII
60	五百鴈聞佛 法生天品	優波鞠提品	五百鴈聞佛 法生天品	48. Ngang pa Inga brgya lhar skyes pa'i le'u
61	堅誓師子品	汪水中虫品	堅誓師子品	49. Seng ge yi dam brtan [pa] ces bya ba'i le'u
62	梵志施佛納 衣得受記品	沙彌均提品	梵志施佛納 衣得受記品	43. Bram zes lhan pa phul pa'i le'u
63	佛始起慈心 緣品		佛始起慈心 緣品	44. Sangs rgyas thog ma byams pa'i sems bskyed pa'i le'u
64	頂生王品		頂生王品	45. Rgyal po spyi bo skyes kyi le'u
65	蘇曼女十子 品		蘇曼女十子 品	46. Bu mo su ma ni'i bu bcu'i le'u
				Volume XI
66	婆世躋品		婆世躋品	38. Ba shi tsir gyi le'u
				Volume XII
67	優波鞠提品		優波鞠提品	47. Upa gup ta'i le'u
68	汪水中虫品		汪水中虫品	50. Srin bu rgyu bstan pa'i le'u
69	沙彌均提品		沙彌均提品	51. Dge slong kyung te zhes bya ba'i le'u

Notes

1. Takakusu Junjiro, "Tales of the Wise Man and the Fool, in Tibetan and Chinese," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, July 1901, pp. 447–460.
2. J. Terjék, "Fragments of the Tibetan Sutra of 'The Wise and the Fool' from Tun huang," *Acta Orientalia Hungarica*, vol. 22, 1969, pp. 289–334; continued in vol. 23, 1970, pp. 55–83.
3. Victor H. Mair, "The Linguistic and Textual Antecedents of the *Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish (Hsien-yü ching)*" *Sino Platonic Papers*, vol. 38, April 1993. It includes a translation of "Sudatta Raises a Monastery" as appendix.
4. It is proclaimed by the editors of the Taishō edition, but we should know that actually we do not have the whole picture of both Song and Yuan editions.
5. Under the title of the last story "Śramaṇa *Kuntī", the Korean edition notes that it is the sixty-ninth story in the Khitan edition.
6. There are two stories in the sixth volume of the Tibetan version. For the added four stories of the Taishō edition, the last three cannot be found in the Tibetan version.
7. The series number in the table of content of the Taishō edition is the same as the Korean edition, but in the text is given as no. 31.
8. It is the 35th story in the Tibetan version.
9. The number included in the title is no. 16.
10. The number included in the title is no. 42.
11. For the catalogue of the Phug brag Kanjur, see Jampa Samten, *A Catalogue of the Phug Brag Manuscript Kanjur*, Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works & Archives, 1992, p. 131, no. 359.
12. 'Gos chos grub kyi bsgyur, *mDzangs blun zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo*, Zi ling: Mtsho sngon mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2003 (2nd edition), p. 428.
13. The colophon of Kanjur editions read *Rgya nag las 'gyur bar snang ngo*.
14. Rdo rje rgyal po (ed.), *Bu ston chos 'byung gsung rab rin po che'i mdzod*, pe cin: Krung go'i bod kyi shes rig dpe skrun khang, 1991, p. 215: *mDzang blun gyi mdo ... rgya gar dang rgya'i dpe las bsgyur ba*. Si tu pañ chen Chos kyi 'byung gnas, *Rgyal ba'i bka' 'gyur rin po che'i bzhugs byang dkar chag*, Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2008, p. 463: *mDzang blun zhes bya ba'i mdo ... rgya gar dang rgya nag gi dpe las bsgyur ba*.
15. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Catalogue of the Tibetan Manuscripts from Tun huang in the India Office Library*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 79.
16. For Tibetan translation, see Derge Kanjur, 'dul ba gzhi, kha, 273a4-274b5; for Yijing's Chinese translation, see T. 24, no. 1448, pp. 72b29–73a27.
17. T. 4, no. 201, pp. 306c7-307b28.
18. Vol. 84, see T. 27, no. 1545, pp. 437a28–b22. Here the protagonist is not Śākyamuni, but the King Prasenajit.
19. M.K. Dresden, "The Jātakastava or Praise of the Buddha's Former Births," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, Philadelphia, n.s. 45, no. 5, 1955.
20. *Bu ston chos 'byung gsung rab rin po che'i mdzod*, pp. 60–61. For English translation, see E. Obermiller, *History of Buddhism (Chos hbyung) by Bu ston*, Heidelberg, 1932, part II, pp. 101–102.

Svakāyadr̥ṣṭi Reconsidered

Akira SAITO

Preamble

Today, there still remains an enigma surrounding the well-known concept *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*¹ which was traditionally regarded in the Sarvāstivāda's system of defilements (*kleśa*) as one of the five false views (*dr̥ṣṭi*). What I call “enigma” here concerns the etymological meaning of the word *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* in relation to the traditional explanation of this view, i.e., twenty-alternatives view* of the self (*ātman*) or those belonging to the self (*ātmīya*). The analysis of this view into twenty alternatives was widely shared by both Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda Buddhist circles, as shown in the following table:

* *viṃśati-koṭikā satkāya-dr̥ṣṭiḥ* or “the view of *satkāya* with twenty alternatives”:

<i>satkāyadr̥ṣṭi</i>	I. <i>ātmadr̥ṣṭi</i>	<i>rūpam ātmeti samanupaśyati</i>
	II. <i>ātmīyadr̥ṣṭi</i>	-1. <i>rūpavantam ātmānam</i>
		-2. <i>ātmīyaṃ rūpam / ātmani rūpam</i>
		-3. <i>rūpe ātmeti</i>

In this table, *rūpa* or “body/matter” can alternatively be *vedanā* or “sensation”, *saṃjñā* or “representation”, *saṃskāra* or “formative forces”, or *viññāna* or “consciousness”, which amounts to $4 \times 5 = 20$ alternatives in total. The above table is explained typically by Yaśomitra (c. 6–7 CE) in the following way:

The view of *satkāya* is [traditionally] spoken of as having twenty alternatives [in the following way]: “One regards body as the self, self as possessed of body (*rūpa*), body as belonging to the self, or self as being in body. The explanation of the same type should be applied up to consciousness (*viññāna*).”

viṃśati-koṭikā hi satkāya-dr̥ṣṭiḥ paṭhyate. rūpam ātmeti samanupaśyati. rūpavantam ātmānam. ātmīyaṃ rūpam. rūpe ātmeti evaṃ yāvad viññānaṃ vaktavyam. (AKVy 705.20–22.)

A similar expression of twenty alternatives is also found in the Pāli *tipiṭaka*, e.g., as follows:

Herein, Monks, the unlearned ordinary men regard body as the self, self as possessed of body, body as being in the self, or self as being in body. [They regard likewise as to] sensation, representation, formative forces, and consciousness.

Idha bhikkhave assutavā puthujjano rūpam attato samanupassati // rūpavantam vā attānam attani vā rūpam rūpasmim vā attānam // Vedanam // // Saññam // // Saṅkhāre // Viññānam....// (SN III, p. 46)

Concerning the etymological interpretation of *satkāya*, Childers and Nakamura² take this word as deriving originally from Pāli *sakāya* (Skt. *svakāya*) or “one’s own body/aggregation” instead of *sakkāya* (Skt. *satkāya*). On the other hand,

Edgerton understands the word *satkāya* as meaning “real, existent, body; individuality, personality” and *satkāya-dr̥ṣṭi* as “the heretical belief in a real personality, belief in the self and what belongs to the self”.³

Despite Childers and Nakamura’s suggestion, it seems that the Pāli form *sakāyadiṭṭhi* (= Skt. *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi*) is not attested in the current editions of the Pāli *tipiṭaka*. However, in this regard, it is interesting to note that, as far as my present knowledge goes, the term *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* is found only in a few texts of the Mahāyāna tradition such as Nāgārjuna’s *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, (hereafter, MMK), the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitāsūtra* (hereafter, *Aṣṭa*), and Haribhadra’s *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* (hereafter, AAA) on the *Aṣṭa*’s above usage.⁴

The present paper deals with the following three points: First, which usage of *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* is earlier, that of MMK or *Aṣṭa*? Second, in what sense did the *Aṣṭa* use the term? In view of discussing this question, let me refer to Haribhadra’s AAA. Third, did Nāgārjuna use the term *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* in the same sense as *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*? If such is the case, why is it so? Is it due only to his preference for *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* over *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*? Or is it because he understood that the original form of the Pāli term is *sakāyadiṭṭhi* (= Skt. *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi*) but not *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* (= Skt. *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*) as Childers and Nakamura suggested? For inquiring into this question, let me consult with the commentators’ explanations of Nāgārjuna’s usage of *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* as found only in the MMK 23.5.

I. *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*

First, let me turn to the only usage of *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* found in the *Aṣṭa*. While we find two examples of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* in this *sūtra*⁵, *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* is used only in Chapter 1 in the following way:

Venerable Śāriputra answered as follows: “He will teach the *dharma* for the purpose of eliminating those strong views such as the view of self, the view of sentient being, the view of living being, the view of person, the view of the state of existence, the view of the state of non-existence, the view of cessation, the view of eternity, the view of *svakāya*, and so forth. For this reason, *bodhisattva* is called *mahāsattva*.”

āyusmān Śāriputra āha: mahatyā ātmadr̥ṣṭyāḥ sattvadr̥ṣṭyāḥ jīvadr̥ṣṭyāḥ pudgaladr̥ṣṭyāḥ bhavadr̥ṣṭyāḥ vibhavadr̥ṣṭyāḥ ucchedadr̥ṣṭyāḥ śāsvatadr̥ṣṭyāḥ svakāyadr̥ṣṭyā etāsām evamādyānām dr̥ṣṭīnām prahāṇāya dharmam deśayīṣyatīti tenārthena bodhisattvo mahāsattva ity ucyate / (Aṣṭa, 9.32–10.2)

tshe dang ldan pa śāri’i bus gsol pa / bdag tu lta ba dang sems can du lta ba dang / (P om. /) srog tu lta ba dang / (P om. /) gang zag tu lta ba dang / byung bar lta ba dang / jig par lta ba dang chad par lta ba dang rtag par lta ba dang rang gi lus la lta ba chen po / di lta bu la sogs pa’i lta ba de dag spang ba’i slad du chos bstan to snyam ste / (P om. /) don des na byang chub sems dpa’ sems dpa’ chen po zhes bgyi’o // (Aṣṭa, Tib. D Tōhoku No. 12, Ka 10b7–11a2; P Ōtani No. 734, Mi 11a6–7)

As for the meaning of *svakāya*, it is probable from the context of the above usage and its Tibetan translation that the term means “one’s own [physical and mental] aggregation”. Before inquiring into this matter about the meaning of *svakāya*, let me here turn to another related question of when this term started to be used in the *Aṣṭa*. The following are Chinese translations of the *Aṣṭa* arranged in chronological order:

Dào xíng bō rě jīng 道行般若經, Zhī lóu jiā chèn 支婁迦讖 (*Lokakṣema) tr. (178 CE) (T No. 224)

摩訶薩者, 悉自了見, 悉自了知, 十方天下人十方所有. 悉曉了知, 知人壽命, 知有惡無惡, 樂不樂, 有志無志. 悉曉了知見, 爲說法. 如是無所著, 爾故字爲摩訶薩. (T vol.8, 427b18–21)

Mahāsattva by himself entirely sees and completely knows people and things in the ten directions. He completely understands them, knowing people’s lifetime, knowing evil and good ones, pleased and unpleased ones, and ambitious and unambitious ones. Completely understanding, knowing, and seeing them, he teaches the *dharma*. For this reason, having thus no attachment, he is called *mahāsattva*.

Dà míng dù jīng 大明度經, Zhī qiān 支謙 tr. (222–228 CE) (T No. 225)

秋露子曰. 吾亦樂其爲大士者, 於見, 身見, 性見, 命見, 人見, 丈夫見, 有見, 無見, 斷滅見. 常在爲斷大見. 何者爲說上法, 度諸見淵. 是故爲大士. (T vol.8, 480c7-10)

Śāriputra answered as follows: “I am also pleased to call him *mahāsattva*. Concerning views such as the view of body, the view of own-nature, the view of living being, the view of human being, the view of person, the view of existence, the view of non-existence, and the view of cessation, he at all times tries to eliminate these strong views. The reason for his teaching the above *dharma* is to save [people] from the depth of views. Therefore, he is called *mahāsattva*.”

Mó hē bō rě chāo jīng 摩訶般若鈔經, Zhú fó niàn 竺佛念 & Tán mó pí 曇摩婢 tr. (382 CE) (T No. 226)

摩訶薩者, 悉自了見, 悉了知一切人世間所有. 悉了知人壽命, 悉了知, 悉了知著斷之事. 便能隨人所樂爲說法. 以是故名爲摩訶薩. (T vol. 8, 510b10–13)

Mahāsattva by himself entirely sees and completely knows all people and things in the world. He completely knows people’s lifetime, completely knows such a thing as the view of cessation. That is, he can teach the *dharma* in accordance with people’s wish. For this reason, he is called *mahāsattva*.

Xiǎo pǐn bō rě jīng 小品般若經, Jiū mó luó shí 鳩摩羅什 (Kumārajīva) tr. (408 CE) (T No. 227)

舍利弗白佛言. 世尊, 菩薩爲斷我見, 衆生見, 壽者見, 人見, 有見, 無見, 斷見, 常見等, 而爲說法. 是名摩訶薩義. (T vol. 8, 538c21-23)

Śāriputra answered the Buddha as follows: “The *bodhisattva* teaches the *dharma* for the purpose of eliminating the view of self, the view of sentient-being, the view of living being, the view of person, the view of existence, the view of non-existence, the view of cessation, the view of eternity and so forth. This is the reason why he is called *mahāsattva*.”

Dà bō rě jīng 大般若經, Xuán zàng 玄奘 tr. (660–663 CE) (T No.220)

舍利子言。以諸菩薩方便善巧，爲諸有情宣說法要。令斷我見，有情見，命者見，補特伽羅見，有見，無有見，斷見，常見，薩迦耶見，及餘種種有所執見。依如是義，名摩訶薩。(T vol. 7, 766b13–16)

Śāriputra answered as follows: “Because *bodhisattvas* are skillful in means, they teach the essence of the *dharma* to sentient beings for the purpose of eliminating the view of self, the view of sentient being, the view of living being, the view of person, the view of existence, the view of non-existence, the view of cessation, the view of eternity, the view of *svakāya* (*/satkāya*), and other various attached views. For this reason, they are called *mahāsattva*.”

From the above translations of the *Aṣṭa*, it seems most probable that the view of *svakāya* was newly inserted into the text of *Aṣṭa* between *Xiǎo pǐn bō rě jīng* 小品般若經 and *Dà bō rě jīng* 大般若經, i.e., from 5th to the middle of 7th centuries.

II. Haribhadra’s explanation of the *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi*

On the above single usage of *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* in the *Aṣṭa*, Chapter 1, Haribhadra (ca. –800) in his AAA comments as follows:

The view of *svakāya* “one’s own [physical and mental] aggregation” means regarding the five aggregates as the aspects of either the self or what belongs to the self (*ātmāmīya*).

ātmāmīyākāreṇa pañca-skandha-darśanaṃ svakāyah (sic, read *svakāyadr̥ṣṭiḥ* as the above usage in the *Aṣṭa* as well as the following Tib.) (AAA, p. 81).

Tib.: *bdag dang bdag gi ba’i rnam pas phung po lngar lta ba ni rang gi lus su lta ba’o* // (AAA, Tib. D Tōhoku No. 3791, Cha 50a1; P Ōtani No. 5189, Cha 61b2)

It is worthy of note that Haribhadra in the above commentary regards *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* as almost having the same sense as *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* which is traditionally defined as the view of the self (*ātman*) or those belonging to the self (*ātmīya*)⁶.

III. Nāgārjuna’s usage of *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*

Taking into consideration the above unique usage of *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* in the *Aṣṭa*, Nāgārjuna (ca. 150–250) appears to be the first in India who used this term⁷, most probably, instead of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*. His usage is found in the MMK 23.5 as follows:

As with the view of *svakāya* or “one’s own aggregation”, the defilements do not exist in a defiled one (= mind) in any of the five ways. As with the view of *svakāya*, a defiled one does not also exist in the defilements in any of the five ways.

svakāyadr̥ṣṭivat kleśāḥ kliṣṭe santi na pañcadhā /
svakāyadr̥ṣṭivat kliṣṭam kleśeṣv api na pañcadhā // (MMK 23.5)⁸

IV. Commentators’ understandings of *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* as used by Nāgārjuna

On the above verse, Qīng mù 青目 (*Piṅgala)’s *Zhōng-lùn* 中論, *Akutobhayā*, which has almost the same text in Tibetan as that of Buddhapālita’s commentary regarding this and following chapters⁹, Bhāviveka’s (ca. 490–570) *Prajñāpradīpa*, and Candrakīrti’s (ca. 600-660) *Prasannapadā* make their comments as follows:

Zhōng-lùn 中論 (tr. by Kumārajīva in 409 CE)

“As the view of *svakāya* or ‘one’s own aggregation’ is not possible [in five aggregates] searched for in any of the five ways, the defilements are not possible in a defiled mind searched for in any of the five ways.”
As the view of *svakāya* is not possible in five aggregates searched for in any of the five ways, the defilements are also not possible in a defiled mind searched for in any of the five ways and a defiled mind is not possible in the defilements searched for in any of the five ways.

如身見五種 求之不可得

煩惱於垢心 五求亦不得 (MMK 23.5)

如身見五陰中五種求不可得，諸煩惱亦於垢心中五種求亦不可得。
又垢心於煩惱中五種求亦不可得。 (T No. 1564, vol. 30, 31b2–6)

Akutobhayā (ascribed traditionally to Nāgārjuna¹⁰ and tr. by Klu’i rgyal mtshan and Jñānagarbha in the early 9th century)

“As with the view of *svakāya* or ‘one’s own aggregation’, the defilements do not exist in a defiled one in any of the five ways. As with the view of *svakāya*, a defiled one does not also exist in the defilements in any of the five ways.”

As the view of *svakāya* is not possible in aggregates in any of the five ways, the defilements are also not possible in a defiled mind in any of the five ways. As the view of *svakāya* is not possible in aggregates in any of the five ways, a defiled mind is also not possible in the defilements searched for in any of the five ways

rang lus lta bzhin nyon mongs rnam // (P /) nyon mongs can la rnam lngar med //

rang lus lta bzhin nyon mongs can// nyon mongs pa la rnam lngar med // (MMK 23.5)

ji ltar rang gi lus la lta ba phung po rnam la rnam pa lngar yod pa ma yin pa de bzhin du / (P om. /) nyon mongs pa rnam kyang (P om. kyang) nyon mongs pa can gyi sems la rnam pa lngar you pa ma yin no // ji ltar rang gi lus la lta ba phung po rnam la rnam pa lngar yod pa ma yin pa (P om. ma yin pa) de bzhin du / nyon mongs

*pa can gyi sems (*kliṣṭaṃ cittam) kyang nyon mongs pa rnams la rnam pa lngar yod pa ma yin no // (D na l) (D Tōhoku No. 3829, Tsa 85b7–86a2; P Ōtani No. 5229, Tsa 99a2–b1)*

Prajñāpradīpa (by Bhāviveka and tr. by Klu'i rgyal mtshan and Jñānagarbha in the early 9th century)

“As with the view of *svakāya* or ‘one’s own aggregation’, the defilements [do not exist in the defiled one in any of the five ways.]” “One’s own” (*sva*) means both the self (*ātman*) and those belonging to the self (*ātmīya*). “Aggregation” (*kāya*) is a synonym of the accumulation (**upacaya*) of name-and-form (*nāmarūpa*) [i.e., psycho-physical complex¹¹]. “The view of one’s own aggregation” (*svakāyadr̥ṣṭi*) means the view defiled by conceiving one’s own [physical and mental] aggregation [i.e., five aggregates].

rang lus lta bzhin nyon mongs rnams // (MMK 23.5a)

*rang zhes bya ba ni bdag dang bdag gi'o (*sva ity ātmāmīyāḥ) // lus zhes bya ba ni ming (P mi) dang / gzugs nye bar bsags pa'i rnam (D rnams) grangs so (*kāya iti nāmarūpocayaparyāyaḥ) // rang gi lus la lta ba zhes bya ba ni / rang gi lus la dmigs pa'i nyon mongs pa can gyi lta ba'o // (D Tōhoku No. 3853, Tsha 221a1–2; P Ōtani No. 5253, Tsha 277a7–8)*

Prasannapadā (by Candrakīrti)

“As with the view of *svakāya* or ‘one’s own aggregation’, the defilements do not exist in a defiled one in any of the five ways. As with the view of *svakāya*, a defiled one does not also exist in the defilements in any of the five ways.” (MMK 23.5)

Svakāya, or “one’s own aggregation”, means a collection of the characteristics of body/matter (*rūpa*) and so forth. *Svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* is a view of one’s own aggregation, which works as an apprehension of the aspects of either the self (*ātman*) or what belongs to the self (*ātmīyā*). Just as this [view of one’s own aggregation], being examined in the five ways, does not exist in one’s own aggregation because of the following [Nāgārjuna’s statement]:

“The Tathāgata is not identical with the aggregates nor distinct from the aggregates; the aggregates are not in him nor is he in them; he is not possessed of the aggregates. What Tathāgata, then, is there?” (MMK 22.1)

so the defilements also do not exist in a defiled one, ...

svakāyadr̥ṣṭīvat kleśāḥ kliṣṭe santi na pañcadhā /

svakāyadr̥ṣṭīvat kliṣṭaṃ kleśeṣv api na pañcadhā // (MMK 23.5)

*svakāyo hi nāma rūpādīlakṣaṇasamhātāḥ / *svakāye dr̥ṣṭiḥ svakāyadr̥ṣṭir ātmāmīyākāra-grahaṇapravṛttā*¹² // yatheyam pañcadhā vicāryamānā svakāye na saṃbhavati*

skandhā na nānyaḥ skandhebhyo nāsmiṃ skandhā na teṣu saḥ / tathāgataḥ skandhavān na katamo 'tra tathāgataḥ // (MMK 22.1) ity anena // evaṃ kliṣṭe 'pi kleśā... (PSP, p. 454.10–455.1).

The above are those commentaries on Nāgārjuna’s unique usage of *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi*. The Tibetan and Chinese translations of *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* for the above examples are *rang (gi) lus (la) lta (ba)* and 身見 (*Zhōng-lùng* 中論 tr. by Kumārajīva)¹³.

The anonymous commentary on the PSP also glosses the above *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* as follows:

“The view of one’s own aggregation means the view of existing aggregation.”

svakāyadr̥ṣṭiḥ satkāyadr̥ṣṭiḥ (Yonezawa [2007: 229])

In this brief gloss, the anonymous author of **Lakṣaṇaṭīkā* shows his understanding of Nāgārjuna’s term *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* as corresponding to the referent of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*.

Although whether Nāgārjuna intentionally changed the traditional term *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* to *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* is unclear, it seems certain that, as is confirmed by both Bhāviveka’s *Prajñāpradīpa* and Candrakīrti’s *Prasannapadā*, Nāgārjuna used the term *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* in the sense of *ātmadr̥ṣṭi* and *ātmīyadr̥ṣṭi*¹⁴ and what he meant by the term *pañcadhā* is, as Candrakīrti puts it, *pañcadhā vicāryamāṇa* (*Jmrgyamāṇa*¹⁵) or “being examined in the five ways”, i.e., A (e.g. *dr̥ṣṭi*) is identical with B (e.g. *svakāya* in the sense of five aggregates (*pañca skandhāḥ*)), A is different from B, A is not in B, B is not in A, and A is not possessed of B. This scheme of criticism accords well with that of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* as set out in the Preamble of this paper.

Conclusion

From the above examination of *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* as found in the *Aṣṭa*, Haribhadra’s commentary on it, and MMK, we can draw the following conclusions: First, as far as our present knowledge goes, Nāgārjuna appears to be the first who used *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* instead of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*.

Second, as is confirmed by both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, Nāgārjuna used the term *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* in the sense of both *ātmadr̥ṣṭi* and *ātmīyadr̥ṣṭi*.

Third, for Nāgārjuna, *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* is to be examined in the five ways, i.e., A is identical with B, A is different from B, A is in B, B is in A, and A is possessed of B. In his unique usage of this term in MMK 23.5, “A” stands for *dr̥ṣṭi* and “B” for *svakāya*. *Svakāya* refers to “one’s own [five] aggregates (*pañca skandhāḥ*)” which is shared by all the above-mentioned commentators on MMK.

Fourth, it seems most probable that the unique usage of *svakāyadr̥ṣṭi* was newly inserted into the text of *Aṣṭa* Chapter 1 between *Xiǎo pǐn bō rě jīng* 小品般若經 and *Dà bō rě jīng* 大般若經, i.e., from 5th to the middle of 7th centuries.

Abbreviations

- AAA: *Abhisamayālamkāraśāloka*. U. Wogihara ed., *Abhisamayālamkāraśāloka Prajñāpāramitāvyaḅhyā: The Work of Haribhadra*, Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1932; repr. Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, 1973.
- AKBh: *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. P. Pradhan ed., *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu*, Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967.
- AKVy: *Abhidharmakośavyāḅhyā*. U. Wogihara ed., *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyāḅhyā: The Work of Yaśomitra*, Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, 1936.
- Aṣṭa: *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*. P. L. Vaidya ed., *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā*, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 4, 1960.
- D: Tibetan tripiṭaka, sDe dge edition.
- MMK: *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* by Nāgārjuna. Ye Shaoyong ed., *Zhonglunsong (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā)*, Shanghai: Zhongxi Book Company, 2011.
- Mvy: *Mahāvyyutpatti*. Y. Ishihama and Y. Fukuda ed., *A New Critical Edition of the Mahāvyyutpatti: Sanskrit-Tibetan-Mongolian Dictionary of Buddhist Terminology*, Studia Tibetica 16, Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1989.
- P: Tibetan tripiṭaka, Peking edition.
- PSP: *Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti-Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti. L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica, IV. St. Pétersbourg: Académie impériale des sciences, 1903-1913.
- SN: *Samyuttanikāya*. M. Léon Feer ed., *Samyutta-nikāya of the Sutta-piṭaka*, London: Pali Text Society, 1884 ~ (vol. III 1890).

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Notes

- 1 See, e.g., Nakamura [1963: 106-110], Hirakawa [1963: 404-408], Dhammajoti [2015: 374-375].
- 2 Childers, *A Dictionary of the Pali Language*, 1875, s.v. “*sakkāyo*”; Nakamura [1963: 107-108].
- 3 F Egerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, New Haven, 1953 (repr. India, 1977), s.v. “*satkāya-drṣṭi*”.
- 4 As is well-known, Vasubandhu gives an etymological explanation to the same word as follows: “The view of *satkāya* is either the view of self or the view of those belonging to the self. Because it perishes (*sīdati*), it is [called] *sat*. *Kāya* means accumulation, collection, and aggregate. It is *satkāya* ‘perishing body (*kāya*)’ because it perishes and at the same time a body, viz. the five appropriative aggregates. It was so expressed for the purpose of eliminating both the [wrong] conception of eternity and that of a mass because adherence to the self in regard to those [five aggregates] is preceded by these [wrong conceptions].” *ātmadrṣṭir ātmīyadrṣṭir vā satkāyadrṣṭiḥ / sīdatīti sat / cayaḥ kāyaḥ saṃghātaḥ skandha ity arthaḥ / sac cāyaṃ kāyaś ceti satkāyaḥ pañcopādānaskandhāḥ / nityasaṃjñāṃ piṇḍasaṃjñāṃ ca tyājayitum evaṃ dyotitā / etatpūrvako hi teṣv ātmagrāhaḥ /* (AKBh, V, p. 281). The widely used Tib. tr. ‘*jig tshogs la lta ba*’ (Mvy, nos. 1966, 4671) agrees with the above Vasubandhu’s etymological explanation of *satkāyadrṣṭi*.
- 5 *Aṣṭa* Chap. 25, p. 213.12-13: *tad yathāpi nāma Subhūte satkāyadrṣṭau dvāṣaṣṭidṣṭigatāny antargatāni bhavati, evam eva...* “Subhuti, just as, for instance, those belonging to the sixty-two [wrong] views are [all] included in the view of *satkāya*, so...”; Chap. 31, p. 255.16: *... sarvasatkāyadrṣṭipratīṣṭhitānāṃ sarvāsaddṣṭyabhiniviṣṭānāṃ sattvānāṃ //* “...of sentient beings who are dependent on all views of *satkāya* and clinging to all wrong views.”
- 6 See the above Preamble and Candrakīrti’s *Prasannapadā* cited in the following section.
- 7 *svakāyadrṣṭi* is also found in a unique ms. of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* in its citation from *Daśabhūmikasūtra* whose reading, however, is therein *satkāyadrṣṭi* and not *svakāyadrṣṭi* in both Rahder’s (p. 28.30) and Kondo’s (p. 44.2) editions. See C. Bendall’s edition of *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (Bibliotheca Buddhica I, 1897-1902), p. 289.4, n. 4 and PSP p. 454, n. 1.
- 8 In MMK *svakāyadrṣṭi* appears only in this verse, while *satkāyadrṣṭi* is not used in this treatise.
- 9 See J. Fehér, “Identical Chapters in *Akutobhayā* and Buddhāpālita’s Commentary,” *Altorientalische Forschungen* 13, 1986, pp. 134-175.
- 10 See A. Saito, “『無畏論』の著者と成立をめぐる諸問題” [Remarks on the Authorship and Textual Development of the *Akutobhayā*], *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* [Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies] 51-2, 2003, pp.863-869; *do.*, “『無畏論』とその成立年代—『般若経』の引用を手がかりとして—” [The *Akutobhayā* and Its Approximate Date of Formation: In view of a citation from *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*], *Journal of Buddhist Studies* 仏教学45, 2003, pp. (1)-(29).
- 11 See Dhammajoti [2015: 601].
- 12 For the text of this sentence with asterisks, which accords with Tib.: *rang gi lus la lta ba ni rang lus lta ste / bdag dang bdag gi ba’i rnam par ’dzin par (P pa) zhugs so //* (D Tōhoku No. 3860, ‘a 148b4; P Ōtani No. 5260, ‘a 168b8), see PSP, p. 454, n. 3.
- 13 Cf. *Dà shèng zhōng guān shì lùn* 大乘中觀積論 (by Sthiramati and tr. by Wéi jìng et al. 惟淨等): 有身見 (卍字藏經26-1, 68右上); *Dà bō rě jīng* 大般若經 (tr. by Xuán zàng 玄奘): 薩迦耶見 (T vol. 7, 766b15-16).
- 14 See MMK 18, kk. 1-2.
- 15 PSP, pp. 284.5, 439.8, 590.1.

Some Remarks on Chapter VIII (Against Meat Eating) of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*

Lambert SCHMITHAUSEN

(1.) The present paper¹ is concerned with some aspects of the VIIIth chapter of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (LaṅkS), the “Chapter on not eating [any] meat” (*Amāṃsabhakṣaṇaparivarta*)². This chapter consists of a prose portion and a verse portion. In contrast to other chapters, it is available in two basically different versions: a longer version transmitted in Sanskrit, and a much shorter one in the form of a Chinese translation by Guṇabhadra, from the year 443 (T 670). Both versions have been translated into Tibetan, and of Guṇabhadra’s version there is also a translation into Sogdian. There are also two Chinese translations basically representing the longer version: one by Bodhiruci (from 513: T 671) and one by Śikṣānanda (produced between 700 and 704: T 672); but in the prose part both are rather free, and especially Bodhiruci’s translation is often more like a paraphrase, with numerous insertions.

It is in the *prose* portion that Guṇabhadra’s version is much shorter than the Sanskrit. In the verse portion, only two verses are lacking, but still there is a remarkable difference: in the Sanskrit version, the verse portion as a *whole* follows after the prose, and it includes *both* the bodhisattva Mahāmati’s request to the Buddha to explain the detriments of meat eating *and* the Buddha’s detailed answer. In contrast to this, in Guṇabhadra’s version the verses containing Mahāmati’s request occur in the very beginning of the chapter, *before* the prose. That this is their original position is clear even from the Sanskrit prose, where in the very beginning it is expressly stated that Mahāmati had already formulated his request in verses,³ although in this version these verses appear only *after* the prose.

That Guṇabhadra’s version of the prose portion is not merely an abbreviated paraphrase of the longer version but rather the translation of an earlier, much shorter text is supported by other facts as well, like the absence of whole paragraphs,⁴ or the fact that in the other chapters contained in his translation his rendering is quite meticulous. It may not be possible to reach certainty in every detail with regard to the phraseology of his Sanskrit original, but we can at any rate be sure that whatever textual element is somehow or other represented in Guṇabhadra’s translation formed part of the text before 443, whereas elements not represented are at least doubtful in this regard.

(2.) As regards the structure and the contents of the chapter in detail, prose and verse partly overlap, but there are also divergences. The *prose portion* starts with a request of the bodhisattva Mahāmati (pt. A: 244,1–245,7),

who asks the Buddha to point out to him the detriments of meat-eating and the advantages of abstention from meat, so that Mahāmati himself and the other bodhisattvas may be able to dissuade meat-eaters from eating meat. The Buddha then (pt. B: 245,8–252,14) presents a considerable series of arguments against meat eating. In the Sanskrit version, these arguments are expressly addressed to bodhisattvas, but in Guṇabhadra's version there is no such specification. After a kind of summary, a further special argument is added (pt. C: 252,15–253,9), with the main purport that those who buy meat for consumption are no less responsible for the killing of animals than the butchers, hunters and fishermen. The final part (pt. D: 253,10–256,6) of the prose is dedicated to exegetical problems concerning mainly the Vinaya, with the intention to show that what looks like restricted permissions to eat meat are in reality only preliminary steps towards a wholesale prohibition. Here, the main addressees are obviously the monks, including traditional monks. In the *verse portion* (pt. E: 256,6–259,5), all these elements are also found, but the structure is less lucid, and there are remarkable differences in detail, both portions containing elements not represented in the other portion.⁵ In the verse portion, the addressees are mostly called *yogis*.⁶

(3.) In the initial part of the prose portion, it is worth noting that Mahāmati underpins his request by pointing out that eating meat is prohibited even by the misguided representatives of non-Buddhist teachings (*anyatīrthika*) and that it is in fact not eaten by them (*svayaṃ ca na bhakṣyate*), and he thinks that in view of this it is altogether incredible that in the Buddhist teaching, the basic flavour or tenor of which is sympathy or benevolence, meat-eating should be practised or allowed.⁷ These lines would seem to indicate that a categorical rejection of meat-eating was indeed introduced into Buddhism under the influence of the social environment,⁸ and a similar indication can also be found in a somewhat earlier text, the *Aṅgulimālīyasūtra*.⁹

When we ask which circles of the social environment may have been strong enough to exercise such an influence, there is little evidence for Jain influence. Rather, we do find a number of indicators of Hindu influence. In the verse portion, what a bodhisattva, or yogi, should avoid eating is not only any kind of meat (and, of course, alcohol) but also *onions*, garlic and leek. To be sure, this is disapproved of not only in the higher Hindu casts but also among the Jains,¹⁰ but in the case of verse 5a (*gr̥ṇjanam laṣunam caiva*) the echo of *Manusmṛti* 5.5 (*laṣunam gr̥ṇjanam caiva*) is hard to miss. Equally interesting is verse 2ab: “[meat is] enjoyed by ignoble ones (or: not agreeable to the noble ones) and evil-smelling, and invariably causes ill-fame” (*anāryajuṣṭa-durgandham akīrtikaram eva ca*), for the wording is conspicuously similar to *Bhagavadgītā* 2.2 (*anāryajuṣṭam asvargyam akīrtikaram eva ca*),¹¹ even though what is characterized in the BhG verse is not meat but despondency before the battle.

The most remarkable borrowing, however, appears to be the additional argument (pt. C) separately appended to the long series of arguments, but also found in the verse portion (vs. 9), i.e., the argument according to which the consumer, by buying meat, increases the demand and is thus co-responsible for an increase of the supply, hence indirectly also for the killing of animals for the sake of meat to be sold on the market. As far as I know, there is no such argument in earlier Buddhist texts. But there are several verses in the *Anuśāsanaparvan* of the *Mahābhārata* expressing the same idea: If there were nobody who eats meat, nobody would kill [an animal]; the man who kills it does so for the sake of the eater (13.116.29); Thus, the person who eats the meat of sentient beings is [as bad] as the killer (13.116.37): the man who brings the animal, the one who agrees to the slaughter, the one who does the slaughtering, the one who sells the meat, the one who buys it, the one who prepares it and the one who eats it: they all are killers (13.116.47; similarly *Manusmṛti* 5.51).

Interesting in connection with Hindu influence is also a passage in the verse portion (vs. 18)¹² according to which persons who desist from eating meat will be reborn either in a family of (Buddhist?) yogins *or* in a family of *brahmins*.

Finally, in the prose portion as transmitted in Sanskrit, but not in Guṇabhadra and not in the verse portion, the bodhisattva is three times characterized as one who is, or wants to become, *sarvabhūtātmaabhūta*.¹³ In the Tibetan and Chinese translations, this is (I think: correctly) understood as “one for whom all [sentient] beings are [equal to] himself”, i.e., in the sense of *ātmaupamya*, or of the Golden Rule, as Bodhiruci amply elaborates. The expression *sarvabhūtātmaabhūta* does not occur in the other chapters of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, and as far as I can see, it is quite rare in earlier Buddhist texts (I have only noted one occurrence, in Āryaśūra’s *Jātakamālā*)¹⁴. In early Jaina sources, too, I have found it only once, namely in the *Dasaveyāliya* (vs. 4.9). But it is quite common, once again, in the *Mahābhārata*,¹⁵ though, in some of its occurrences, probably with a different meaning.¹⁶

(4.) The second part of the prose portion (pt. B: the one with a long series of arguments against meat-eating) begins with a set of four arguments,¹⁷ corresponding to vs. 4 of the verse portion, just in the beginning of the Buddha’s answer to Mahāmāti’s request. The yogi, or the bodhisattva, should not eat meat for the following reasons:

1. because in the course of the beginningless *samsāra* all beings, including those who are now animals, have been, in one or the other former life, one’s own relatives;
2. because of deviation (*vyabhicāra*), i.e., because the butchers (*aurabhrikāḥ*) in the market often cheat their customers by fraudulently selling them – as allegedly edible, pure meat – socially tabooed kinds of meat, like the meat of an ass, a camel, a dog, a bull or a horse, or even human meat;

3. because all meat, as part of a body, is basically impure since the body has originated from the impure substances semen and (procreative female) blood;
4. because the meat-eater, by the odour or stench emanating from his body, terrifies other beings, especially smaller animals (such as are eaten by predators?), just as dogs bark (*prabhaṣanti*) with fear when they come across low-caste people accustomed to eating dog's meat.

At first glance, these four arguments look somewhat heterogeneous. In fact, the first argument may have been taken over from the *Aṅgulimālīyasūtra*,¹⁸ and the last one from the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra*.¹⁹ But on closer inspection, there may be a kind of logic behind the curtain. If the first argument is not, as the Sanskrit version might suggest, understood in terms of the Golden Rule, but taken more literally, it would imply that when former lives are taken into account eating the meat of an animal means eating the meat of a former relative, perhaps ones own former parents or children, i.e., amounts to endo-cannibalism. Still, since we have no experience or memory of former lives this may sound somewhat abstract and remote, and may not sufficiently impress the hearer. Therefore, the second argument points out that meat-eating actually involves the danger of real cannibalism, i.e. of, albeit unknowingly, eating human meat, or at least the risk of eating other kinds of impure meat. For those who think that, by being sufficiently circumspect, they can avoid this danger, the third argument points out that *any* kind of meat is impure. Finally, those who do not care for this kind of indirect material impurity are exhorted in the fourth argument to take into account the terrifying effect of meat-eating, the meat-eater being considered to emanate an aura of aggressiveness.

(5.) In the last argument, the person addressed is the yogi who wants to practise benevolence (*maitrī*). This suggests that meat-eating is incompatible with benevolence. In Guṇabhadra,²⁰ this idea is actually presented as an additional argument against meat-eating. The antagonism between meat-eating and benevolence is also evident from another group of arguments found in all versions of the prose: Already in the old canon, benevolence is said to make you sleep well, wake up well and be free from bad dreams, to be dear to both men and demons, and to be protected by the deities.²¹ By way of contrast, the Laṅkā states that meat-eating causes bad sleep, horrible dreams and bad awakening; it makes the deities withdraw their protection, and when you meditate in solitude it enables demons to deprive you of your vitality (*ojas*).²² According to Guṇabhadra, in the wilderness the odour of the meat-eater provokes dangerous animals like tigers and wolves.²³ As against this, in the last but one verse (vs. 23) of the verse text we read that giving up meat and practising benevolence enables one to live together with lions, tigers, wolves, etc., in one and the same place [without being attacked by them]. This clearly refers to the well-known protective function of benevolence,²⁴ which would be paralysed by meat-eating.

(6.) In this connection, it may be interesting to refer to yet another argument, the eighth in the ‘argument part’ (B). In *Guṇabhadra*’s version, the argument is very simple: it just says that one should not eat meat because meat-eating prevents magically powerful formulas (*vidyā*) from being effective.²⁵ This is obviously based on a passage of the *Hastikakṣ(y)asūtra*, where the bodhisattva who wants to successfully employ a certain formula that heals all diseases is ordered to remain pure and to avoid meat-eating.²⁶ In the *Sanskrit* version of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*,²⁷ the argument has been considerably enlarged and has been transformed into a more complex argument. If we follow the analysis of the Tibetan translation (which I believe hits the mark),²⁸ the argument starts from the statement that meat-eating not only prevents those who hold magical formulas from applying them successfully, but also prevents the yogis who live on the burial ground, or in the wilderness in places haunted by demons, from attaining liberation. These yogis are expressly characterized as practising benevolence (*maitrī*). This would seem to point to the idea, also found in mainstream sources,²⁹ that these groups of persons must practise benevolence for the sake of self-protection and should desist from eating meat in order not to provoke demons³⁰ (and perhaps also animals of prey). Now, from this fact (*°vighnakaratvāt*) the Sanskrit version of the argument concludes that meat-eating will also be an obstacle to the success of all spiritual efforts of the noble persons who have set out on the Great Vehicle (or Path). The logic behind would be that for them benevolence is still more essential, since it is the core of bodhisattva spirituality; therefore, meat-eating, incompatible with benevolence, would render all their endeavour futile. The text concludes that in view of this (or, in the Sanskrit text: according to those who see this)³¹ a *bodhisattva*, since he desires both his own and other beings’ welfare, should not eat meat.

There is a further extension of this argument in the Sanskrit version of the last part of the prose portion (pt. D).³² Here, the text has the Buddha start, so to speak, from the result of the aforementioned argument, just in order to generalize its validity: Were it – he says – my intention to permit meat eating, I would not have prohibited the yogis practising on the burial place and the noble persons set out on the Great Vehicle from eating any meat. But actually I have prohibited the noble persons set out on *any* Vehicle (*sarvayānasamprasthita*), [let alone] the yogis practising on the burial ground or in the wilderness, from eating any meat, so that all their spiritual efforts may be successful. Here, the phrase “all their spiritual efforts” surely includes the efforts of the followers of the other Vehicles, or mainstream Buddhism, as well, and the repeated emphasis on benevolence and on the cultivation of the contemplation of all sentient beings as one’s only little son (or child) indicates that this attitude, and hence abstention from meat-eating, is considered essential for *any* Buddhist practice. The more so since it is clear from the initial part of the prose portion that finally all Vehicles, directly or indirectly, lead to Buddhahood.³³ This extension of the prohibition

of meat-eating beyond the (overlapping) circles of yogis and bodhisattvas to all Buddhist practitioners, including mainstream Buddhists, especially traditional monks and nuns, is fully in accordance with the main purport of the last part (D) of the prose portion.

(7.) As mentioned before, one line in the verse portion arguing against meat-eating (viz. vs. 2ab) has assimilated a line from the *Bhagavadgītā*. In the LañkS verse, meat is problematic because it is not appreciated by noble persons (or: appreciated only by ignoble persons: *anāryajuṣṭa*), because of its bad smell (*durgandha*), and because its consumption causes a bad reputation (*akīrtikara*). These arguments are also found in the prose portion.³⁴ In Guṇabhadra's version³⁵ they have more or less the same form as in the verse, without any enlargement. In the Sanskrit prose, however, there are considerable additions, albeit partly in connection with a later paragraph of the text.

First, the idea that meat is enjoyed or consumed by ignoble persons but avoided by noble people is taken to mean that the latter feed on the food of hermits (*ṛṣi*),³⁶ who in the *Jātakas* are often described as living on roots and fruit,³⁷ and who in some *Mahābhārata* passages are described as arguing against bloody rituals.³⁸ A few pages later,³⁹ the food consumed by the hermits, considered by them as excellent (*praṇīta*) and permitted by the Buddha, is defined as consisting in rice, barley, beans, lentils, etc., [prepared] in ghee, sesamum oil, honey or sugar-cane products, and bestowed on the monks spontaneously(?) (*samupapadyamānam*).⁴⁰

Second, in another paragraph, the Sanskrit version⁴¹ elaborates on meat as having a bad smell by stating that when meat of animals is burnt (/roasted [too much]?) there is no difference in smell from a human corpse being burnt.

Third, the aspect of meat-eating causing a bad reputation appears to have been elaborated in yet another paragraph⁴² according to which wandering monks who eat meat, especially such as show a strong preference for meat, are disdained by people as bad ascetics, who rather behave like carnivorous beasts of prey or demons.⁴³ Still, if the monk is a bodhisattva, it is not so much on account of this bad reputation as such that he is exhorted to abstain from meat; it is rather because his bad behaviour may induce people to disparage the Buddhist community and the Buddha's teaching as a whole, and this would surely be extremely unwholesome for these people themselves; thus, the bodhisattva-monk should abstain from eating meat in order to protect people's mind from being misled into disparaging the Buddhist teaching.⁴⁴

(8.) It is remarkable that among the many arguments against meat-eating in the LañkS there is none that makes use of the concept of *tathāgatagarbha*, of Buddha-nature inherent in every sentient being, although the concept does occur in other chapters of the sūtra.⁴⁵ This is all the more remarkable

in view of the fact that an argument based on this concept is indeed already found in the *Āṅgulimāliyasūtra*. There we read that the *dhātu*, the central, meta-physical element or true essence, is one and the same in all living beings and in myself.⁴⁶ Therefore, eating meat means eating the meat of something ultimately identical with oneself,⁴⁷ which would make meat-eating appear as a kind of auto-cannibalism. Still, there is no such argument in the *LañkS*. At most, one might interpret the expression *sarvabhūtātmabhūta* in the Sanskrit-version as alluding to such an idea: “he/she for whom all beings are [ultimately *identical* with] himself/herself”, and not merely “*like* him- or herself”. But actually none of the Tibetan and Chinese translations suggest such an interpretation.

Notes

- 1 The paper in honour of my highly esteemed colleague, Ven. KL Dhammajoti, is an English extract from ch. V.3 of vol. 1 of my German study on meat eating and vegetarianism in Indian Buddhism up to the middle of the first millennium A.D. (S 2020 = *Fleischverzehr und Vegetarismus im indischen Buddhismus bis ca. zur Mitte des ersten Jahrtausends n. Chr.*, 3 vols., Bochum: projekt verlag 2020). For a more detailed investigation, the reader is referred to vol. 1 of this publication, for a critical edition of LañkS ch. VIII to vol. 3 pp. 55–103, and for an annotated translation to vol. 1 pp. 363–381 and the respective notes in vol. 2. For details on the textual witnesses and on previous editions, see Sh. JIA in *Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism* vol. I (Leiden 2015): 138–139, and S 2020, vol. 3 pp. 41–47. In the present article, references to LañkS passages are to B. NANJIO's edition (page + line) and to my own edition (§).
- 2 Thus according to Tibetan, Chinese and most mss.; see L. SCHMITHAUSEN, "Some Philological Remarks on Chapter VIII of the Lañkāvatārasūtra", in: *Koshakyō kenkyū no saizensen: shinpojiumu kōen shiryō shūsei* 古写経研究の最前線---シンポジウム講演資料集成---, Tokyo: The International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies, Section 2006, p. 86.
- 3 LañkS 244,1-2 (§ A.1).
- 4 E.g. LañkS 247,8–248,7 (§§ B.6–7); 249,14–250,12 (§ B.13.2–3); 251,5–252,10 (§ B.14.2–3); 253,11–254,16 (§§ D.2–3).
- 5 E.g., the arguments LañkS 247,8–248,7 (§§ B.6–7, missing in Guṇabhadra) are not represented in the verse portion, nor is there, in the latter, any reference to the story of king Śiṃhasaudāsa (LañkS 250,13–251,4 = § B.14.1; Guṇabhadra 513c28–514a1) or Kalmāṣapāda (251,12–252,2 = § B.14.3a; not in Guṇabhadra), or to the Śibi story (251,5–11 = § B.14.2; not in Guṇabhadra). On the other hand, the prose portion does not contain any reference to alcohol and onions, garlic etc. (vs. 1 and vs. 5), and the repeated stress on bad rebirth (vs. 14, 15 and 17) and torture in hell (vs. 10–11, missing in the Chinese versions) as a result of meat eating is mentioned only once in the Sanskrit version of the prose portion (252,5–10 = § B.14.3c), with no reference to hell and no parallel in Guṇabhadra.
- 6 Verses 4d, 5d, 13a, 22d; cf. also 18b; *bodhisattvas* are mentioned only in verses 1c and 17a. In the prose portion, references to the addressees as *yogis* are not missing (cf. LañkS 246,12 and 247,3 = § B.4.1 and B.4.4; 248,7 = § B.7.3; 248,9 = § B.8; 254,9–10 and 15 = § D.3.1–2), but in the Sanskrit version the predominant designation in pt. B is *bodhisattva*, and in pt. D the addressees are mainly referred to by the more general designations *śrāvaka* (253,11 = § D.1; 254,9 = § D.3.1; 255,11 and 256,3–5 = § D.5.2 and D.5.5) or *kulaputra/kuladuhitr* (254,11–13 = § D.3).
- 7 LañkS 244,12–245,1 = § A.3, probably to be read as: *durākhyātadharmair api tāvad ... anyātrthikair ... māṃsāṃ nivāryate bhakṣyamāṇāṃ svayaṃ ca na bhakṣyate, prāg eva kṛpākarase samyaksambuddhapraṇīte lokanātha tava śāsane māṃsāṃ svayaṃ ca bhakṣyate bhakṣyamāṇāṃ ca na nivāryate.*
- 8 For similar judgment, see Hyoung Seok HAM, "Manipulating the Memory of Meat-Eating: Reading the Lañkāvatāra's Strategy of Introducing Vegetarianism to Buddhism", in: *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 47 (2019): 133–153.
- 9 Peking-Kanjur, mDo, vol. tsu 205a5–6 ≈ T vol. 2, no. 120: 541a18–20. Cf. S 2020, vol. 1, §§ 227–228, vol. 1, p. 360 § 4a (transl.), and vol. 3, p. 39 § 4a (ed.).
- 10 Cf., e.g., *Sūyagada* (ed. Muni JAMBUVIJAYA, Bombay 1978) I.7.13 (= vs. 393); R. WILLIAMS: *Jaina Yoga*, repr. Delhi 1983: 113–116.
- 11 This parallel was kindly pointed out to me by Divakar Acharya during a seminar on LañkS ch. VIII at Kyoto University in 2005.
- 12 In the Chinese versions, this verse is also found, but only at the very end of the chapter, after vs. 24 of the Skt version, thus giving the impression of an addendum.
- 13 LañkS 245,15 (§ B.1.2; read *sarvabhūtātmaabhūtātām upagantukāmēna*), 248,15 (§ B.9), and 250,10 (§ B.13.3b).
- 14 *Jātakamālā* (ed. P.L. VAIDYA) p. 1,19 = p. 6,25, where the expression refers to the Buddha.
- 15 Cf., e.g., *Mahābhārata* (crit. ed.) 12.254.29–32, 12.261.32, 13.114.5–7, 13.130.27–28, and especially 13.105.27 (*ye ... amāṃsādā ... sarvabhūtātmaabhūtāḥ*) and 13.116.63–64.
- 16 Cf. Angelika MALINAR, *Rājavidyā: Das königliche Wissen um Herrschaft und Verzicht, Studien zur Bhāgavadgītā*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 1996: 196–203 (focussing on *Bhāgavadgītā* 5.7).
- 17 LañkS 245,10–247,3 = §§ B.1–4.
- 18 Peking-Kanjur, mDo, vol. tsu 204b1–3 ≈ T vol. 2 no. 120: 540c23–26. Cf. S 2020, vol. 1, p. 357 § 1a (transl.), and vol. 3, p. 35, § 1a (ed.).

- 19 Hiromi HABATA, *A Critical Edition of the Tibetan Translation of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra*, Wiesbaden: Ludwig Reichert 2013, p. 140, § 175,8-17. Cf. S 2020, vol. 1, p. 340–342, § B.7 (transl.), and vol. 3, p. 22–23, § B.7 (ed.).
- 20 T vol. 16, no. 670: 513c18-19.
- 21 See, e.g., AN V 342 (11.16).
- 22 LaṅkS 249,3-7 and 248,16–249,1 (§§ B.12.1–2 and B.10).
- 23 T vol. 16, no. 670: 513c24-25.
- 24 See L. SCHMITHAUSEN, *Maitrī and Magic* (Vienna 1997): 35–44.
- 25 T vol. 16, no. 670: 513c20-21: 令諸呪術不成就故, 不應食肉. In Sanskrit, this would correspond to something like: **vidyāsādhāntārayakaratvād api* (or: *antarāyakaram ity api*) *māmsam abhakṣyam*.
- 26 Peking-Kanjur, mDo, tsu 115a2-3: *rig sngags 'di dag 'don pa'i byang chub sems dpas gtsang sbra bya ba dang | sha mi bza' bar kun tu spyad par bya'o* ||; T vol. 17, no. 813: 781b13-14; no. 814: 787a10-11; see S 2020, vol. 1, § 141.
- 27 LaṅkS 248,8-14 (§ B.8).
- 28 For a detailed discussion of the passage see S 2020, vol. 2, endnotes 2950–2967, for the Tibetan version endnote 2967[4.1].
- 29 See, e.g., *Visuddhimagga* (ed. WARREN and KOSAMBI) II.65; S 2020, vol. 1 § 49–50.
- 30 Thus explicitly in the *Ratnameghasūtra*: see Bhikṣuṇī VINĪTĀ: “The *Dhutagaṇa* Passage in the *Avatamsaka* Translation by Prajñā (般若) and the *Ratnameghasūtra*”, in: VON CRIEGERN et al.: *Saddharmāmṛtam, Festschrift für Jens-Uwe Hartmann*, Wien: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien 2018: 511–526, esp. 523.
- 31 See S 2020, vol. 2, endnote 2964.
- 32 LaṅkS 254,8-16 (§ D.3; read ... *kuryām | kṛtavāms cāsmi mahā°*); not represented in Guṇabhadra.
- 33 See LaṅkS 244,10-12 (§ A.2; read *śrāvakaḥpratyekabuddhabhūmyor vā*).
- 34 LaṅkS 247,4-5 (§ B.5). I suggest to read *anāryajuṣṭa-durgandha-m-akīrtikaratvād api* (*°juṣṭa-* is supported by the oldest ms.), see S 2020, vol. 2, endnote 2931.
- 35 T vol. 16 no. 670: 513c19-20.
- 36 LaṅkS 247,5-6 (§ B.5).
- 37 See, e.g., *Jātaka* II 52,25–53,4; 41,9-10 and 19-20; III 37,4-5; 110,8-11.
- 38 *Mahābhārata* (crit. ed.) 12.324 and 14.91; see Ludwig ALSDORF, *Beiträge zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien*, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner 1961: pp. (39)–(40) (English version: *The History of Vegetarianism and Cow-veneration in India*, ed. by Willem BOLLÉE, London and New York: Routledge 2010: 41–42). For a similar attitude in the Buddhist canon, see, e.g., DN I 141,26-36 and 142,23-33 as against 127,10-14, or Sn 295–297 as against 308–309.
- 39 LaṅkS 249,14–250,3 (§ B.13.2). Not in Guṇabhadra.
- 40 For my reading (*°masūrādi sarpiś°*) and my understanding of the passage, see S 2020, vol. 2, endnote 3004.
- 41 LaṅkS 248,3-7 (§ B.7).
- 42 LaṅkS 247,10-15 (§ B.6.2).
- 43 Cf. also vs. 2c: *kravyādabhojanam māmsam*.
- 44 LaṅkS 247,8-10 and 247,16–248,2 (§ B.6.1–3).
- 45 LaṅkS 220,1–224,3 and 234,16–236,8. See also X.746 and 750 and the more critical explanation of the concept in LaṅkS 77,13–79,9.
- 46 T vol. 2, no. 120: 540c26-27: 一切眾生界我界 即是一界. For Tibetan (P tsu 204b3) see S 2020, vol. 3 p. 36 and vol. 1 p. 357 (§ 1b{a}) with vol. 2, endnote 2781.
- 47 Peking-Kanjur, mDo, tsu 204b3 (S 2020, vol. 3, p. 36, § 1b{b}): “[Any meat eating] turns out to be eating the meat of someone who [ultimately] is one and the same true essence (*dhātu*) [as oneself]” (*dbyings gcig tu gyur pa'i sha za bar 'gyur bas ...*). See S 2020, vol. 1, §§ 221–224. See also D. Seyfort Ruegg, “Ahimsā and Vegetarianism in the History of Buddhism”, in: Somaratna BALASOORIYA et al. (eds.), *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula*, London 1980, pp. 234–241, esp. p. 236.

The Concept of Abhidharma in Buddhism: Some Observation

Lalji 'SHRAVAK'

Being poured out with the taste (essence) of liberation, the Teachings of the Buddha (*Buddha-vacana*) have even taste (equal inclination). Why has *Buddha-vacana* been divided into three categories? The Buddha has himself mentioned his teachings as *dharma* (*dhamma*) and *vinaya*. How did three divisions take place and how was the third division designated as Abhidharma (Abhidhamma)? Why and how has abhidharma¹ been added? The present paper intends to deal with such questions.

Three Divisions of the Teaching of the Buddha (*Buddha vacana*)

Dealing with such questions, Chinese translation of *Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣā* and the Pāli commentaries mention several views of the teachers and Schools. *Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣā* has recorded the views of teachers and schools regarding the three divisions of the *Buddha-vacana* as follows—

Some teachers explain that since all the teachings of the Buddha are originated from the same ocean of the wisdom, flowed out from the same lake of the Bodhi (enlightenment), drawn out from the same power (*bala*) and confidence (*vaiśāradya*), arisen from the same great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*), there is no difference among them.²

Some teachers opine the difference among the *Sūtra*, *Vinaya* and *Abhidharma*, based on different reasons, which are as follows:

Difference in the base (*adhiṣṭhāna*): That, on which the training in the higher thought (*adhicitta śikṣā*) depends or relies, is *Sūtra*; that, on which the training in the higher morality (*adhiśīla śikṣā*) depends or relies, is called *Vinaya*, and that, on which the training in the higher wisdom (*adhiprajñā śikṣā*) depends or relies, is called *Abhidharma*.³

All kinds of teachings and trainings i.e. higher thought, higher morality and higher wisdom are available in all i.e. *Sūtra*, *Vinaya* and *Abhidharma*. Besides higher thought, the higher morality and higher wisdom are also contained (available) in *Sūtra*. Likewise, the higher thought and higher wisdom are also available in *Vinaya*; and the higher thought and higher morality are also available in *Abhidharma*; hence there should be no difference. Dealing with such objection, it has been made clear that all are available within all, but on the basis of the primacy (*prādhānya*), it has been designated separately. In *Sūtra*, the teaching of higher thought (*adhicitta śikṣā*) is premier than other. Likewise, in *Vinaya*, the teaching of higher morality (*adhiśīla śikṣā*)

and in *Abhidharma*, the teaching of the higher wisdom (*adhiprajña śikṣā*) is premier than remaining other two. Some say that in *Sūtra*, whatever is the base of higher thought is *Sūtra*, whatever is the base of higher morality and higher wisdom is *Vinaya* and *Abhidharma* respectively. Same is applied in the case of *Vinaya* and *Abhidharma* also.⁴

Difference in the Teaching (*deśanā*): In *Sūtra*, there are subsequent (successive) discourses (*anukrama deśana*); in *Vinaya*, there are instructions regarding the cause (*nidāna deśanā*) on which account the precepts are instructed (told); and in *abhidharma*, there are instructions regarding the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa deśanā*).⁵

Again there is the **difference in the flowing down (*niḥṣyandatā*):** *Sūtra* is flowing down power (*bala*), *Vinaya* is flowing down great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) and *Abhidharma* is pouring (flowing) down perfect self-confidence (*vaiśāradya*).⁶

In *Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra* (T. 1546, p. 2/a/16-18) and *Vibhāṣāśāstra* (T. 1547, p. 416/b/29- c/1), it is explained that *Sūtra* is the resting place of the power (*bala*), *Vinaya* is the resting place of the great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) and *abhidharma* is the resting place of the perfect self-confidence (*vaiśāradya*).

Again there is a **difference in narration (*kathana*):** various mixed discourses are *sūtra*; where there is the narration of precepts (*śikṣāpada*), is *vinaya*; where there is a discussion of the division of self-nature and common nature (*sva-sāmānya lakṣaṇa*) of the dharmas, is *abhidharma*.⁷

Again there is the **difference in performance (action, *kāritra*):** To produce the wholesome roots (*kuśalamūlas*) in those people, where the wholesome roots are not arisen, the *sūtra* has been spoken; to execute the continuity of the fruition in those people, where the wholesome roots have already been arisen, the *vinaya* is said; and to make the emancipation (deliverance) obtained to those people, where the continuity of the fruition has been executed, *abhidharma* is said.⁸

Again there is the **difference in penetration (entrance, *pravṛitti*, *praveśa*):** To make them entered in the pursuit of *Saddharma*, who have not yet entered, *sūtra* has been taught; to make them hold the set of precepts, who have already been entered in the *Saddharma*, *vinaya* has been told; to make them penetrate (comprehend, know) in to the ultimate characteristic of all the dharmas, who have been held the set of precepts, *abhidharma* has been spoken.⁹

Theravada tradition also explains the reason of three divisions of the teachings of the Buddha. Distinguishing the divisions of the Buddha's teachings, Buddhaghosa says that the three divisions of teachings of the

Buddha indicate the teachings of Order, teachings of popular (common) use (application), and teachings of highest philosophical truth. It also signifies the instructions according to misconduct, instructions according to circumstances and instructions according to the states or law. Discourses are also divided in view of restraint, refutation of heretical wrong views, and connotation of (distinction between) mind and matter. Accordingly, they have been collected in *Vinaya*, *Sutta* and *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*.¹⁰

Buddha was very much expert in instructing the people according to their intellect, interest and circumstances. According to Buddhaghosa, where there the instructions regarding the order are given by the Buddha, the worthy of instructing orders, is called *Vinaya*; the discourses defining the things in the common way, given by the Buddha, the expert in defining the things in common way, are called *Sutta*; and the teachings, in which the ultimate truths are instructed by the Buddha, the skilled in defining the ultimate truths, are called *Abhidhamma*. Considering these three aspects, the teachings of the Buddha have been divided into three caskets: *Vinaya*, *Sutta* and *Abhidhamma* respectively.¹¹

There is another way of the triple division of the Buddha's teachings. According to Buddhaghosa, such teaching, which controls the people who commits the offences, is called the teaching in accordance with the offences (*yathāparādha sāsana*). The beings, attached with various intensions, latent dispositions and temperaments, have been instructed according to the circumstances. Those discourses are called the teaching in accordance with circumstances (*yathānuloma sāsana*). The beings, having perception of 'I', 'mine' in the heap of the mere *dhammas* (*dharmas*), have been instructed according to the states of the *dhammas*. That is called the teaching in relation to the state of the *dhammas* (*yathādhamma sāsana*).¹² Accordingly the teachings have been divided into *Vinaya*, *Sutta* and *Abhidhamma* respectively.

According to the subject discoursed in, the Teachings of the Buddha have also been divided into three categories. According to Buddhaghosa, being opponent (antagonised) to the flirtation (*ajjhācāra*), wrong views (*dvāsattḥiditṭhi*) and passion etc. (*rāgādi*), the discourses have been made distinct with regard to restraint (*saṁvarāsaṁvara kathā*), with regard to refutation of heretical wrong views (*ditṭhiviniveṭhana kathā*), and with regard to the distinction between mind and matter (*nāmarūpa-pariccheda kathā*) respectively. Accordingly, they have been collected in *Vinaya*, *Sutta* and *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* respectively.¹³

Recitation of the Dhamma and Vinaya

The Buddha did not designate any of his disciples as his successor. He left his followers under the refuge of Dhamma and Vinaya.¹⁴ Buddha's disciples followed the instruction of their Teacher (Sattḥā) and accepted Dhamma and Vinaya as

their teacher. Bhikkhu Saṅgha had to follow, respect and worship the Buddha's Dhamma and Vinaya. In this situation it was necessary for and responsibility of the saṅgha to maintain the purity and longevity of the Dhamma and Vinaya.

Just after the Mahāparinibbāna of the Buddha, hearing the dialogues of Subhadda, an immoral monk, Ven. Mahākassapa felt the need of recitation of the Dhamma and Vinaya. To follow the way that leads to Nibbāna and to fulfil the aims and objectives of the Dhamma and Saṅgha, the monks assembled and recited the Dhamma and Vinaya taught by the Buddha, in this assembly organized by Ven. Mahākassapa.¹⁵ They made whole hearted effort to collect and compile the whole teaching given by the Buddha begins from his First Sermon (Dhammacakka-pavattana) up to his Great decease (Mahāparinibbāna), which took the shape of the *Tipiṭaka* in the course of time.

In his teaching at many places, the Buddha has referred Dhamma and Vinaya simultaneously. Dhamma and Vinaya have been said as the Order (*sāsana*) of the Buddha.¹⁶ It denotes that the whole teaching of the Buddha was categorized as Dhamma and Vinaya. Besides the rules of the Vinaya to keep the saṅgha disciplined and monks routed on the way of Dhamma, remaining teaching of the Buddha was included (accommodated) in Dhamma.¹⁷

After the second Buddhist Council at Vaiśālī, the Buddhist Saṅgha was divided formally and till the Third Buddhist council held under the patronage of Asoka, Saṅgha was divided into 18 groups. The reasons for division were different. There were disputes over the doctrine (Dhamma) and rules (Vinaya). But all the groups (Nikāyas) accept the triple division of Buddha Vacana as Sutta, Vinaya and Abhidhamma.

Abhidhamma and abhivinaya

How did this division take place and how was the third division designated as Abhidhamma?

The word *abhidhamma* has been referred at different places in the *Tipiṭaka* in different ways. At some place it is referred lonely¹⁸ and some places it is referred jointly with *abhivinaya*.¹⁹ In *Majjhima Nikāya*, where it is used lonely, it refers to the 37 *Bodhipakkhiya dhammas* (dhammas leading towards bodhi).²⁰ Here Buddhaghosa has considered it as special Dhamma, Excellent Dhamma.²¹

When *abhidhamma* is used jointly with *abhivinaya*, it refers to *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*. In *Samantapāsādikā*, Buddhaghosa has explained it as 'nāmarūpa pariccheda' and to *abhivinaya* as the whole *Vinaya Piṭaka*.²² Buddhaghosa has elucidated the word *abhidhamma* referred in *Dīgha Nikāya* as seven Abhidhamma texts (*sattapakaraṇas*), and *abhivinaya* as *Khandhaka* and *Parivāra* of the *Vinaya Piṭaka*.²³ Elaborating the explanation of Buddhaghosa, the sub-commentator Dhammapāla has described that being concern with

special *dhammas*, very distinguished *dhammas*, accomplished *dhammas*, the seven texts (*sattapakaraṇas*) are abhidhamma. Because of praising or explaining the *dhammas* belonging to the practice of lesser ethics (*abhisamācārikadharmakittanato*)²⁴ *Khandhaka* and *Parivāra* of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* are called *abhivinaya*.²⁵ *Abhidhamma-abhivinaya* referred in *Majjhima Nikāya* are also accepted by Buddhaghosa as *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* and *Vinaya Piṭaka*.²⁶

In Pāli *Tipiṭaka*, the word *abhidhamma* has been used jointly with *Kathā* also. In *suttas*, the discussions through question and answer on the profound philosophical subjects and concepts have been referred as *Abhidhamma kathā*. It is also said *dhammikathā*.²⁷ There are several references of the discussion among the monks on profound subjects, occurred in the *Tipiṭaka*.²⁸ Those, who were engaged in such kind of discussion, were referred as 'Dhammakathika'. Buddhaghosa has considered Dhammakathikas as Abhidhammikas.²⁹ In *Tipiṭaka* such kind of discussions done on the profound subject matter, have also been referred as *Vedallakathā* along with *dhamma(dhammī)kathā*.³⁰ Explaining this *dhammikathā* and *vedallakathā*, Buddhaghosa says that discussion on *sīla* etc. excellent *dhammas* is *abhidhammakathā* and the discussion associated with wisdom, mixed with knowledge is *vedallakathā*.³¹ At another place, he explains *abhidhammakathā* as discussion associated with *abhidhamma*.³²

In Pāli *Tipiṭaka*, the teachings of the Buddha in brief on the deep philosophical subjects and elaboration of those brief teachings given by the disciples of Buddha have been included / collected under the title of *Vedalla*.³³ Such kind of elaborations also has become very deep and thoughtful. *Sāratthamañjūsā* has claimed such *suttas* like *Mahāvedalla sutta* etc. as very profound.³⁴ Among the nine fold division of Buddha Vacanas, such kind of *suttas* having deep meanings have been designated as *Vedalla*.³⁵ In these *suttas*, the profound philosophical subject matter has been made clear and explained through the method of question and answer. Its style and subject matter are very similar to *Abhidhammakathā*. The one who narrates *Vedalla* is also designated as *Dhammakathika*. The *sutta* containing the Dhammadinnā's teaching to her household husband Vishākha, has been included in *Tipiṭaka* as *Cūla Vedalla sutta*.³⁶ Dhammadinnā is praised by the Buddha as the excellent or foremost among the *Dhammakathikā* Bhikkhunis.³⁷

The *suttas*, which classify the brief teachings of the Buddha and elaborate them extensively, are also collected in a section named *Vibhaṅga*. Even there are such kinds of some *suttas*, which contain the word *vibhaṅga* in their title.³⁸

In *Pācittiya* and *Pārājika* of *Vinaya Piṭaka*, the classification is available in the name of *Vibhaṅga*, in which the words of the Buddha have been explained word by word. Where ever the Buddha has spoken in brief, there has become a list of *dhammas*. These words spoken in brief have been given the name as *mātikā*. General meaning of the *mātikā* is index (directory or listing). Those *suttas*, in which deep philosophical and doctrinal teachings

are collected in *mātikā* form, have been extensively explained or elaborated through question and answer form, and have been enlisted and collected in *Tipiṭaka* under the title of *Vedalla*, *Vibhaṅga*, etc. Their style of explanation, structure and characteristics are almost similar.

The Buddha has instructed that the assembled monks either should discuss or talk among them on *dhamma* (*dhammikathā*) or should keep noble silent.³⁹ Explaining to this *dhammikathā*, Buddhaghosa has said that the *kathā*, which is associated with four truth *dhammas*, the teaching which enlightens the arising (*pavatti*) and annihilation (extinction, disappearance) (*nivatti*), is called *dhammikathā*.⁴⁰ The Buddha has prohibited the kulaputtas, who have left their household life and have been taken into order i.e. the monks, to indulge in the aimless talk on such topics- talk on the kings (*rāja kathā*), on the robbers (*cora kathā*), on the great ministers (*mahāmatṭa kathā*), on the panic (*bhaya kathā*), on the battle (*yuddha kathā*), etc.. He has allowed them to talk on the 10 topics of talk (*kathāvatthus*)- wanting little (*appiccha kathā*), about contentment (*santuṭṭhi kathā*), seclusion (*paviveka kathā*), solitude (*asaṃsagga kathā*), energetic striving (*viriyārambha kathā*), virtue (*sīla kathā*), concentration (*samādhi kathā*), insight (*paññā kathā*), release (*vimutti kathā*), release by knowing and seeing (*vimuttiñāṇadassana kathā*).⁴¹ Talks on these ten subjects or topics are also called *dhammikathā*.⁴²

On the basis of above discussion, it is very much clear that the discussion or talking on the profound doctrinal and philosophical subjects through the question and answer method is referred as *dhammi kathā*. The discussions in the form of *vedalla*, *vibhaṅga*, *abhidhamma kathā* are characterized as *dhammi kathā* and those, who hold such kind of discussion, are called *dhammakathika*.

In Pāli and Sanskrit Buddhist texts, there are three categories of the holder of the Buddha *vacanas*. Those who hold the Buddha *vacanas* are classified in to three special categories - Dhammadhara, Vinayadhara and Mātikādhara.⁴³ Here *mātikā* has been associated with *dhamma* and *vinaya*. Literal meaning of *mātikā* is listing. Those who hold the list of the *dhammas*, perhaps were called *mātikādhara*. *Divyāvadāna* mentions the attainment of the *mātrkā* (*mātikā*) and refers it as the grasping of the third *Piṭaka*.⁴⁴ In *Tipiṭaka*, many *suttas* have been included, in which *dhammas* are counted over as listing/ index or stated in brief (concise) as aphorism. Some *suttas* refer that the monks whenever could not understand the brief or concise teaching of the Buddha, they used to approach the foremost disciples of the Buddha to explain them.⁴⁵

In *Tipiṭaka* at some places Suttantika, Vinayadhara and Dhammakathika, this threefold categorization has been used in lieu of the triad Dhammadhara, Vinayadhara and Mātikādhara.⁴⁶ Here the word Dhammadhara has been replaced by the word Suttantika and Mātikādhara by Dhammakathika. It

seems Dhammadhara and Suttantika, and Mātikādhara and Dhammakathika were mutual substitute words in practice. In the course of time, those Buddha *vacanas*, to which Dhammadharas and Suttantikas were holding or explaining, were designated as *Sutta Piṭaka*; and to which Mātikādhara and Dhammakathika were holding or elucidating, were accepted as *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*. It may be noticed that Buddhaghosa, in *Samantapāsādikā*, has used the triad Suttantika, Vinayadhara and Abhidhammika.⁴⁷ It makes clear that the word Abhidhammika came gradually into the practice either as the substitute of Mātikādhara and Dhammakathika or as the synonyms of Dhammakathika.

If we look at the structure, the style of elaboration and other characteristics of *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, it appears that there has been adopted the catechetical style of *Mātikā* in the classification and arrangement of the subject matter, and the style of *Vedalla*, *Vibhaṅga*, *Dhammakathā* etc. has been adopted in their explanation. In the light of the adoption of the style, we could consider Abhidhamma as the mixed form of the *Mātikā* and *Vedalla-Vibhaṅga-dhammakathā*.

In the Pāli *Vinaya* text *Parivāra*, explaining the *vinaya* and *abhivinaya* it is said that the manifestation is *vinaya* and detailed classification and elaboration of manifestation is *abhivinaya*.⁴⁸ We can distinguish the *dhamma* and *abhidhamma* also in this very form. The recitation of the *dhammas* in the form of matrix is the manifestation and it may be designated as *dhamma*; and the detailed explanation of matrix (*dhammas*) in the form of *Vedalla-Vibhaṅga-dhammakathā* is the classification and elaboration of manifestation of *dhammas*, may be nominated as *abhidhamma*. Probably, it seems to me, the teachers of later generation have designated the mixed and assimilated form of the style having the characteristics and classification of matrix and *Vedalla-Vibhaṅga-dhammakathā* as *abhidhamma*; and in the course of time it established and developed as the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, which consists the organization and systematization of *Mātikā* (matrix) and elaboration like *Vedalla-Vibhaṅga-dhammakathā*.

Abbreviations

Atthasā.	<i>Atthasālinī</i>
Aṅ.	<i>Aṅguttara Nikāya</i>
Cull.	<i>Cullavagga</i>
Divyā.	<i>Divyāvadāna</i>
DN	<i>Dīgha Nikāya</i>
DPE	<i>Dhammagiri-Pāli-Granthamālā</i> (Devanāgarī) Edition
Līnattha.	<i>Līnatthappakāsanā</i> (<i>Dīgha Nikāya Tīkā</i>)
Manoratha.	<i>Manorathapūraṇī</i> (<i>Aṅguttara Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā</i>)
Mūla. Vinaya.	<i>Mūla-sarvāstivāda Vinayavastu</i>
MN	<i>Majjhima Nikāya</i>
Papañca.	<i>Papañcasūdanī</i>
Samanta.	<i>Samantapāsādikā</i>
Sumaṅgala.	<i>Sumaṅgalavilāsini</i>

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Notes

- 1 What is Abhidharma? I have dealt with this question in my article "Exposition of *Dharma* and *Abhidharma* with special reference to the *Miśrakābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra* of Dharmatrāta" in *Buddhist and Pali Studies in Honour of The Venerable Professor Kakkapalliye Anuruddha*, ed. Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti and Y. Karunadasa, Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong, 2009, pp. 285-298.
- 2 T. 1545, p. 1/b/25-29; Cf. T. 1547, p. 416/b/24-28; T. 1546, p. 1/c/27.
- 3 Same kind of explanation has been given by Buddhaghosa in his commentary on *Vinaya Piṭaka, Samantapāsādikā* (I, p. 21): *Vinayaṭṭhake viśesena adhiśīlasikkhā vuttā, Suttapiṭake adhicittasikkhā Abhidhammapiṭake adhipaññasikkhā.*
- 4 T.1545, p. 1/c/1-18; T. 1546, p. 2/a/1-13; T.1547, p. 417/c/1-9.
- 5 T. 1545, p. 1/c/18-25; T. 1546, p. 2/a/13-16. This explanation is not available in T. 1547.
- 6 T. 1545, p. 1/a/25-26
- 7 T. 1545, p. 1/c/27-29; T. 1546, p. 2/a/18-19; T. 1547, p. 416/b/28-29.
- 8 T. 1545, p. 2/a/1-4; T. 1546, p. 2/a/20-22. This explanation is not available in T. 1547.
- 9 T. 1545, p. 2/a/8-11; T. 1546, p. 2/a/22-24. This explanation is not available in T. 1547.
- 10 *Etāni hi tīṇi piṭakāni yathākkamaṃ āṇā-vohāra-paramattha desanā, yathāparādha-yathānuloma-yathādhammasāsanāni, saṃvarāsamvara-diṭṭhiviniveṭhana-nāmarūpa-paricchedakathā cā ti vuccanti. Aṭṭhasā. 1.52, p. 18; Samanta., I, p. 20; Sumaṅgala., I, p. 26.*
- 11 *Ettha hi Vinayaṭṭhake āṇārahena bhagavatā āṇābhūllato desitatta āṇādesanā, suttapiṭakam vohāra-kusalena bhagavatā vohārabhūllato desitatta vohāradesanā, abhidhammapiṭakam paramatthakusalena bhagavatā paramatthabhūllato desitatta paramatthadesanā. Aṭṭhasā. 1.52, p. 18; Samanta., I, p. 20-21.*
- 12 *Tathā paṭhamam ye te pacurāparādhaṃ sattā te yathāparādham ettha sāsītā ti yathāparādha sāsanaṃ, ... yathānuloma sāsanaṃ, ... yathādhamma sāsanaṃ ti vuccati. Aṭṭhasā. 1.52, p. 19; Samanta., I, p. 21; Sumaṅgala., I, p. 26.*
- 13 *Tathā paṭhamam ajjhācārapaṭṭhake saṃvarāsamvaro ettha kathito ti saṃvarāsamvarakathā; ... dvāsaṭṭhi-diṭṭhapiṭakabhūta ... diṭṭhiviniveṭhana kathā; ... rāgādiṭṭhapiṭakabhūta ... nāmarūpa-paricchedakathā ti vuccati. Aṭṭhasā. 1.52, p. 19; Samanta., I, p. 21; Sumaṅgala., I, p. 26-27*
- 14 *Yo vo Ānanda, mayā dhammo ca vinayo ca desito paññatto, so vo mamaccayena satthā. DN, II.3, p. 118.*
- 15 *.... handa mayaṃ āvuso dhammaṃ ca vinayaṃ ca saṅgāyāma. Cull., p. 406.*
- 16 *Dhammaṃ vinayaṃ satthu sāsanaṃ. Cull., p. 152; DN, II, p. 96; - ... Eso dhammo ... Eso vinayo, Etam satthu sāsanaṃ dhāreyyāsi Līnattha., II (DPE, vol. 8), p. 149.*
- 17 *.... sabbamevetam dhammo ca vinayo cāṭisaṃkhyāṃ gacchati. Tattha vinayaṭṭhake vinayo avasesaṃ buddhavacanaṃ dhammo; Samanta., I, p. 16.*
- 18 MN, III.3, p. 32.
- 19 *Mahāvagga, p. 69; DN, III, pp. 206, 236; MN, II, p. 160; AN, I.1, pp. 324-26; etc.*
- 20 *Tasmātiha, bhikkhave, ye vo mayā dhammā abhiññā desitā, seyyathidaṃ- cattāro satipaṭṭhānā, cattāro sammappadhānā ..., dve bhikkhū abhidhamme nānāvādā. MN, III.3, p. 32.*
- 21 *Abhidhamme 'ti viśiṭṭhadhamme, imesu sattaṭṭha bodhipakkhiya dhammesū 'ti attho. Papañca., III (DPE, vol. 18), p. 18.*
- 22 *Abhidhammo 'ti nāmarūpa paricchede vinetuṃ na paṭibalo ti attho. ... abhivinaye 'ti sakale vinayaṭṭhake vinetuṃ na paṭibalo' ti attho. Samanta., III, 1040.*
- 23 *Abhidhammo 'ti satta pakaraṇāni. abhivinayo 'ti khandhaka parivārā. Sumaṅgala., III, p. 395.*
- 24 Being related to the *cūla sīla* (small *sīla*) it is said *ābhisamācārika*. Expounding the *cūla sīla* (small *sīla*) it is called *ābhisamācārika dhammakittana*.
- 25 *Abhidhammo satta pakaraṇāni adhiko abhiviśiṭṭho ca pariyaṭṭidhammoti katvaā. abhivinayo khandhaka parivārā viśesato ābhisamācārika dhammakittanato. Līnattha., III (DPE, vol. 9), p. 238.*
- 26 *Abhidhamme abhivinaye 'ti abhidhammapiṭake ceva vinayaṭṭhake ca pāliwasena. Papañca., II (DPE, vol. 17), p. 132.*
- 27 *Idhāvuso sārīputta, dvebhikkhū abhidhammakathaṃ kathenti, te aññamānāṃ pañhaṃ pucchanti, aññamānāssa pañhaṃ puṭṭhā viśajjenti, no ca saṃsādentī, dhammī ca nesaṃ kathā pavattanti hotī. MN, I.32, pp. 266, 268; — ... māyasmā citto hatthisārīputto therānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ abhidhammakathaṃ kathentānaṃ antarantarā kathaṃ opātesī, ... AN, III.6-6-6, p. 101; see also Manoratha., III (DPE, vol. 43), p. 133.*
- 28 Cf. *Rathavināta sutta, Mahāvedalla sutta, Cūlavedalla sutta etc. .*

- 29 *Ābhidhammika dhammakathikasessa pākaṭaṃ*. Papanā, I.2 (DPE vol. 16), p. 153. *Ābhidhammikā bhikkhū yeva hi kira dhammakathikā nāma, avasesā dhammaṃ kathentā pi na dhammakathikā*. Aṭṭhasā., 1.72, p. 25.
- 30 *abhāvitā citta abhāvitā paññā abhidhammakathaṃ vedallakathaṃ kathenti kaṇha dhammaṃ okammamānā ne bujjhissanti*. AN, II.5.8.9, p. 366-
- 31 *Abhidhammakathaṃ ti sīlādī uttamadhamma kathaṃ. vedallakathaṃ ti veda paṭisaṃyuttaṃ nānamissaka kathaṃ*. Manoratha., III (DPE vol. 43), p. 37 .
- 32 *Abhidhammakathaṃ ti abhidhammamissikaṃ kathaṃ ti*. Manoratha, III (DPE vol. 43), p. 133.
- 33 *Cūlavedalla-mahāvedalla-sammādiṭṭhī-sakkapañha-saikhārabhājanīya-mahāpuṇṇamasuttādayo sabbepi vedam ca tuṭṭhīm ca laddhā laddhā pucchita suttanta vedallaṃ ti veditabbam*. Samanta., I, p. 26; Sumaṅgala., I, p. 33; Aṭṭhasā., 1.66, p. 23.
- 34 *Atthavasena gambhīrā mahāvedalla sutta sadisā Sāratthamañjūsā*, III (DPE vol. 46), p. 29.
- 35 *Kathaṃ aṅgavasena nava vidhaṃ? Sabbameva hidaṃ suttaṃ geyyaṃ veyyākaraṇaṃ gāthā udānaṃ itivuttakaṃ jātakam abbhutadhammaṃ vedallaṃ ti navappabhaṇaṃ hoti*. Samanta., I, p. 25; Sumaṅgala., I, p. 32; Aṭṭhasā., 1.66, p. 22.
- 36 MN, I, 44, p. 369.
- 37 *Etadaggaṃ, bhikkhave, mama sāvikānaṃ bhikkhunīnaṃ dhammakathikānaṃ yadidaṃ Dhammadinnā*. AN, I.1.14.5, p. 26.
- 38 E.g.- *Cūlakamma vibhaṅga sutta, Mahākamma vibhaṅga sutta, Saḷāyatana vibhaṅga sutta, Uddesa vibhaṅga sutta, Araṇa vibhaṅga sutta, Dhātu vibhaṅga sutta, Sacca vibhaṅga sutta*, etc. *suttas are collected in the Vibhaṅga vagga of Majjhima Nikāya*.
- 39 *sannipattitānaṃ vo, bhikkhave dvayaṃ karaṇīyaṃ dhammī vā kathā ariyo vā tuṭṭhībhāvo 'ti Udāna*, pp. 74, 98-99.
- 40 *Dhammikathāti catusaccadhammato anapetā kathā pavattinivatti paridīpanī dhammadesanā 'ti attho. Paramatthadīpanī (Udāna Aṭṭhakathā)*, (DPE vol. 52), p. 83.
- 41 *Na kho panetaṃ, bhikkhave, tumhākaṃ patirūpaṃ kulaputtānaṃ Rājakathaṃ, corakathaṃ, mahāmatthakathaṃ, bhayaṅkathaṃ, yuddhakathaṃ, ... iti bhavābhavakathaṃti vāti. Dasa yimāni, bhikkhave, kathāvattūni appicchakathā santuṭṭhikathā pavivekakathā asaṃsaggakathā viriyārambhakathā śīlakathā samādhikathā paññākathā vimuttikathā, vimuttiñāḍassanakathā dasa kathāvattūni*. AN, IV.10.7.9, p. 202.
- 42 *Dasa kathāvattu saṅkhātāpi hi dhammakathā tadekadesā evāti. Paramatthadīpanī (Udāna Aṭṭhakathā)*, (DPE vol. 52), p. 83. – *Dhammī vā kathāti dasa kathāvattu nissitā vā dhammikathā. Papanā, I.2 (DPE vol. 16), p. 73*.
- 43 *Dhammadharā, vinayadharā, mātikādharaṃ DN, II, p. 97; Mahāvagga*, pp. 120, 369; Cull, p. 421; Mūla, Vinaya., I, p. 259; II, pp. 59, 136-137.
- 44 *Tena pravrajya māṭṭhādhūta, anāgāmiphalaṃ sāksātṭkaṃ uttare ca paripreccanti sūtrasya vinayasya māṭṭhāyāh. tena tṛtīya piṭakamadhūtaṃ*. Divyā., p. 11.
- 45 *Madhupiṇḍika sutta (MN, I.2.8); Mahākaccāna bhaddekaratta sutta (MN, III.4.3); Uddesavibhaṅga sutta (MN, III.38); Saccavibhaṅga sutta (MN, III.4.11); Sevītabbāsevitabba sutta (MN, III.2.4); etc.*
- 46 *Ye te bhikkhū suttantikā suttantaṃ saṅgāyissanti. vinayadharā vinayaṃ vinicchinnissanti. dhammakathikā dhammaṃ sākacchissanti. Cull.*, p. 154.
- 47 Samanta., II, pp.479, 903.
- 48 *Ko tattha vinayo, ko tattha abhivāyāyo ti. Paññatti vinayo, vibhatti abhivāyāyo. Parivāra*, pp. 4, 13.

Sarvalokavipratyanīka

सर्वलोकविरुद्धश्रुत्यत्रयेवञ्चैवेति श्रुतः

Dharma Teachings Contrary to the Whole World

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I

Prologue

Ideas leave traces in material culture and in words. The traces of material artefacts are far older than those left by written words. For example, a splendid boar painted at least 45,500 years ago in a rock shelter in Sulawesi has recently been declared to be ‘the world’s oldest painting’,² whereas the earliest traces of writing in India are only about 2,300 years old (leaving aside the unsolved ‘Indus script’). Artefacts like cave paintings or megalithic alignments were conceived and crafted during prehistoric ages long before the advent of writing. Our attempts to decode (re-encode, re-code?) them are acts of the imagination informed by current modalities of anthropological and aesthetic speculation. As with ancient paintings, we can trace the passage of ideas through the remains they leave behind, in this case written words: but even though these are much younger, here as well the act of decoding, or reading, is an act of the interpretative spirit, a product of our human capacities.

In this essay I trace a phrase that maintained a noteworthy presence in Buddhist literary creations for centuries: the statement that the Buddha’s teaching is *sarvalokavipratyanīka* or *sarvalokavipratyanīya*—‘contrary to the entire world’. This small phrase has a big history: it caught on and was recycled across a range of texts in different contexts that brought out different nuances and meanings.³ What does *sarvalokavipratyanīka* mean? Does it mean that Gautama the Buddha was a contrarian? A dissident, a misfit? That he was out of step with the world, beyond the fringe? To answer these questions, if that is possible at all, we need to trace the history of the term in its literary contexts.

This essay is an effort to understand the term’s translation history into European languages. The texts in question have been translated several times over a long period: the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* from one hundred and seventy years ago, the *Sukhāvātīvyūha* since one hundred and forty years ago. Some of the important *dharmaparyāyas* were translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva (*Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, Shorter *Sukhāvātīvyūha*), and I feel that these and the Chinese renderings in general deserve the attention of specialists. Therefore I limit my investigation to versions preserved in Sanskrit and Tibetan, although, in a few cases, I quote translations from the Chinese

for historical or aesthetic reasons. I give examples of translations done to date from Sanskrit and Tibetan, starting from 1852.⁴ I tend to give longer passages rather than single phrases in order to give some idea of the broader contexts.

I became interested in the compound about forty years ago when I was reading through a long Mahāyāna *paripṛcchā* entitled *The Questions of Brahmā Viśeṣacintin*. The dialectics of the dialogues intrigued me, and I translated several passages. In one of these, the Awakened One and Brahmā Viśeṣacintin engage in a long discussion of abstruse topics. At one point, the Brahmā says:⁵

‘This Dharma, Fortunate One, is contrary to the entire world.’
 [Śākyamuni] ‘How, Brahmā, is it contrary to the entire world?’
 [Viśeṣacintin] ‘Fortunate One, it is like this: the world clings to truth, but this Dharma is neither true nor is it false. The world clings to *dharma* (righteousness, teaching), but this Dharma is neither *dharma* nor is it not *dharma*. The world clings to *nirvāṇa*, but in this Dharma there is neither *saṃsāra* nor *nirvāṇa*. The world clings to goodness (*kuśala*), but here there is neither good nor evil (*akuśala*). The world clings to happiness (*sukha*), but here there is neither happiness nor suffering (*duḥkha*). The world clings to the advent of a Buddha, but here no Buddha either appears or passes to *nirvāṇa*. The Dharma is indicated, but it is inexpressible; the Saṃgha is indicated, but it is uncompoundable (*asaṃskṛta*).⁶ For these reasons, this Dharma is contrary to the entire world.

‘O Fortunate One, it is like fire and water: they do not go together in the same place. It is the same with affliction (*kleśa*) and awakening (*bodhi*): affliction and awakening do not go together. What is the reason for this? The Tathāgata awakened to the unafflicted state. [Awakening] is taught, but it is intangible. It is realized, but it is not cognized. It is cultivated, but it is not a duality. It is experienced, but it is not obtained. It turns back on suffering, but it is not tranquility.

‘O Fortunate One, sons of good family or daughters of good family who are intent upon this particular *dharma* method (*dharmanaya*) become liberated from all modalities of views (*dṛṣṭigata*). They have paid worship to the Tathāgatas, they have done service of the Conquerors of the past (*pūrvajina*). They are nurtured by spiritual friends (*kalyāṇamitra-pariṅrṛta*). Because they have set the roots of goodness aglow,⁷ they are intent upon the exalted state.

‘Because they have performed appropriate actions, their behaviour is extremely appropriate. Because they uphold the lineage of the Buddhas (*buddhavaṃśa*), they belong to an honourable lineage.’⁸

What struck me in the passage was the compound that I have rendered here as ‘contrary to the entire world’. In the original languages the phrase is:

Sanskrit	<i>sarva-loka-vipratyanika / sarvalokavipratyanīya sarvalokavipratyanīyo dharma</i>
Tibetan	<i>’jig rten thams cad mi mthun pa</i>

II

Vipaccanika and *paccanika* in the *Āgama/Nikāyas*

Can we trace the compound *sarvalokavipratyanika* to the early Buddhist literature of the *Āgamas* and *Nikāyas*? I have not encountered it so far in the surviving portions of Sanskrit or Prakrit *Āgamas*. The components of the compound do, however, exist in Pali, but as far as I have seen, they are not combined in a comparable phrasal unit:

Sanskrit	<i>sarva-loka</i>	Pali	<i>sabba-loka</i>
Sanskrit	<i>vipratyanika</i>	Pali	<i>vipaccanika</i>
cf. also:			
Sanskrit	<i>pratyanika</i>	Pali	<i>paccanika</i>

The term *vipaccanika* with the meaning of opposition, opposite, opposed, contrary, is relatively frequent in canonical Pali literature. A classic example is *uju-vipaccanika*, directly opposite, directly opposed, used for statements or opinions (*vāda*, *diṭṭhi*):

DN 1 (*Brahmajāla-s*) I 1.15, *iti ha te ubho ācariyantevāsī aññamaññassa uju-vipaccanika-vādā bhagavantaṃ piṭṭhito piṭṭhito anubaddhā honti bhikkhu-saṃghaṃ ca*.⁹

MN 60 (*Apaṇṇaka-s*) I 401.29, *santi gahapatayo eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃdivādino evaṃdiṭṭhino ... tesam yeva kho gahapatayo samaṇabrāhmāṇam eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā ujuvipaccanikavādā te evam āhaṃsu ... 402.7 taṃ kim-maññatha gahapatayo nanu 'me samaṇabrāhmaṇā aññamaññassa ujuvipaccanika-vādā ti*

AN IV 95.4 *tass' ime dhamma aññam aññavipaccanikā gahitā*.

The term is found in other Pali texts including the *Jātaka* (IV 108.8: verse 43c plus comm., 108.13) and the *Abhidhamma* (*Puggalapaññatti* 20.13; *Vibhaṅga* 351.ult, 359.21, 371.13).

A cognate Pali word is *paccanika* + √*kr*, to contradict:

MN 56 (*Upāli-s*) I 378.29, *evāhaṃ bhagavantaṃ paccanikātabbaṃ amaññissam*

= DN 23 (*Pāvāsi-s*) II 352.12 (*evāhaṃ bhagavantaṃ kassapaṃ*) ...

The term becomes a name (or rather a nickname, specially tailored for this narrative?): a brahman at Sāvattihī, who, in the eponymous *Paccanika-sutta* goes to see Samaṇa Gotama with the idea, 'Whatever Samaṇa Gotama says, I will contradict him' (SN I 179).

Other references include: Ps II 67 sq.; SnA 288. 2. (in method) reverse, negative, opp. to *anuloma*. -*gāthā* SnA 39.

The *Abhidhānappadīpikāṭikā* comments as follows on *paccaniko*: *natthi etasmā iti upaddavo ti anīto, mitto, tappaṭipakkho paccanīto, so eva paccanīko*.¹⁰

The only place in which *paccanīka* occurs in close proximity with *sabbaloka* is a verse found in the the *Dvayatānupassanā-sutta* in the *Mahāvagga* of the *Suttanipāta* as well as in the *Salāyatanasamyutta* of the *Samyuttanikāya*.¹¹ The *Suttanipāta* version reads:¹²

*sukhan ti dittham ariyehi sakkāyass' uparodhanaṃ
paccanīkam idaṃ hoti sabbalokena passataṃ.*

K.R. Norman translates:¹³

The stopping of individual personality is seen by the noble ones as happiness. This [view] of those who see [properly] is contrary to [that held] by the whole world.

That the verse is ancient is suggested by the fact that it belongs to a set of verses that, in addition to being placed in the *Suttanipāta*, conclude a *sutta* in the *Salāyatanasamyutta* of the *Samyutta-nikāya*: that is, the verses should antedate the formation of the *Suttanipāta* and the *Salāyatanasamyutta* that we know today, and they would have circulated independently before entering in the wider collections. Bhikkhu Bodhi notes, however, that N.A. Jayawickrama 'regards [*Dvayatānupassanā-sutta*] as one of the youngest *suttas* in the [*Suttanipāta*]'.¹⁴

We see that there is plentiful evidence for the use of the term (*vi*)*paccanīka* in Pali. It is likely that it was an idiomatic usage current in the Buddha's time or that of the redaction of the oral texts. We do not have any comparable evidence for the Sanskrit or Prakrit *Āgamas* but, since these collections are preserved if at all in fragments, this does not mean a great deal. The term does occur in an early Sanskrit version of the *Caṅgisūtra* but it is only a small fragment: the word is broken and the context is not preserved.¹⁵ Outside of the *Āgamas*, the first-second century poet Mātrceṭa uses *pratyanīka* in the sense of 'opposite' to contrast purification and defilement (*vyavadāna* and *saṃkleśa*): 'conducive to purification, the opposite of defilement'.¹⁶ Here the Tibetan translation interprets *pratyanīka* as 'enemy', *dgra*.

III

To teach or not to teach?

Gautama's reflections in *Mahāvastu* and *Lalitavistara*

The full phrase *sarvalokavipratyanīka* occurs in two accounts that relate the newly awakened Gautama's inner reflections about what he has accomplished. The two works are the *Mahāvastu* and the *Lalitavistara*. Both are compiled in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit but they have different origins and redactional histories. The *Mahāvastu* is a section of the *Vinaya* of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādins; it is preserved in palm-leaf and paper manuscripts from the Kathmandu Valley. There are no Tibetan or Chinese translations. The *Lalitavistara* is a narrative of Śākyamuni's past lives and final human life up to his awakening and first teaching. It too is preserved in manuscripts

from the Kathmandu Valley, but in this case there are Chinese as well as Tibetan translations. The *Lalitavistara* was probably formed within a Mahāsāmghika or Mahāsāmghika-Lokottaravādin environment, and then adopted (repurposed, if that means anything) as a Mahāyāna text. Equivalents of the phrase *sarvalokavipratyanika* are not found in other extant Indic-language accounts of Gautama's post-awakening hesitations like those of the Theravādins (*Ariyapariyesana-sutta*) or Sarvāstivādins (*Catuṣpariṣat-sūtra*) and Mūlasarvāstivādins (*Samghabhedavastu*), or in the citation from an unnamed *sūtra* in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*.

The two works introduce this phrase into a key moment in the newly awakened Buddha's spiritual course: seated beneath the Bodhi-tree, Gautama reflects on his achievement and wonders whether or not he should teach. This well-known episode is related in any number of accounts stemming from the different traditions; those of the early *Vinayas* and *Nikāya/Āgamas* have been studied comparatively by Bareau, Nakamura, and others.¹⁷

III.1. *Mahāvastu*¹⁸

III.1.1. *Mahāvastu*: English translation from Sanskrit by J.J. Jones (1956)¹⁹

Then the Exalted One went on to the Goatherd's Banyan-tree, and while staying at the foot of the tree he reflected on the world. 'Profound', said he, 'is the dharma of mine to which I have awakened, abstruse, subtle, hard to understand, but no mere dialectic; it is intelligible only to the wise, and **repugnant to the world in general**.²⁰ But this race of men delights in the things to which it clings, rejoices and exults in them. And for a race of men which delights, rejoices and exults in the things to which it clings, this is a matter hard to understand, namely, what antecedent condition is, what cause is, and what the arising of all things from a cause; the renunciation of all substrates of rebirth, the break-up of sensorial states by the previous stilling of the *saṃskāras*, the destruction of craving, passionlessness, cessation, nirvana. And were I to teach the dharma to others and those others were not to understand, that would be a vexation for me. Let me then abide in silence on a mountain in the wilderness."

And on that occasion these verses were revealed to the Exalted One: –

*The Way up against the stream, profound and hard to see,
passion's slaves will fail to see it. Enough then of the thought
of preaching it.*

*With hard toil did I win it. Enough then of the thought of preaching
it. For men who are consumed by sensual desires are carried
down with the current.*

III.2. *Lalitavistara*²¹

Our compound occurs in *Adhyeṣaṇāparivarta*, Chapter XXV.

III.2.1. *Lalitavistara*: French translation from Tibetan by Philippe Édouard Foucaux (1883)²²

Bhikchous, le Tathāgata ayant eu une pensée de miséricorde, et décidé à s'occuper du monde des hommes et des Asouras, accorda par son silence (sa demande) au grand Brahma qui porte une touffe de cheveux.

Et le grand Brahma qui porte une touffe de cheveux, ayant connu le consentement du Tathāgata à son silence, répandit sur lui de la poudre de sandal divin et de la poudre d'aloès; puis rempli de la plus grande allégresse, il disparut en ce lieu même.

Ensuite, Bhikchous, le Tathāgata ayant fait naître le respect du monde pour la Loi, et le grand Brahma qui porte une touffe de cheveux, l'ayant exhorté à plusieurs reprises, le Tathāgata, afin de faire grandir la racine de la vertu et à cause de la profondeur de la Loi, s'en alla tout seul dans la solitude, et y étant resté dans la contemplation, il méditait ainsi dans son cœur: La Loi qui vient de moi est profonde, déliée, lumineuse, difficile à comprendre; elle échappe à l'examen, elle est hors de la portée du raisonnement, accessible (seulement) aux savants et aux sages; **elle est en opposition avec tous les mondes**, elle est difficile à apercevoir. Ayant abandonné toute individualité, apaisant toutes les idées, interrompant par la voie du calme, invisible en son essence de vide, ayant épuisé le désir, exempte de passion, empêchant (toute production de l'être), et conduisant au Nirvāṇa. Si, devenu Bouddha vraiment accompli, j'enseigne cette Loi, les autres ne la comprendront pas, et elle m'exposera à des insultes. Je resterai certainement ainsi dans mon peu de miséricorde. Telle fut sa pensée.

III.2.2. *Lalitavistara*: French translation from Sanskrit by Foucaux (1884)²³

Religieux, le Tathāgata consentit par son silence, ayant conçu de la miséricorde pour Brahmā qui porte une crête de cheveux réuni aux dieux et aux hommes et afin de s'occuper des affaires du monde.²⁴

Alors, le grand Brahmā qui porte une crête de cheveux ayant connu le consentement du Tathāgata à son silence, après l'avoir couvert de poudres divines de sandal et d'aloès, rempli de la plus grande allégresse, disparut en ce lieu même.

Alors, Religieux, afin de produire le respect du monde pour la loi, et par l'effet de la requête réitérée au Tathāgata du grand Brahmā qui porte une crête de cheveux, afin de faire croître la racine de la vertu et en considération de la grandeur extrêmement profonde de la loi, tel fut le raisonnement de l'esprit du Tathāgata retiré de nouveau tout seul dans la solitude et plongé dans la contemplation: Profonde, en vérité, est cette loi qui résulte de la qualité de Bouddha; elle est subtile, parfaite, difficile à comprendre, en dehors du raisonnement, hors du domaine du raisonnement, est faite pour être connue des savants et des sages, **est en désaccord avec tous les mondes**, difficile à voir, mettant tout reste de côté, apaisant toute idée, coupant court à toute passion, insaisissable par sa qualité d'être le Coṇya [*śūnya*]; détruisant le désir, sans passion, empêchant (la transmigration, c'est le) Nirvāṇa. Si j'enseignais cette loi, les autres ne la comprendraient pas, et ce serait pour moi le suprême préjudice. Il faut donc que je reste ainsi avec peu d'empressement.

III.2.3. *Lalitavistara*: translation from French into English by Gwendolyn Bays (1983)²⁵

O monks, in his concern for the welfare of the worlds of gods, men, and asuras, the Tathāgata consented with compassion to Brahmā's request by remaining silent.

The great Brahmā with his crown of hair, understanding the silent consent of the Tathāgata, sprinkled heavenly powders of sandalwood and aloes around the Tathāgata, and filled with great gladness, disappeared.

O monks, because of Brahmā's repeated requests, and because of the increasing respect for the Dharma in the world, the Tathāgata withdrew into solitude to consider the extremely profound greatness of the Dharma, and the increase in the root of virtue for the world. Deep within his contemplation, the Tathāgata reasoned thus: 'Profound indeed is the Dharma which as Buddha I possess; subtle, clear, and difficult to understand, it escapes analytical investigation. It lies outside the domain of reasoning; it is known by wise men and sages; **it does not accord with the worldly dharmas** and is difficult to see. It puts aside all the aggregates and calms every karmic inclination; it resolves everything by the path of calm abiding. It is imageless emptiness; it destroys desire and is free from desire. It is cessation, it is Nirvāṇa, the perfect and complete Buddhahood.

If I were to teach this Dharma, others would not understand it, and would make of it a mockery. So I am left with little sense of urgency to teach.

III.2.4. *Lalitavistara*: English translation from Sanskrit by Bijoy Goswami (2001)²⁶

Tathāgata consented through silence, O Bhikṣus, to Śikhin Brahmā out of compassion towards the world comprising gods and men, for their good.

The Śikhin Mahābrahmā, knowing the consent of Tathāgata through his silence, strewed divine sandal powder and *aguru* powder on Tathāgata, and disappeared from there with delighted heart.

Then, O Bhikṣus, this consideration occurred to Tathāgata, retired in solitude, for the production of respect towards the light of Dharma by the repeated request to Tathāgata for instruction from Śikhin Mahābrahmā, for the propagation of the good religion, producing the profundity of *Dharma*: 'This profound *Dharma* has been attained by me, which is subtle, perfect, difficult to grasp, beyond reason and argument, to be known by wise and learned men, **opposed to all the world**, difficult to be seen, devoid of all passion, with all obscurities removed, inconceivable because of voidness, the destruction of desire, dispassion, obstruction (of birth), *Nirvāṇa*. If I instruct this *Dharma*, others will not understand, and will have great aversion to me. Therefore, I will sojourn in scant interest.'

III.2.5. *Lalitavistara*: English translation from Tibetan by Dharmachakra Translation Committee (2013)²⁷

Monks, in order to show kindness to the world of gods, humans, and nonhumans, the Thus-Gone One looked upon this world with compassion and silently acquiesced to Great Top-Knotted Brahmā. Indeed, once Great Top-Knotted Brahmā understood that this Thus-Gone One had silently acquiesced, he anointed the Thus-Gone One with divine sandalwood powder and divine aloeswood powder, became joyful and ecstatic, and then vanished that very instant.

Monks, in order to engender respect for the Dharma in the world, in order to increase the root of virtue by having Great Top-Knotted Brahmā repeatedly request the Dharma, and because the Dharma is exceedingly profound, the Thus-Gone One once again went into the privacy of solitude and had the following thought:

This truth to which I awakened is profound, subtle, luminous, hard to comprehend, inconceivable, and beyond the intellect. Understood only by the clever and the wise, **it is out of step with all worldly people** and difficult to see. It is the abandonment of all aggregates, the cessation of all formations, a state of interruption through the path of tranquillity, and imperceptible like emptiness. It is the exhaustion of craving, and it is cessation free of desire. It is nirvāṇa. If I were to teach this truth, and if others did not comprehend it, this would be harmful to me. Thus I will most certainly continue to keep it to myself.

IV

Sarvalokavipratyayanīyo dharmo in *Vaitulya/Mahāyāna dharmaparyāyas*

When we step from the *Āgamas* to the world of the *Vaitulya* and *Mahāyāna* texts, we find not only that the compound *sarvalokavipratyayanīka* becomes more prominent and, perhaps, carries more ideological weight, but also that it does this in some of the most venerated *Vaipulya/Mahāyāna dharmaparyāyas*—the *Sukhāvātīvyūha*, the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāparamitā*, the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, and the *Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra*, as well in the *Sarvadharmāpravṛttinirdeśa*, and the *Adhyāśayasamcodana*.²⁸

It is difficult, perhaps futile, to attempt to assign even relative dates to Indian *Vaitulya/Mahāyāna* texts. I give them in the order listed above, which starts with what are perhaps the three oldest members of distinguished group.

IV.1. *Sukhāvātīvyūha*

As its title informs us, this short text is a *Vyūha*, an ‘array’ or ‘panorama’, an imaginative geography of Amitābha’s paradise.²⁹ The phrase comes at the end, in the *Vyūha*’s rhetorical apotheosis; it has woven the rich tapestry of Amitābha’s paradise before our very own eyes (or in terms of antiquity, it has diverted our ears with a recitative, a pleasing operetta), and now the focus shifts from Amitābha’s realm to Śākyamuni. Śākyamuni is in fact

the speaker throughout, addressing his oration to Śāriputra, his foremost disciple in wisdom. He reports that all the Buddhas praise his inconceivable virtues because he has performed such a difficult task, to teach the Dharma in the troublesome Saha world at the time of the five *kaṣāya*—turbidities, corruptions, or degenerations. This may be interpreted as an allusion to Gautama’s doubts beneath the Bodhi-tree. He then endorses the praise and repeats the hyperbole in the first person. Like certain other Vaitulya/Mahāyāna works, the *Sukhāvātī-vyūha* calls on different voices for inspirational and operatic effect.

The earliest description of the *Sukhāvātī-vyūha* in modern European scholarship is probably that given by Transylvanian savant Alexander Csoma de Kőrös (1784–1842) in his *Analysis of the mDo*, which appeared in 1826 at Calcutta as part of his path-breaking synoptic study of the Kanjur. Parisian scholar Léon Feer understood the importance of Csoma’s work and in 1881, fifty-five years later, published a French translation.³⁰ Csoma de Kőrös gives a succinct précis:

The third *sūtra* in this volume [*ja*, the seventh], entitled, in Sans. ‘*Sukhāvātī vyūha*,’ Tib. *Bde ba can gyi bkod pa*, is contained on seven leaves, from 306 to 313 [Csoma’s references are to the Narthang Kanjur kept at the Asiatic Society, Calcutta]. Contents—Śākya addressing Śāri’i bu [Śāriputra], gives a description of the happy mansion, or of the province of Amitābha, to the west, beyond an infinite number of other regions or provinces. The great happiness there, and mental illumination—no misery, no bad places of transmigration—the great abundance of all sort of precious things—tanks or reservoirs richly adorned with precious metals or stones—excellent birds.

Csoma then lists the names of the ‘sixteen principal disciples called *gnas brtan*’ [*sthavira*] and closes with the names of the translators, the veteran team Prajñāvarma, Sūrendra[bodhi], and Ye shes sde.

The extraordinary Central Asian scholar Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什 Jūmóluóshí, 344–413) translated the *Sukhāvātīvyūha* into Chinese in CE 402. Over two hundred years later, the celebrated translator and philosopher Xuanzang (玄奘 602–664) translated it again in 650. But Kumārajīva’s version became, and remains, the most popular of the two, used for quotidian chanting and spiritual benefits as well as for sermons and exegesis. One of the first translations of the Shorter Sūtra into a European language was done from this version by Samuel Beal (1825–1889) and published in 1871,³¹ and since then it has been translated and retranslated repeatedly as a living liturgical text.

In the *Sukhāvātīvyūha*, the phrase is *sarvalokavipratyayanīyo dharmo deśitaḥ*, in Tibetan ‘*jig rten thams cad dang mi mthun pa*’i chos bstan pa. The modern comparative study of the *Sukhāvātīvyūha* was initiated by formidable Indologist F. Max Müller (1823–1900) in the course of his search for Sanskrit

manuscripts in East Asia, starting with a paper that he read before the Royal Asiatic Society, London, in 1880 and published in the Society's *Journal* in the same year.³² The 'discovery' of the Sanskrit *Sukhāvatīvyūha* was his first success, located not in China but in Japan through the help of his Japanese students.³³ Müller's work inspired two translations into French, one a translation of his London publication by Léon-Joseph de Milloué (1842–1930), director of the Musée Guimet,³⁴ the other a translation of Kumārajīva's Chinese version by Izaizumi and Yamata; these were published together in volume II of *Annales du Musée Guimet* in 1881 in what was a florilège of Pure Land classics. Müller's paper was republished in his *Selected Essays* in 1881,³⁵ and he followed with the publication of an edition at Oxford in 1883 in *Anecdota Oxoniensia, Aryan Series*. Ten years later, in 1894, Müller's translations of both the long and short Amitābha *sūtras* were published along with Junjiro Takakusu's (1866–1945) translation of the so-titled '*Amitāyur-dhyāna-sūtra*' in volume 49 of the *Sacred Books of the East* series.³⁶ The last-named is the 佛說觀無量壽佛經 *Guan wuliangshufo jing*, for short the 'Visualization Sūtra', which is 'often cited in scholarship under the imaginary titles *Amitāyur-dhyāna-sūtra* or *Amitāyurbuddhānusmṛtisūtra*, and traditionally credited as translated by Kālayaśas between 424 and 442 CE'.³⁷ The Longer and Shorter *Sukhāvatīvyūhas* and the Visualization Sūtra are foundational to the Pure Land thought, practice, and culture of Japan. For the first time, the 'Three Pure Land Sūtras' became accessible in a European translation under a single cover, with scholarly introductions and apparatus.³⁸

These few years, starting in 1880, were bumper years for European Buddhist studies. In 1881, T.W. Rhys Davids founded the Pali Text Society in London 'to foster and promote the study of Pāli texts' and in France *Annales du Musée Guimet* (Volume II) published important materials related to the Shorter *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, including translations and texts, along with Léon Feer's *Analyse du Kandjour et du Tandjour*. This was a French translation of Csoma de Kőrös's work published over fifty years earlier; Feer followed this up in 1883 by publishing an independent collection of translations from the Kanjur, also in *Annales du Musée Guimet* (Volume V): this was *Fragments extraits du Kandjour*, 577 pages long, an independent collection of translations from the Kanjur that has never been surpassed by a single author in any European language.³⁹ In just a few years, Pali, Tibetan, and Pure Land studies were flourishing as never before.

The pioneering Pure Land studies were spearheaded by Oxford-based German Indologist Max Müller, who invited the Amida *sūtra* from the celestial provinces (to borrow a term from Csoma de Kőrös) into the quotidian world of modern comparative textual scholarship.⁴⁰ Even if Max Müller inspired this flurry of Pure Land publishing, the grand Orientalist did not in the least appreciate the *dharmaparyāya*'s message, an attitude that has been shared by at least some Western scholars up to the present day.⁴¹

IV.1.1. English translation from Sanskrit by Max Müller (1880)⁴²

And as I at present magnify here the inconceivable excellences of those blessed Buddhas, thus, O Śāriputra, do those blessed Buddhas magnify my own inconceivable excellences.

A very difficult work has been done by Śākyamuni, the sovereign of the Śākyas. Having obtained the transcendent true knowledge in this world Saha, he taught the **Law which all the world is reluctant to accept**, during this corruption of the present Kalpa, during this corruption of mankind, during this corruption of belief, during this corruption of life, during this corruption of passions.

This is even for me, O Śāriputra, an extremely difficult work that, having obtained the transcendent true knowledge in this world Saha, I taught the **Law which all the world is reluctant to accept**, during this corruption of mankind, of belief, of passion, of life, and of this present Kalpa.

IV.1.2. French translation of Kumārajīva's Chinese version by Imaizumi Yūsaka and Yamada Tadazumi (1881)⁴³

Sharipoutra, de même que j'exalte maintenant les bonnes qualités inconcevables (des Bouddhas), d'autres Bouddhas exaltent aussi mes bonnes qualités inconcevables et développent ces paroles: Sakyamouni-Bouddha en faisant les choses très difficiles et rares obtient Anouttara-Samyassambôdhi au milieu des cinq impuretés du monde de Saha: impureté de kalpa, impureté de perception, impureté de mauvaises passions, impureté des êtres, impureté de vie, et donne aux êtres les enseignements sur **les doctrines difficiles à croire dans tous les mondes**.

Sharipoutra, comprends bien! en faisant des choses difficiles au milieu des mondes coupables des cinq impuretés, j'ai obtenu Anouttara-Samyassambôdhi et je donne, pour tous les mondes, les enseignements sur **ces doctrines difficiles à croire**, ce qui est très difficile.

IV.1.3. French translation of Müller's English version by M. de Milloué (1881)⁴⁴

Et de même qu'ici en ce moment j'exalte les excellences inconcevables de ces saints Buddhas, de même, ô Śāriputra, ces saints Buddhas exaltent mes propres excellences inconcevables.

Śākyamuni, le monarque des Śākyas, a accompli une œuvre très difficile. Ayant acquis la véritable science transcendante dans ce monde Saha, il enseigne **la loi que tout l'univers refuse de recevoir**, pendant cette corruption du Kalpa actuel, pendant cette corruption de l'humanité, pendant cette corruption de croyance, pendant cette corruption des passions.

C'est même pour moi, ô Śāriputra, une œuvre extrêmement difficile, ayant obtenu la véritable science transcendante, d'enseigner **la loi que tout l'univers refuse de recevoir**, pendant cette corruption de l'humanité, de la croyance, de la passion et du Kalpa actuel.

IV.1.4. English Translation from Sanskrit by Luis Gòmez (1996)⁴⁵

In 1996, Luis Gòmez published *The Land of Bliss*, a study that he divided into two parts, one each for the Sanskrit and Chinese versions, each with an introduction and translation and other scholarly apparatus.

[Exhortation by All Buddhas: The Buddha's Task]

And, Shariputra, just as I at present here extol the inconceivable wondrous qualities of the other buddhas, blessed ones, so in the same manner, Shariputra, all those other buddhas, blessed ones, extol these inconceivable wondrous qualities of mine, saying: 'A most difficult task has been accomplished by the Blessed One, Shakyamuni, the Sage of the Shakyas, the Monarch of the Shakyas. After he awakened to unsurpassable, perfect, and full awakening in this Saha World, he taught a **Dharma that the whole world was reluctant to accept**, at a time when the cosmic age was in a period of decay, when living beings were in a period of decay, when views and opinions corrupted human beings, when the length of human life had declined, when the afflictions vitiated human beings.'

This was, even for me, Shariputra, a most difficult task, namely, that after I awakened to unsurpassable, perfect, and full awakening in this Saha World, I taught a **Dharma that the whole world was reluctant to accept**, at a time when living beings were in a period of decay, when views and opinions corrupted human beings, when the afflictions vitiated human beings, when length of human life had declined, when the cosmic age was in a period of decay.

IV.1.5. English Translation from Kumārajīva's Chinese by Luis Gòmez (1996)⁴⁶

[Exhortation by All the Buddhas: The Buddha's Task]

Shariputra, in the same way that I now praise the inconceivable virtues of all buddhas, all buddhas praise my inconceivable virtues, saying: 'Shakyamuni Buddhas has been able to accomplish this most difficult and marvelous task. In this Saha World, during this evil age plagued by the five corruptions—the corruption of the evil cosmic age, the corruption of views, the corruption of the afflictions, the corruption of living beings, and the corruption of the life span—he has attained unsurpassable, perfect awakening, and has preached, for the sake of living beings, **this Dharma that the whole world finds so difficult to believe in.**'

Shariputra, you should know that during this evil age plagued by the five corruptions I have carried out this difficult task. I have attained unsurpassable, perfect awakening, and I have, for the sake of living beings, preached **this Dharma that is so difficult to believe in.** This was a most difficult task.

Since 1871, *Sukhāvataīvyūhasūtra* has been translated many times into many languages, and indubitably it has become a world Buddhist classic.⁴⁷ Some of the different translations read:

Beal (after Chinese, p. 382):⁴⁸ ‘Law, difficult to be embraced by those for whom it is said’/ ‘Law, difficult to be believed, and this is that which is most difficult’

Cicuzza (after Sanskrit, p. 1188): ‘un Dharma che tutti gli uomini sono riluttanti ad accettare’

Ducor (after Chinese, p. 17): ‘cette Loi extrêmement difficile à croire dans tous les mondes.’

Eracle (after Chinese, p. 292):⁴⁹ ‘cette Loi qui, dans tous les mondes, est difficile à croire’

Gòmez (after Sanskrit, p. 21): ‘Dharma that the whole world was reluctant to accept’

Gòmez (after Chinese, p. 151): ‘Dharma that is so difficult to believe in’

Gòmez (after Tibetan): ‘Dharma that the whole world was reluctant to accept’⁵⁰

Hidas (after Tibetan, p. 100): ‘Dharma that goes against the ways of the world’

Imaizumi (after Chinese, p. 44), ‘O-Mi-To-King’, ‘ces doctrines difficiles à croire’

Inagaki (after Chinese, p. 359): ‘This teaching, which is the most difficult in the world to accept in faith’⁵¹

Müller (after Sanskrit, p. 102): ‘Law which all the world is reluctant to accept’

Müller (French translation of preceding Sanskrit, p. 22): ‘la loi que tout l’univers refuse de recevoir’

Red Pine (comparative, p. 18): ‘this teaching difficult to believe’

IV.2. *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*

In the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, the compound *sarvalokavipratyanika* is used twice in two different chapters.

IV.2.1. *Devaparivarta* (Chap. 15)

First, in the *Devaparivarta*, the phrase comes in a development of the theme of Gautama’s awakening and initial reluctance to teach; this seems to invoke the *Mahāvastu* and *Lalitavistara* passages cited above; it is impossible to determine whether there is any shared textual lineage although there is certainly a shared flow of ideas. The chapter opens with a discussion between Subhūti and the Bhagavat about newcomer bodhisatvas, which mentions at several points how difficult is the bodhisatva’s task. At the close of the chapter, Śakra and the gods of the sensual realm, along with Brahmā Sahāpati and the gods of the form realm, approach the Bhagavat and pay homage. Śakra remarks that when the Tathāgata was seated at the terrace of awakening just after his awakening, he understood the profundity of the Perfection of Wisdom, and he inclined towards inaction rather than teaching the Dharma. The Buddha affirms that such is the case, and Śakra and the deities all proclaim:⁵²

It is wonderful. O Lord, it is astonishing, O Well-Gone! As **contrary to the ways of the whole world** is this dharma demonstrated,—it teaches you not to seize upon dharmas, but the world is wont to grasp at anything.

Vainqueur transcendent, quelle étonnement! Allé en joie, quelle merveille ! Vainqueur transcendent, **cette vérité est enseignée**

comme contraire au monde entier. Vainqueur transcendent, alors que cette vérité est enseignée afin de ne saisir aucun phénomène, les mondains, eux, vivent dans la saisie.

The *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*'s prose is recast as two verses in the *Ratnaguṇasaṃcaya-gāthā*:⁵³

*gambhīra dharma ayu durdṛṣu nāyakānām na ca kena cīd adhigato
na ca prāpuṇāti |
etārtha bodhim adhigamya hitānukampī alpotsuko ka imu jñāsyati
sattvakāyo ||
sattvās ca ālayaratā viṣayābhilāṣī sthita āgrāhe abudhāyo muha-
andhabhūtāḥ |
dharmo anālayu anāgrāhu prāpitavyo lokena sārḍha ayu vighrahu
prādubhūto ||*

The verse version does not, however, use the adjective *vipratyanīka*, but substitutes the noun *vighraha*, 'conflict'. The translation by Edward Conze (1904–1979) reads:⁵⁴

Deep is this dharma of the Leaders, hard to see,
Nor is it attained by anyone, nor do they reach it.
For that reason, when he has obtained enlightenment,
the Benevolent and Compassionate
Becomes unconcerned, – 'what body of beings will cognize this?' [7]
For beings delight in a place to settle in, they are eager for sense-
objects,
Bent on grasping, unintelligent, and quite blinded.
The Dharma should be attained as noting to settle in and as nothing
to grasp.

Its conflict with the world is manifest. [8]

Tibetan master Tshong kha pa (1357–1419) paraphrases the verses with regard to the difficulty of understanding *śūnyatā*, emptiness. In his *Brief Exposition of the Main Points of the Graded Sutra and Tantra Courses to Enlightenment (Lam gyi rim pa mdo tsam du bstan pa)*, he writes:⁵⁵

It is said that this understanding of *śūnyatā* was difficult even for the direct disciples of Buddha when Śākyamuni Buddha himself was alive. According to the *Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā*, 'The teaching of the Buddhas is profound and difficult to see. No one has ever understood it and no one has ever attained its realisation without the help of a Guru, extensive study and meditational practice. Therefore after Śākyamuni Buddha, who had always performed virtuous actions out of compassion, had attained Full Enlightenment, he was concerned about who among all living beings would be able to understand it.

IV.2.2 Dharmodgata-parivarta (Chap. 31)

Chapter 31 centres around the figure of the lay bodhisatva and *dharmabhāṇaka* Dharmodgata, who delivers an 'Exposition on how Tathāgatas neither come nor go' (*tathāgatānām-anāgatyagamana-nirdeśa*). This is so momentous

that the great trichiliocosm responds, and Śakra and the Four Great Kings chime forth with praises of Dharmodgata's sermon:⁵⁶

When this disquisition on the fact that the Tathagatas neither come nor go had been taught, the earth and the entire great trichiliocosm shook in six ways, it stirred, quaked, was agitated, resounded and rumbled. And all the realms of Mara were stirred up and discomfited. All the grasses, shrubs, herbs and trees in the great trichiliocosm bent in the direction of the Bodhisattva Dharmodgata. Flowers came up out of season. From high up in the air a great rain of flowers came down. And *Shakra*, Chief of Gods, and the *Four Great Kings* scattered and poured heavenly sandalwood powder and heavenly flowers over the Bodhisattva Dharmodgata, and said: 'Well spoken, son of good family. Through your might we have heard a sermon which has issued from ultimate reality, **which is contrary to the whole world**, and which gives no ground to any of those beings who are established in any of the views which involve the assumption of an individuality, or who have settled down in any of the views which assume the existence of something that is not.'

In Driessens' French translation, this reads:⁵⁷

En outre, lorsque fut exposée cette absence d'allée et de venue des Aïns allés, un grand tremblement de terre se manifesta: cet univers d'un milliard de mondes fut ébranlé de six manières et selon dix-huit présages; voici: il fut agité, secoué, ébranlé, trembla, gronda, résonna, et tous les lieux du Démon furent bouleversés et soumis. Dans l'univers d'un milliard de mondes les herbes, plantes, arbustes et bois, autant qu'ils sont, tous s'inclinèrent du côté où se trouvait le Héros pour l'Eveil, le grand être Dharmodgata, des fleurs [épanouies] hors de saison se dispersèrent haut dans le ciel et une grande pluie de fleurs tomba. Le seigneur des dieux Shakra et les quatre Grands Rois dispersèrent, répandirent et éparpillèrent en direction du Héros pour l'Eveil, le grand être Dharmodgata et du Héros pour l'Eveil, le grand être Sadaprarudita de la poudre de santal céleste et des fleurs célestes en prononçant ces paroles: « Fils de la lignée, c'est bien, c'est bien. Fils de la lignée, par ta force nous aussi avons entendu aujourd'hui l'enseignement du discours issu de l'ultime **incompatible avec le monde entier** qui adhère à toutes les formes de vues, les êtres qui demeurent sur le plan de la vue relative à la collection destructible. »

IV.3. *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*/Lotus Sūtra⁵⁸

The compound occurs four times in three chapters of the *Lotus Sūtra*.

IV.3.1. *Nidāna-parivarta* (Chap. 1)

First is in the introductory chapter or setting (*nidāna*), which starts out with a succession of prodigies. The Buddha is seated in meditation, motionless and tranquil, on Vulture Peak, surrounded by the four assemblies. Divine flowers float down from the sky and blanket the gathering, and the earth shakes in six

ways. A ray issues forth from the tuft of hair between the Buddha's eyebrows and it beams over 18,000 Buddhafields. Maitreya asks Mañjuśrī what it means, and after an exchange of verses, Mañjuśrī explains what is going on.

IV.3.1.1. French translation from the Sanskrit by Burnouf (1852)⁵⁹

Ensuite Mañdjuçrī devenu Kumâra s'adressa ainsi au Bôdhisattva Mahâsattva Mâitrêya, et à l'assemblée tout entière des Bôdhisattvas: O fils de famille, l'intention du Tathâgata est de se livrer à une grande prédication où la loi soit proclamée, de faire tomber la grande pluie de la loi, de faire résonner les grandes timbales de la loi, de dresser le grand étendard de la loi, de faire brûler le grand fanal de la loi, d'enfler la grande conque de la loi, de battre le grand tambour de la loi. L'intention du Tathâgata, ô fils de famille, est de faire aujourd'hui une grande démonstration de la loi. C'est là ce qui me paraît être, ô fils de famille, et c'est ainsi que j'ai vu autrefois un pareil miracle accompli par les anciens Tathâgatas, vénérables parfaitement et complètement Buddhas. Ces anciens Tathâgatas vénérables, etc., ont aussi produit au dehors la lumière d'un semblable rayon; aussi est-ce par là que je reconnais que le Tathâgata désire se livrer à une grande prédication où la loi soit proclamée, qu'il désire qu'elle soit grandement entendue, puisqu'il vient de manifester un ancien miracle de cette espèce. Pourquoi cela? C'est que le Tathâgata vénérable, parfaitement et complètement Buddha, désire faire entendre **une exposition de la loi avec laquelle le monde entier doit être en désaccord**,⁶⁰ puisqu'il a produit un grand miracle de cette espèce, et cet ancien prodige qui est l'apparition et l'émission d'un rayon de lumière.

IV.3.1.2. English translation from the Sanskrit by Kern (1884)⁶¹

Whereupon Mañjusrī [Mañjuśrī] the prince royal, addressed Maitreya, the Bodhisattva Mahāsattva, and the whole assembly of Bodhisattvas (in these words): It is the intention of the Tathāgata, young men of good family, to begin a grand discourse for the teaching of the law, to pour the great rain of the law, to make resound the great drum of the law, to raise the great banner of the law, to kindle the great torch of the law, to blow the great conch trumpet of the law, and to strike the great tymbal of the law. Again, it is the intention of the Tathāgata, young men of good family, to make a grand exposition of the law this very day. Thus it appears to me, young men of good family, as I have witnessed a similar sign of the former Tathāgatas, the Arhats, the perfectly enlightened. Those former Tathāgatas, &c., they, too, emitted a lustrous ray, and I convinced that the Tathāgata is about to deliver a grand discourse for the teaching of law and make his grand speech on the law everywhere heard, he having shown such a fore-token. And because the Tathāgata, &c., wishes that **this Dharmaparyāya meeting opposition in all the world** be heard everywhere,⁶² therefore does he display so great a miracle and this fore-token consisting in the lustre occasioned by the emission of a ray.

IV.3.1.3. English translation from the Tibetan by Roberts (2021)⁶³

Then Mañjuśrī Kumārabhūta said to the bodhisattva mahāsattva Maitreya and the complete assembly of bodhisattvas, ‘Noble sons, the Tathāgata’s intention is to relate a great Dharma teaching.

‘Noble sons, the Tathāgata’s intention is to send down a great Dharma rain, to sound the great Dharma drum, to erect the great Dharma banner, to light the great Dharma lamp, to blow the great Dharma conch, and to beat the great Dharma bherī drum. Noble sons, that is the intention the Tathāgata has formed today.

‘Noble sons, from previous tathāgatas there has come illumination with a light ray like this, and I think that just as it was revealed to me, just as I have seen an omen of this kind in the past from previous tathāgatas, arhats, perfectly enlightened buddhas, this tathāgata, too, intends to give a great Dharma teaching, to make others hear a great Dharma teaching, and has therefore created such an omen. Why is that? The Tathāgata, the Arhat, the perfectly enlightened Buddha has revealed a miraculous omen of this kind, this illumination from a ray of light, because he intends to teach the **Dharma that is not in accord with the entire world.**

IV.3.1.4. French translation from Kumārajīva’s Chinese by Jean-Noël Robert (1997)⁶⁴

Alors Mañjuçrī s’adressa à l’être d’Éveil, au grand être Maitreya, ainsi qu’aux grands seigneurs:

Fils de bien, selon mon jugement, l’Éveillé Vénééré du Monde va à présent prêcher sa grande Loi, il va faire pleuvoir la pluie de la grande Loi, il va souffler la conque de la grande Loi, il va faire retentir le tambour de la grande Loi, il va exposer le sens de la grande Loi.

Ô fils de bien, j’ai déjà vu auprès des Éveillés du passé ces signes auspicious: après avoir émis une telle lumière, ils prêchaient la grande Loi. Sachez que si l’Éveillé a maintenant fait apparaître cette lumière, c’est qu’il en est de même: il va faire entendre et connaître à tous les êtres **une Loi incroyable pour l’ensemble des mondes.** C’est pour cela qu’il a fait apparaître ces signes auspicious.

IV.3.2. *Dharmabhāṇaka-parivarta* (Chapter 10)

In this chapter, the Buddha addresses *bodhisattva-mahāsattva* Bhaiṣajyarāja. Bhaiṣajyarāja is mentioned as part of the assembly at the start of the *sūtra*, and he is the addressee in this chapter, along with 80,000 other *bodhisattvas*.⁶⁵ In Chapter 22, in response to a question put by *bodhisattva-mahāsattva* Nakṣatrarājasaukusumitābhijñā, Śākyamuni relates Bhaiṣajyarāja’s spiritual antecedents or *pūrvayoga* (rendered by Kern as ‘ancient devotion’).

A past Buddha with the same name figures in the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* (see below) and in *Lalitavistara*.⁶⁶

IV.3.2.1. French translation from the Sanskrit by Burnouf (1852)⁶⁷

Je vais te parler, ô Bhâichadjyarâdja, je vais t'instruire. Oui, j'ai fait jadis de nombreuses expositions de la loi, j'en fais maintenant et j'en ferai encore dans l'avenir. De toutes ces expositions de la loi, celle que je fais aujourd'hui **ne doit pas recevoir l'assentiment du monde**; elle ne doit pas être accueillie par le monde avec foi. C'est là, ô Bhâichadjyarâdja, le grand secret de la contemplation des connaissances surnaturelles que possède le Tathâgata, secret gardé par la force du Tathâgata, et qui jusqu'à présent n'a pas été divulgué. Non, cette thèse n'a pas été exposée jusqu'à ce jour. Cette exposition de la loi, ô Bhâichadjyarâdja, est l'objet des mépris de beaucoup de gens, même pendant qu'existe en ce monde le Tathâgata; que sera-ce donc, quand il sera entré dans le Nirvâna complet?

IV.3.2.2. English translation from the Sanskrit by Kern (1884)⁶⁸

I announce to thee, Bhaishagyarâga [Bhaiṣajyarâja], I declare to thee, that many are the Dharmaparyâyas which I have propounded, am propounding, and shall propound. And among all those Dharmaparyâyas, Bhaishagyarâga, it is **this which is apt to meet with no acceptance with everybody**, to find no belief with everybody. This indeed, Bhaishagyarâga, is the transcendent spiritual esoteric lore of the law, preserved by the power of the Tathâgatas, but never divulged; it is an article (of creed) not yet made known. By the majority of people, Bhaishagyarâga, this Dharmaparyâya is rejected during the lifetime of the Tathâgata; in far higher degree such will be the case after his complete extinction.

IV.3.2.3. English translation from the Tibetan by Roberts (2021)⁶⁹

Bhaiṣajyarâja, I declare to you, I proclaim to you that I, Bhaiṣajyarâja, have given, am giving, and will give many Dharma teachings, but from among all those many Dharma teachings, Bhaiṣajyarâja, it is **this Dharma teaching that is unacceptable to the entire world**, and which will not be believed by the entire world.

Bhaiṣajyarâja, this is the great secret from the higher knowledge of the Tathâgata that has been kept through the power of the Tathâgata and has not previously been revealed, has not previously been told. Bhaiṣajyarâja, many beings will reject this Dharma teaching while the Tathâgata lives, let alone after the Tathâgata has passed into nirvâna.

IV.3.2.4. French translation from Kumârajîva's Chinese by Jean-Noël Robert (1997)⁷⁰

Parmi les innombrables millions de myriades de textes canoniques prêchés par moi dans le passé, le présent et l'avenir, *ce Livre du lotus de la Loi* est le plus difficile à croire, le plus difficile à comprendre. Roi des Remèdes, ce livre est le réceptacle des arcanes des Éveillés; il ne peut être distribué ni donné à la légère aux hommes. Sauvegardé par les Éveillés Vénérés du monde, jamais encore dans les temps

anciens il n'avait été révélé. Or ce livre canonique, alors même que l'Ainsi-Venu est présent en personne, est déjà en butte à mainte rancœur; à plus forte raison alors après son passage en Disparition.

IV.3.3. *Sukhavihāra-parivarta* (Chapter 13)

In this chapter we find two closely related instances of the term. The section starts with the wheel-turning king going to battle.

IV.3.3.1. French translation from the Sanskrit by Burnouf (1852)⁷¹

... et de même, ô Mañdjuçrî [Mañjuśrî] que ce joyau était pour le roi un bien qu'il a gardé longtemps, qui ne quittait pas son front; de même le Tathāgata aussi, vénérable, etc., ce grand roi de la loi, qui exerce avec justice l'empire de la loi dans les trois mondes, quand il voit des Çrāvakas et des Bôdhisattvas combattre contre le Mâra des conceptions, contre le Mâra de la corruption [du mal], quand il voit que ses soldats en combattant ont, par leur grand courage, détruit l'affection, la haine et l'erreur, qu'ils sont sortis des trois mondes, et ont anéanti tous les Mâras; alors le Tathāgata aussi, vénérable, etc. plein de contentement, fait également pour ces Āryas, qui sont ses soldats, cette exposition de la loi, **avec laquelle le monde entier doit être en désaccord**, à laquelle il ne doit pas croire, qui n'a jamais été prêchée ni expliquée auparavant. Le Tathāgata donne à tous les Çrāvakas la possession de l'omniscience, laquelle ressemble au grand joyau qui décore le diadème d'un roi. C'est là, ô Mañdjuçrî, le suprême enseignement des Tathāgatas; c'est là la dernière exposition de la loi des Tathāgatas. Entre toutes les expositions de la loi, c'est la plus profonde; c'est **une exposition avec laquelle le monde entier doit être en désaccord**. De même, ô Mañdjuçrî, que le roi Balatchakravartin, détachant de son diadème le joyau qu'il a gardé pendant longtemps, le donne à ses soldats, de même le Tathāgata explique aujourd'hui cette exposition de la loi, ce mystère de la loi qu'il a longtemps gardé, cette exposition qui est au-dessus de toutes les autres, et qui doit être connue des Tathāgatas.

IV.3.3.2. English translation from the Sanskrit by Kern (1884)⁷²

Just as in that case, Mañgusrî [Mañjuśrî], that king, ruler of armies, astonished at the great valour of his soldiers in battle gives them all his property, at last even his crown jewel, and just as that crown jewel has been kept by the king on his head to the last, so, Mañgusrî, the Tathāgata, the Arhat, &c., who as the great king of the law in the triple world exercises his sway with justice, when he sees disciples and Bodhisattvas fighting against the Māra of fancies or the Māra of sinful inclinations, and when he sees that by fighting they have destroyed affection, hatred, and infatuation, overcome the triple world and conquered all Māras is satisfied, and in his satisfaction he expounds to those noble (*ārya*) soldiers **this Dharmaparyāya which meets opposition in all the world**, the unbelief of all the world, a Dharmaparyāya never before preached, never before explained.

And the Tathāgata bestows on all disciples the noble crown jewel, that most exalted crown jewel which brings omniscience to all. For this, Mañgusrī, is the supreme preaching of the Tathāgatas; this is the last Dharmaparyāya of the Tathāgatas; this is the most profound discourse on the law, **a Dharmaparyāya meeting opposition in all the world**. In the same manner, Mañgusrī, as that king of righteousness and ruler of armies took off the crown jewel which he had kept so long a time and gave it (at last) to the soldiers, so Mañgusrī, the Tathāgata now reveals this long-kept mystery of the law exceeding all others, (the mystery) which must be known by the Tathāgatas.

IV.3.3.3. English translation from the Tibetan by Roberts (2021)⁷³

Mañjuśrī, just as that king keeps the crest jewel fixed upon his topknot for a long time, in the same way, Mañjuśrī, the Tathāgata, the Arhat, the perfectly enlightened Buddha, who is the great King of the Dharma, while he is the King of the Dharma sees the śrāvakas and bodhisattvas battling with the Māra of the skandhas or the Māra of the kleśas. When they battle with them, desire, anger, and ignorance cease, they escape from all three realms, and have the great strength of a great being who defeats all the māras. This pleases the Tathāgata, the Arhat, the perfectly awakened Buddha, who then teaches those ārya warriors this kind of Dharma teaching, which is contrary to the world, which is not believed in by the world, which has previously not been expounded, which has previously not been taught. The Tathāgata gives to the śrāvakas that which causes all to attain omniscience, which is like the great crest jewel.

Mañjuśrī, this is the supreme Dharma taught by the tathāgatas. This is the final Dharma teaching of the tathāgatas. Among all Dharma teachings this is the most profound Dharma teaching. **It does not accord with the world.**

Mañjuśrī, just as the balacakravartin king unties the crest jewel he had kept for a long time and gives it to the supreme warriors, likewise today the Tathāgata teaches the secret Dharma teaching of the Tathāgata that has been kept for a long time, which is at the crest of all Dharma teachings, and which is known by the Tathāgata.

IV.3.3.4. French translation from Kumārajīva's Chinese by Jean-Noël Robert (1997)⁷⁴

Mañjuçrī de même que le souverain de l'orbe, voyant parmi ses armées ceux qui sont de grand mérite, se réjouit en son cœur et que de cette perle incroyable, posée de longue date dans son chignon, qu'il ne donne pas inconsidérément, il fait à présent don, ainsi en est-il pour l'Ainsi-Venu. Il est le grand roi de la Loi dans les trois mondes, il enseigne et convertit par sa Loi l'ensemble des êtres. Voyant l'armée des sages et des saints combattre contre les démons des cinq agrégats, contre les démons des passions, contre les démons de la mort et s'y distinguer par de grands mérites, détruire les trois poisons, sortir des trois mondes, briser les filets du Malin, l'Ainsi-Venu

à ce moment se réjouit grandement lui aussi: ce *Livre du lotus de la Loi*, capable de faire accéder l'ensemble des êtres à l'omniscience, qui a de nombreux ennemis dans l'ensemble des mondes, **qui est difficilement croyable**, qu'il n'avait jamais exposé auparavant, il le leur prêche à présent.

Mañjuçrī, ce *Livre du lotus de la Loi* est la prédication primordiale des Ainsi-Venus; c'est la plus profonde des diverses prédications et il est donc donné en dernier lieu, comme ce souverain puissant qui a longtemps gardé sa perle limpide et en fait don à présent.

Mañjuçrī, ce *Livre du lotus de la Loi* est le réceptacle secret des Éveillés Ainsi-Venus, le plus haut des livres canoniques; au cours de la longue nuit des siècles, ils l'ont sauvegardé sans l'exposer inconsidérément. Aujourd'hui enfin il vous est dévoilé.

IV.4. *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* XII.10⁷⁵

Śākyamuni relates a story of the far distant past (*bhūtapūrvam*) during the time of Tathāgata Bhaiṣajyarāja to Śakra, Lord of the gods. The gods explain Dharma-worship to Prince Somachattrā⁷⁶ from the sky above and send him to learn about it from the Tathāgata of the age, Bhaiṣajyarāja. Bhaiṣajyarāja's definition of 'the worship of the Dharma' draws on the classical description of Śākyamuni's ruminations upon the nature of the Dharma that he has just discovered when he is seated on the terrace of awakening.

There have been several translations from Kumārajīva's Chinese, Étienne Lamotte described the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* as 'perhaps the crowning jewel of the Buddhist literature of the Great Vehicle'. This may or may not be so, but whatever the case, Lamotte's work on this *nirdeśa* is a crown jewel of European translation of Buddhist literature. In 1962, he produced a magisterial annotated French translation with seven appendixes, which was rendered into English by Sara Boin[-Webb] and published by the Pali Text Society (PTS), London, in 1976.⁷⁷ Lamotte's translation is based on the Tibetan Kanjur version; he compares in smaller print Xuanzang's and other Chinese versions. This and all other translations, from whatever language, were done long before a Sanskrit manuscript from the Potala was published alongside the Tibetan and Chinese translations in 2004.⁷⁸ To date there has been only a single new translation from the Sanskrit, that by Dragonetti and Tola cited below. First I cite Thurman's venerable English translation from the Tibetan.

IV.4.1. English translation from the Tibetan by Robert Thurman (1976)⁷⁹

Then, by the supernatural power of the Buddha Bhaiṣajyarāja, the gods spoke to him from the sky, 'Good man, the supreme worship is the Dharma-worship'.

Somachattrā asked them, 'What is this "Dharma-worship"?'

The gods replied, 'Good man, go to the Tathāgata Bhaiṣajyarāja, ask him about the "Dharma-worship", and he will explain it to you fully.'

Then, the prince Somachattrā went to the Lord Bhaiṣajyarāja, the saint, the Tathāgata, the insuperably, perfectly enlightened one, and having approached him, bowed down at his feet, circumambulated him to the right three times, and withdrew to one side. He then asked, ‘Lord, I have heard of a “Dharma-worship”, which surpasses all other worship. What is this “Dharma-worship”?’

The Tathāgata Bhaiṣajyarāja said, ‘Noble son, the Dharma-worship is that worship rendered to the discourses taught by the Tathāgata. These discourses are deep and profound in illumination. **They do not conform to the mundane** and are difficult to understand and difficult to see and difficult to realize. They are subtle, precise, and ultimately incomprehensible. As Scriptures, they are collected in the canon of the bodhisattvas, stamped with the insignia of the king of incantations and teachings. They reveal the irreversible wheel of Dharma, arising from the six transcendences, cleansed of any false notions. They are endowed with all the aids to enlightenment and embody the seven factors of enlightenment. They introduce living beings to the great compassion and teach them the great love. They eliminate all the convictions of the Māras, and they manifest relativity.

IV.4.2. Spanish translation from Sanskrit by Dragonetti and Tola (2018)⁸⁰

A él desde el cielo una divinidad por disposición de Buddha le dijo así: ‘La veneración al Dharma, oh buen hombre, es superior a toda veneración.

Él dijo así:

‘Y ¿cuál es esa veneración?’

La divinidad dijo:

‘Oh buen hombre, tú acercádate al Tathāgata Bhaiṣajyarāja, pregúntale:

‘¿Cuál es aquella veneración del Dharma? Él, oh Bhagavant, te explicará.’

Entonces, oh Rey de los Dioses, aquél príncipe Somacchatra se acercó, adonde se encontraba el Bhagavant Bhaiṣajyarāja, Tathāgata, Arhant, Perfectamente Iluminado. Habiéndose acercado, rindiendo homenaje con su cabeza a los pies de aquel Bhagavant, se quedó de pie a un lado. Y, parado de pie un lado, el príncipe Somacchatra, al Bhagavant Bhaiṣajyarāja, Tathāgata, le dijo esto:

‘Oh Bhagavant, se dice, ‘¡Veneración del Dharma!’ ‘¡Veneración del Dharma!’’. ¿Como es esa veneración del Dharma?’

El Bhagavant dijo:

Oh hijo de familia, la veneración del Dharma es la que es propia de los Sūtras dichos por el Tathāgata, que son profundos, que se manifiestan profundos, **que suscitan la oposición de todo el mundo**, difíciles de profundizar, difíciles de examinar, difíciles de recordar, sutiles, precisos, difíciles de captar, contenidos en el *Bodhisattva Piṭaka*, marcados por los sellos del rey de Dhāraṇīs y Sūtrāntas, reveladores de la Rueda de la Ley que no retrocede, surgidos de las Seis Pāramitās, conservadores de la acumulado, acomañantes de los Dharmas Auxiliares de la Iluminación, portadores de los Miembros

de la Iluminación, procuradores para los seres de la Gran Compasión, introductores de la Gran Benevolencia, despojados de los puntos de vista equivocados de Māra, reveladores de Surgimiento Condicionado ...

IV.5. *Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra*⁸¹

The *Suvarṇaprabhāsa* has an especially tangled translation history, into Chinese, Tibetan, Khotanese, and other languages: for this we benefit from the seminal works of dedicated scholars Johannes Nobel (1887–1960),⁸² Ronald E. Emmerick (1937–2001),⁸³ and Prods Oktor Skjaervø (Harvard University).⁸⁴

In Chapter 6, ‘On the Four Great Kings’, the Fortunate One and the Four Great Kings discuss the protocols and rituals that a ‘king of men’ should adopt if he wants to listen to the excellent *Suvarṇabhāsa*, King of Sūtras, and gain benefits and blessings like protection for his family, palace, and kingdom. The Buddha explains the attitudes that a monarch should adopt to welcome a preacher of the Law (*dharmabhāṇaka*) to his palace. Effectively, he should identify the Dharmabhāṇaka with the Buddha himself, a theme found in other texts as well.

The king should think, ‘Today Śākyamuni, the Tathāgata, Arhat, fully enlightened one, will enter my palace here. Today Śākyamuni, the Tathāgata, Arhat, fully enlightened one, in my palace here will enjoy his food. Today I will hear from Śākyamuni, the Tathāgata, Arhat, fully enlightened one, **the Law, which is unacceptable to the whole world ...**’⁸⁵

The compound *sarvalokavipratyanika* occurs in other texts such as the *Sarvadharmāpravṛttinirdeśa* and the *Adhyāśayasamcodana*. I hope to discuss these in a continuation of this article. The topic is broad: to trace all the usages and then comment on this single intriguing notion could easily turn into a monograph. A whole world of questions awaits us, and there remains much to do: there are commentaries to consult, and I do not doubt that more examples of the term remain to be found, especially in Chinese and Tibetan translations and even in Sanskrit. Beyond this—and beyond my range—there are the interpretations of the masters and scholars of the streams of thought and practice directly inspired by two of the texts, the *Sukhāvātīvyūha* and the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, in China, Korea, and Japan.

There are many topics to explore. How does the phrase *sarvalokavipratyanika* mesh with Buddhist ideas and definitions of *loka*, both in the earlier texts and in the developed cosmological literature? How does it relate to the Buddha’s celebrated statement: ‘Bhikkhus, I do not dispute with the world; rather, it is the world that disputes with me’?⁸⁶ How does it relate to ideas about *lokānuvartana*: that the Buddha adhered to the ways and norms of world, that even when he appeared to belong to the world, he was beyond

the world (*lokottara*)? Are the notions of *sarvalokavipratyanīka* and *lokānuvartana* contradictory or incompatible, or are they different levels of discourse that can be reconciled? To what degree do they refer to resistance, to difficulty in the reception of texts and their ideas, or fears of rejection? How do we situate *lokavipratyanīka* in relation to *lokasaṃvṛtti*? Does the phrase signify disjuncture between levels of teaching? Does it mean that the Buddha's ideas run counter to those of the world—an idea already seen in the *Dvayatānupassanā* and other texts?

One question that is difficult if not impossible to answer, is that of context. What does the statement *sarvalokavipratyanīka* respond to? What audience(s) can we presuppose, what questions, actual or perceived, do the passages that use the term address? Since we know little if anything about the social history of the *dharmaparyāyas*, where do we start? This brief study shows that the shorter *Sukhāvātīvyūha* and the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* share, and even highlight, certain notions such as the five *kaṣāya*,⁸⁷ and they share vocabulary with the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* like the description of the Dharma as *sarvalokavipratyanīka*, a phrase drawn from the description of the awakening that is known so far from only the *Mahāvastu* and the *Lalitavistara* versions. Both the *Sukhāvātīvyūha* and the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* make dramatic use of the 'long tongue of truth' of the Tathāgata.⁸⁸ Fujita concluded that these two texts originated in the Northwest during the Kuṣāṇa period. If I suggest that the use of the compound belongs to the age of the *dharmabhāṇakas*, does this tell us much? The *dharmabhāṇakas* are active in Vaitulya/Mahāyāna literature—including *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, *Suvarṇabhāṣottama*, and *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*—for more than a few centuries, but we know them as figures of the literary imagination with scarcely any socio-historical underpinnings, apart from a few inscriptions. There are many such intriguing intertextualities but study of a broader range of texts is needed before firm conclusions can be ventured.

The development of Vaitulya/Mahāyāna literature is characterized by a magnetism of ideas, with the result that the compositions abound in intertextual allusions and verbal-cum-ideational associations. The vision that inspired the architecture of the grandiose *dharmaparyāyas* belongs to a different order than that which produced the sober and systematic structures of the Abhidharma and scholastic literature. The thought world grew from different perfumings (*vāsanā*) of the human spirit that inevitably configured differing agendas and priorities; these were not necessarily incompatible but could also complement each other or generate new intellectual dynamisms. Although the Abhidhamma is without narrative, a grand narrative grew up around it, linking it in several ways to the narrative of the Vaipulya *dharmaparyāyas*. We may wonder whether in some cases the phrase *sarvalokavipratyanīka* raises questions not only of content and meaning but of presentation and packaging. The phrase singles out a distinctive and wondrous feature of Śakyamuni's Dharma: its unique quality of being 'contrary to the entire world'.

Appendix:

Tibetan text of passage from *The Questions of Brahmā Viśeṣacintin*

Excerpted from the *Exalted Great Vehicle Sūtra* entitled *Questions of Brahmā Viśeṣacintin*: *Ārya-Brahmaviśeṣacinti-paripṛcchā-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra* / 'phags pa tshangs pa khyad par sems kyis zhus pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo. Otani cat. no. 827, reprint vol. 33, mdo phu 23b1–106a1, excerpt = *Mdo, phu*, 41b4–42a6 (in the Derge Kanjur the passage begins at folio *mdo ba*, 40a5). The paripṛcchā, which is included in the list of *dharmaparyāyas* at *Mahāvīyutpatti* § 1367, was translated by the Indian *upādhyāyas* Śākyaprabha, Dharmapāla, and Jinamitra, and the master editor translators bhande Dharmatāśīla, with the proof-reader translators bande Devendrarakṣita, Kumārarakṣita, and others. See Hackett, *Catalogue of the Comparative Kangyur* (New York, 2012) § 178, for references to other Tshal pa Kanjurs.

bcom ldan 'das chos 'di ni 'jig rten thams cad dang mi mthun pa'o || bka' stsal pa | tshangs pa ji ltar 'jig rten thams cad dang mi mthun pa yin | gsol pa | bcom ldan 'das ji ltar 'jig rten ni bden pa la mngon par chags na | chos 'di ni bden pa yang ma lags | brdzun pa yang ma lags so || 'jig rten ni chos la mngon par chags na chos 'di ni chos kyang ma lags | chos ma lags pa'ang ma lags so || 'jig rten ni mya ngan las 'das pa la chags na | chos 'di la ni 'khor ba yang ma mchis | mya ngan las 'das pa yang ma mchis so || 'jig rten ni dge ba la mngon par chags na 'di la ni dge ba yang ma mchis | mi dge ba yang ma mchis so || 'jig rten ni bde ba la mngon par chags na 'di la ni bde ba yang ma mchis | sdug bsngal ba yang ma mchis so || 'jig rten ni sangs rgyas 'byung ba la mngon par chags na 'di la sangs rgyas 'byung ba yang ma mchis | mya ngan las 'das pa yang ma mchis so || chos bstan kyang de brjod du ma mchis pa'o || dge 'dun bstan kyang 'dus ma bgyis pa'o || de ni c'i slad du zhe na chos 'di ni 'jig rten thams cad dang mi mthun pa lags so ||

bcom ldan 'das 'di lta ste dper na | me dang chu 'am chu dang me'i gnas 'di ni mi 'thun pa'o || de bzhin du nyon mongs pa dang byang chub 'am | byang chub dang nyon mongs pa ni mi mthun pa'o || de ci'i slad du zhe na | nyon mongs pa ma mchis par de bzhin gshegs pas mngon par sangs rgyas so || bshad kyang snang ba'i gzugs ma lags | kun mkhyen kyang rnam par mkhyen ba ma mchis | bsgom kyang gnyis su ma bgyis | mngon du bgyis kyang thob pa ma mchis | mya ngan las bzlas kyang zhi ba yang ma mchis te |

bcom ldan 'das rigs kyi bu'am rigs kyi bu mo gang rnam chos kyi tshul gyi rnam pa 'di la mos pa de dag ni lta bar gyur pa thams cad las rnam par grol bar 'gyur ro || de bzhin gshegs pa la bsnyen bkur bgyis shing sngon gyi rgyal ba la lhag par bgyi ba bgyis pa lags so || de dag dge ba'i bshes gnyen gyis yongs su bzung ba lags so || de dag dge ba'i rtsa ba 'bar ba'i slad du rgya chen po la mos par 'gyur ro || de dag de bzhin gshegs pa'i mdzod 'chang ba'i slad du gter rab tu rnyed par 'gyur ro ||

de dag legs par bgyi ba'i las bgyid 'i slad du las kyi mtha' shin tu 'thun par 'gyur ro || de dag sangs rgyas kyi rigs 'dzin pa'i slad du rigs btsun par 'gyur ro ||

Notes

- 1 I thank Mattia Salvini and Eng Jin Ooi for their help with this essay. The header, reading *sarvalokavipratyayaṇīyo dharmo deśītaḥ* in Siddham letters, is from a *Sukhāvātīvyūha* manuscript preserved in Japan, reproduced from ‘Texte sanscrit du Soukhavati-vyouha-soutra’, *Annales du Musée Guimet* II, pp. 63–64. Graphic prepared by Eng Jin Ooi, January, 2021.
- 2 *The Guardian*, ‘World’s oldest known cave painting found in Indonesia’, 13 January 2021 (Agence France Press), accessed 15 January 2021: <https://www.theguardian.com/science/2021/jan/13/worlds-oldest-known-cave-painting-found-in-indonesia>.
- 3 In this study I use primary sources in Pali, Sanskrit, and Tibetan. The compound exists in Chinese translations, not only of the texts that I discuss here but assuredly in others. I do not know Chinese, and I hope that this facet of the term’s history will be taken up by interested specialists.
- 4 I generally retain, with a modicum of inconsistency, the original spellings of the sources—rather than smooth them for ‘modern’ readers, considering that the surface of the earth in Sukhāvātī is itself smooth. I have not included German translations, from a lack of familiarity with and access to the literature, or Italian works like *Sutra del Loto* (*Sutra del Loto*, introduzione di Francesco Sferra, traduzione dal sanscrito e note di Luciana Meazza, Milano, BUR Biblioteca Univ. Rizzoli, 2001).
- 5 For the Tibetan text see Appendix at end of article.
- 6 The *saṅgha* is related to the uncompound in several *sūtras*, including the *Vajracchedikā*.
- 7 *dge ba’i rtsa ba ’bar ba’i slad du: ’bar ba* is to blaze, blossom. I do not understand the phrase; one expects a verb meaning to plant, for example *avaropita*.
- 8 For the ‘lineage of the Buddhas’, see Peter Skilling, ‘How the Unborn was Born: The Riddle of Mahāyāna Origins’, in *Setting Out on the Great Way: Essays on Early Mahāyāna Buddhism*, edited by Paul Harrison, Sheffield: Equinox Publishing, 2018, pp. 33–71 (especially pp. 38–45).
- 9 Burnouf already noted this parallel from a Pali manuscript in 1852 (see below).
- 10 I thank Mattia Salvini for the reference (25.01.2021).
- 11 *Mahāvagga, Devadahavagga*, SN IV, p. 127.20, trans. Bhikkhu Bodhi, *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya*. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2000, Volume II, p. 1209. See nn. 140–143, especially 141, 142.
- 12 *Suttanipāta, Mahāvagga*, verse 761 = *Dvayātānupassanā-sutta*, verse 38. Cf. trans. by Bhikkhu Bodhi, *The Suttanipāta: An Ancient Collection of the Buddha’s Discourses together with its Commentaries*, Somerville, Mass.: Wisdom Publications, 2017, pp. 289–290. There are some variant readings between *Suttanipāta* and *Saṃyuttanikāya* but to assess their significance is difficult given that ‘current’ editions were done long ago and took into account only the very limited number of manuscripts that were accessible at the time.
- 13 K.R. Norman, *The Group of Discourses (Sutta-nipāta)*, Second edition, Oxford: The Pali Text Society, 2001, p. 101 and notes, p. 321. In his note, Norman quotes ‘Pj II 509.22–23 *paccanīkam idam hotī ti, paṭilomam idam dassanaṃ hoti*. We have to assume that *paccanīka* is constructed with the instrumental.’
The verse needs to be seen as part of the whole set (starting with the preceding prose, then vv. 759–765), a thematic unit which can be related to Gautama’s post-awakening reflections (see below).
- 14 Bodhi, *Suttanipāta*, p. 137.
- 15 *Manuscripts in the Schøyen Collection*, I (Oslo, 2000), p. 59.
- 16 Jens-Uwe Hartmann, ed., tr., *Das Varṇārhavarṇastotra des Mātṛceṭa* (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden XII). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987, 5:11c (p. 176) *vyavadānānukulaṃ ... saṃkleṣapratyanīkaṃ: nṃam par byaṅ ba’i rjes mthun la ... kun nas nyon mongs dgrar gyur la*.
- 17 For comparative studies of the extant versions of selected Vinaya schools, see André Bareau, *Recherches sur la biographie du Buddha dans les Sūtrapīṭaka et les Vinayapīṭaka anciens: de la quête de l’être à la conversion de Śāriputra et de Maudgalyāyana* (Publications de l’École française d’Extrême-Orient, vol. 53), Paris, École française d’Extrême-Orient, 1963, pp. 135–143; Hajime Nakamura, *Gotama Buddha: A Biography Based on the Most Reliable Texts*, translated by Gaynor Sekimori, Tokyo: Kosei, 2002, pp. 227–235. For an early translation from Chinese, see Samuel Beal, *The Romantic Legend of Śākya Buddha: A Translation of the Chinese Version of the Abhinīṣkramaṇasūtra*, [London: Trübner & Co., 1875] repr. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985, pp. 241–244.

- 18 Émile Senart, ed., *Le Mahāvastu*, Vol. III, [Paris, 1897] Repr. Tokyo: Meicho-Fukyū-Kai, 1977, pp. 313.ult–314.12; Katarzyna, Marciniak, ed., *The Mahāvastu: A New Edition*, vol. III (Bibliotheca Philologica et Philosophica Buddhica XIV, 1). Tokyo: The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhism Soka University, 2019, pp. 398.14–399.ult.
- 19 Trans. J.J. Jones, *The Mahāvastu*, III, London: The Pali Text Society, [1956] 1978, pp. 302–303.
- 20 Marciniak chooses the reading *sarvalokapratyanika* as per Mss Sa and Na (p. 399, n. 2), the oldest palm-leaf and oldest paper manuscripts, respectively. As she notes, however, a few lines down the mss. read ... *sarvalokavipratyaniko* (see p. 400.4).
- 21 *Lalita-vistara*, ed. by P.L. Vaidya (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, No. 1), Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1958, p. 257.5–15. First published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, edited by Rajendralal Mitra, 1877 (Repr. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 2004).
- 22 Ph. Éd. Foucaux, (trans.), *Rgya tch'er rol pa ou développement des jeux: L'histoire du Bouddha Çakya-Mount. Traduit sur la version tibétaine du Bkahlgyour, et revu sur l'original sanscrit (Lalitavistāra)*, Paris: L'Imprimé Nationale, 1883, pp. 367–368.
- 23 Ph. Éd. Foucaux, trans., *Le Lalitavistara: L'histoire traditionnelle de la vie du Bouddha Çakya-muni traduit du sanscrit*, Paris: [Leroux, 1884] repr. Les Deux Océans, 1998, p. 329.
- 24 Sanskrit *lokasyānugrahārtham anukampām upādāya*. I find the rendering misleading. The sense is more 'for the assistance of the world, out of sympathy': the other translations are all closer.
- 25 Gwendolyn Bays, *The Voice of the Buddha: The Beauty of Compassion*. 2 vols. (Tibetan Translation Series), Berkeley: Dharma Publishing, 1983, pp. 598–599.
- 26 Bijoya Goswami, *Lalitavistara: English Translation with Notes*, Kolkata: The Asiatic Society, 2001, p. 360.
- 27 Translation from Derge Kanjur as *The Noble Great Vehicle Sūtra 'The Play in Full'* by the Dharmachakra Translation Committee, 84000.co, accessed 9 January 2021.
- 28 For references to the Buddhist Sanskrit forms of the term collected prior to 1953, see Edgerton, BHSD, p. 493a.
- 29 For the textual history and a summary of the *sūtra* see Vincent Eltschinger, 'Pure Land Sūtras', in *Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism* (Leiden, 2015), pp. 220–221.
- 30 Alexander Csoma de Kőrös, 'Analysis of the Mdo', *Asiatic Researches*, Calcutta, vol. XX, p. 439; French version published by Léon Feer in *Annales du Musée Guimet* II, Paris, 1881, 'Analyse du Kandjour', pp. 245–246.
- 31 Samuel Beal, 'The Western Paradise', in *A Catena of Buddhist Scriptures from the Chinese*, [London, 1871] Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1989, pp. 378–383. The translation may have been previously published in JRAS or elsewhere. Beal's 'Brief Prefatory Remarks to the Translation of the Amitābha Sūtra from Chinese' (JRAS, N.S., Vol. II, No. 1, 1886, pp. 136–44), includes a translation of the Long Sūtra.
- 32 F. Max Müller, 'On Sanskrit Texts Discovered in Japan', *The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, New Series, Vol. XII, No. 2 (April, 1880), pp. 153–188; for the 1881 reprint, see n. 35.
- 33 See his remarks at *Anecdota Oxoniensia, Aryan Series*, Vol. I, Part II, *Sukhāvati-vyūha: Description of Sukhāvati, The Land of Bliss*, edited by F. Max Müller and Bunyiu Nanjio, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1883, pp. xiii–xiv.
- 34 French Orientalist Léon-Joseph de Milloué (1842–1930): he published the *Petit guide illustré au Musée Guimet* (Paris: E. Leroux, Paris, 1890) and works like *Le Brahmanisme* (1905), *Bod-Youl ou Tibet* (1906), *Bouddhisme* (1907) and translations from English on Buddhism like *Visites des Bouddhas dans l'île de Lanka* by Rev. G. Alwis (1880) and *Le Bouddhisme au Tibet* by Emil Schlagintweit (1881).
- 35 Friedrich Max Müller, *Selected Essays on Language, Mythology and Religion*, 2 vols., London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1881: Vol. II, pp. 313–371.
- 36 The *sūtra* has been translated several times since, most recently in a superb volume with a translation and study of the text by Jérôme Ducor and of the art history by Helen Loveday: *Le sūtra des contemplations du Buddha vie-infinie : Essai d'interprétation textuelle et iconographique* (Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, Sciences religieuses, volume 145), Turnhout: Brepols, 2011. For the textual history and analysis of the *sūtra* see Eltschinger, 'Pure Land Sūtras', pp. 221–223.
- 37 The *sūtra* is not known to have an Indian original and its origins have been, and continue to be, much debated. The widely used Sanskrit title, *Amitāyur-dhyāna-sūtra*, is a modern invention, apparently by Nanjō. Other titles have been proposed: see Ducor, *Le sūtra des contemplations du Buddha vie-infinie*, p. 115, n. 3. Paul Williams writes 'if it warrants a Sanskrit title at all [it]

- should probably more accurately (and significantly) be referred to as the **Amitāyurbuddhānusmṛti Sūtra**: *Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations*, Second edition, London: Routledge, 2009, p. 239. For the ‘Amitābha sūtras’ see Williams, pp. 238–243 and Eltschinger, ‘Pure Land Sūtras’, in *Brill’s Encyclopedia of Buddhism* (Leiden, 2015), pp. 210–230.
- 38 For remarks about the three *sūtras* by historian Gyōnen (1240–1321) in a work completed at Kyoto in 1311, see Mark L. Blum, *The Origins and Development of Pure Land Buddhism: A study and Translation of Gyōnen’s Jōdo Hōmon Genrushō*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 145–152.
- 39 Only recently has Feer’s output been surpassed by the online English-language Kanjur translations published by the 84000 project (84000.co).
- 40 I am happy to give excerpts from these translations which were originally published 140 years ago.
- 41 See Müller’s remarks beginning, ‘This Sūtra sounds to us, no doubt, very different from the original teaching of Buddha. And so it is...’: ‘On Sanskrit Texts Discovered in Japan’, pp. 174–176 (reprint, *Selected Essays*, Vol. II, pp. 363–367).
- 42 Müller, ‘On Sanskrit Texts Discovered in Japan’, p. 173 (reprint, *Selected Essays*, Vol. II, pp. 361–362). There are few if any differences between this and the Sacred Books of the East version and, understandably, that translated by de Milloué.
- 43 Y. Ymaizumi, ‘O-Mi-To-King’, ou Soukhavati-Vyouha-Soutra, d’après la version chinoise de Koumarajiva’, traduit du chinois par MM. Ymaizumi et Yamata, *Annales du Musée Guimet*, Tome II, Lyon: Imprimerie Pitrat Ainé, 1881, pp. 39–44 (quotation from p. 44).
- 44 F. Max Müller, ‘Textes sanscrits découverts au Japon, Lecture faite devant la « Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland », traduit de l’anglais par M. de Milloué, revu, corrigé et annoté par l’auteur’, *Annales du Musée Guimet* II, Lyon : Imprimerie Pitrat Ainé, 1881, pp. 1–37, with facsimile of Sanskrit manuscript in Siddham letters, pp. 45–64 (quotation from p. 22).
- 45 Luis O. Gómez, *The Land of Bliss – The Paradise of the Buddha of Measureless Light: Sanskrit and Chinese Versions of the Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtras* (Studies in Buddhist Traditions), Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press/Kyoto: Higashi Honganji Shinshū Ōtani-ha, 1996, pp. 21–22.
- 46 Gómez, *Land of Bliss*, p. 151.
- 47 For the textual history of the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* with a bibliography of editions, translations, and studies, including especially those in Japanese, see Fujita Kotatsu, *The Larger and Smaller Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtras*, Kyoto: Hozokan, 2011, pp. xxxvii–xliv, 194–200.
- 48 Samuel Beal, ‘The Western Paradise’, in *A Catena of Buddhist Scriptures from the Chinese*, [London, 1871] Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1989], pp. 378–383.
- 49 Jean Eracle, *Aux sources du Bouddhisme Mahāyāna: Trois sūtras et un Traité sur la Terre Pure*, Genève: Editions Aquarius, 1984.
- 50 Gómez, ‘Rebirth in the Land of Bliss’, pp. 67–68.
- 51 The same translation is given in the BDK English Tripiṭaka Series edition, p. 126.
- 52 *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* (BST) 152.7 *sarvalokavipratyanīko ’yaṃ dharmo deśyate*; translations from Conze, *Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines*, p. 192, followed by Georges Driessens, trans., *La noble perfection de sagesse en huit mille versets*, Marzens (Tarn): Editions Vajra Yogini, 2007, p. 276.
- 53 XV 7, 8, after Akira Yuyama (ed.), *Prajñā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā: Sanskrit recension A*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 59–60 (Tibetan text Recension A, or Tunhuang Recension, p. 173); see also E. Obermiller (ed.), *Prajñā Pāramitā-Ratna-Guṇa-Saṃcaya-Gāthā, Sanskrit & Tibetan Text*, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1997, pp. 58–59 [First edition Leningrad, 1937]. The verses correspond to *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* (BST) pp. 151–152, Conze trans. pp. 191–192, cited here.
- 54 Conze, Edward (transl.). *The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines & its Verse Summary*. Bolinas, California: Four Seasons Foundation, [1973] Second printing with corrections, 1975, p. 37.
- 55 Sherpa Tulku, Khamlung Tulku, Alexander Berzin, Jonathan Landaw, revised edition, in *A Short Biography and Letter of Je Tzong-k’a-pa*, prepared by the Translation Bureau of the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives at the Headquarters of H.H. the Dalai Lama, 1975, p. 61.
- 56 *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* (BST) 255.14, *sadhu sadhu kulaputra | tava kulaputra anubhāvena adyāmābhīḥ paramāthanirjātā kathā deśyamānā śrūtā sarvalokavipratyanīkā, yatrābhūmiḥ sarvasatkāyadr̥ṣṭipratīṣṭhānāṃ sarvāsaddr̥ṣṭyabhiniviṣṭānāṃ savānāṃ* ||. Translation after Conze, *Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines*, p. 293.
- 57 Driessens, pp. 452–453.

- 58 See 'Lotus Sūtra', by 'the editors', in *Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism* (Vol. I, Leiden, 2015), pp. 144–157.
- 59 Eugène Burnouf, trans., *Le Lotus de la bonne loi*, Paris: Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient Adrien Maisonneuve, 1989, pp. 10–11.
- 60 SP BST 11.11 = KN 17.5 *sarvalokavipratyanīyadharmaparyāyaṃ śrāvītukāmas tathāgato*: See Burnouf p. 323, Burnouf expresses his dissatisfaction with this translation, writing: '**Avec laquelle le monde entier doit être en désaccord.**] L'expression que j'interprétais ainsi est *sarvalōka vipratyanīyaka* ; je pense aujourd'hui qu'il est plus exact de dire, « avec laquelle le monde entier est en désaccord. » Le sens fondamental de cet adjectif est confirmé par la version tibétaine, qui rend *vipratyanīyaka* par *mithun-pa*, « accord, concorde, » précédé de la négative *mi*, de cette manière *mi mithun-pa*, « qui est en désaccord. » Le même mot, sauf le préfixe *vi*, remplacé par l'*a* négatif, et la suppression de la syllabe *ya*, se trouve sous la forme de *apratyanīka*, que je traduis par « qui est un objet d'aversion. » C'est de cette dernière forme que vient le terme pāli *vipatchchanika*, que je trouve dans un passage du Brahmadjāla sūtra, où il ne peut avoir d'autre sens que celui de *contradictoire*, *hostile*. Au commencement de ce traité, le Brāhmane Suppiya (Supriya) et son disciple Brahmādatta sont représentés l'un attaquant, l'autre défendant le Buddha, ce que le texte résume ainsi: *Itiha te ubhō ātchhariyantēvāsī aññamaññassa udjuvipatchchanikavādā bhagavantaṃ piṭṭhitō piṭṭhitō anubaddhā hōnti*. « C'est ainsi que tous les deux, le maître et le disciple, ils marchaient sur les pas de Bhagavat, disputant entre eux avec des discours, les uns justes, les autres hostiles. » Des deux formes *vipratyanīyaka* et *apratyanīka*, c'est la seconde qui est la plus fréquemment employée; elle a de plus l'avantage de trouver son analogue dans le pāli *vipatchchanika*.
- 61 *The Saddharma-Pundarīka or The Lotus of the True Law*, translated by Hendrik Kern (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 21), [Oxford University Press, 1884] Repr. Delhi: Motilal Barnarsidass, 1965, pp. 16–17.
- 62 Kern trans. p. 17: see his fn. 2, which is off the mark on several points, and seems to misunderstand the import of Burnouf's note, pp. 323–324.
- 63 Translated by Peter Alan Roberts, *The Mahāyāna Sūtra 'The White Lotus of the Good Dharma'*, 84000.co, 2018, accessed 21 January 2021.
- 64 Jean-Noël Robert, transl. *Le Sūtra du Lotus, suivi du Livre des sens innombrables et du Livre de la contemplation de Sage-Universel*. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1997, pp. 57–58.
- 65 Apart from a brief response to a rhetorical question at the start, Bhaiṣajyarāja is a silent and passive listener.
- 66 For these and other *bodhisatva* names with the element *bhaiṣajya*, see BHSD, p. 412. See Lamotte's n. 11 in *The Teaching of Vimalakīrti*, rendered into English by Sara Boin, London, 1976, p. 256.
- 67 Burnouf, *Le Lotus de la bonne loi*, p. 140.
- 68 Kern, *The Saddharma-Pundarīka or The Lotus of the True Law*, p. 219.
- 69 Translated by Peter Alan Roberts, *The Mahāyāna Sūtra 'The White Lotus of the Good Dharma'*, 84000.co, 2018, accessed 21 January 2021.
- 70 Jean-Noël Robert, *Le Sūtra du Lotus*, p. 215.
- 71 Burnouf, *Le Lotus de la bonne loi*, pp. 176–177.
- 72 Kern, *Saddharma-Pundarīka or The Lotus of the True Law*, pp. 275–276.
- 73 Translated by Peter Alan Roberts, *The Mahāyāna Sūtra 'The White Lotus of the Good Dharma'*, 84000.co, 2018, accessed 21 January 2021.
- 74 Jean-Noël Robert, *Le Sūtra du Lotus*, pp. 260–261.
- 75 See Rafal Felbur, 'Vimalakīrtinirdeśa', in *Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism* (Leiden, 2015), pp. 274–282.
- 76 *Rgyal po zla gdugs: somacchatra rājakumāra* in the manuscript. Thurman translated this *nirdeśa* nearly thirty years before the Sanskrit was published in 2004. The Tibetan word for moon, *zla ba*, can stand for either Sanskrit *soma* or *candra*; without any manuscripts to help him, Thurman chose *candra* to make Candrachattrā. Now that we know the correct form, the name should be corrected to Somachattrā as in the Sanskrit manuscript.
- 77 Etienne Lamotte, trans., *L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti (Vimalakīrtinirdeśa)*, Louvain: Publications Universitaires, Université de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste; Bibliothèque du Muséon, 1962; idem, *The Teaching of Vimalakīrti (Vimalakīrtinirdeśa)*, rendered into English by Sara Boin, London: The Pali Text Society, 1976.
- It is a curious that the English translations of three of the texts studied here—*Mahāvastu*, *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, and *Suvarṇabhāsottama*—have been published by the PTS.

- 78 *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa: Transliterated Sanskrit Text Collated with Tibetan and Chinese Translations*, edited by Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature, The Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism, Taisho University, Tokyo, Taisho University Press, 2004.
- 79 Robert A.F. Thurman, trans., *The Holy Teaching of Vimalakīrti, A Mahāyāna Scripture*, University Park: The Penn State University Press, 1976, p. 98. This translation is now available electronically on 84000.co.
- 80 Carmen Dragonetti y Fernando Tola, *Vimalakīrtinirdeśha, La Enseñanza de Vimalakīrti*, Buenos Aires : Fundación Instituto de Estudios Buddhistas FIEB, 2018, p. 262.
- 81 See Natalie Gummer, 'Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra', in *Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism* (Leiden, 2015), pp. 249–260.
- 82 Johannes Nobel (ed.), *Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra: Das Goldglanz-Sūtra, ein Sanskrit Text des Mahāyāna-Buddhismus*, Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1937 and other volumes.
- 83 R.E. Emmerick, *The Sūtra of Golden Light, Being a translation of the Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra*, Oxford: The Pali Text Society, first edition 1970, second revised edition 1990, third revised edition, 1996.
- 84 Prods Oktor Skjaervø, *This Most Excellent Shine of Gold, King of Kings of Sutras: the Khotanese Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra*, 2 vols., [Cambridge, Mass.] Harvard University, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 2004.
- 85 Johannes Nobel (ed.), *Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra: Das Goldglanz-Sūtra, ein Sanskrit Text des Mahāyāna-Buddhismus*, Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1937, p. 81.6 *adyāhaṃ śākyamunes tathāgatasyārhatāḥ samyaksambuddhasya sarvalokavipratyanīkaṃ dharmam śroṣyāmi*; Tib. from Skjaervø, I, p. 126, *deng bdag gis de bzin gshegs pa dgra bcom pa yangs dag par rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas śākya thub pa'i chos 'jig rten thams cad dang mi 'thun pa myan par bya'o*; English translation by E. Emmerick, *The Sūtra of Golden Light*, third revised edition, 1996, pp. 32–33. Cf. also the French translation by Christian Charrier, *Le Discours du Grande Véhicule La Suprême Lumière d'Or, Roi du Recueil des Soutras*, Marzens, France: Éditions Vajra Yogini, 2007, p. 55, 'la Doctrine de Shakyamouni ... qui n'a pas sa pareille dans le monde entier', which seems to miss the point. For an abridged translation of Yijing's version of the chapter from Taishō 665 by Daniel Stevenson, see 'A Scripture that Protects Kings', in *Buddhist Scriptures*, edited by Donald S. Lopez, Jr., London: Penguin Books, 2004, pp. 37–45.
- 86 The Pali *locus classicus* for the passage is found in the *Khandha-saṃyutta* of the *Saṃyutta-nikāya*: SN III, pp. 138–140, trans. Bodhi, *Connected Discourses*, p. 949
- 87 BHSD, q.v. Pali *kasāya* does not go much beyond literal usages: see PTSD p. 201 q.v.
- 88 See Peter Skilling, 'The *tathāgata* and the long tongue of truth: The authority of the Buddha in *sūtra* and narrative literature', in *Scriptural Authority, Reason, and Action*, edited by Vincent Eltschinger and Helmut Krasser (Proceedings of a Panel at the 14th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto, September 1st–5th, 2009), Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press (AASP), 2013, pp. 1–47.

Conjoining Meditative Appeasing and Meditative Watching for the Attainment Arahatsip

G.A. SOMARATNE

Introduction

The discourses of the Buddha and the Theravāda texts clearly recognise the indispensability of the practice of both meditative appeasing (*samatha*) and meditative watching (*vipassanā*) for the attainment of liberation from suffering and its psychosomatic and epistemic configurations of craving and ignorance, by attaining liberation of mind (*cetovimutti*) and liberation by wisdom (*paññāvimutti*). However, they show that the Buddha, by taking into consideration some factors as the character types of the practitioners, has recommended four efficacious ways of combining the two techniques. Therefore, the combining the two techniques in actual practice lacks clarity, and hence it has become a topic of contention. This essay therefore intends to examine the two techniques and their ways of combining as presented in the Pāli discourses and the Theravāda tradition, giving a special focus to the *Yuganaddha Sutta* (AN 4.170; AN II 157) which not only identifies four methods of joining the two techniques but also serves as the basis for the Theravāda interpretation of the issue.

The Significance of the Two Schemes

The discourses expect Buddhist followers practise both meditative appeasing and meditative watching. They define Arahats as one who dwells having here and now realized with his own penetrative knowledge liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom (*cetovimuttiṃ paññāvimuttiṃ diṭṭheva dhamme sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā*), implying that they have practised both, as liberation of mind is to be achieved by removing lust (*rāga*) by practising meditative appeasing and liberation by wisdom is to be achieved by removing ignorance (*avijjā*) by practising meditative watching. The short text AN 2.31 (AN I 61), for example, states that meditative appeasing is the technique for removing lust and that meditative watching is the technique for removing ignorance. It recognises two lines: one by linking meditative appeasing, development of mind, elimination of lust (*rāgavirāga*), and liberation of mind; and the other by linking meditative watching, development of wisdom, elimination of ignorance, and liberation by wisdom. For convenience, I identify the first, as the psychosomatic line and the other as the epistemic line.

Monastics, two things are conducive to liberating knowledge. What two? Meditative appeasing and meditative watching. If meditative appeasing is developed, what profit does it bring? Mind becomes

developed. And what is the profit of a developed mind? All lust is abandoned. If meditative watching is developed, what profit does it bring? Wisdom becomes developed. And what is the profit of developed wisdom? All ignorance is abandoned. And mind defiled by lust is not liberated; and wisdom defiled by ignorance cannot be developed. Thus, monastics, through the fading away of lust there is liberation of mind; and through the fading away of ignorance there is liberation by wisdom.

deveme... dhammā vijjābhāgiyā, katame dve? samatho ca vipassanā ca. samatho... bhāvito kamatthaṃ anubhoti? cittaṃ bhāvīyati. cittaṃ bhāvitaṃ kamatthaṃ anubhoti? yo rāgo so pahīyati. vipassanā... bhāvitaṃ kamatthaṃ anubhoti? paññā bhāvīyati. paññā bhāvitaṃ kamatthaṃ anubhoti? yā avijjā sā pahīyati. rāgūpakkiliṭṭhaṃ vā... cittaṃ na vimuccati. avijjūpakkiliṭṭhaṃ vā paññā na bhāvīyati. iti kho... rāgavirāgā cetovimutti avijjāvirāgā paññāvimuttīti.

In addition, the *Saṅgīti Sutta* (DN 33; DN III 213) too classifies meditation into meditative appeasing and meditative watching (*samatho ca vipassana ca*). The *Samathavipassanā Sutta* (SN 43.2; SN IV 359-60) introduces the two meditations as the path conducive to the attainment of the unconfigured (*asaṅkhatagāmīmaggo*), meaning that the conjoint practice of the two techniques is conducive to producing the Arahāt, the Buddhist saint, one who has reached the unconfigured, the destruction of lust, hatred, and delusion (*yo rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo idaṃ vuccati asaṅkhatam*). In the *Mahāvaccagotta Sutta* (MN 73; MN I 494), the Buddha advises the monastic Vacchagotta who has fulfilled the higher training, to practise the two meditations, introducing them as those which lead to here and now penetration of the multiplicity of elements (*anekadhātupaṭivedhāya*), referring to the six penetrative knowledges (*chaḷabhiññā*) that includes the taintless liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom as the sixth. This implies that the practice of the two meditations can produce Arahats with six penetrative knowledges. If so, it should also be able to produce Arahats with three penetrative knowledges (*tevijjā*) and Arahats who are liberated by wisdom (*paññāvimutta*). Actually, the discourse informs that Venerable Vacchagotta became an Arahāt with three penetrative knowledges. In addition, the *Dasuttara Sutta* (DN 34; DN III 273) introduces the two meditations as two meditative schemes to be developed (*dve dhammā bhāvetabbā*) by the Buddhist practitioners.

The discourses show that even though each of these two meditative schemes constitutes its own preliminary and advanced levels of practice, for practising them leading to witness the extinguishment (*nibbāna*) of the fires of lust, hatred, and delusion, each scheme must support the other scheme. However, they point out, for the development of the two meditative schemes, the practitioners must fulfil some preliminary training in virtuous conduct (*sīla*). In the case of the lay follower Vacchagotta, for example, the instructions for the practise of the two meditations were offered only after his completion of the preliminary training as a practitioner in the Buddhist monastic community (MN 73).

In a more general sense, we could draw from the discourses that one undertakes meditative appeasing to remove lust and meditative watching to remove ignorance. However, the removal of lust, without the removal of ignorance, would be temporary. In manifold ways lust is operative in full force in men and women. Lust constitutes lust for sensuality, lust for existence and continuity, and lust for the form and the formless states. All forms of lust are conditioned by ignorance, the inability to see things in oneself and in the external world as they really are. The removal of ignorance is possible only by right understanding of oneself and the world as they truly are. One reaches right understanding and subsequent removal of ignorance by undertaking the practice of meditative watching with reference to oneself and the external world by taking the five aggregates subject to grasping and the objects in the external world as meditation subjects (*kammaṭṭhāna*). Removal of ignorance stands for the removal of both ignorance and lust irreversibly.

As the discourses show, the Buddhist practice is a practitioner-centered undertaking. The practitioners are to undertake the path tiers, moving forward in stages, considering their present standing in the path, character type, and the progress made so far, if there is any; hence it is known as a gradual and progressive path. The nature of the path allows for some to commence the practice with meditative appeasing; and for others, with meditative watching. By the time one reaches the ultimate extinguishment, however, one must have practised both meditative schemes and have understood rightly the true nature of things, ‘self’ and the world, as they really are as impermanent (subject to arising and ceasing), full of suffering, and selfless. To practise meditative watching proper, however, one must possess a higher level of concentration, whether that concentration comes from the practice of meditative appeasing or of any other way is irrelevant. One can reach this required level of concentration for the practice of meditative watching even by practising meditative watching itself at a preliminary level. It is normally understood, however, that one obtains the required level of concentration for the practice of meditative watching by means of practising meditative appeasing.

In both these meditative schemes one deals with the same type of configurations (*saṅkhārā*). In meditative appeasing, one appeases configurations, and in meditative watching, one watches configurations as they truly are. As the *Peṭakopadesa* (123-4) states, through the practice of meditative appeasing, one comprehends one’s physical body (*kāya*), the aggregate of matter (*rūpakkhanda*), the first of the five aggregates subject to grasping. One who understands one’s physical body fully as it really is, abandons craving. When craving is abandoned one becomes dispassionate and free from the emotional reactions of attachment and aversion toward things. Thus, by abandoning passion, one experiences liberation of mind (*samathaṃ bhāvento rūpaṃ pariṇānāti; rūpaṃ pariṇānanto taṇhaṃ pajahati; taṇhaṃ pajahanto rāgavirāgā cetovimutti sacchikaroti*). Similarly, as the *Peṭakopadesa* also states, by practising meditative watching, one comprehends

one's name body (*nāma*) as it really is, that is, the three aggregates subject to grasping: feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), and mental configurations (*sankhāra*). With the understanding of the name body one abandons ignorance and experiences liberation by wisdom (*vipassanaṃ bhāvento nāmaṃ parijānāti; nāmaṃ parijānanto avijjaṃ pajahati; avijjaṃ pajahanto avijjāviraḡā paññāvimuttiṃ sacchikaroti*). As the *Suka Sutta* (SN 45.9; SN V 11) states, it is through well-established right view and well-established path-practice that one could break ignorance (*sammāpañihitāya diṭṭhiyā sammāpañihitāya maggabhāvanāya avijjaṃ bhindissati*).

The discourses show that the practice has been designed in relation to the goal. For example, the ultimate liberation constitutes liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom; therefore, it is required that one practises both meditative appeasing and meditative watching. Meditative appeasing purifies right concentration (*sammāsamādhi*) and enables liberation of mind. Meditative watching purifies right view (*sammādiṭṭhi*) and enables liberation by wisdom. In this connection, the *Vāsijaṭaṃ Sutta* (SN 22.101; SN III 153-54) emphasizes the importance of meditative practice for the attainment of non-clinging. The mind of one who engages in meditative practice, due to non-clinging, gets liberated from mental taints (*bhāvanānuyogaṃ anuyuttassa... anupādāya āsavehi cittaṃ vimuccati*).

What one develops in meditation are the wholesome factors that appear in one's mind as one fulfils right conditions through preliminary training and practice. These factors are interconnected and complementary, and for the most part, overlap. To facilitate practice, thirty-seven factors are classified into seven sets: four foundations of mindfulness, four exertions, four foundations of miracle powers, five faculties, five powers, seven factors of enlightenment, and the noble eightfold path. The seven sets exemplify that it is possible for every practitioner, to create his or her own path of practice that works for him or her. As such, the path or the factors that one develops is always one's own design and discovery out of the pool of thirty-seven wholesome factors. In practice, one purifies mind while removing craving by developing concentration; and removing ignorance by developing wisdom.

The practice of meditative appeasing produces four form absorptions (*jhāna*), four types of altered states of concentration that are distinguishable from one another. One can use one's absorptions achieved by meditative appeasing as meditation subjects of meditative watching. For example, the practitioner of meditative appeasing, after rising from fourth form absorption, contemplates that his or her experience or concentration is impermanent, unsatisfactory and selfless. Such meditative watching practised coupling with fourth absorption concentration can produce liberating knowledge (*aññā*), and unshakable liberation of mind (*akuppā cetovimutti*) to be achieved by abandoning ignorance and understanding things as they really are. The liberated person experiences perfect wisdom, seeing the true state of affairs,

and as a result he experiences mind which is completely detached and free from mental taints. The liberated person's wisdom assures that he or she is no longer liable to be influenced by lust and hate for in him or her they are irrevocably non-arising.

One can attain liberation of mind, without the attainment of liberation by wisdom. The latter liberation is attainable only through abandoning ignorance. Liberation of mind which does not accompany liberation by wisdom signifies only a temporary type and level of liberation. It is to be achieved by liberating mind from craving at its varying levels. The detachment and dispassion of mind from craving, however, produces concentration that in turn can serve as base for generating wisdom. The practitioner of meditative watching who also possesses concentration can understand things as they really are (*samāhito yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti*).

The complex nature of interconnection between ignorance and craving, and in turn concentration and wisdom, and in turn liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom, makes the ultimate extinguishment of lust, hatred and delusion, the highest of liberation, a difficult goal. The practice of meditative appeasing curbs craving and the practice of meditative watching curbs ignorance. Once the practice of meditative appeasing creates a tranquil state of mind by liberating it from craving, though temporary, that tranquil state serves as base for meditative watching to uproot ignorance by seeing things as they truly are. Hence to resolve craving-ignorance complex entirely, one must practise both meditative appeasing and meditative watching, either one after the other or in conjunction. Without the practice of meditative watching, gaining of wisdom is not possible; hence, in the absence of wisdom, gaining of irreversible type or level of liberation is not possible.

The methodological multiplicity in Buddhist practice generates identifiable distinct levels and kinds of temporary and irreversible liberations. By practising meditative appeasing alone, one could experience types of temporary liberations of mind called absorptions (*jhāna*), formless attainments (*samāpatti*), and supreme dwellings (*brahmavihāra*). By practising meditative watching, one could experience many levels of liberation by wisdom, the highest of which is the attainment of Arahathship (*arahatta*). The Arahath with the highest level of liberation by wisdom, is called one liberated by wisdom (*paññāvimutta*). The Arahath who has practised both meditative appeasing and meditative watching to their highest levels can also attain a set of liberations called eight deliverances (*aṭṭhavimokha*). The latter Arahath is called "both-ways liberated one" (*ubhatobhāgavimutta*). However, all Arahaths are equally liberated from the cycle of birth and death (*saṃsāra*) because an Arahath means one who has achieved liberation from existence and continuity. Furthermore, as implied in the *Saṅgīti Sutta* (DN 33; DN III 214), all Arahaths have achieved not only knowledge in the destruction (*khaye nāṇa*) of mental taints but also knowledge in not letting them to arise (*anuppāde nāṇa*).

Meditative Appeasing and Right Concentration

The *Nettipakaraṇa* (128), a para-canonical text of the Theravāda tradition, conveys that, when taken in its own, meditative appeasing (*samathabhāvanā*) is a concentration meditation (*samādhibhāvanā*) designed for attaining concentration by purifying mind from the defilement of craving (*tattha taṇhākilesa samathena visujjhati, so samatho samādhikkhandho*). Therefore, meditative appeasing functions as a means to attain extinguishment because concentration achieved by practising meditative appeasing forms a key intermediary state in the progressive path to extinguishment. The *Peṭakopadesa* (122), another para-canonical text of the same tradition, defines the word *samatha* as concentration, non-distraction, non-dispersal of thought, calming of mind, one-pointedness of mind (*yā cittassa ṭhiti saṅghīti ṭhānaṃ paṭṭhānaṃ upaṭṭhānaṃ samādhi samādhānā avikkhepo avippaṭṭisāro vūpasamo mānaso ekaggaṃ cittassa*). The *Cūḷavedalla Sutta* (MN 44; MN I 301) too defines *samādhi* as concentration, one-pointedness of mind (*cittassa ekaggaṭā*). It is because of this that the discourses identify meditative watching as development of concentration. The *Cūḷavedalla Sutta* further conveys that one practises meditative appeasing to develop concentration and for this one uses the fourfold establishing of mindfulness as basis of concentration, and the right four kinds of striving (*padhānā*) as the supports of concentration (*samādhiparikkhārā*). Exertion is to make effort to avoid (*saṃvara*) and overcome (*pahāna*) unwholesome mental factors and also to make effort to develop (*bhāvanā*) and maintain (*anurakkhanā*) wholesome mental factors. Concentration meditation (*samādhibhāvanā*) means the association, cultivation, and repeated practice of the same mental factors (*yā tassā yeva dhammānaṃ āsevanā bhāvanā bahulīkammaṃ*), for example, the fourfold establishing of mindfulness and the four right strivings. Concentration provides the foundation and basic condition required for the practice of meditative watching that is aimed at removing ignorance.

The path to extinguishment, in its vertical structure, as defined in the *Subha Sutta* (DN 10; DN I 206) progresses through the aggregate of morality, the aggregate of concentration, and the aggregate of wisdom in sequence (*ariyassa sīlakkhandhassa, ariyassa samādhikkhandhassa, ariyassa paññākkhandhassa*). Concentration as an intermediate factor serves as means to the goal. Once one attains a level of concentration, there is still further work to be done (*atthi ceva uttariṃ karaṇīyanti*). For attaining concentration leading to super mental powers, many types of concentration meditations are available. However, in the Buddha's teaching, these concentration meditations serve as means and methods for attaining supramundane states whose culmination is Arahatsip. After introducing a number of concentration meditations conducive to the attainment of some super mental powers, in the *Mahāli Sutta* (DN 6; DN I 153-57), the Buddha states that his disciples live a religious life under him not for realizing those concentration meditations but for something beyond and better (*na kho... etāsaṃ samādhibhāvanānaṃ sacchikiriyāhetu bhikkhū mayi*

brahmacariyaṃ caranti, atthi kho aññe ca dhammā uttarītārā ca pañītārā ca yesaṃ sacchikiriyaḥetu bhikkhū mayi brahmacariyaṃ caranti). Under the category of something beyond and better, he enumerates the supramundane states of stream-entry, once-return, non-return, and Arahatsip. These states achieved by the four standard noble persons of one who has entered the stream, one who returns once, one who will never return, and Arahatsip respectively exhibit their achievement of irrevocable progressive psychosomatic and epistemic transformations. The knowledge of Arahatsip is the knowledge in the destruction of mental taints (*āsavakkhayaññā*). This knowledge occurs as a result of seeing things as they really are. To attain it, the pleasure-bound mind is to be lifted up to a higher level through the practice of concentration. The exertion, as it is said, involves only until one obtains right concentration. As the last factor of the noble eightfold path, right concentration is supported by the other seven: right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, and right mindfulness (SN 45.28; SN V 21: *yā kho ... imehi sattah'aṅgehi cittassa ekaggatā saparikkhārā ayaṃ vuccati ariyo sammāsamādhī*).

Right concentration is characterized as the Buddhist practitioner's attainment of the four form absorptions. With their attainment, the practitioner temporarily abandons lust, aversion, and ignorance. For example, the *Cūḷavedalla Sutta* (MN 44; MN I 303-4) states that, with the attainment of the first form absorption, he abandons lust, and when he is in the fourth form absorption, the inclination to ignorance does not occur (*paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati, rāgaṃ tena pajahati, na tattha rāgānusayo anuseti; ... catutthajjhānaṃ upasampajja viharati, na tattha avijjānusayo anuseti*). However, the liberations attained by the absorptions are provisional. The *Ambaṭṭha Sutta* (DN 3; DN I 100) carefully treats the four form absorptions under practice (*carāṇa*), not under liberative knowledge (*vijjā*). Right concentration is a wilfully attained configured state (MN 52; MN I 350-51: *abhisaṅkhatam abhisañcetaṃ*), obtained by practicing meditative appeasing. Any configured state carries with it its universal characteristic of impermanence and being subject to cessation (MN I 351: *yaṃ kho pana kiñci abhisaṅkhatam abhisañcetaṃ tad aniccaṃ nirodhadhammam*). It is this very characteristic of configured phenomena that serves as subject matter for practising meditative watching.

Although there exists a variety of concentration meditations (*samādhībhāvanā*), all of them do not conduce to extinguishment. The *Samādhī Sutta* (AN 4.41; AN II 44) lists four types of concentration meditations and states that only some meditations bring destruction of mental taints (*āsavakkhaya*). Some meditations such as four absorptions cause an immediate happy dwelling (*ditṭhadhammasukhavihāra*). Some others like perception of light (*ālokaśāññā*) lead to attaining knowledge and vision (*ñāṇadassanapaṭilābha*). As stated elsewhere, the perception of light conduces divine eye (*dibbacakkhu*):

Herein the monastic practitioner who contemplates on perception of light fixes his mind to the perception of the day, and as at daytime so at night, and as at night so in the day. In this way, with wakeful and stainless mind, he develops a state of consciousness accompanied by light. This concentration, developed and often practiced, leads to the attainment of divine eye.

Then there are some concentration meditations that lead to mindfulness and awareness (*satisampajañña*). Under this category, the discourse (AN II 45) states that, “the monastic practitioner’s feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), and discursive thinking (*vitakka*) arise, exist, and disappear while he is fully aware.” Finally, there are concentration meditations that lead to the destruction of mental taints (*āsavakkhaya*), the attainment of Arahantship. The monastic practitioner, undertaking these meditations, dwells while noticing the arising (*udaya*) and disappearance (*vaya*) of each of the five aggregates subject to grasping.

Such is matter, such is the arising of matter, such is the disappearance of matter; such is feeling... such is perception ... such are mental configurations ... such is consciousness, such is the arising of consciousness, such is the disappearance of consciousness. This is the development of concentration that leads to the destruction of mental taints.

The *Vitakka Sutta* (SN 43.3; SN IV 360) and the *Suññatā Sutta* (SN 43.4; SN IV 360) present two sets of concentrations as means to the unconfigured (*asañkhatagāmīmagga*), the extinguishment. Each set comprises three concentrations. The first set consists of concentration entailing the presence of both discursive thinking and sustained thinking (*savitakkasavicārasamādhī*), concentration entailing the presence of sustained thinking only (*avitakkavicāramattasamādhī*), and concentration entailing the absence of both discursive thinking and sustained thinking (*avitakka-avicārasamādhī*). The second set contains concentration entailing emptiness (*suññatāsamādhī*), concentration entailing signlessness (*animittasamādhī*), and concentration entailing desirelessness (*appanīhitasamādhī*).¹ Both sets showcase the gradual and progressive development of one’s practice. Thus, according to these discourses, some concentration meditations conduce extinguishment. Does this mean that the practice of concentration meditations is sufficient for one’s attainment of extinguishment? What is meant by this discourse is that all types of concentrations are not suitable for the attainment of enlightenment. For instance, one can concentrate on a beautiful object, but produces a type of concentration which creates desire and attachment, then that concentration is not conducive to extinguishment. Therefore, the expression that those concentration meditations are conducive to extinguishment means that there are certain concentration meditations which produce a type of right concentration on which one is able to perceive things as they really are, and to realize extinguishment on the basis of that concentration. For the attainment of extinguishment, a developed form of concentration is essential.

Meditative Watching and Right View

The scholars say that of the two meditation techniques, meditative watching is more Buddhistic than meditative appeasing. They identify it as “the unique discovery of the Buddha,”² “the Buddhist heart of the Theravāda meditational discipline,”³ “the essential key to liberation, [and] the direct antidote to the ignorance underlying bondage and suffering.”⁴ As the *Nettipakaraṇa* (128) points out, meditative watching is specifically designed to purify self-views by eradicating ignorance (*diṭṭhisañkilesa vipassanāya visujjhati*). In this meditation, the meditator becomes aware of the five aggregates subject to grasping and eradicates wrong views of self and eventually all views and defilements. Since the function of meditative appeasing is to pacify defilements rather than uproot them, the function of meditative watching is to eradicate specifically the mind’s latent defiling tendencies.

Meditative watching is a process of knowing and seeing things as they really are (*jānaṃ passaṃ yathābhūtaṃ*); it is a process of analytical investigation of the real. In other words, through the practice of meditative watching, the meditator attempts to gain knowledge of things as they really are (*yathābhūtañāna*), the insubstantiality and selflessness of all experiential and existential structures concerning life and the world (*sabbe dhammā anattā*). The knowledge of things as they really are is the knowledge obtained in accordance with reality, and it consists in the analyses of the factors of existence (*dhammā*), especially to view the five aggregates subject to grasping as impermanent, suffering, and not-self (SN 22.10-11; SN III 19-20: *rūpaṃ* (et cetera)... *aniccaṃ, dukkhaṃ, anattā atītānāgataṃ, ko pana vādo paccuppannaṃ*). Winston King beautifully defines meditative watching as “insight into the empty, impermanent, pain-filled nature of all existence, including the jhānic and formless meditational states.”⁵

As defined in the *Peṭakopadesa* (122), meditative watching is a search or an investigation of various *dhammas* presented under such categories as aggregates, elements, faculties, et cetera as they really are; it is a comprehensive analytical examination, an acquiring of the reality as it is; it is a weighing, a knowledge, an understanding, a wisdom, an illumination, light, lustre, and radiance. These categories indicate an internal spiritual awakening, enlightenment. One can have this perception of reality with reference to various categories in our experiential world such as aggregates, elements, faculties, name-and-matter, things configured by dependent co-arising, the four noble truths, and the wholesome and the unwholesome, right and wrong, good and bad, or associate and dissociate *dhammas*

yā khandhesu vā dhātūsu vā āyatanesu vā nāmarūpesu vā pañiccasamuppādesu vā dhammesu vā dukkhesu vā samudayesu vā nirodhe vā magge vā kusalākusalesu vā dhammesu vā sāvajja-anaajjesu vā kaṇhasukkesu vā sevītappa-asevītappesu vā so yathābhūtaṃ vicayo pavicayo vīmaṃsā paravīmaṃsā gāhanā aggāhanā pariggāhanā

*cittena paricitanā tulanā upaparikkhā ñāṇaṃ vijjā vā cakkhu
buddhi medhā paññā obhāso āloko ābhā pabhā khaggo nāraḷḷo
dhammavicayasambojjhaṅgo sammādiṭṭhi maggaṅgaṃ, ayaṃ vipassanā.*

This analysis of the factors of existence is also known as discriminative knowledge or wisdom (*paññā*); hence, the development of meditative watching (*vipassanābhāvanā*) by which one analyses the factors of existence is meaningfully designated as wisdom meditation (*paññābhāvanā*). The *Vibhaṅga Sutta* (SN 48.9; SN V 197) defines the faculty of wisdom (*paññīndriya*) as follows:

Here, monastic practitioners, the noble disciple is wise; he has wisdom directed to arising and falling, which is noble and penetrative, leading to complete destruction of suffering” (*ariyasāvako paññavā hoti udayatthagāminiyā paññāya samannāgato hoti ariyāya nibbedhikāya sammādukkhakkhayaḷḷāminiyā*). Wisdom is the developed state of right view (*sammāsamādhī*).

Meditative watching often focuses on the five aggregates subject to grasping, and it guides one realize there is no self to be attached to as “this is mine, this am I, and this is my self.” This realization of the five aggregates subject to grasping as impermanent, suffering, and not-self is essential for enlightenment to take place. According to the *Upādānaparivaṭṭa Sutta* (SN 22.56; SN III 58-61), the Buddha once stated that, so long as he understood not fully, as they really are, the fourfold circle with regard to these five aggregates subject to grasping, just so long was he not assured that he was fully enlightened with the supreme enlightenment (*yāvakīvañcāhaṃ... ime pañcupādānakkhandhe catuparivaṭṭaṃ yathābhūtaṃ nābhaññāsiṃ neva tāvāhaṃ... anuttaraṃ sammāsambodhiṃ abhisambuddhoti paccaññāsiṃ*), but as soon as he fully realized them, he was assured that he was fully enlightened. The same discourse identifies the fourfold circle as: “I have understood” (*abbhaññāsiṃ*) each of the five aggregates subject to grasping; “I have understood their arising” (*samudaya*); “I have understood their ceasing” (*nirodha*); “I have understood the path leading to their ceasing” (*nirodhagāminīpaṭipadā*).

Many discourses point out the need for correct assessment of the five aggregates subject to grasping by way of meditative watching. Those who are in the process of realizing, disgusting, fading out, utter ceasing of the five aggregates subject to grasping are called those who have approached well (*supaṭipannā*) and have firmly established (*gādhanti*) in the doctrine and discipline of the Buddha. Moreover, those who have completed the process are called those who have liberated well (*suvimuttā*), the perfected ones (*kevalino*).⁶ This means that for them there is no more the whirling round of birth and death (*ye suvimuttā te kevalino, ye kevalino vaṭṭaṃ tesāṃ natthi paññāpanāya*). In the *Yadanicca Sutta 2* (SN 22.16; SN III 22), the Buddha advises monks to see the five aggregates subject to grasping as they really are through right wisdom (*evamevaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ*).

The discourse also explains the method of viewing. One must view each of the five aggregates subject to grasping as “not, this is mine; not, this am I; not, this is my self” (*netam mama nesohamasmi na meso attā*) because each one of these is impermanent, hence suffering, hence not-self (*yadaniccaṃ taṃ dukkhaṃ, yaṃ dukkhaṃ tadanattā*). The *Ānanda Sutta* (SN 22.21; SN III 24-5) also explains in detail the process of reality-perception with regard to the five aggregates subject to grasping. In this discourse, the five aggregates subject to grasping are seen not only as impermanent but also as configured, dependently arisen, nature of vanishing, nature of decaying, nature of fading away, and nature of ceasing (*aniccaṃ saṅkhatam paṭiccasamuppannam khayadhammam vayadhammam virāgadhammam nirodhadhammam*). This penetrative understanding liberates the individual from the cycle of bondage forever (SN III 21: *evaṃ passataṃ... sutavā ariyasāvako rūpasmiṃ [and other four] nibbindati, nibbindaṃ virajjati, virāgā vimuccati, vimuttasmiṃ vimuttamiti ñāṇaṃ hoti*). It also becomes the cessation of the five aggregates subject to grasping (SN III 24-5: *tassa... nirodhā nirodhoti vuccati*).

According to the *Parijāna Sutta* (SN 22.24; SN III 27), the cessation of suffering is not possible unless and until one really understands, comprehends, and gives up the five aggregates subject to grasping (*rūpaṃ... anabhijānaṃ aparijānaṃ avirājayam appajahaṃ abhabbo dukkhakkhayāya*). This process of understanding and giving up of the aggregates is the practising of meditative watching. As the *Assāda Sutta* 1 (SN 22.26; SN III 28) points out, until the Bodhisatta has realized these five aggregates subject to grasping as they really are, he did not claim that he had achieved enlightenment

yato ca khvāhaṃ... imesaṃ pañcannaṃ upādānakkhandhānaṃ evaṃ assādaṃ ca assādato ādīnavaṇṇa ādīnavato nissaraṇaṇṇa nissaraṇato yathābhūtaṃ abhaññāsiṃ, athāhaṃ ... anuttaraṃ sammāsambodhim abhisambuddho ti paccaññāsiṃ; ñāṇaṃ ca pana me dassanaṃ udapādi akuppā me cetovimutti ayam antimā jāti nathidāni punabbhavo ti.

After the Bodhisatta completed his investigation (*pariyesanaṃ*) regarding the aggregates, he was able to see with wisdom (*paññāya me sudiṭṭho*) their enjoyment, perils, and escape as they really are. This practice of meditative watching was the condition that led to liberate him irrevocably (SN III 29: *akuppā me cetovimutti*).

In addition, the *Mahāpadāna Sutta* (DN 14; DN II 34-5) explains the importance of the practice of meditative watching for the attainment of enlightenment (*vipassanāmaggo bodhāya*). In this practice one must understand the dependent nature of existence and realize how one after the other, the cessation of things take place: “With the cessation of name-and-matter (*nāmarūpa*), consciousness (*viññāṇa*) ceases; and with the cessation of consciousness, name-and-matter ceases; with the cessation of name-and-matter, six sense-spheres cease; ... and finally with the cessation of birth, all the suffering cease.” As the context points out, Vipassi Bodhisatta

too practised meditative watching by contemplating on the arising and disappearing nature of the five aggregates subject to grasping. As a result of this practice, his mind achieved liberation from its mental taints without finding any dependency or any attachment (*tassa pañcasupādānakkhandhesu undayavyayānupassino viharato na cirasseva anupādāya āsavehi cittaṃ vimucci*). In this case, the subject matter of meditative watching is the five aggregates subject to grasping. The process of meditation is to view these five aggregates subject to grasping as impermanent, suffering, and not-self. Thus it is evident from the above discussion that meditative watching is the true Buddhistic meditation and that it is indispensable for attaining the ultimate liberation shown by the Buddha.

Meditative Appeasing and Meditative Watching

The message of the discourses is that, to accomplish liberation from existence (*bhava*) and birth-cycle (*jātiśamsāra*), one must practise both meditative appeasing and meditative watching. In the *Mahāpadāna Sutta* (DN 14; DN II 36) where Vipassi Buddha reflects that it would be difficult for people to understand the path to enlightenment, we find the following statement: *idampi kho thānaṃ duddasaṃ yadidaṃ sabbasañkhārasamatho sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhakkhaya virāgo nirodho nibbānaṃ*. The statement indirectly refers to the functions of both meditative appeasing and meditative watching. The function of meditative appeasing is to calm all configurations (*sabbasañkhārasamatha*), and the function of meditative watching is to forsake all acquisitions (*sabbūpadhipaṭinissagga*). The occurrence of these two functions marks the destruction of craving (*taṇhakkhaya*), dispassion, cessation, and extinguishment. This implies that by meditative appeasing alone, meditator can only appease craving, not destroy craving (*taṇhakkhaya*). The complete destruction of craving occurs with the destruction of ignorance. The destruction of ignorance comes with the attainment of wisdom, and the attainment of wisdom comes by practising meditative watching.

The Buddhist theories tell that wisdom does not arise in a mind that lacks concentration, that concentration does not arise in the absence of some level of understanding, that concentration arises with the practice of meditative appeasing, and that wisdom arises with the practice of meditative watching. All these theories inform that, to achieve ultimate liberation, one must practise both meditative appeasing and meditative watching. Commenting on this requirement, In his *An Introduction to the Oldest Form of Buddhist Meditation: Tranquility and Insight*, A. Sole-Leris (1986, 21) says: “the cultivation and development of the mind is the means whereby this erroneous perception [the assumption of a self] is corrected, and its practice comprises two distinct types of techniques, known respectively as *samatha* and *vipassanā*.”⁷⁷ He identifies meditative appeasing as “abstractive meditation” since its function discards progressively the sensory and mental stimuli without harming the distinctive qualities and characteristics of the mind. He further says that

meditative appeasing produces “altered states of consciousness,” but not necessarily the enduring change, that is, enlightenment or the liberation. His conclusion is that for liberation to be achieved, the development of meditative watching is required.

The difference between these two types of meditations, as Sole-Leris (1986, 23-24) states, lies in the fact that, in meditative watching, one does not go on to ever higher degrees of concentration and absorption. The aim of meditative watching is to achieve direct and immediate awareness of all phenomena, including all the sensory and mental processes, as these phenomena lack any enduring essence or self-entity. He says further that, in this old tradition, normal method is that meditators practice both meditative appeasing and meditative watching. Meditative appeasing is to develop a high degree of concentration and tranquillity, and meditative watching is to achieve liberation by insight or wisdom. As he elaborates, this combined practice facilitates meditators to develop insight easily and quickly. The theory is that greater the meditator’s concentration, the calmer and more balanced his mental state; calmer and more balanced his mental state, the more easily and quickly he would attain wisdom.

Based on his analysis, Sole-Leris concludes that meditative appeasing cannot by itself produce enlightenment, and that enlightenment can only be attained by developing meditative watching. For practising meditative watching adequately, however, a reasonable level of concentration, which he identified as access or momentary concentration, a level of concentration just prior to the attainment of the first form absorption, is required. Sole-Leris’s this conclusion means that the results of meditative appeasing are means to an end not ends in themselves. This view, however, contradicts with what Paul Griffiths (1981) suggests by saying that the technique of meditative appeasing has its own soteriological validity. For Griffiths, meditative appeasing has its own soteriological goal, that is, the cessation of perception and feeling (*saññāvedayitanirodha*) or attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*), while meditative watching has extinguishment (*nibbāna*) as its goal.⁸

As far as the discourses of the Buddha are concerned, Griffiths’s conclusion cannot be affirmed. The cessation of perception and feeling is a here and now experience of extinguishment and is a result of practicing both meditative appeasing and meditative watching because, as it is explained in the Theravāda tradition and also implied in the discourses, it can be attained only by those non-returners, those who will never return to this sensual realm, and Arahats who have progressively come to those supramundane states (non-return and Arahatship) by practicing both types of meditations to their highest level. If we treat the passages of the discourses which describe this cessation state, taking them out of context, we may easily misunderstand the attainment of cessation as it results from practising meditative appeasing alone. The discourses are clearly against such a conclusion.

Commenting on these two meditation techniques further, Sole-Leris (1986, 17) states that, both share their commonality by being “attention training methods.” He maintains that depending on character type and circumstances certain meditators prefer to start meditative watching, without practicing parallel development of meditative appeasing. Such practitioners are identified in the texts as “pure meditative watchers” (*sukkhavipassakā*). Sole-Leris observes the need to uproot craving completely, to ensure its complete vanishing. To do so it requires a complete change in mental attitude which can be brought about by cultivating “the mindful, non-reactive observation of bodily and mental processes so as to develop an increasingly thorough awareness (undistorted by our usual desires, fears, views, etc.) of their true nature.”⁹ By the practice of mindful observation of the nature of things, the delusion which makes us perceive things incorrectly is gradually dispelled. Sole-Leris (1986, 17) says that liberation consists in “experiencing and understanding fully and clearly that everything is impermanent, and seeing that there is, quite literally, nothing to worry about.” Understanding in the same line, Winston King in his *Theravāda Meditation: The Buddhist Transformation of Yoga* (1992,16) points out that, meditative watching is absolutely essential for the attainment of extinguishment and that the peaceful abidings (form and formless absorptions) are not. It should be noted that, he refers to the peaceful abidings, not to meditative appeasing altogether. The discourses too view the necessity of practising both meditative appeasing and meditative watching for the attainment of extinguishment. The differences in attainments come in the degree and the way one conjoins and develops the two meditation systems.

Combined Practice

The *Yuganaddha Sutta* (AN 4.170; AN II 157) which also serves as the base for the *Yuganaddhakathā* of the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (92-103) presents four different ways of conjoining of the two techniques: meditative appeasing and meditative watching. In this discourse, Venerable Ānanda states that those who declare their attainment of Arahantship in his presence do so having attained it by practising the two meditations in one of four ways:

Herein, colleagues, a monastic practitioner develops meditative watching having developed first meditative appeasing (*samathapubbaṅgamaṃ vipassanaṃ*). While he thus develops meditative watching preceded by meditative appeasing, the (supramundane) path is born in him. He now cultivates, develops and strengthens that path and while doing so, the fetters are abandoned, and the latencies are uprooted (*idha ... bhikkhu samathapubbaṅgamaṃ vipassanaṃ bhāveti. tassa samathapubbaṅgamaṃ vipassanaṃ bhāvayato maggo sañjāyati. so taṃ maggaṃ āsevati bhāveti bahulīkaroti. tassa taṃ maggaṃ āsevato bhāvayato bahulīkaroto saññōjanāni pahīyati, anusayā vyanti honti*).

Or again, colleagues, a monastic practitioner develops meditative appeasing having developed first meditative watching

(*vipassanāpubbaṅgamaṃ samathaṃ*). While he thus develops meditative appeasing preceded by meditative watching, the path (supramundane) is born in him. He now cultivates, develops and strengthens that path and while doing so, the fetters are abandoned, and the latencies are uprooted (*puna ca paraṃ... bhikkhu vipassanāpubbaṅgamaṃ samathaṃ bhāveti. tassa vipassanāpubbaṅgamaṃ samathaṃ bhāvayato maggo sañjāyati. so taṃ maggaṃ āsevati bhāveti bahulīkaroti. tassa taṃ maggaṃ āsevato bhāvayato bahulīkaroto saññojanāni pahīyati, anusayā vyanti honti*).

Or again, colleagues, a monastic practitioner develops meditative appeasing and meditative watching joined in pairs (*samathavipassanaṃ yuganaddhaṃ*). While he thus develops meditative appeasing and meditative watching joined in pairs, the path (supramundane) is born in him. He now cultivates, develops and strengthens that path and while doing so, the fetters are abandoned, and the latencies are uprooted (*puna ca paraṃ... bhikkhu samatha-vipassanaṃ yuganaddhaṃ bhāveti. tassa samathavipassanaṃ yuganaddhaṃ bhāvayato maggo sañjāyati. so taṃ maggaṃ āsevati bhāveti bahulīkaroti. tassa taṃ maggaṃ āsevato bhāvayato bahulīkaroto saññojanāni pahīyati, anusayā vyanti honti*).

Or again, colleagues, a monastic practitioner's mind is seized by agitation with respect to the *dhammas*.¹⁰ But there comes a time when his mind becomes settled internally, becomes steady, unified and concentrated; then the path (supramundane) is born in him. He now cultivates, develops and strengthens that path and while doing so, the fetters are abandoned, and the latencies are uprooted (*puna ca paraṃ... bhikkhuno dhammuddhaccaviggahitamaṇā hoti, so... samayo yantaṃ cittaṃ ajjhantaṃ yeva santiṭṭhati sannisīdati ekodihoti samādhiyati. tassa maggo sañjāyati. so taṃ maggaṃ āsevati bhāveti bahulīkaroti. tassa taṃ maggaṃ āsevato bhāvayato bahulīkaroto saññojanāni pahīyati, anusayā vyanti honti*).

Following this discourse, the *Peṭakopadesa* (249) introduces the first three types of meditators who practise meditative appeasing and meditative watching, either successively or conjointly. As it states, the three methods relate to three types of persons who differ from one another on the basis of their ability to understand. Accordingly,

(1) the method of meditative watching after meditative appeasing is for one who understands through a mere mention; who receives a 'soft' teaching and trains in higher wisdom; (2) the method of meditative appeasing after meditative watching is for one who is to be trained gradually; who receives a 'sharp' teaching and trains in higher training pertaining to the mind; and (3) the method of the conjunction of meditative appeasing and meditative watching is for one who understands through exposition; who receives a teaching that is both 'sharp' and 'soft' (*tikkhamudukā*) and trains in higher morality (*tattha ugghaṭitaññussa samathapubbaṅgamaṃ vipassanā, neyyassa vipassanā pubbaṅgamo samatho, vipaṇcitaññussa samathavipassanā*

*yuganaddhā, vipañcitaññussa mudukā desanā, neyyassa tikka desanā,
vipañcitaññussatikkhāmudukādesanā, uggāṭitaññussa adhipaññāsikkhā,
neyyassa adhicittasikkhā, vipañcitaññussa adhisīlasikkhā).*

This *Peṭakopadesa* description seems to convey the message that, the three methods are for three types of persons who are on three different standings in the threefold training of the path. One who is slow to understand can train in higher morality while also training in both concentration by practising meditative appeasing and wisdom by meditative watching. One who has higher training in morality has a choice. He can train either in higher concentration and then higher wisdom or in higher wisdom and then higher concentration. The former practises meditative appeasing first and then practises meditative watching, and the latter practises meditative watching first and then practises meditative watching. In all three cases, one must train in higher morality, higher concentration and higher wisdom. However, those who practise first meditative watching and attain extinguishment are not required to develop concentration to the highest.

From Appeasing to Watching

The first method of practice, that is, the practice of meditative watching after practising meditative appeasing (*samathapubbaṅgamaṃ vipassanaṃ*) seems to have been the common way. According to the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* Commentary, the *Saddhammapakāsinī* (585), in this method, the meditator first generates concentration and then develops insight (*samathapubbaṅgamaṃ vipassanaṃ bhāveti ti samathaṃ pubbaṅgamaṃ purecārikaṃ katvā vipassanaṃ bhāveti, paṭhamaṃ samādhiṃ uppādetvā pacchā vipassanaṃ bhāveti ti attho*). Similarly, in the second method, that is, the practice of meditative appeasing after the practice of meditative watching, the meditator develops concentration after giving rise to wisdom by practising meditative watching (*vipassanāpubbaṅgamaṃ samathaṃ bhāveti ti vipassanaṃ pubbaṅgamaṃ purecārikaṃ katvā samathaṃ bhāveti, paṭhamaṃ vipassanaṃ uppādetvā pacchā samādhiṃ bhāveti ti attho*).

The *Mahāmālunkya Sutta* (MN 64; MN I 432-37) explains a method that can be identified with the above first type, that is, the practice of meditative watching after practicing meditative appeasing. The discourse (MN I 435-36) describes it as follows:

And what... is the path, the way to the abandoning of the five lower fetters? Here, with the seclusion from the acquisitions, with the abandoning of unwholesome states, with the complete tranquilization of bodily inertia, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states, a monastic practitioner enters upon and abides in the first absorption, which is accompanied by discursive thinking and sustained thinking, with rapture and pleasure born of seclusion. Whatever exists therein of matter, feeling, perception, configurations, consciousness, he sees those states as impermanent, as suffering, as

a disease, as a tumour, as a barb, as a calamity, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as void, as not-self. He turns his mind away from those states, and directs it towards the deathless element, thus: 'This is the peaceful, this is the sublime, that is, the stilling of all configurations, the relinquishing of all acquisitions, the destruction of craving, the dispassion, the cessation, the extinguishment.' If he is steady in that, he attains the destruction of mental taints; But if he does not attain the destruction of mental taints, because of that desire for the Dhamma, that delight in the Dhamma, then with the destruction of the five lower fetters, he becomes one due to reappear spontaneously, and there attains the utter extinguishment, without ever returning from that world. This is the path, the way to the abandoning of the five lower fetters.

The discourse continues to explain this method of meditation by replacing the first form absorption with the second, the third, the fourth, and also the sphere of infinite space, the sphere of infinite consciousness, and the sphere of nothingness. The absorption section of this quotation implies the practice of meditative appeasing, and the reviewing of the five aggregates subject to grasping as impermanent, suffering, and not-self implies the practice of meditative watching. The discourse indicates also that although some attain the form and formless absorptions, they cannot destroy mental taints. If so, it implies that some are able to attain temporary liberation of mind but not the enduring liberations. These differences in attainments are there because of the differences in the faculties (*indriyavemattatā*) in different individuals. In this way, the discourse not only describes meditative watching preceded by meditative appeasing but also explains the necessity of both meditations for the attainment of unshakable and irreversible liberation of mind.

The *Samādhi Sutta* (SN 22.5; SN III 13-5) too discusses this method of developing wisdom after developing concentration. The Buddha asks his disciples to develop concentration (*samādhiṃ... bhāvētha*) taking into account his theory that the concentrated one understands things as they truly are (*samāhito... yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti*): the arising and cessation of this whole mass of suffering with regard to the arising of the five aggregates subject to grasping. The concentrated one understands not only the arising but also the passing away of matter, feeling, perception, configurations and consciousness. The arising of the five aggregates subject to grasping is no other than the arising of this whole mass of suffering. The reason is that the mundane person not only delights and welcomes the five aggregates subject to grasping but also persists having clung to them. Delight in the five aggregates is clinging. Configured by clinging, there comes existence; configured by existence, birth; configured by birth, aging-and-death (SN III 13-5):

*rūpaṃ... abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati, tassa rūpaṃ...
abhinandato abhivadato ajjhosāya tiṭṭhato uppajjati nandi, yā rūpe...
nandi tadupādānaṃ, tassupādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti,
jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṃ.*

One who has concentration can know and see how the whole mass of suffering arises, by watching the arising of the five aggregates subject to grasping. Similarly, one with concentration can know and see that the passing away of matter, feeling, perception, configurations and consciousness is also the cessation of the whole mass of suffering. When one does not seek delight and welcome, one cannot persist having clung to the five aggregates subject to grasping. The absence of clinging leads to cessation of suffering. In this way, the discourses show that the well-practised concentration naturally conduces to meditative watching by means of which one examines the five aggregates as they are: impermanent, suffering and not-self. Finally, through the practice of meditative watching with regard to the five aggregates subject to grasping, one makes an end to suffering.

The *Kassapaśihanāda Sutta* (DN 8; DN I 167) too explains the gradual process of moving from concentration to wisdom. It states that, as long as a person has not cultivated and realized the three accomplishments of morality (*sīlasampadā*), concentration (*cittasampadā*), and wisdom (*paññāsampadā*), he remains far from being a true *samaṇa* or *brāhmaṇa*. The discourse categorically identifies the true *samaṇa* or *brāhmaṇa* to be one who develops mind suffusing it with loving-kindness and experiences here and now liberation of mind (*cetovimutti*) and liberation by wisdom (*paññāvimutti*). The attainment of liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom refers to the attainment of Arahatsip. In other words, the true *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* are Arahats. This discourse thus clearly shows the necessity of the accomplishment of concentration and the accomplishment of wisdom for the attainment of liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom. It also (DN I 172) informs that, when one achieves moral perfection, mind turns to concentration, and the concentrated mind turns to meditative watching which sees things as they truly are. The mind so developed turns to liberation. The *Subha Sutta* (DN 10; DN I 206-9) which identifies the three accomplishments as noble one's aggregates of morality (*ariyassa sīlakkhandha*), concentration (*samādhikkhandha*), and wisdom (*paññākkhandha*) states clearly that, the accomplishment of concentration is not the end, but there is more to be accomplished, that is, wisdom (*atthi ceva ettha uttariṃ karaṇīyaṃ*). In this way, many discourses favor the successive development of the two meditation techniques, first meditative appeasing, and then, meditative watching.

Conjoining the Two Techniques

One of the most important meditation methods described in the discourse of AN 4.170 (AN II 157) quoted above is that the practice of meditative appeasing and meditative watching conjointly, that is, that the two must operate so to speak in conjunction like a pair of oxen teamed together or “yoked together” (*yuganaddha*). The *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, explaining this conjoined method, states that, first, the practitioner attains the first form absorption and then, after rising from it, contemplates on the conditionality

of the configurations that had configured the particular absorption. Again, after this contemplation on the conditionality of the configurations of the first form absorption, he then attains the second form absorption. With regard to it too, after emerging from it, the meditator contemplates on the conditionality of its configurations. In this way, the meditator progresses in developing both meditations while maintaining a balance.

It is important to note here that in this text we are not told that the meditator contemplates on the conditionality of the configurations of the attained absorption while being in that absorption. This may be due to the fact that it is impossible to undertake the two tasks, appeasing and watching, simultaneously. If it were to be the case, this third meditation type must also be understood as a method of practising the two techniques one after the other. The uniqueness is then that every time this meditator attains an absorption by practising meditative appeasing, soon he turns that attainment's configurations (causes and conditions) into a meditation subject of meditative watching, that these configurations are impermanent, suffering and not-self. Furthermore, soon after he contemplates on the conditionality of the configurations of that attainment, he endeavours to attain another absorption and do the same. In this way, as the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* Commentary, the *Saddhammappakāsinī* (585) also elaborates, the process of attaining the absorptions by practising meditative appeasing, and the contemplation of the conditionality of that attainment's configurations by practising meditative watching continue progressively in eight stages, from the first form absorption to the fourth formless absorption, the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception

yuganaddham bhāvetīti yuganaddham katvā bhāveti; ettha teneva cītena samāpattiṃ samāpajjivā teneva saṅkhāre sammasitūṃ na sakkā, ayaṃ pana yāvātā samāpattiyo samāpajjati tāvatā saṅkhāre sammasati, yāvātā saṅkhāre sammasati tāvatā samāpattiyo samāpajjati. kathaṃ? paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ samāpajjati, tato vuṭṭhāya saṅkhāre sammasati, saṅkhāre sammasitvā dutiyajjhānaṃ samāpajjati, tato vuṭṭhāya saṅkhāre sammasati, saṅkhāre sammasitvā tatiyaṃ jhānaṃ... nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ samāpattiṃ samāpajjati, tato vuṭṭhāya saṅkhāre sammasati, evaṃ samathavipassanaṃ yuganaddham bhāveti nāma.

In this method of meditative practice, the balancing of concentration and wisdom is the key. If the practice of meditative appeasing is in excess, the meditator's mind will be blunted and dull, and meditative watching will then have to be especially developed. But if meditative watching is in excess, his mind will be agitated, and meditative appeasing will have to be developed in particular. When meditative appeasing and meditative watching are on the contrary in balance, the mind rests in equilibrium (*samādhi*), and in the absence of both dullness and agitation, the meditator's mind proceeds naturally of itself. The mind is then in its natural state. The perfect practice of this meditation method is accordingly described as operating as

a syzygy of meditative appeasing and meditative watching. It seems that when the *Mahāsaḷāyatanika Sutta* (MN 149; MN III 289) states that for the meditator who develops the noble eightfold path, meditative appeasing and meditative watching are yoked, it refers to this same practice. The discourse states that, in this meditator, the four establishments of mindfulness, four exertions, four foundations of miracle powers, five spiritual faculties, five spiritual powers, and the seven constituents of awakening reach perfection one after the other. It further states that, such a meditator is capable of comprehending by direct knowledge the five aggregates subject to grasping; discarding by direct knowledge, ignorance (*avijjā*) and craving for existence and continuity; developing by direct knowledge, meditative appeasing and meditative watching; and finally, realizing by direct knowledge, the liberative knowledge and liberation

tassa evaṃ imaṃ ariyaṃ aṭṭhaṅgikaṃ maggaṃ bhāvayato cattāropi satipaṭṭhānā bhāvanāpāripūriṃ gacchanti, cattāropi sammappadhānā/ cattāropi iddhipādā/ pañcapi indriyāni/ pañcapi balāni/ sattapi bojjanāgā bhāvanāpāripūriṃ gacchanti, tassa ime dve dhammā yuganaddhā vattanti, samatho ca vipassanā ca. so ye dhammā abhiññā pariññeyyā [=pañcupādānakkhandhā], te dhamme abhiññā pariñānāti; ye dhammā abhiññā pahātabbā [avijjā ca bhavataṅhāca], te dhamme abhiññā pajahati; ye dhammā abhiññā bhāvetabbā [=samatho ca vipassanā ca], te dhamme abhiññā bhāveti; ye dhammā abhiññā sacchikātabbā [=vijjā ca vimutti ca], te dhamme abhiññā sacchikaroti.

Dhammudhacca

With regard to the last method of the four, the discourse (AN 4.170; AN II 157) does not directly refer to meditative appeasing and meditative watching. Yet, with regard to this fourth method too, it continues by stating that there comes a time when the meditator's "mind internally comes to rest, settles, becomes one-pointed and is concentrated" (*taṃ cittaṃ ajjhattameva santiṭṭhati sannisīdati ekodī hoti samādhiyati*). For him or her the (supramundane) path is then produced. Just like for the practitioners of the first three methods, for one who observes, develops, and practices this fourth method too, fetters (*saṃjyana*) are thrown off and latencies (*anusaya*) are uprooted. It is interesting to notice the involvement of concentration even with this fourth method, which indicates the recognition of the necessity of concentration for the arising of wisdom (*samāhito yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti*).

With reference to this fourth method, the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* states that the word "dhamma" in the description refers to the illumination et cetera that arise when one reflects on things as impermanent, suffering, and not-self (*aniccato... dukkhatō... anattato manasikaroto obhāso uppajjati*). And in each case, agitation (*uddhacca*), that is, distraction (*vikkhepa*), results from adverting to this illumination. Therefore, mind (*mānasa*) that is thus seized, or seduced, by agitation does not correctly know what is presented (*upaṭṭhāna*) as impermanent, suffering and not-self (Paṭis.II.100-02:

kathaṃ dhammuddhaccaviggahītamānaṣaṃ hoti? aniccato manasikaroto, obhāso uppajjati; obhāso dhammāti obhāsaṃ āvajjati, tato vikkhepo uddhaccaṃ. tena uddhaccena viggahītamānaṣo aniccato upaṭṭhānaṃ yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāti; dukkhato/ anattato upaṭṭhānaṃ yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāti. tathā aniccato manasikaro nānaṃ uppajjati; pīti/ passaddhi/ sukhaṃ/ adhimokkho/ paggaho/ upaṭṭhānaṃ/ upekhā/ nikanti uppajjati; nikanti dhammo ti nikantiṃ āpajjati. tato vikkhepo uddhaccaṃ. tena uddhaccena viggahītamānaṣo aniccato... dukkhato... anattato upaṭṭhānaṃ yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāti.¹¹

Commenting on this last method, David Seyfort Rugg (1989, 189) says that, although its full implications are not altogether clear, the obstacles formed by agitation with respect to the dhammas (*dhammuddhacca*) may be relatable to the case where, in meditation, wisdom or discriminative knowledge (*paññā*) becomes excessive and overwhelms meditative appeasing.¹² This situation, as Rugg understands, is described as the situation of the practitioner described in the *Cunda Sutta* (AN 6.46; AN III 355) as *dhammayoga* (one who analyses the dhammas) as opposed the *jhāyin* (absorption meditator), and also the pure meditative watcher or dry inspector (*sukkhavipassaka*).¹³ Depreciation of analytical investigation among some absorption meditators (*jhāyin*) who were especially on their guard against the mental agitation that can arise in a person given to the analysis of the dhammas is evident. Although the discourses and other canonical texts note this danger, they do not reject or condemn analysis and inspection, that is, meditative watching, in favour of meditative appeasing alone.

With regard to this fourth type, Bhikkhu Bodhi opines in a note of *The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha* (1707, n. 862) that the meditator refers in the context as “a practitioner who reflects deeply on the Dhamma, acquires a sense of urgency, and then finally settles down and gains insight when meeting with the favourable supporting conditions.” However, this simplistic explanation seems not match with the commentarial understanding of *dhammuddhacca* as given, for example, in the *Saddhammapakāsinī* (585) which seems to define *dhammuddhacca* as the mental agitation or distraction arising in meditative watchers because of the confusion created by the illumination et cetera ten dhammas which function as obstructions to those meditative watchers who are slow to understand things as they truly are

mandapaññānaṃ vipassakānaṃ upakkilesavattuttā vipassanūpakkilesasaññītesu obhāsādisu dasasu dhammesu bhantāvasena uddhaccasahagatacittuppattiyā vikkhepasānikhātāṃ uddhaccaṃ dhammuddhaccaṃ. tena dhammuddhaccena viggahītaṃ virūpagahītaṃ virodhaṃ āpādītaṃ mānaṣaṃ cittaṃ dhammuddhaccaviggahītaṃ mānaṣaṃ hoti. tena vā dhammuddhaccena kāraṇabhūtena tammūlakatanhāmānadiṭṭhuppattiyā viggahītaṃ mānaṣaṃ hoti.

Furthermore, as the Commentary informs, with time and practice, this practitioner, being a meditative watcher, finds a way to overcome this

agitation by analysing the *dhammas*. In other words, this fourth method has its connection to meditative watching. The Commentaries attribute this method also to those of the pure meditative watchers and identify the method as the path (of the stream-winner) preceded by *dhammuddhacca* (See the *Saddhammappakāsinī*, 584).

Thus, the four methods discussed in the discourse (AN 4.170; AN II 157) can be shown as follows: (1) One practises first meditative appeasing and then practises meditative watching and attains liberation; (2) one practises first meditative watching and then practises meditative appeasing and attains liberation; (3) one practises meditative appeasing and meditative watching conjointly and attains liberation; (4) one practises meditative watching in excess, meets with and overcomes obstructions generated by meditative watching itself, and then continues with meditative watching, and attains liberation.

Conclusion

As it could be seen from the above discussion, the two main Buddhist meditation techniques of meditative appeasing and meditative watching could be combined in four different ways to make them effective in gaining access to the supramundane path (the paths of the stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner, and Arahāt) conducive to liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom, the final goal, or the extinguishment of the fires of lust, hatred, and delusion. The four ways of combining the two that are discussed in both the discourses and Theravāda texts could be summarized as: (1) the method in which meditative appeasing is practised first and meditative watching second; (2) the method in which meditative watching is practised first and meditative appeasing second; (3) the method in which meditative appeasing and meditative watching are practised conjointly; and (4) the method of pure meditative watching in which the required level of concentration to facilitate wisdom is generated within meditative watching itself.

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Notes

- 1 In the Bodhisattva Path of the Mahāyāna Buddhism, the first three concentrations appear as the first three of four *dhyānas*, the fourth being the *adukkhamasukha* (*savitarkasavicāra*, *avitarka-avicāra*, *avicāra*, *aduḥkhāsukha*). The next three comes as *samādhis* (*sūnyatāsamādhi*, *animittasamādhi*, *aprañihitasamādhi*). Then the ten stages of the Bodhisattvahood begin (*pramuditā*, *vimalā*, *prabhākarī*, *arcismatī*, *sudurjayā*, *abhimukhā*, *dūraṅgamā*, *acalā*, *sādhūsmatī*, *dharmameghā*). At the final stage of the *dharmameghā*, the Bodhisattva defers his *nirvāna* in order to liberate others.
- 2 Henepola Gunaratana, *The Path of Serenity and Insight* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985), p. 3.
- 3 Winston King, *Theravāda Meditation*, p. 82.
- 4 Gunaratana, *The Path of Serenity and Insight*, p. 3.
- 5 King, *Theravāda Meditation*, p. 16.
- 6 The term *kevalin* is often used in Jainism to denote the omniscience and the release of the perfected ones in Jainism as those who have attained the *kaivalya-nāṇa* or the state of *kevala*, as Zimmer renders it, “isolation-integration” or the absolute release.
- 7 A. Sole-Leris, *An Introduction to the Oldest Form of Buddhist Meditation: Tranquility and Vipassanā*, (London: Rider & Company, 1986), p. 21.
- 8 Paul Griffiths, “Concentration or Insight: The Problematic of Theravāda Buddhist Meditation-Theory,” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, vol. xlix, no. 4 (December 1981).
- 9 Sole-Leris, *An Introduction to the Oldest Form of Buddhist Meditation*, p. 17.
- 10 The PTS edition reads *dharmuddhaccaviggahītaṃ mānasam*, and the Nālandā edition reads *dharmuddhaccaviggahitaṃ mānasam*. The *Saddhammapakkāsīnī* (585) reads: *dharmuddhaccaviggahitaṃ mānasam* in the lemma and adds: *dharmuddhaccaviggahitamānasanti vā pāṭho hoti*. Bhikkhu Bodhi interprets *dhamma-* as the Dhamma, the Buddha’s teaching in general (See Bhikkhu Bodhi, *The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha*, p. 536).
- 11 These ‘illumination’ et cetera are counted as the ten ‘afflictions of vipassanā’ (*vipassanūpakilesā*) that are said to affect an inexperienced meditator. On the other hand, Buddhaghosa in his *Visuddhimagga* (PTS), p. 634, has explained this illumination et cetera as the illumination et cetera from vipassanā (*tattha obhāsoti vipassanobhāso*).
- 12 David Seyfort Rugg, *Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective: On the Transmission and Reception of Buddhism in India and Tibet*, (London: University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1989), p. 189.
- 13 Rugg gives following references in his footnote number 414: See *Visuddhimagga* xxxiii 18. On the *sukkhavipassaka* (and *suddha-vipassanā-yānika*), see *Visuddhimagga* viii 237 and xviii 5; *Saddhammapakkāsīnī*, pp. 563, 584. Cf. Nyanatiloka-Nyanaponika, *Buddhist Dictionary* (Colombo, 1980), p. 215; and S.Z. Aung, *Compendium of Philosophy* (London, 1910), pp. 55, 75. On *vipassanā* as ‘rough’ or ‘brittle’ (*lūkhabhūta*), in contradistinction to *samatha* as ‘soft’ or ‘malleable’ (*siniddhabhūta*), see *Saddhammapakkāsīnī*, p. 281.

Three ‘Endangered Species’ in Theravāda Buddhist Studies

Asanga TILAKARATNE

Introduction

The theme discussed in this essay does not belong to Theravāda studies proper because it does not involve any doctrinal, philosophical or any other aspect in Theravāda Buddhism. If at all it may be accommodated among the methodological studies relevant to Buddhist studies in general and Theravāda studies in particular. What I would like to do in this paper is to bring to the notice of the Buddhist and Theravāda scholars specifically a trend prevalent in Theravāda studies, if allowed to go unexamined, will cause invalidation of the subject altogether. The paper, accordingly, is both descriptive and prescriptive.

Theravāda Buddhist Studies: Historical Context

As Theravāda is the oldest and oldest existing Buddhist tradition, it has also a claim to be the oldest Buddhist academic tradition. Although one does not entail the other, in the case of Theravāda, however, it so happens that it is both the oldest Buddhist tradition and Buddhist academic tradition as I will explain shortly. We all know that Buddhism as an institution started as a community of people who gathered around the Buddha and opted to follow the path shown by him. However, from what we can gather from the *Sutta* and the *Vinaya* we see the gradual evolution of this community to form an organization with people bound by a common philosophical vision and a way of behavior.

The life of such eminent disciples as Sāriputta, Upāli, Mahā Kaccāna and Ānanda, in particular, betray indications that they, in addition to their being religious people with religious goals bearing on their inner purity and inner happiness, represented themselves within the community as ‘learned’ in the Dhamma and the *Vinaya*, in addition to being elders, guides, teachers, colleagues [co-religionists – *sabrahmacāri*] etc. The rest of the *saṅgha* depended on them for the knowledge of the teaching which was an essential prerequisite of the practice. Surely there must have been organized efforts during the time of the Buddha himself to keep without loss what the Buddha taught. Discourses such as *Saṅgīti* and *Dasuttara* (*Dīgha-nikāya* 33 & 34) seem to bear evidence to some of the early efforts by the immediate disciples of the Buddha to keep the Dhamma (and *Vinaya*) in some organized form. In the *Alagaddūpama-sutta* (*Majjhima-nikāya* 22) the Buddha finds fault with some *bhikkhus* who learned the Dhamma for wrong purposes. But it is sufficient evidence to believe that study of the Dhamma existed at this early stage as a separate function among the *Saṅgha*.

According to my understanding, however, the clear beginning of what we may consider today as the ‘academic’ study of Buddhism is marked by the first council convened three months after the *parinirvāṇa* of the Buddha. Up to this point, by and large, the disciples of the Buddha learned the Dhamma only insofar as such knowledge was needed for the practice of the Dhamma for the simple reason that without knowing what the Dhamma is one cannot be expected to practice it. The rationale behind this approach to the Dhamma was well exemplified in the following well known statements of the *Dhammapada*¹ (19-20):

Though much he recites the Sacred Texts, but acts not accordingly,
that heedless man is like a cowherd who counts others’ kine. He has
no share in the fruits of the Holy Life.

Though little he recites the Sacred Texts, but acts in accordance with
the teaching, forsaking lust, hatred and ignorance, truly knowing,
with mind well freed, clinging to naught here and hereafter, he shares
the fruits of the Holy Life.

Marking a turning point from this practical attitude to the Dhamma, in which learning was understood merely as a means to the soteriological end, was the Buddha’s *parinirvāṇa*, leaving none as the successor, and to make matters even worse (in the eyes, most probably, of many disciples who felt ‘refugeless’ and started missing a personal leader), placing the Dhamma he taught and the *Vinaya* he prescribed in his place as the future guide (*satthā*) of the community.² This state of affairs necessitated keeping the Dhamma and the *Vinaya* as a methodical and organized body agreed upon by all stake holders so that the authority of the teaching of the Buddha remained unchallenged. The immediate reason for the first *saṅgāyanā*, most probably, is this (although tradition highlights a different development as the reason³). As I have highlighted elsewhere⁴ the meaning of the act of ‘chanting together’ or communal recitation (*sam+gāyanā*) was acceptance with unanimity what is so chanted. Another very important tradition with far-reaching effects initiated at this meeting was to assign what was jointly chanted to specific groups to preserve for the sake of the future generations. Accordingly, the *Vinaya* was assigned to Upāli Thera and his pupils who were already considered to be ‘*Vinaya* experts’. The four *nikāyas* (because the *Khuddaka* was yet to be formed), *Dīgha*, *Majjhima*, *Samyutta* and *Ānguttara* were assigned in that order to the four *theras* and their pupils, Ānanda, the pupils of Sāriputta (who had predeceased the Buddha) Mahā Kassapa and Anuruddha.⁵

Clearly what happened at the first *saṅgāyanā* was to establish what may be called an ‘academic’ tradition which has continued up till today. This should not be understood as something totally new in the monastic life which did not exist when the Buddha was still living. There is evidence in the canon to the existence of ‘learning groups’ organized around the chief disciples of the Buddha while the Buddha was still living.⁶ The interest in the preservation of the word of the Buddha should not come to us as a totally

new innovation judging by the fact that some of the chief disciples of the Buddha were coming from Brahmin families who, we may imagine, were very familiar with the Brahminic tradition of Vedic studies. So what may have happened at the first *saṅgāyanā* was to officially establish as a tradition what was already there among the key disciples of the Buddha. From this point onward, it is reasonable to imagine that the *bhikkhus* and the *bhikkhunīs*⁷ had the additional responsibility of learning the word of the Buddha for the sake of its preservation, which is to go beyond the needs of their immediate soteriological task, falling, nevertheless, very much within the scope of practice of compassion for others who were desirous of following the path. What I mean by 'academic study' in this context is this need to study the Dhamma and the *Vinaya* for an extra-soteriological reason.

How the practice started in this manner gradually evolved to become a full-fledged academic tradition represented by the term '*gantha-dhura*', the yoke of books, is a well-known story which I need not detail here.⁸ A peak occasion of this development is reported in the Buddhist history of Sri Lanka: the *Mahāvamsa* records that the word of the Buddha was committed to writing in books (*potthakesu likhāpayum*) during the reign of Vaṭṭagāmiṇī Abhaya (29-17 BCE). Although some modern scholars are reluctant to accept this as historical, citing that it is only literary evidence recording an event that took place five centuries back, what makes this record reliable is the context in which a good number of monks who remembered the texts died due to the long famine and the fact that for the first time the Mahāvihāra fraternity lost the royal support. The commentaries further report that one text, *Niddesa*, was remembered by only one monk whose moral integrity was questionable, making it hard for good monks to go to him and learn the text from him. It is quite logical that the monks decided at this crucial point to copy down the texts they maintained till that point by memory. The commentaries refer to a very important shift of emphasis in the Buddhist monastic life and attitudes that came along with this development, namely, the victory of the 'preachers of the Dhamma', (*dhamma-kathika*), who represented the learning (*pariyatti*) or the yoke of books (*gantha-dhura*) over 'those who wore rag-robos' (*paṃsukūlika*), who represented practice (*paṭipatti*) or who practiced the yoke of insight (*vipassanā-dhura*). The relevance of this incident to the present discussion is that, whatever its implications for the soteriological practice of the monastic life, it marks the existence of a full-fledged academic tradition within Theravāda Buddhism as far back as the 1st century BCE.

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we can safely assume that it is this tradition established in the 1st century BCE that has continued in Sri Lanka till modernity. As we have just seen this tradition traces its origin to the time of the Buddha, to be more specific, to the first *saṅgāyanā* in which the immediate disciples of the Buddha played a key role. Although the Pāli canon was still at its inception, it is reasonable to take what was chanted

at the first *saṅgāyanā* as forming the basis not only for what later evolved to be the canon or the *ti-piṭaka* ('three baskets') of Theravādins but also of all the other traditions that broke away from it. In this sense the Pāli canon claims the word of the Buddha in its earliest available form. The unbroken continuity of the canon also testifies to the continuation of Pāli language which the Theravāda tradition takes to be the language spoken by the Buddha.

Here we have three basic beliefs which are central to the Theravāda tradition, namely, the Pāli canon as representing the earliest version of the word of the Buddha, Pāli to be the language spoken by the Buddha and the third, which was not required to spell out specifically, that the tradition that traces its origin to the immediate disciples of the Buddha to be the Theravāda tradition. The traditional Buddhist scholarship still asserts these beliefs, and these beliefs constitute the basic assumptions of the tradition. One may think that the tradition is dogmatic to hold these assumptions. Whether the present traditional Theravāda Buddhist scholarship accepts these assumptions dogmatically or not, these beliefs are what is unanimously supported in the Theravāda historical and commentarial literature. Anyone who accepts the recorded historical tradition cannot draw different conclusions. Nevertheless, the fact of the matter is that the tradition has been questioned and it has been questioned seriously by the modern Buddhist scholarship.

What I am going to do in the remainder of this paper is to study the grounds on which these assumptions have been questioned, and to develop some thoughts on how the Theravāda scholars should respond to these developments. When I say Theravāda scholars or academics it, of course, includes both categories, scholars who specialize in Theravāda as in any other academic discipline and hence Theravāda scholars in professional sense and those scholars who, in addition to being Theravāda scholars or academics in professional sense, also identify with the Theravāda tradition as their religion inherited by birth or adopted subsequently. This division does not mean that only those academics who are not Theravāda Buddhists question these assumptions or that the Buddhist scholars who are traditional Theravāda Buddhists, or Theravāda scholars who are non-Theravāda Buddhists, do not question these assumptions.

Early Buddhism

The concept of early Buddhism is not known to the traditional students of Buddhism. Nor was it a category conceptualized during the premodern period. It came into vogue starting from the late nineteenth century when the Western scholars started studying Buddhism. As we know, Pāli texts started appearing in the West starting from the latter part of the nineteenth century⁹ and the systematic introduction of Pāli texts to the West was started with the establishment of Pāli Text Society in 1880 by Rhys Davids who came to Sri Lanka, then Ceylon, as a junior member of the British Colonial

administration, and studied Pāli from Sri Lanka monks. Rhys Davids appears to be the first to use the concept 'early Buddhism'. As early as 1881 delivering Hibbert lecture series in America he announced the birth of Pāli Text Society and said: "The sacred texts of the early Buddhists have preserved to us" (as quoted by Jaini in 2001, p.33). The Pāli canon and early Buddhism were coextensive for these early scholars. In other words, early Buddhism was to be found in the Pāli canon.

The initial need to think in terms of early Buddhism may have been the perceived difference between what the Western visitors saw in the day-to-day practice of the lands where Buddhism was the traditional religion and what they found in the texts. Subsequently, in academic use, the term was more refined to signify a distinction between the canonical discourses and the commentaries and sub-commentaries and other related texts which were considered to belong to a later period. Going beyond this classification, even a finer distinction was made within the Pāli canon itself, some texts or some sections of the texts to have earlier and some to have later origins,¹⁰ thus limiting the concept of early Buddhism only to some sections of the texts or to some texts in the Pāli canon. Gradually, with Buddhist scholarship expanding to non-Pāli sources, particularly to the *āgama* literature found in classical Chinese sources, the concept of early Buddhism started having candidates other than the Pāli canon.

To illustrate this shift in Buddhist scholarship we may refer to two distinguished Sri Lankan Buddhist scholars, both are now no more, K.N. Jayatilleke and D.J. Kalupahana. When Jayatilleke published his main study of Buddhist philosophy, he named it 'Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge' without any further explanation. His primary source was the discourses in the Pāli canon and only very sparsely he referred to commentaries.¹¹ Jayatilleke's book was published in 1963, and he did his studies in London in late 1940s and 1950s. Kalupahana, on the other hand, who did his studies in London in late 1960s studied classical Chinese and made use of that knowledge to refer to Chinese *Āgama* to support his arguments. Thus for Kalupahana early Buddhism included not only Pāli sources but also Classical Chinese sources. In his study of Nāgārjuna Kalupahana refers to the Chinese translation of the *Kaccāyanagotta-sutta* in order to establish the authenticity of the *sutta* in the Pāli canon.¹²

With these new developments, on the one hand, the concept of early Buddhism shrunk because it was understood not to refer to the entire Pāli canon but only some parts of it, and, on the other hand, it became expanded to include the Chinese *Āgama* literature and other sources considered as belonging to an early period.

The story (or rather the fate) of early Buddhism does not end here. The more recent developments focus on the very concept of early Buddhism. A representative of the scholars who have questioned the validity of the concept

of early Buddhism is Steve Collins, one of the leading Buddhist scholars whose recent demise is a great loss to the field of Buddhist studies¹³. Collins identifies three periods in the history of Buddhism, namely, (i) early, pre-Asokan Buddhism, (ii) the 'long Middle Ages' from Asoka in the 3rd century BC to the period of modernization, and (iii) modernization. Describing the early pre-Asokan period, Collins says:

For the first period there is some archeological evidence from Northeast India in the mid-1st millennium BC, from which we may be able to draw conclusions about urbanization and state-formation as contexts for early Buddhism. But for early Buddhism itself we have only the evidence of texts, all of which are from a much later period. In my view any attempt at delineating what early Buddhism was, and still more 'What the Buddha Taught' are fantasies, wish-fulfillment exercises which select materials from the later evidence and project them back to the Buddha.¹⁴

In this statement Colin's argument to support his view is that texts are from much later period. About the Buddhist canonical texts we have the evidence, as we noted earlier in this discussion, from the *Mahāvamsa* which says that the word of the Buddha was committed to writing during the reign of Vaṭṭagāmiṇī Abhaya (29-17 BCE).¹⁵ But for critics like Collins this is textual evidence about textual evidence which was recorded in the *Mahāvamsa* roughly about five centuries after the event. Since at least some of the Pāli texts recorded in the 1st century BCE could date back to the *parinirvāṇa* of the Buddha (which could have happened somewhere around 5-4 centuries BCE) what the *Mahāvamsa* recorded can be dated back to one thousand years. Furthermore, the palm-leaf manuscripts available for us today are hardly older than three hundred years.¹⁶ So the argument is: how can we talk about two thousand five hundred years of history based on evidence not older than three hundred years? The end result of this skepticism is that ultimately we are not in a position to say anything definitively about the teaching of the Buddha. As Collins would assert again in a more recent writing, 'we cannot have any historically certain, or even reliable, knowledge of what Buddhism was'.¹⁷ Hence his allusion in the above-quoted passage to Walpola Rahula Thera's celebrated work, *What the Buddha Taught*, as betraying some kind of naïve sense of certainty on our knowledge of what the Buddha taught.

When Walpola Rahula Thera published his work in 1959 he would not have imagined that the title of his book would carry a sense of arrogance or that it would be understood as making an emphatic statement of *what the Buddha taught*. He must have simply accepted the textual tradition that was preserved in Sri Lanka for about two millennia and presented in his work what these texts consistently and coherently contained as what the Buddha taught. The question is: is the situation as bleak as Collins would have us to believe?

A leading scholar of Buddhism who has questioned this skepticism and relativism is Professor Richard Gombrich. His approach to this issue is twofold: one is by way of defending a method to understand the origin of the teaching of the Buddha and to interpret the Buddhist texts. And the other is a critique of the very liberal way of interpreting texts as 'anything goes'. The method he uses is historical method. His more recent work deals mainly with this method following which he wishes to establish that the early Buddhist texts present a coherent philosophy which must have been thought by one person. In *How Buddhism Began* (second edition 2006) Gombrich elaborates on the historical method according to which the context or the historical context is crucial to understand any historical text, and applies this method to understand Buddhism. The sub-title of the book, *The conditional genesis of the early teachings*, amply clarifies this point. His subsequent work, *What the Buddha Thought* (Equinox, UK 2009), is a clear reference to Walpola Rahula *Thera's* work and meant to answer those who question the possibility of knowing what the Buddha taught. Gombrich believes that the historical approach provides a way to understand the basic teachings of the Buddha as 'dependently arisen', or as responses to the main teachings of the Upanisadic traditions and other Indian traditions, in particular, the teachings of *Bṛhadāranyaka-Upaniṣad* (p.31).

In responding to the interpretational relativism which holds that a text is open for any number of interpretations, Gombrich says:

That extreme form of relativism which claims that one reading of a text, for instance of a historical document, is as valid as another, I regard as such a contraction of knowledge. I wish to take the Buddha's middle way between two extremes. One extreme is the deadly oversimplification which is inevitable for beginners but out of place in a university, the over-simplification which says that 'the Buddha taught X' or 'Mahayanists believe Y', without further qualification. The other extreme is deconstruction fashionable among social scientists who refuse all generalization, ignore the possibilities of extrapolation, and usually leave us unenlightened (Gombrich 1996, p.7)

Against this form of relativism in interpretation Gombrich proposes that there must be one right way to understand what the Buddha thought and taught.

In responding to the skepticism amounting to rejecting any knowledge of Buddhism, Gombrich has to say the following:

It [*What the Buddha Thought*] argues that we can know far more about the Buddha than it is fashionable among scholars to admit, and that his thought has a greater coherence than is usually recognized. ...Incidentally, since many of the Buddha's allusions can be traced in the Pāli versions of surviving texts, the book establishes the importance of the Pāli canon as evidence. (Gombrich 2009, Preface)

Gombrich's research aims to establish that the system of thought found in the Pāli canon is systematic and coherent, and hence it must have been thought out by one mind, and that mind should belong to the Buddha. It is not my purpose here to reproduce Gombrich's arguments. My purpose here is to highlight the on-going academic debate on early Buddhism and the Pāli canon. The type of skepticism held by scholars such as Collins is based on questioning the authenticity of the Pāli canon. But what this skepticism fails to explain is the existence of the Pāli canon and its continuation through history. Is it a result of some kind of conspiracy on the part of the Buddhist monks in India or in Sri Lanka? There is no doubt that the texts originated at some point of time. But how did that happen? Did the texts come out of nowhere? What was the basis for these texts? Theravāda has an answer for this question. But although it may not explain how all texts came into existence, at least that story tells us how the main set of texts came into being. If the basic Dhamma and *Vinaya* were collected at the first council we can understand how Abhidhamma developed based on the Dhamma and how '*abhivinaya*' (although it is not called so), namely the *Parivāra-Pāli*, came into existence based on the *Ubhato vibhaṅga* and *Khandhaka*. If we do not accept this traditional story the other possibility would be to attribute some mischievous plan to the early groups of monks to hoodwink the posterity to believe that there was a person called Buddha who taught these ideas.

In this context, in particular, we cannot ignore the practical application of the teaching, namely, generations of people practicing the path and claiming to get results. This practical element is something unique to the Pāli canon. Although what is preserved in classical Chinese belongs to early schools, these texts were translated into Chinese motivated mainly by the desire to know what the Indian and hence early tradition was and to preserve those for posterity. The content may have been incorporated to some extent into the subsequent Chinese religious life. But in most of the cases, these texts have remained as library collections playing virtually no role in actual religious life of the people who preserved them. Theravāda Pāli canon is different. It has an unbroken history of two millennia of continued practice at varying intensities in meditating, teaching, listening, memorizing etc.

To believe in the tradition without critical inquiry is equally wrong as to reject it totally. I do not think that anyone should believe the story told in the accounts of the 1st *saṅgāyanā* that the entire three *piṭakas* were recited during that council. Historically it is a loss for the students of Buddhism to not to have the names of those who were responsible for compiling the canonical texts.¹⁸ With a text like *Aṅguttara-nikāya* which is clearly a result of great a compilation effort, it is ridiculous to think that the Buddha taught his disciples the collections of ones, twos etc. Abhidhamma texts with their detailed, precise and intricate analyses might have taken years to develop among different groups of teachers and pupils. In the over enthusiasm of

the Theravāda to make the entire Abhidhamma the word of the Buddha – *buddha-vacana* – we have been deprived of the knowledge of a great analytical tradition of monastic scholarship.

It is not a problem at all that the modern scholarship analyses the literary formation and the content of the Pāli canon which is the early phase of Buddhism. The real problem is when critical scholarship goes beyond the boundaries of constructive scholarship and tends to be dismissive and nihilist. Before dismissing the Pāli canon on the basis of the relative recentness of the palm-leaf manuscripts, one has to explain how those manuscripts came into being. If they have been copied from earlier ones where did those earlier ones come from? Finally, either we have to go to the early beginnings of the texts right from the *parinirvāna* of the Buddha or we have to accept a conspiracy theory. The interesting and intriguing story of Puraṇa Thera in the *Cullavagga* account of the first council clearly points to the possibility of the existence of 'versions' of the word of the Buddha already during the life time of the Buddha. Evidence of this nature recorded in the Theravāda history, notwithstanding its potential harm to Theravāda, cannot be ignored easily. Therefore any effort to dissolve the very idea of early Buddhism and the Pāli canon's claim on it is to take away the heart of Theravāda Buddhist studies. The task of the Theravāda Buddhist scholar is not to hold on to the traditional view at any cost, but to subject it to logical scrutiny with an overall constructive attitude to the system.

Theravāda and Pāli Language

The other two aspects that have come under scrutiny of the modern Buddhist scholars are Theravāda and Pāli language. The recent academic discussions and debates on these two issues have been mainly on two matters: one is on Theravāda and Pāli as proper names: when were Theravāda and Pāli called Theravāda and Pāli and by whom? The second matter with regard to Pāli is its historicity: is it the language spoken by the Buddha? Is the present Pāli canon a 'translation' from an original canon existed in even earlier more ancient dialect? For Theravāda, the issue is whether or not there is any identifiable phenomenon called Theravāda. The general flavor of these discussions is characterized by skepticism and hence leading to dismissal of the validity of these concepts.

On the word 'Pāli' to refer to Pāli language, there has been much scholarly discussion recently. As all scholars agree, initially 'Pāli' was not a term denoting a language. In the commentaries it was used to refer specifically to the word of the Buddha. The language attributed to the Buddha in the commentaries is Magadha. The belief is that the Buddha spoke in Magadha dialect. In the Buddhist world today no one uses '*magadha*' to refer to the canonical language. This has been replaced by 'Pāli'. The question is when did this happen and who is responsible for it. The view proposed by

such scholars as K.R. Norman and Oskar von Hinuber is that the Europeans started this usage and it was followed by the Theravādins, making it another instance of the European influence on Buddhist studies. Von Hinuber refers to *Saṅgharājasādhucariyāva* written in Sri Lanka in 1779 as the earliest instance of using ‘Pāli’ as a language name. He also refers to a report written in 1672 by Charles Angot who mentions that a French missionary named M. Laneau in Thailand studied this language¹⁹. According to Norman and von Hinuber initially this was a misunderstanding which later became established.

I do not need to go into this debate which is now becoming a thing of the past. Kate Crosby (2004) in her paper “The Origin of Pāli as a Language Name in Medieval Theravāda Literature”²⁰ reviews the history of the whole debate among the European scholars on this matter and provides conclusive evidence to establish Pāli as a language name is not a result of misunderstanding on the part of Europeans, but it was a natural development among the Theravāda scholars, who used this word which initially referred to the word of the Buddha, to refer to the language of the word of the Buddha. She cites *khuddsikkhā Abhinavatīka* of Saṅgharakkhita Thera who was a pupil of Sāriputta Thera of the Polonnaruva period of ancient Lanka (12th century CE) as the earliest clear reference to Pāli as a language although she points out to an even earlier instance of commentator Dhammapāla using it in his sub-commentary to Buddhaghosa’s *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*.

The scholarly debate on the name of Pāli language appears to be over. But the significance of this debate in the present context is how scholarly debates in the Theravāda studies are formed. Furthermore it highlights how the things should not be taken for granted which is an undesirable characteristic of Theravāda studies in the traditional Theravāda settings.

A similar scholarly discussion is taking place on the term Theravāda: when was this term used to refer to the Theravāda tradition as a whole?²¹ Collins traces the recent history of the term:

The modern use of the term seems to derive originally from the British civil servant George Turnour in Sri Lanka in 1836; the first use of the phrase ‘Theravāda Buddhism’ seems to have been by the Thai Prince Chudadharn at the Chicago World’s Parliament of Religions in 1893 (though it was not used there by the much more influential speaker Anagarika Dharmapala), and by the western monk Ananda Maithreya (Allen Bennet) in an article in the *Bulletin de l’École française d’extrême-orient* in 1907 (he wrote of ‘*le pur Bouddhisme de l’ecole Theravada*’). The single most important factor in establishing the world’s current usage was the decision by the World Fellowship of Buddhists to use the term (as opposed to others such as *Hīnayāna* or *Southern Buddhism*) taken at a meeting in 1950.²²

In this view, the term was first used by George Turnour who was a British civil servant in Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) in 1836. This is just after two decades from the British take-over of the country. Now, did Turnour invent this term on his own which is most unlikely? Where did he get it? Isn't it more reasonable to think that he got it from an already existing tradition? Collins refers to Anagarika Dharmapala at Chicago and his non-use of the term. As I have highlighted elsewhere²³ Dharmapala had a global vision of Buddhism (which Kemper 2015 calls 'universalism') following which he represented not Theravāda or Sri Lanka but all Buddhists all over the world. He started his inaugural speech at Chicago by saying that he brought good wishes of more than four hundred million Buddhists all over the world. **Whatever that may be, what is more important to me in this debate, as I will discuss again shortly, is the reductionism which deprives Theravāda of any definitive content or continuity.**

The term, as all know, occurs in the discourses such as the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* (*Majjhima-nikāya* 22) clearly not in this later sense. But its presence even in a different sense makes its later metamorphosis more understandable because the later users did not have to invent a new term. But when did the tradition start using the term to refer to itself is a question. In the first *saṅgāyanā* the term used to refer to the event was 'theriya' (belonging to *theras*). In the subsequent commentarial literature the term is used to refer to the literal meaning of the term, the view or the standpoint of the elders. In the *Samantapāsādikā* introduction Buddhaghosa uses this term in this sense when he said:

*tathāpi antogadhatheravādani – saṁvaṇṇanā samma samārabhissani.*²⁴

In a discussion of Theravāda tradition and its identity (in the second IATBU conference keynote speech) Professor Oliver Abenayake identifies three meanings of the term Theravāda. One is the early canonical use of the term in the discourses such the *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta* where it means stability (*thira-bhāva*). The second is the commentarial use of the term to refer to the views of individual Theravāda elders. A representative instance of this use is Buddhaghosa's four criteria (*apadesa*), namely, *sutta*, *suttānuloma*, *ācariyavāda* and *attano-mati*. The first three respectively mean the discourses of the Buddha, what is in conformity with the discourses, and commentaries. And the fourth is the views of individual elders (one's own view) which is named Theravāda (views of the elders). In degree of authority, Buddhaghosa maintains, this last occupies the lowest position.

Elaborating on to the third meaning of the term Abenayake refers to several instances in the commentaries, sub-commentaries and *Dīpavaṁsa* which he interprets as referring to the entire tradition: Let me quote the relevant passage completely:

The third meaning is employed in the commentaries, chronicles and the sub-commentaries. The *Samantapāsādikā* states that the Arahant Mahinda learned all the commentaries with Theravāda from the Arahant Moggaliputta Tissa. The Venerable Buddhaghosa informs us that he compiled the *Samantapāsādikā* inclusive of the Theravāda. The *Dīpavaṃsa* records that the collections of the First Council are called Theravāda, since they were carried out by the Elders. The *Dīpavaṃsa* further informs that the Arahant Moggaliputta Tissa taught the complete Theravāda and the entire *Vinaya-piṭaka* to the arahant Mahinda. The *Mahāvamsa* too recounts that the First Council is called Theriya since it was done by the Elders. According to the *Mahāvamsa*, the Venerable Buddhaghosa studied both Theravāda and commentaries at the Mahāvihāra in Anuradhapura. While elaborating the phrase *sāṅghakatham sabbaṃ theravādam* in the *Samantapāsādikā*, the *Sāratthadīpanī*, the sub-commentary on the *Vinaya*, clarifies that it means the Pāli canon inclusive of the commentaries that was determined in the first two councils.²⁵

Of the evidence provided by Abenayake, except for the *Dīpavaṃsa* and the *Sāratthadīpanī*, the occurrence of the term Theravāda in the rest cannot be interpreted as exclusively referring to the entire Buddhist literature including the Pāli canon. ‘Theravāda’ in such contexts could well be the views of the respected elders in the tradition as Buddhaghosa would usually maintain. However, two examples from the *Dīpavaṃsa* and the *Sāratthadīpanī* seem to support better Abenayake’s interpretation.

The question, however, is: while relegating ‘Theravāda’ to ‘one’s own view’ – *attano-mati* – which is the lowest in the degree of authority, how is it possible that the same tradition opts to go by that name? One possible way to explain this would be to make a distinction between the doctrinal tradition of Buddhaghosa and the historical tradition represented by the *Dīpavaṃsa*. When Buddhaghosa interpreted ‘Theravāda’ as referring to *attano-mati* he was viewing the phenomenon from a point of view of the Dhamma. The *Dīpavaṃsa*, and subsequently the *Sāratthadīpanī* following the *Dīpavaṃsa*, may have referred to a historical tradition in which ‘Theravāda’ was acquiring a broader definition which subsequently got established as the name of the entire tradition.

According to Rupert Gethin who made a minute study of the instances of the occurrence of this term in the commentaries, Buddhaghosa does not use the term to refer to the organization or the doctrine as a whole.²⁶ Nor does Buddhaghosa identify himself with a tradition called Theravāda for the most obvious reason that such an institution called Theravāda did not exist for him. As I have shown in an earlier discussion,²⁷ notwithstanding our trust in Gethin in this matter, what is more relevant to the present context is whether or not Buddhaghosa identified himself with the interpretive tradition he is adhering to. On this matter there cannot be a doubt that he did. In his

commentaries Buddhaghosa makes frequent references to the tradition of the Mahāvihāra which he was following and he pays glowing tribute to that tradition.²⁸ We cannot easily reject the story of the origin of the *Visuddhimagga*: Buddhaghosa was required to write a text incorporating the entire Mahāvihāra way of interpretation of the word of the Buddha. Buddhaghosa considered his work as central to all the other commentaries.²⁹ This shows that there was a textual and interpretive tradition at Mahāvihāra which was very much settled even to the extent that the commentators of the caliber of Buddhaghosa came to Sri Lanka to study and translate it for the sake of the 'international community of the bhikkhus' (*dīpantare bhikkhujanassa*³⁰). It is this same tradition that was transmitted to the Southeast Asia in the 11th century (CE) and got established and developed further in that region.

Another historical example of the existence of a homogeneous Dhamma and *Vinaya* tradition in the Theravāda world is the phenomenon of 'purification of the *saṅgha*' executed by the kings with the support of the *Saṅgha*. The first of its kind was done, according to the Theravāda history, by King Asoka in India in the 3rd century BCE. Subsequently such acts were done, based on the Theravāda *Vinaya* tradition, by kings in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia which received the Sri Lanka tradition. Mahā Parakramabahu in the 12th century in Polonnaruva of ancient Lanka did one such purification with far-reaching effects. Subsequently the practice was followed by many rulers in Southeast Asia, in particular, in Myanmar. These acts of purification of the *Saṅgha* presuppose the existence of a well settled tradition of the Dhamma and the *Vinaya* which cannot be taken as just created abruptly and ad hoc by Asoka in India or Parakramabahu in Sri Lanka and the associated monks for the particular purpose exclusively.

The conclusion is, there is no doubt that there was a well-articulated and well-defined system in the Theravāda world. Whether it was called Theravāda or '*Mahāvihāra-vāda*' becomes less crucial from that point of view. Furthermore, why the tradition was not called by a specific name has something to do with the location of Sri Lanka as an island without any rival (Mahāyāna or Vajrayāna) Buddhist schools.³¹ There was not any particular need for the Sri Lanka Theravādins or the Theravādins in the Southeast Asia to assert themselves as Theravādins for naming requires differentiation.³²

Theravāda Tradition

This discussion of 'Theravāda' (Theravāda as a term) has automatically led us to a discussion on Theravāda as a tradition. As we just saw, whether it was called Theravāda or not, that there was from the beginning a well-articulated systematic set of teachings and canonical and non-canonical literature containing such teachings we cannot deny. In its present usage Theravāda refers to an organization comprising men and women, both monastic and household, spread around the world, with innumerable branch organizations

and institutions. In addition to this larger organizational aspect Theravāda refers to the following four inter-related phenomena: a set of teachings that constitute the philosophical core of Theravāda, a corpus of literature that contain these teachings, a tradition of interpretation of those teachings, and a form (or forms of) practice based on or even not based on such teachings. In this last category I would include, in addition to the very important and presently wide-spread practices of Theravāda meditation, sociological, anthropological and cultural behaviours and practices of different Theravāda groups.

What I see as problematic is sometimes Theravāda is presented without making adequate distinction between its different aspects. In particular, there is a tendency to present as Theravāda whatever that is found in Theravāda societies. This may be true from sociological or anthropological points of view. But it is important to be clear about the limits. At times this way of presenting Theravāda is supported by anti-essentialist argument, namely, to maintain that there is something fixed called Theravāda is to assume some sort of essentialism which is to be avoided. No doubt, anti-essentialism is closer to Buddhism, particularly in its understanding of reality including human being as non-substantial. That both the no-soul view and no-God view are rooted in Buddhist anti-essentialism is well known. However, if this position is taken out of its soteriological context and driven to an extreme it becomes self-defeating because there will not be a room to talk about something called Theravāda Buddhism or the teaching of the Buddha in the absence of which chaos becomes inevitable. What Richard Gombrich says in a slightly different context may be relevant here:

Those Buddhist traditions, which have lasted for over two and a half millennia and extended over a vast geographical area, are so diverse that some scholars scoff at the very notion that one can talk about 'Buddhism', and insist on using the word in scare quotes, if it has to be used at all. I disagree. Granted, Buddhism itself, as a human phenomenon, is subject to the Buddha's dictum that 'All compounded things are impermanent'. It would be astonishing if over such a long time, as it moved to different regions and cultures, it had not undergone vast changes; the same has happened to every human tradition. But the historian should be able to trace every branch of the tradition back to another branch, until we arrive at the trunk and root, the Buddha himself.³³

Gombrich uses the metaphor of going from branches to the trunk of the tree. This is equally applicable to Theravāda. While it is possible to talk about different forms of Theravāda, the very possibility of being able to talk about Theravāda assumes that there is some basic thing called Theravāda. If Theravāda does not have a core, particularly when it comes to its soteriology, Theravāda loses its purpose, will be ineffective, and consequently no longer will be Theravāda. Hence Theravāda needs to be rescued from this self-defeating relativism.

Pāli Language

Apart from the debates about 'Pāli' as a name for a language (which we discussed above), there is a wider debate about the status of Pāli language. This debate is centred around the traditional notion of Theravādins that Pāli is the language spoken by the Buddha. The Theravāda notion of Pāli which initially was called Magadhi is characterized in the later Pāli literature³⁴ in the following stanza:

*Sā māgadhi mūlabhāsā – narā yāyādikappikā
Brahmāno cassutālāpā – sambuddhā cāpi bhāsare*

(This Magadhi is the root language; it is the language which the human beings at the beginning of the aeon, Brahmās, those who have not yet heard any speech, and the Fully Enlightened Ones would speak.)

There is no evidence to show that this traditional belief was ever questioned by the Theravāda tradition although there are indications in this very statement that it was, most probably, proposed by the Theravādins to counter the Brahmanic view that theirs was the language of gods (*daivī vāg*). Therefore, the contemporary Theravāda tradition has to be appreciative of the recent scholarship, largely Western, for initiating critical studies of these beliefs. The point, however, is to have a realistic assessment as to what should be retained and what should be removed from the set of traditional beliefs.

Geiger, one of the early scholars of Pāli, holds a view closer to the traditional Theravāda view. He says:

I consider it wiser not to hastily reject the tradition altogether but rather to understand it to mean that Pāli was indeed no pure Magadhi, but was yet a form of the popular speech which was based on Magadhi and which was used by Buddha himself. It would appear therefore that the Pāli canon represents an effort to reflect the *Buddhavacanam* in its original form.³⁵

More recently writing an essay on Pāli language to the Pāli Text Society edition of Geiger's *A Pāli Grammar* Richard Gombrich provides three interconnected responses to the question 'what is Pāli?'

Pāli is the language of the earliest Buddhist scripture as preserved in one (conservative, but not static) Buddhist tradition (p. xxiii).
Pāli is the form of Prakrit (or Middle Indo-Aryan, which is the same thing) used in first writing down the Theravāda Buddhist Canon, an event took place in Sri Lanka in the 1st century B.C. (p. xxviii).
Pāli has undergone changes and development over the centuries: least in morphology (grammatical inflection) but quite noticeably in phonetics, syntax, style and vocabulary. As von Hinüber has put it, Pāli is not so much a "dead" language as an artificial language that has been repeatedly reshaped. (p. xxx).

What the scholars such as Gombrich wish to allow Pāli to be is that it is not the language the Buddha spoke but one related to it and very close to it.³⁶ This scholarly understanding is a result of studying the different stages and

different genres of Pāli literature including the Pāli canon. In particular, scholars have observed various mixed linguistic characteristics in the canonical language. If we understand the Buddha's refusal to translate his word into Sanskrit ("chandas") and subsequent approval of learning the Dhamma in the disciples' own language (*saka nirutti*) it is understandable how the word of the Buddha might have got mixed characteristics. In this manner it is quite possible that disciples memorized the word of Buddha with slight variations in word order, vocabulary etc. Buddhaghosa's commentaries testify to the existence of variant readings.³⁷ These may have been continued from early periods or found their way into the texts even after they were written down. If we accept that the entire Dhamma was not rehearsed at the first or even at the second *saṅgāyanā*, which means that the Pāli canon was gradually compiled by later disciples, then the present *Tripitaka* might not be the exact word of the Buddha, though undoubtedly, it is the closest we can get. This could be so even if what we have today is what was written down in the first century BCE in Sri Lanka because writing down itself is not a guarantee that changes, omissions or inadvertent commissions found their way into the texts in the process of continued copying.

One could argue for a 'pure' Pāli canon deriving support from Buddhaghosa's interpretation of '*saka-nirutti*' as meaning the Magadha dialect used by the Buddha. Geiger too accepts the Buddhaghosa's interpretation on the ground that the Buddha who did not approve translating his word into Sanskrit would not allow translating it into any other dialect.³⁸ Although this is not the proper context to go into this interpretational matter, the possibility of a canon comprising the exact word of the Buddha clearly goes against all historical evidence. Even if we were to accept that the disciples studied the Dhamma in the Buddha's own dialect it does not explain the presence of mixed characteristics in the canonical language including non-Magadha uses. There is no doubt that Pāli language has undergone changes. For instance, Geiger outlines four stages of its evolution, namely, Pāli in the *gathas*, canonical Pāli, Pāli in the post-canonical literature and Pāli in the later artificial poetry.³⁹ For the disciples of a tradition which rejected the Vedic conception of sacred language it is nothing but natural that they were more concerned about the meaning of what the Buddha said than its wording itself. Presently, however, the Theravāda tradition is guided by the Buddhaghosian tradition of attributing sacredness to the Pāli language.⁴⁰ Although here we are dealing with a sentiment of a long-held tradition, it is not always correct to interpret the early with the late. What is more crucial is to establish that there is a coherent and consistent system of thought articulated in these words.

Concluding Remarks

Early Buddhism, Theravāda and Pāli are three key terms in the Theravāda studies. All three are related and connected to one another. Jeopardization of one is to jeopardize all three. As the present review shows, on the one

hand, there is a growing skepticism and relativism in the field to the extent of denying any definitive content for the key concepts we discussed. On the other hand, we have the traditional scholarship, mostly but not exclusively, characterized by the unequivocal approval of the tradition lock stock and barrel. The correct position has to be found between these two extremes.

The message of this study is not that Theravāda scholars should wage war against the critical scholarship pertaining to the three concepts discussed above. What needs to be done is to employ the techniques of the same critical scholarship to counter the relativism and skepticism that have developed in the field to the point of self-destruction. It should be the responsibility of the higher learning centres of Pāli and Theravāda Buddhist studies world over to orient their studies and research to face this challenge successfully.

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Notes

- 1 *Bahumpi ce sahitāṃ bhāsamāno – na takkarō hoti naro pamatto*
Gopova gāvo ganayaṃ paresaṃ – na bhāgavā sāmāñhassa hoti (Dhammapada 1:19)
Appampi ce sahitāṃ bhāsamāno – dhammassa hoti anudhammacāri
Rāgañca dosañca pahāya mohaṃ – sammappajāno suvimuttacitto
Anupādiyāno idha vā huraṃ vā – sa bhāgavā sāmāñhassa hoti (Dhammapada 1:20)
 The translation is from Narada Thera (1963).
- 2 *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta, Dīgha-nikāya*. II p.154.
- 3 *Pañcasatikakhandhaka, Vinaya Piṭakaṃ II (Cullavagga-pāli)*.
- 4 Refer to “Sangiti and Samaggi: Communal Recitation and the Unity of the Sangha” in *Buddhist Studies Review* vol. 17 No.2, 2000.
- 5 *Sumaṅgalavilāsiniṅ Commentary to the Dīgha-nikāya I*. pp. 13-15.
- 6 Discourses mention how different groups of *bhikkhus*, depending on their intellectual and emotional preferences, gathered around different elders among whom were those well versed in the Dhamma and the *Vinaya (Saṃyutta-nikāya II p.155-156)*. The *Udāna* (Ud: 59) and the *Vinaya* (I: 197) mention that Sona Kuṭikaṇṇa, a student of Mahā Kaccāna Thera, chanting the *Aṭṭhaka vagga* (included the *Sutta-nipāta*) before the Buddha. Upāli Thera and his pupils are known to have mastered the *Vinaya*. The *Alagaddūpama-sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya* (22) mentions ‘certain empty persons’ (*ekacce moghapurisā*) who studied the Dhamma for wrong purposes. Mahā Kaccāna Thera was praised as the highest among those who elaborated in detail what the Buddha said in brief (*saṅkhittena bhāsītassa vitthārena atthaṃ vibhajantānaṃ yadidaṃ mahā kaccāno: Aṅguttara-nikāya I: 23*). The story of Purana Thera (*Cullavagga II 289-290*) alludes to the existence of the individual ‘experts’ in the Dhamma and the *Vinaya*.
- 7 Although nothing much is said in the Theravāda literature about the ‘academic’ aspect of *bhikkhunīs*, the discourses are not without reference to learned *bhikkhunīs* during the time of the Buddha. The *Cullavedalla-sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya* (44) refers to Bhikkhuni Dhammadinnā who explained deep Dhamma matters to her former husband; *Aṅguttara-nikāya* (I: 25) refers to *bhikkhunīs* who excelled in learnedness and teaching. In the later Theravāda literature, the *Dīpavaṃsa*, the earliest chronicle of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, records a tradition of *bhikkhunīs* who continued the unbroken tradition of Theravada *bhikkhuni* learning from the time of the Buddha to its writing presumably in the 2nd century CE.
- 8 For detailed discussions on this matter see Adikaram (2011) and Rahula (1956).
- 9 Refer to de Jong’s (1976) *A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America* for a discussion on this matter.
- 10 Refer to G.C. Pandey’s *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, Allahabad, 1957 for an exercise of this nature.
- 11 Rune Johansson, psychologist turned Buddhist scholar who studied under K.N.Jayatilke in 1960s at Peradeniya is even a better example for this method. His *Psychology of Nibbana*, (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1969) does not refer to any of the commentaries, and is based only on some selected texts of the *Sutta-piṭaka*. His subsequent works too follow the same method.
- 12 Refer to his *Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986). p.94. Note # 23.
- 13 See Charles Hallisay (2018) “Exploring the Buddhist Middle Way from a Middle Ground: In Memoriam Steven Collins” in *Sophia* (2018: 57 # 2) pp. 203-206. for a discussion of his contribution to Buddhist studies and other academic fields.
- 14 “‘Theravada Civilization(s)? Periodizing its History”, paper published along with “The Theravada Civilizations Project: Future directions for the study of Buddhism in Southeast Asia” by Juliane Chober and Steve Collins in *Contemporary Buddhism: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 13.1 (pp.157-166).
- 15 *Mahāvamsa* 33: 100-101.
- 16 According to Richard Gombrich (2005) many of the palm-leaf manuscripts found in Myanmar and Sri Lanka have been copied in the 18th or 19th centuries. A considerable number of manuscripts in Thailand belong to the 16th century. The oldest manuscript so far available is one of four leaves found in Kathmandu, Nepal, dated to the 800 CE. which may have been copied from a North Indian original several centuries back. Two Indian inscriptions containing several lines of canonical text have been dated to the 5th century CE or close to it. These lines are in a Middle Indo-Aryan dialect very close to Pāli.
- 17 Collins (2013) [page 4, not numbered]

- 18 It is possible that those arahants who were assigned at the end of the first council to study and maintain the Dhamma and *Vinaya* were in fact the compilers of those texts?
- 19 Crosby (2004).
- 20 *Journal of the Centre for Buddhist Studies Sri Lanka*, vol.II 2004, pp.70-116.
- 21 Todd LeRoy Pereira in his chapter (in Skilling 2012 pp. 443-571) on “Whence Theravada? The modern genealogy of an Ancient term” discusses in detail the early 20th century developments that led to the replacement of ‘*hīnayāna*’ by ‘*theravāda*’.
- 22 Collins 2013 p.2 (not numbered).
- 23 Tilakaratne 2015.
- 24 *Samantapāsādikā* I p.2.
- 25 “The Theravada Tradition: Its Identity” (2009) in *The Journal of The Association of Theravada Buddhist Universities*, ed. Ven. Dr. Khammai Dhammasami. Vol 1- 2009/2552. p.4.
- 26 “Was Buddhaghosa a Theravadin?” in Peter Skilling and others (2012), *How Theravada is Theravada? Exploring Buddhist identities* (Thailand: Silkworm Books).
- 27 “Theravada Tradition: An Outline of its History, Doctrines and Practice”, a paper presented at the conference on Buddhist Teresian Mysticism at Avila, Spain in 2017.
- 28 Refer to the introduction and the concluding remarks of the *Visuddhimagga*.
- 29 Refer to the introductory stanzas of the commentaries of all the four *nikāyas*.
- 30 *Sanvaṇṇanā sīhaladīpakena – vākyena esā pana saṅkhatattā na kiñci atthaṃ abhisambhunāti – dīpantare bhikkhujanassa yasmā: Samantapāsādikā Vinayaṭṭhakathā* I p.2.
- 31 This does not mean to deny that some elements of these two traditions were present in the country. How Abhayagiriya was open to the Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna texts and teachers is well known. But Abhayagiriya was not Mahāyāna as sometimes believed.
- 32 Anyhow it would be important for modern Theravāda scholars to inquire as to how the pre-modern *Saṅgha* in Sri Lanka or in the Theravāda world called themselves if they had to use a name at all.
- 33 Gombrich (2009) pp. 1-2.
- 34 *Dīgha-nikāya Abhinava-ṭīkā* introductory verses (*Chaṭṭha-saṅgāyanā* CD Rom). Also found in the *Payogasiddhi* introductory verses.
- 35 *Pāli Literature and Language* (original German edition 1916) Tr. Batakrishna Ghosh. 1943/1976.
- 36 In a more recent work Gombrich (2018) argues that Pāli is the language spoken by the Buddha.
- 37 Refer to Gombrich (2005)
- 38 Geiger (1943/1978) p.7.
- 39 Geiger (1943/1978) *Pāli Literature and Language*.
- 40 See Asanga Tilakaratne (1993) for a discussion on this matter. The belief in Pāli language as sacred itself can be an argument to support the view that Theravādins would not have dabbled in the Pāli canon.

The Influence of Daṇḍin's *Mirror of Poetry (Kāvya-darśa)* on Mongolian Buddhist Poetics

Vesna A. WALLACE

The *Mirror of Poetry*, a prominent treatise on poetics, composed by celebrated Indian poet Daṇḍin (7th-8th centuries), is the earliest, systematized Sanskrit work on poetics, a guide to writers striving for literary excellence (*mahākāvya*). It contains the earliest definition of poetry, sources and purpose of poetry (*kāvya*), poetic paths of dictions (*mārga*), ten excellent qualities of poetry (*guṇa*) and its ten faults (*doṣa*), poetics figures (*rūpa*) and ornaments (*alaṅkāra*), meters, classification of poetry, and so on. Its influence spread far beyond South Asia to Buddhist lands of Central and Inner Asia and shaped the Buddhist poetic theories and poetry of Tibet and Mongolia. Once translated into Tibetan and Mongolian languages, the *Mirror of Poetry* was included in the Tibetan and Mongolian Buddhist canons (Bstan 'gyur and Danjur).

For nearly three and a half centuries, beginning from the late seventeenth century, the study of Daṇḍin's *Mirror of Poetry* in Mongolia was carried out primarily by Buddhist monks. Although Mongolian Buddhist authors' interest in this work originally stemmed from their monastic training in linguistics, their fascination with it was also rooted in the fact that the Mongolian literary tradition was primarily a poetic tradition, which had hardly any "pure" prose. The frequent inclusions of poetry in prose texts and the fluid boundaries between verse and rhythmicized prose resulted in the prose-poetic hybridization of diverse genres of the Mongolian prose literature. A rich tradition of poetry writing in classical Mongolian literature took shape in the fourteenth century owing to the works of a renowned Mongolian scholar, author, and translator from Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Uighur, Choiji Odser (Chos kyi 'Od zer), who seems to have been the first to apply the principles of Indian poetics and the *Kāvya-darśa* to Mongolian writings. Mongolian scholars and writers studied the *Kāvya-darśa* chiefly through the Fifth Dalai Lama Lobsang Gyatso's (Ngag dbang Blo bzang Rgya Mtsho) commentary on this work, composed in 1647 and titled *The Melody of Please Sarasvatī, Explaining the Difficulties of the Kāvya-darśa Snyan ngag me long gi dka' 'grel dbyangs can dgyes pa'i glu dbyangs zhes bya ba bzhugs so*, in which the Fifth Dalai Lama also examined the previous, relevant works, corrected errors that he found in those works, and gave additional examples. For this reason, Mongolian authors deemed this commentary on the *Kāvya-darśa* as indispensable for a thorough understanding of its content.

Copious examples in the writings of Mongolian Buddhist authors demonstrate how instrumental the *Mirror of Poetry* was in the development of the Mongolian poetic tradition in general. Numerous versified eulogies, prayers, verses recited at the time of ritual offerings, benedictions in colophons, and other poetic works written by Mongolian scholars of the late seventeenth through the early twentieth centuries evidence both their authors' attempts to follow Daṇḍin's principle of poetic ornaments (*alamkāra*) and the influence of other theoretical principles of the *Mirror of Poetry*¹ on their writings. Here is a chronological list of only few well-known Mongolian authors who wrote in verse by following the principles of poetics as given in the *Kāvyaśāstra*:

17 th -18 th Centuries	18 th -19 th Centuries	19 th -20 th Centuries
Oirat Zaya Pandita Namkhajamts (1599-1662)	Dai <i>güüsh</i> Agvandampil (1700-1780)	Buriat Nomtyn Rinchin (1821-1907)
Öndör Gegeen Zanabazar (1635-1723)	Erdene Mergen Bandida, Ihsambuū's (Ngag dbang Ye shes bzang po, 1847-1896) ²	Shadvandandar (1835-1915)
Bandida Gegeen Luvsan Danzanjaltsan (1635-1704)	Zuugiiin Lam Dagvadarjaa (1734-1803)	Khoriny <i>lovon</i> (Tib. <i>slob dpon</i>) Baldansanjaajav (1839-1906)
Uradyñ <i>güüsh</i> Bilgüün Dalai (1680-1750)	Agvanbaldan (Ngag dbang dpal ldan, 1797-1864)	Zava Damdin's (Rta ba Rta mgrin Blo bzang Rta dbyangs 'Jam dbyans Dgyes pa'i Bshes gnyen, 1867-1937) ³
	Bragri Yongdzin Damtsigdorj (Brag ri Dam tshig rdo rje, 1781-1855)	Agvandanzanyam (Ngag dbang bstan 'dzin nyi ma, 1882-1937)
	Beiliin Lam Agvandamba (Ngag dbang bstan pa, 1814-1855)	Tsültemjamts (1880-1938)

Daṇḍin's definition of poetry given in the *Kāvyaśāstra*, Chapter 1, v. 11, *pada b*, according to which a verse consisting of four lines can be either in *vr̥tta* or *jāti* metre (*padyam̐ catuspadī tacca vr̥ttam̐ jātir̥ dvidhā*), directly affected the structure of Mongolian Buddhist poetry through centuries, which was almost invariably written in quatrains. Here is one of many examples, which comes from the collection of verses composed by Čaqar Geshe Luvsan Tsültrim (Cha Khar dge bshes Blo bzang Tsul khriṃs, 1740-1810), written in four lines, having nine syllables each:

'dod kun stsal pa'i drin can bla ma |
 deng nas skyid sdug gi gnas skab kun du |
 brtse pas snying dbus su 'brel med bzhugs nas |
 bsam spyod chos mthun du 'gro bar byin rlobs ||⁴

Gracious Guru who grants all wishes,
 From now on, in every circumstance of joy and sorrow,
 Having dwelt with [your] kindness in the center of [my] heart,
 Please bless [me] that my thoughts and actions accord with the Dharma!

Each line of this verse consists of nine syllables and four *padas*. But at the end of the second *pada*, the ninth syllable with punctuation corresponds to a half *pada*. Here is translation of a Mongolian scholar who tried to translate this verse without changing the principle of the number of syllables, *padas*, and punctuations while not losing its meaning.

khüslig khairlasan achit mergen
 largal zovlongiin akhui bükhnee
 khairlakh enerleer zürkhnee orshij
 sanakh bütekhüig tetgen ivgee.

Gracious wise one who has granted wishes,
 In all states of happiness and suffering,
 With kindness entering my heart,
 Support all [my] aspirations!⁵

Another example of the quadrant verse in which the principle of nine syllable, *pada*, and punctuation are adjusted to the Mongolian language comes from Chakhar Geshe Luvsan Tsülüm's texts *A Sūtra of Benediction for the Ger*⁶ (*Ger-ün irügel-ün sudur oršibui*):

<i>om say in a m ya lang bolt u yai</i>	<i>(om sayin amyalang boltuyai</i>
<i>ge ri bayi yu luy san tan dur bar</i>	<i>ger-i bayiγuluγsan tan-dur bar</i>
<i>geyi gü lü gči bur qan bo lun bui;</i>	<i>geyigülügči burqan bolun bui;</i>
<i>gem i sa kin sayin i öi güin bui.</i>	<i>gem-i sakin sayin-i öi güin bui.)⁷</i>

The popular practice of composing poetic works in quatrains expanded beyond monastic settings and became widely used in other contexts of the Mongolian literary tradition, such as the Shamanic and folk poetic traditions, and its influence still can be seen in some contemporary writings.

The *Kāvyaḍarśa* was translated into the Mongolian language in the first half of the eighteenth century, at the time of the formation of the Mongolian Danjur (Tib. Bstan 'gyur). It was translated by the eighteenth century-Mongolian translator from Khalkha by the name of Gelegjaltsan (Tib. Dge legs Rgyal mtshan), who also translated other Indian treaties included in the 205th volume of the Mongolian Danjur.⁸ In his rendering of the *Kāvyaḍarśa*, Gelegjaltsan closely followed the Tibetan version, utilizing the old method of word-for-word translation from the Tibetan, which was otherwise no longer in vogue during that period. At the time of the formation of the

Mongolian Danjur, this principle of *ad verbum* translation, which had been applied earlier to the translation of the Ganjur (Bka' 'gyur), was replaced by a contextual method of translation, because the previous method resulted in both stylistically awkward and semantically unclear readings. Although Gelegjalsan's translation of the *Kāvvyadarśa* is generally correct, his word-for-word translation from the Tibetan violates the syntactic norms of the Mongolian literary language, making it at times difficult to understand if not completely incomprehensible. Another unusual feature of Gelegjalsan's translation of the *Kāvvyadarśa* is that he often literally rendered the proper names, figures of speech, metonyms, and the like from the Tibetan even when there were Mongolian equivalents for the corresponding Tibetan and Sanskrit terms.⁹ By his time, a standard rule of translation from Tibetan into Mongolian, which was created specifically for a translation of the Tibetan Bstan 'gyur into the Mongolian, was to use Mongolian equivalents for Sanskrit technical terms, personal names, names of deities, and natural phenomena or to retain Sanskrit terms when Mongolian equivalents were not found, as opposed to translating them *ad verbum* from the Tibetan. For this reason, terms used by Gelegjalsan in his translation of the *Kāvvyadarśa* never penetrated the vocabulary of the Mongolian language.¹⁰ Here is an example of such a case taken from Gelegjalsan's translation of the *Kāvvyadarśa*, Ch. 1, v. 11, where he slavishly followed the Tibetan reading, literally translating each segment of Tibetan terms and phrases, for which reason, the Mongolian version of the given Tibetan verse, particularly of the line *a*, is nearly incomprehensible unless one examines the Tibetan version. For instance, the standard Tibetan term for the word "verse" *tshigs bcad* is translated in the xylographic version of the Peking edition of the Mongolian Danjur as *üilen tasuluγsan*. There are several problems with this Mongolian phrase. First, *üilen* ("deed," "action") appears at first to be a typographical error, for it should read *üiy-e* ("limb," "link") in the literal rendering of the Tibetan word *tshigs* appearing in the phrase *tshigs bcad*, which is a standard Tibetan term for the word "verse." But if one renders the term etymologically, it would mean a "broken link," which literally translates into the Mongolian as *üiyen tasuluγsan*, although the well-established term *siliüg* ("verse," "*śloka*") was already in use by that time. However, since the *üilen tasuluγsan* appears again in the line *c*, where one would expect to see *üiyen tasuluγsan*, it seems, it is not a mere typographical error but that the scribe, who could not make a sense of the text, most likely edited the phrase that now reads "the cut off karma." Mongolian reading:

*tegün-dür üilen tasuluγsan kiged ürgülfilegsen ba
qabsuruγsan luy-a mön kü yurban jüil bolun orusimu
dörben köl-iyer üilen tasuluγsan tegün-dür
bridda za a ti kemeküi qoyar jüil buyu.*¹¹

Tibetan reading:

*de yang tshigs bcad lhug pa dang |
spel ma rnam gsum nyid du gnas |*

tshigs bcad rkang bzhi pa de yang |
britta zaa ti zhes rnam gnyis ||

Sanskrit reading:

padyaṃ gadyaṃ ca miśraṃ ca tat tridhaiva vyavasthitam |
padyaṃ catuspadī tacca vṛttaṃ jātir iti dvidhā ||

Thus, while the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions read:

This [body of a poetical composition] is established as being of three kinds:
the verse, prose, and mixed.

A verse has four lines, and it is of two kinds: the *vṛtta* and *jāti*,

the first two lines of the Mongolian version read:

In that regard, [it] consists of the three kinds:
the cut of karma, prolonged, and mixed.

It is not clear why in the case of the *Kāvyaḍarśa* Gelegjaltsan held onto a method of translation that was already deemed ineffective and had been abandoned by his colleagues. It appears that in some instances Gelegjaltsan might have not understood the lines he was translating. For instance, in the Ch. 1, v. 32, line *b*, where the Sanskrit copula “*ca*” (“and”) appears for the second time in the phrase “*apabhraṃśās ca miśraṃ ceti (ca iti) āhur āptās caturvidhaṃ*,” Gelegjaltsan, not recognizing it to be the copula, did not translate it but transliterated it as “*za:*” *ava bhra śa kiged miśr-a za kemekiü lüige dörben jüül merged nomlabai*.¹²

Moreover, even before Galagjaltsan's Mongolian translation became available, Mongolian Buddhist scholars had become well acquainted with the *Kāvyaḍarśa* through the Tibetan translations of this text and through indigenous Tibetan commentaries on it. It is plausible that already in the Yuan court of the thirteenth century, and slightly later in the fourteenth century, some Mongolian scholars had access to the *Kāvyaḍarśa* in its first, complete Tibetan version, which was produced some time between 1258 and 1280¹³ by the Tibetan translator Shon ston Rdo rje Rgyal mtshan and the Nepalese *paṇḍita* Lakṣmīkāra¹⁴ under the initiative of Qubilai Khan's Imperial preceptor of religious affairs, Sa skya bla ma, 'Phags pa Blo gros Rgyal mtshan (1235-1280) and his disciple Sa skya Bzang po (Bdag nyid chen po bzang pod pal, 1261-1323), who was the first Regent (*dpon chen*) in Tibet appointed by Qubilai Khan to administer secular affairs.

Along with Shon ston's thirteenth-century translation of the *Kāvyaḍarśa*, the seventeenth-century Tibetan commentaries on the *Kāvyaḍarśa* had a significant role to play in the early development of Mongolian studies of the *Kāvyaḍarśa* and its influence on Mongolian authors who primarily wrote in the Tibetan language. The most influential among these were Bod mkhas pa Mi pham Dge leg Rnam rgyal's (1618-1685) two commentaries—the

Introductory Commentary on the Kāvya mahāśāstradarśa: An Ornament of Daṇḍin's Thought (Snyan ngag gi bstan bcos chen po me long la 'jug pa'i bshad sbyar daṇḍi'i dgongs rgyan), and *A Good Explanation of Examples Shown by the Basic Text of the Kāvya darśa: A Ford of the Ocean of Melodies* (Snyan ngag me long gzhung gi bstan pa'i dper brjod legs par bshad pa sgra dbyangs rgya mtsho'i 'jug ngog)—the Fifth Dalai Lama, Ngag dbang Blo bzang Rgya mtsho's (1617-1682) *Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Kāvya darśa: A Song That Delights Sarasvatī* (Snyan ngag me long gi dka' 'grel dbyangs can dgyes pa'i glu dbyangs), composed in 1647, and Mahāṇḍita Blo bzang Nor bu's *Examples of the Thirty-five Alaṃkāras* (Don rgyan so lnga'i dper brjod).

Inspired by the aforementioned Mahāpaṇḍita Blo bzang Nor bu's work and the Fifth Dalai Lama's commentary, perhaps the earliest Mongolian commentators on the *Kāvya darśa*, Khalkha Zaya Pandita Luvsanprenle (Tib. Blo bzang phrin las, 1642-1715), the head of Zayin Khüree monastery, wrote a short text in the Tibetan language titled *Examples of the Thirty-five Alaṃkāras: A Melody That Delights Sarasvatī* (Don rgyan so lnga'i dper brjod pa tshang sras dgyes pa'i glu dbyangs)¹⁵. During his stay in Tibet between 1660-1679, Khalkha Zaya Pandita also studied the *Kāvya darśa* under the tutelage of the Tibetan teacher, Blo bzang Chos grags.

From the eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries many Mongolian scholars composed not only numerous works related to the *Kāvya darśa* in the Tibetan language, but also commentaries on the text in Tibetan with Daṇḍin's and their own versified examples of the thirty-five *alaṃkāras* ("ornaments"). In this way, these authors contributed not only to Mongolian poetics as familiar to Mongolian scholars trained in the Tibetan language, but also to Tibetans' own studies of the *Kāvya darśa*. Among them worthy of mention are the following Mongolian scholars, whose names and works are given here in chronological order, starting from the eighteenth century, which marked the beginning of the proliferation of Daṇḍin studies in Mongolia.

The Eighteenth to Nineteenth Century-Mongolian Commentators

The Upper Mongol, Sum pa mkhan po Ye shes Dpal 'byor (1704-1788), a prolific Buddhist author wrote two commentarial works pertaining to Daṇḍin's principle of *alaṃkāras*, with examples: *The Entrance into Poetics: A Brief Compendium of the Alaṃkāras of Sound* (Tsig rgyan nyung bsdu snyan ngag 'jug sgo)¹⁶ and *A Beautiful Garland of the Constellation of Examples of the Alaṃkāras Explained in the Kāvya darśa* (Snyan ngag me long las bshad pa'i rgyan rnam kyī dper brjod rgyu skar phreng mdzes).¹⁷

Another important commentator is the previously mentioned Čaqaṛ Geshe Luvsan Tsültrim (Cha Khar dge bshes Blo bzang Tsul khriims, 1740-1810), who also authored two commentaries on the *Kāvya darśa: A Presentation of*

the Poetics of Sound (*Snyan ngag sgra can gyi rnam bzhag*)¹⁸ and *The Origin of the Thirty-five Alamkāras of Meaning* (*Don rgyan so lnga kun 'byung*).

Alashaa Lkharamba Agvandandar (A lag sha lha rams pa Ngag dbang Bstan dar, 1759-1842), who after studying the *Kāvyaḍarśa* in Mongolia, travelled at the age of fifty to the famous monasteries of Central Tibet and Amdo in search of scholars learned in the *Kāvyaḍarśa*, pursued his further study of Daṇḍin's poetics in Labrang Tashi Kyil (Bla brang Bkra shis 'khyil) monastery in Amdo. Upon his return to Mongolia, he wrote three works related to the *Kāvyaḍarśa*. One is a commentarial work composed in 1829, titled *An Elegant Pearl Garland to Ornament the Neck, Illuminating the Knowledge of Examples from the Three Chapters of the Kāvyaḍarśa* (*Snyan ngag me long gi le'u gsum gyi dper brjod blo gsal mgul rgyan mu tig phreng mdzes*),¹⁹ in which he also gives examples of verses related to the topics of all three chapters of the *Kāvyaḍarśa*. The second work of Agvandandar is a poetic composition in which he illustrates the thirty-five *alamkāras* with stanzas of a single poem that eulogize the body, mind, and learning of his Tibetan teacher, Klong rdol Ngag dbang Blo bzang (1719-1795); the text is titled *A River of Devotion that Flows into the Ocean of Excellent Qualities: An Ode of Praise to the Guru by means of Examples* (*Dpe rgyan gyis sgo nas bla ma la bstod pa yon tan rgya mtshor gzhol ba'i dad pa'i chu bo*).²⁰ As we will see, other Mongolian authors also sought to demonstrate their poetic skill by making use of all the *alamkāras* within a single poem. In Agvandandar's third work, titled *The Melodious Symphony that Calls out for Blessing: A Hymn of Praise to My Guru by means of Clarifying Speech that is a Likeness to the Second Chapter of the Kāvyaḍarśa* (*Snyan ngag me long gi le'u gnyis pa'i mtshungs pa gsal byed gyi sgra'i sgo nas rang gi bla ma la bstod pa byin rlabs 'bod pa'i dbyangs snyan rol mo*),²¹ Agvandandar composed seventy-seven verses of praise to his previously mentioned teacher, adapting them to seventy-seven forms of sounds, in order to illustrate the *alamkāras* mentioned in the *Kāvyaḍarśa* and to show the similarities between his own examples and those given in the second chapter of Daṇḍin's work. From among the seventy-seven verses in this collection, sixty-six are his own compositions, and eleven are the verses that he cited from the commentary written by the Tibetan scholar Ngag dbang Grags pa.

Another Mongolian scholar who authored seminal works related to the *Kāvyaḍarśa* is "Vangai Ravjamba" (Tib. Rab 'byams pa), Agvantünev (Ngag dbang Ye shes Thub bstan, the 18-19th cent.) In addition to his two commentaries on the text: *Refreshing the Memory: Notes on the Kāvyaḍarśa* (*Snyan ngag me long gi zin tho dran pa'i gsal 'debs*), and *An Arrangements of the Notes on the Characteristics, Division, and Examples of the Body and Alamkāras of the Kāvyaḍarśa* (*Snyan ngag me long gi lus dang rgyan gyi mtshan nyid dang dbye ba dper brjod rnams dran tho bkod pa*),²² he also composed an ode to the goddess Tārā by making use of the thirty-five *alamkāras* to demonstrate his poetic skill and to exemplify the manner in

which all thirty-five *alaṃkāras* can be applied to a single poetic work. The title of his ode is *Songs of the Messenger of Spring Who Brings the Festival of New Benefits: A Praise to Śrī Tārā by means of the Thirty-five Alaṃkāras of Poetry* (*Rje btsun sgrol ma la snyan ngag don rgyan so lnga'i sgo nas bstod pa dge mtshan gsar ba'i dga' ston 'dren byed dpyid kyi pho nya'i glu dbyangs*).²³

Among other eighteenth and nineteenth-century scholars who wrote on the *Kāvyaadarśa* worthy of mention are Khambo Nomun Khan Agvankhaidav (Mkhan po no mong hang Ngag dbang Blo bzang Mkhas grub, 1779-1838), who wrote a work entitled *A Teaching on the Beautiful Ornaments of Poetry in Connection with the Four Difficulties* (*Bya dka' bzhi sdebs snyan ngag mdzes rgyan gyi bslab bya*),²⁴ and the nineteenth-century *gavj* (Tib. *dka' bcu*)²⁵ from Ikh Khüree, Luvsandash (Blo bzang Bkra shis), who composed *An Annotated Commentary on the Song that Pleases Sarasvatī: The Entrance into the Entire Poetics* (*Dbyangs can dgyes glu'i mchan 'grel snyan ngag kun gyi 'jug so*).

The Nineteenth to Twentieth Century-Mongolian Commentators

The Mongolian literary theory of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was primarily limited to commentaries on the *Kāvyaadarśa*. Among nineteenth and twentieth-century authors, the most influential was Jamyyangarav Sürenkhoryn ('Jam dbyang dkar po, 1861-1917), popularly known as Erdene Bandida Khanchin Khambo (*mkhan chen mkhan po*), from Deyanajalbo *zasag khoshuu* (present Arkhangai Province) of Noën Sain Khan aimag. He wrote the famous *Brahmā's Melody: A General Explanation of the Root Text and Commentary on Poetics* (*Snyan ngag rtsa 'grel spyi'i don rnam par bshad pa Tsangs pa'i sgra dbyangs*), which was block printed in Gandangepiliing (Dga' ldan dge 'phel gling) monastery,²⁶ most likely sometime after 1904.²⁷ In the mentioned work, Jamyyangarav examined different interpretations given in various Tibetan commentaries. He also pointed out the errors in their understandings, and presented his own interpretations which he supported with examples taken from original Sanskrit verses. Jamyyangarav's work seems to exceed the limits of a mere commentary on Indian poetics, since he introduced innovations to traditional Mongolian poetical theory that were based on the *Kāvyaadarśa*. He introduced new ideas and terminology, and he showed from a theoretical point of view and through the example of his own poems, new ways of composing in verse. He also created a compositional style that represents the combination of the tender and uniform styles (Skr. *sukumāratā-samatā*) by introducing soft consonants into a verse; he produced a harsh, uniform style (Skr. *sphuṭa-samatā*) by introducing hard consonants;²⁸ and he created a medium uniform style (Skr. *madhyama-samatā*) by distributing similar soft and hard consonants at the beginning and ending sections of a stanza. In Jamyyangarav's view, a correct understanding of the first chapter of the *Kāvyaadarśa* implies that one should bring the tender, harsh, and medium

uniform styles into each verse of a single poem. He claimed that one should not interpret it in the one-sided manner of earlier Tibetan commentators who preceded Bod mkhas pa Mi pham. According to Jamyangarav, on the basis of such interpretation by the mentioned commentators, they wrote their stanzas only in a medium uniform style and thus restricted the range of stylistic possibilities.²⁹

In his study of a *śleṣa* as presented in the first chapter of the *Kāvyaḍarśa* and in various early and later, Tibetan commentaries on it, Jamyangarav agreed with the previously mentioned Bod mkhas pa Mi pham and with the nineteenth-century Tibetan theorist, Dbyang can Dga ba'i Blo gros Bstan pa, that even when there are mainly soft consonants and only a few hard consonants, there is still a *śleṣa*. In this regard, he rebutted the view of the Tibetan theorist 'Jam dbyangs Kha che, who held that the essential nature of a *śleṣa* consists of hard consonants. He also criticized Shong ston Rdo rje Rgyal mtsan's translation of the *Kāvyaḍarśa*, Ch. 1, vs. 42-43. Jamyangarav held that there is a compositional style in which the Tibetan hard consonants such as *kha*, *cha*, *tha*, *pha*, *tsa*, *zha*, *za*, *sa*, *ha*, and *sha*, the fifteen hard consonants of the Sanskrit alphabet, and the soft sound "la" frequently occur in a harmonious manner in different words in a Tibetan verse. He rejected the position of the earlier Tibetan commentators that the sound "la" only occurs in the Gauḍā compositional style, and he provided an example by means of this verse, where the "la" is replaced by the syllable "na," as seen in the stanza of four lines with nine syllables in each line, which reads:

rnam mang rgyan gyi rnam pa rnam par mdzes (4)
nang du rnal ma'i dbyings la rnam par rol (3)
rnam pa du ma'i rnam gyur rnam rtse 'gyed (3)
rnal 'byor ma yis rnam dpyod rnon por mdzod. (3)

Adorned with many kinds of ornaments,
 Manifesting in the inner, innate expanse,
 Frolicking in manifold manifestations,
 Bring about a sharp discernment by means of a *yoginī*.

To illustrate how the Vaidarbha compositional style may also look, Jamyangarav wrote this verse:

mkha' khyab 'gro la thugs rjes rjes su chags | (4)
pha rol sgrib gnyis mun sel rgyud 'thul te | (4)
khyad 'phags go 'phang mchog la nyer bkod pa'i | (4)
mtsho byung lha mo gyis shes rab lha ||³⁰ (4)

Sarasvatī, a wisdom deity,
 Compassionately concerned with beings as infinite as space,
 You pervade [our] mind-streams, dispelling the darkness of the two inimical
 obscurations,
 Bringing us to the extraordinary, supreme state.

To further illustrate the application of different *alaṃkāras*, Jamyangarav wrote verses on historical themes, depicting certain events in the lives of different Mongol khans.³¹ For instance, making use of the *leśa alaṃkāra* he wrote about Ögödei Khan's joyous laughter upon his conversion to the Buddha Dharma (163a5) and about Godan Khan's invitation to Sakya Paṇḍita to move his residence to the border of China, Tibet, and Mongolia (169b1-2 169b6-170a1). With the *krama alaṃkāra* and so on, he wrote about Qubilai Khan spreading both the Dharma and State law (172b2-3). With the *ūrjasvin alaṃkāra*, he wrote about the Queen Manduqai, who after having the Oirads under her power, promised not to harm persons who abide by the emperor's law and to show them compassion (178a1-2). With the *paryāya alaṃkāra*, he wrote about Altan Khan dipping his foot into the hot cud of a horse in order to treat his gout and recovering from his illness (180b6-181a1). Making use of the *udātta alaṃkāra*, he wrote about Altan Khan forbidding the worship of Shamanic figurines (*ongods*) and issuing a decree concerning the building of Erdene Zuu Monastery and the worship of Buddhist images, such as those of Mahākāla and others (181a5-6); and with the same *alaṃkāra*, he wrote about Abatai Sain Khan erecting 200 *stūpas* and supporting the State and Dharma (181a5-6). Making use of the *hetu alaṃkāra*, he wrote this stanza about the legend of Chinggis Khan's ancestor Alungoo told in the Secret History of the Mongols, which is the first stanza of his long poem on great Mongol khans.

mdza' grogs dang bral btsun mo Ae lung kwa |
gnyd du gyur bar lha dang dga' mgur spyad |
dga' bde rgyas dang chabs cig bu rnyed pa |
skyes ma thag nas dpa' 'dzangs po ton char ||³²

While the Queen Alungoo, without a husband,
 Was in a dream, she engaged in [sexual] delight with a deity.
 [Her] joy and happiness increased, and at the same time she got a son.
 After the newborn [son, came] the brave hero Bodonchar.³³

Lastly, utilizing the *śleṣa* Jamyangarav wrote a verse based on the event described in the orally transmitted legend about the Öndör Gegeen Zanabazar (1635-1723), the head of Buddhism among the Khalkhas, who with his seven attendants, while journeying to Tibet, transformed themselves into flying geese, and were seen by the old couple looking after goats and who showed them a reverence to the flying geese. However, although at first glance the entire verse appears to be about Öndör Gegeen Zanabazar, a son of Tüsheets Khan Gombodorj (1594-1655), in fact, it is about an accomplished yogī who attained the *siddhi* of transformation; and when Jamyangarav addresses the “exalted one” in the poem with the pronoun “you,” he speaks to that other yogī.³⁴

mthong thos dran pa'i dpal 'dzin rje btsun khyod |
mi dbang sras po dam pa ma yin te |
ngang pa'i rgyal po byas na bod phyogs su |
byon po sngon gyi gzur gnas rgan rgon mthong ||³⁵

The exalted one, who holds the glory of seeing, hearing, and memory,
 You are not the lord of men, a supreme son.
 Previously, the honest old man and woman saw
 [You] leaving in the direction of Tibet, after [you] became the king of geese.

To also demonstrate an application of the *tulyayogitā alaṃkāra* with censure, Jamyangarav composed a verse in which he criticizes the moral decline of Mongolian society of his time, pointing out the similar condition of moral corruption of different members of his society.

brid mkhas bud med chang dang 'di snang zhen |
rgyal po'i spyod ngan dmangs kyi sems 'gyur ldog |
dge 'dun mi mthun khrims las g.yel ba rnams |
bstan srid phung ba'i rgyu ru mkhas rnams gleng ||³⁶

Cunning women are fixated on alcohol and the appearance of this life.
 The king's conduct is evil, and the minds of common people are perverse.
 The saṅghas are contentious and neglect the precepts.
 The wise say these are the causes of ruin for the doctrine and society.

In his poem dedicated to Daṇḍin and his *Kāvyaḍarśa*, Jamyangarav eulogizes Daṇḍin as a teacher who has reached the pinnacle of wisdom and his “widely taught poetic theory.”³⁷

The Twentieth Century-Authors

The Mongolian literary development of the twentieth century was an expression of the influence of the *Kāvyaḍarśa* and new contributions to the Mongolian and Tibetan poetical thought. Around the middle of the twentieth century came onto a literary scene Mongolian poets such as T. Danzan Odser and Sh. Ishtavkhai who closely studied the *Kāvyaḍarśa* and endeavored to apply its principles in their anthology of poetry written on the theme of peace, titled “A White Lotus of Peace,” which was initially published in Tibetan and later, in 1959, in its Mongolian translation. Following the principles of the *Kāvyaḍarśa*, Ishtavkhai also composed an ode to Mañjuśrī and Danzan Odser composed a praise to Tārā.³⁸ Ishtavkhai experimented with composing poetry by following the rule called a “Samantabhadra's wheel,” which involves creating the meaning of a stanza by switching or changing the word order, a method which can also be found in other poetry written in the Tibetan and Mongolian languages. Making use of the *śabda alaṃkāra*, Ishtavkhai composed a poetic crossword in Classical Mongolian, titled “A Disseminator of Peace” (*Engke taibung-i badaruγuluγči*). This crossword poem reads from the middle of the four sides to the center, from the four corners to the center, from the middle of the four sides going in the clockwise direction, and from every square of the four sides above and below to the middle square. In the first three manners of reading, this poem has four stanzas, but in the last, fourth manner of reading, it has eighteen stanzas. In this ways, it has altogether twenty stanzas.³⁹ (See figure 1 below)

بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر
بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر
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بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر
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بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر	بدر

Fig. 1⁴⁰

For instance, if read from the middle of the top to the center, the line reads: “May there be blessing, happiness, and wellbeing (*ölzei qutuγ mendü anu boltuγai!*)” If read from the middle of the bottom line to the center, it reads: “May there be the marvelous policy and wellbeing (*γaiqamsiy yosu mendü anu boltuγai!*)” If read from the middle of the left side column to the center, it reads: “May there be the true and significant joy (*mön saiqan čiqula bayasqalang boltuγai!*)” When read from the middle of the right column to the center, it reads: “May there be the supreme, beautiful, and significant happiness (*erkim saiqan čiqula bayasqalang boltuγai!*)” Moreover, if read diagonally, from the bottom corner of the left column to the center, it reads: “May there be power, prosperity, and wellbeing (*erke ĵiryalang mendü anu boltuγai!*)” When read diagonally from the bottom corner of right column to the center, it reads: “May there be wisdom, culture, and wellbeing (*edem soyul mendü anu boltuγai!*),” and so on.

A famous poet and scholar of the same period, Rinchen Byambyn also wrote his poem “Princes” (*Günj*) with the *śabda alamkāra*, which, when read backwards conveys a complete meaning; but it also conveys a full meaning if read from the two lines on the top, starting from the top line of second column and continuing with the first line of the first column, and then with the second line of the second column, etc. (“Having started in the darkest

hour that year from Kherlen Bars city, as we planned to visit a distant temple of our purpose"). It should be noted that every two lines of the first column begin with the same letter, which has been a popular practice of poetry writing in Mongolia to this very day:

<i>Kherlen bars khotoos ter jil</i>	<i>Ünegeṅ kharankhuigaar garaad</i>
<i>Khediin sanasan süm yotai khol</i>	<i>üzej dairakhyg zorytol</i>
<i>Namryn odor daanch bogino</i>	<i>tüleenii balar zamaar</i>
<i>Namaig yaaran fovtolj yavtal</i>	<i>tümen kharankhui bolj</i>
<i>Günj chinii sümiin tend</i>	<i>sansanchlan khiirvees</i>
<i>Gün shönö üülen dundaas</i>	<i>saran genet garch gülee.</i> ⁴¹

"That year, from Kherlen Bars city	Having started in the darkest hour
A distant temple of our purpose	As we planned to visit
An autumn day is too short	By the passage of firewood
While I was going in a hurry	A deep night fell
Around your temple, princess	While reaching there,
Out of a cloud during a deep night	The moon suddenly came out.

Mongolian scholarship of the latter part of the twentieth century saw the reemergence of interest in the *Kāvyaḍarśa*. In 1972, the second international conference on "Mongolian Commentaries on Daṇḍin's *Kāvyaḍarśa*" was held in Mongolia and a new translation of the *Kāvyaḍarśa* in Mongolian language was published. The works of the scholar of late twentieth century have written extensively on Daṇḍin influence on Mongolian poetry, to name the few: Ts. Damdinsüren ("A Brief Information on Daṇḍin's *Kāvyaḍarśa* and Its Commentary," 1962); Sh. Bira ("The Daṇḍin's *Kāvyaḍarśa*," 1978); Ch. Altangerel ("About Mongolian Commentary on Daṇḍin's *Kāvyaḍarśa*" (1971); Kh. Gaadan (*Comparison in the Kāvyaḍarśa*, 1976, 1986); O. Sükhbaatar ("Vyapeta *Alamkāra* in Daṇḍin's *Kāvyaḍarśa*," 1982), and others. The *Kāvyaḍarśa*'s continuing explicit role in the creation of poetic discourse in Mongolia continues to the present time with new translations of the text published in 2014 and 2017, and with extensive study of Jamyangarav's works and his contribution to the influence of the *Kāvyaḍarśa* in Mongolia.

What has been presented so far in this paper are only very few of many examples of the ways in which the *Kāvyaḍarśa* influenced and enriched Mongolian poetics and contributed to the development of the Mongolian literary tradition. Apart from some very short studies on the place and role of the *Kāvyaḍarśa* in Mongolian poetics written by Mongolian scholars in the latter part of the twentieth century, there has not be any rigorous examination of the aforementioned Mongolian commentaries on the *Kāvyaḍarśa* or any comprehensive study of the scope of Daṇḍin's influence on Mongolian poetry. In addition to shedding light on the history of Mongolian poetics and literary composition, such a study would also give us a better insight into the *Kāvyaḍarśa*'s contribution to the exchange of theoretical views and practical applications of Indian poetics among Tibetan and Mongolian scholars.

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Notes

1. According to Khürelbaatar, L. (2002), 208, among those whose works show influence of the *Kāvyaḍarśa* are the following authors who wrote in the Tibetan language: Oirad Zaya Pandita Namkhaijams (1599-1662), Dai *güüsh* Agvandampil (1700-1780), Urud *güüsh* Bilgiin Dalai, Buriat Nomtyn Rinchin (1821-1907), Öndör Gegeen Zanabazar (1635-1723), Bandida Gegeen Luvsandanzanjaltsan (1635-1704), Namdillingiin Lam Agvanbaldan (1794-1864), Zuugiiin Lam Dagvadarjaa (1734-1803), Bragri Lam Damsagdorj (1781-1855), Shadavdandar (1835-1915), Agvandanzanyam (1882-1937), Tsültemjamts (880-1938), Beiliin Lam Agvandamba (184-1885), Khoriny lovon (Tib. slob dpon) Baldansanjaajav (1839-1906).
2. Erdene Mergen Bandida, Ishsambuu's (Ngag dbang Ye shes bzang po, 1847-1896) *The Melodious Song to Please Sarasvatī: A Chapter of Praise to the Eighth Incarnation of Jebsundampa—the Holy Glorious Excellent Ngawang Lobsang Chökyi Nyima Tendzin Wangchüg—the Incomparably Kind Precious Reincarnation, Who Is the Crown Ornament of All Beings in the Three Realm and Elucidates the Buddha's Teachings in the Northern Region* (Sa gsum skye rgu'i gtsug rgyan byang phyogs bstan pa'i gsal byed sku drin mtshungs med sprul sku rin po che rje btsun dam pa'i sku phreng brgyad pa Ngag dbang Blo bzang Chos kyi Nyi ma Bstan dzin Dbyang phyug dpal bzang p'o zhal snga nas bstod pa'i rab tu 'byed pa dbyangs can dgyes pa'i glu snyan), and *The Fulfillment of All Wishes: A Stage of Supplication Prayers to the Precious Guru, the Supreme Protector* (Skyabs mgon bla ma rin po che la gsol ba 'debs pa'i rim bag an 'dun 'grub pa).
3. Zava Damin's (Rta ba Rta mgrin Blo bzang Rta dbyangs 'Jam dbyangs Dgyes pa'i Bshes gnyen, 1867-1937) *The Melodious Song to Intoxicate the Young Bees: A Brief Praise to Ganden Tegchenling Monastery, a Source of Stainless Teachings of Explanation and Practice* (Dri med bshad sgrub bstan pa'i 'byung gnas Dga ldan theg chen gling gi bsngags pa mdo tsam brjod pa bung ba gzhon nu myos pa'i glu snyan)
4. The verse is taken from a citation in Gaadan, J. (1972), 10.
5. Rintshen, Redigit, Y. (1972): 10.
6. Ger is a traditional Mongolian tent home.
7. Rintshen, Redigit, Y. (1972): 10.
8. One of these works is Ratnākāraśānti's work on prosody, the *Candoratnākara* and his auto-commentary on this work.
9. Few exception to these few Mongolized Sanskrit words, occurring in the first chapter of the *Kāvyaḍarśa*: *bridda* (*vr̥ta*), *za a ti* (*jāti*), *a a šu a a sa* (*ucchvāsa*), *labha* (*lambha*), *sa sangrida* (*Sanskṛta*), *bragrida* (*Prākṛta*), *mišr-a* (*miśra*), *ava bhra ša* (*Apabhraṃsa*), *saura si a* (*Śaurasēnī*), *gauda* (*Gaudī*), *la a ti* (*Lāṭī*)
10. Bira, Sh. (1978), 77.
11. Dandin. *Zokistu ayalyu-yi toil*, folio, 2.
12. Dandin. *Zokistu ayalyu-yi toli*, folio, 4.
13. The translation must have taken place after the two mentioned translators met in 1258 and before 'Phags pa Bla ma's death in 1280, since the colophon to the translation indicate that it was completed during the life of 'Phags pa Bla ma. See Bira, Sh. (2001), 66.
14. Their translation was later revised by several Tibetan translators, including Dpan ston Blo gros Brtan pa (1276-1342), who was a younger brother of Shon ston Rdo rje Rgyal Mtshan, Chos skyon Bzang pa (1441-1527), and Snye than Blo gros Brtan pa.
15. Glegs bam, "Ka" vol.
16. Gsung 'bum, "Ja" vol.
17. Gsung 'bum, "Ja" vol.
18. Gsung 'bum, "Sa" vol.
19. Gsung 'bum, "La" vol.
20. Gsung 'bum, "Sha" vol.
21. Gsung 'bum, "Sa" vol.
22. Bka' 'bum, "Nga" vol.
23. Gsung 'bum, "Na" vol.
24. "Kha" vol.
25. A scholastic, monastic degree.
26. The text contains 282 folios, which measure 44.5X8.9 cm, and each folio contains 6 lines of text.
27. It was printed on thick Russian paper, which began to be imported to Mongolia after that time.
28. Hard consonants in the Tibetan alphabet are kha cha, tha, pha, tsa, za, sa, ha, sha.
29. *Snyan ngag rtsa 'grel spyi'i don nram par bzhad pa Tsangs pa'i sgra dbyangs*, Ch.10, 35b-41b. See also Khürelbaatar, Ü. (1992), 30.

30. *Snyan ngag rtsa 'grel spyi'i don rnam par bzhad pa Tsangs pa'i sgra dbyangs*, 32b3-4. See also Khürelbaatar, L. (1989), 210.
31. See Khürelbaatar, Ü. (1992), 31-32.
32. *Snyan ngag rtsa 'grel gyi spyi'i don rnam par bshag pa Tsangs pa'i sgra byangs zhes bya ba*, Ch. 10, 164a6 – 164b1.
33. Bodonchar Munkhag (ca 850-900), a renowned warlord, who established the House of Borjigid and became considered the ancestor of Borjigid lineage, including Chinggis Khan, who was his biological descendent.
34. See Khürelbaatar, Ü. (1992), 32.
35. *Snyan ngag rtsa 'grel gyi spyi'i don rnam par bshag pa Tsangs pa'i sgra byangs zhes bya ba*, Ch. 10, 182a3-4, 182a6-182b1, 182b5-6, 187b4-5.
36. *Snyan ngag rtsa 'grel gyi spyi'i don rnam par bshag pa Tsangs pa'i sgra byangs zhes bya ba*, Ch. 10, 189b6-190a2.
37. “Zokhist ayalguuny shigtgel shüleg,” translated from Tibetan to Mongolian by L. Khürelbaatar, in Ganbold, D. (*Bat Süzeḡt Bandida Khamba Jamyyangarav*. Vol. 1, Ulaanbaatar: Mongol Ulsyin Bolovsrolyn Ikh Sarguuly Mongol Sudlalyn Sarguuly Bichig Soëlyn Töv, 2013): 103.
38. Khürelbaatar, L. (1988), 251-52.
39. See Gaadan, J. (1972), 15-16.
40. Rintshen (1972): 16.
41. See Gaadan, J. (1972), 16.

About the Early History of the *Heart Sūtra*

Charles WILLEMEN

There traditionally are seven versions of the Chinese *Heart Sūtra*. One speaks of *qi zhong Xin Jing*, 七种心经, seven kinds of *Heart Sūtras*. Two are brief versions: Taishō edition 250 and 251, and five are long versions: T.252, 253, 254, 255, and 257, having the structure of a real *sūtra*.

“Kumārajīva’s” Version, T.250 of ca. 406 CE

The brief version, T.250 摩訶般若波羅蜜大明咒經 *Moheboṛoluomi Daming Zhou Jing*, traditionally said to be Kumārajīva’s text, was most likely put together in Chinese by Zhu Daosheng 竺道生 (355–434 CE), ca. 406 CE in Chang’an 长安. He attributed it to Kumārajīva. At that time he was working on translations with Kumārajīva. I have quite recently come to this insight.¹

The text consists of three parts: 1. Introductory part with Avalokiteśvara; 2. Core text based on Kumārajīva’s Chinese *Mahāprajñāpāramyupadeśa*, 大智度論 *Da Zhidu Lun*, *Explanatory Discourse about the Great Perfection of Wisdom*;² 3. *Mantra*, spell. The text was used to protect one’s health. It was used as a spell. The title contains the words *daming* (*mahāvidyā*) *zhou* (*mantra*). *Mahāvidyā* means great esoteric knowledge. *Zhou*, spell, *mantra*, often rendered as *shenzhou* 神咒, divine spell, early in the fifth century, means *zhenyan* 真言, Japanese *shingon*, *mantra*. *Mingzhou* 明咒, Japanese *myōshu*, also exists, meaning spell, *vidyā*.

Daosheng was the first to call Avalokiteśvara Guanyin 观音, actually correcting Kumārajīva’s term Guan Shiyin 观世音. There apparently was no reason to use *shi* 世, *loka*, world. Shi Guanyin 释 (Śākya) 观音, a monastic appellation, became used for the Chinese female *bodhisattva*.

By the way, a Chinese surname and also a given name are limited to two characters. That explains why an Indian name sometimes cannot be completely rendered. E.g. Tanmo Shili 曇摩尸梨 for Dharmasreṣṭhin. He was the author of the *Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra*, *Treatise: Heart of the Abhidharma*.

Furthermore: Xuanzang 玄奘 correctly offers Guan Zizai 观自在 as the translation for Avalokiteśvara. *Zizai* means *īśvara*, lord. In the seventh century, however, Avalokiteśvara was female in China. So, Xuanzang apparently uses a rather male name for her, probably because in India the *bodhisattva* remained male.

Daosheng spent quite some time on Mount Lu, 庐山, with Huiyuan 慧远 (334–416 CE). He was there e.g. in 397 CE. *The Heart of Abhidharma*, *Apitan Xin Lun* 阿毗昙心论, had been brought out there in 391 CE by Saṅghadeva and Huiyuan.³ Daosheng brought the *Heart Sūtra* in ca. 406 CE. Huiyuan was on Mount Lu in both cases.

Xuanzang's (ca.602–664 CE) Version, T.251 of 649 CE

While he was in Sichuan 四川 (618–622 CE), before his departure for India, Xuanzang received the text to keep him healthy. Shortly after his return in China in 645 CE, in 649 CE he offered his version of the Chinese *Heart Sūtra*. About two and a half centuries after Daosheng Xuanzang “edited” the earlier version and offered his version, in 649 CE. Xuanzang knew Sanskrit very well. In Nālandā he became quite fluent. He is said to have translated the *Dacheng Qi Xin Lun* 大乘起信论, *Mahāyānaśraddhotpādaśāstra*, to Sanskrit. In 647 CE the king of Kāmarūpa (Assam), Bhāskaravarman (reign ca. 600–650 CE), asked for a Sanskrit version of the *Daode Jing* 道德经, *The Way and its Power*, the famous Daoist classic. It was completed in 661 CE, but the text is lost now. Anyway, Xuanzang was able to translate the Chinese *Heart Sūtra* to Sanskrit. His brief version of the Chinese *Heart Sūtra* is sometimes referred to as *Duo Xin Jing* 多心经. The *duo* is used for °tā of *pāramitā*, perfection. “Kumārajīva’s” version just used *pāramī*. The earliest extant version of the brief Chinese version of the text is a text inscribed on a stone stele, part of the Fangshan 房山 stone *sūtras*, dated 661 CE, in the Yunju 云居 Temple. After the Sanskrit version of the brief *Heart Sūtra*, a magic text to stay healthy, Xuanzang may have composed the Sanskrit text of the long version, looking like a real *sūtra*. His stay in India apparently had made it clear that a Sanskrit text is needed to be authentic. All Chinese versions after Xuanzang were translations of this *sūtra*, of the long version. The first translation was the work of Fayue 法月, Dharmacandra (653–743 CE), in 741 CE: T.252 *Pubian Zhizang Boreboluomiduo Xin Jing* 普遍智藏般若波罗蜜多心经. This title intends to offer both a meaning translation (*yiyi* 义译) and a phonetic rendering (*yinyi* 音译) of *Mahāprajñāpāramitā*. *Zhi* means *prajñā*, as in *Da Zhidu Lun*. *Zang* often translates *piṭaka*. So, the title means: *Scriptural Text: The Heart of Prajñāpāramitā, Universal Storehouse of Wisdom*.

It is, of course, possible that someone else wrote the Sanskrit versions, both brief and long, but Xuanzang himself is the most likely author of the Sanskrit versions. The earliest evidence of the *Heart Sūtra* in India is a commentary attributed to Kamalaśīla (ca.740–795 CE), end of the eighth century.

Also, let us not forget that Xuanzang was quite familiar with both *abhidharma* and with *prajñāpāramitā* literature. He must have known about Daosheng and about Huiyuan and Saṅghadeva on Mount Lu. Huiyuan is one of the translators of the *Abhidharmahṛdaya*, *Heart of the Abhidharma*, in 391 CE on Mount Lu. Daosheng frequented Mount Lu and Huiyuan, e.g. in 397 CE.⁴

About the Title *Heart Sūtra*, *Xin Jing* 心经

Xuanzang was the first to call the text *sūtra*. He knew from his time in India that a Sanskrit text is needed. This is a good reason to believe that he himself is the author of the Sanskrit versions, both brief and long. He must have known that Daosheng was really responsible for the Chinese brief version. Daosheng may have been influenced by Huiyuan himself on Mount Lu, and Xuanzang apparently did not see any objection against using the term *Heart* for his brief text. Just as Huiyuan was co-responsible for the *Heart of Abhidharma* in 391 CE, so Xuanzang brought the *Heart of Prajñāpāramitā*, “editing” the earlier version of Daosheng. It is not necessary, but possible to think that *xin* 心, *heart*, may mean *dhāraṇī*. A *dhāraṇī* is a text which encapsulates the meaning of a section or of a chapter of a *sūtra*. It is meant to be recited. Chinese terms for *dhāraṇī* normally are *zongchi* 总持, sometimes adding *zhou* 咒, and quite frequently the phonetic rendering *tuoluoni* 陀罗尼. This makes T.256 come to mind. It has the title *Tang Fan Fandui Ziyin Boreboluomiduo Xin Jing* 唐梵翻对字音般若波罗蜜多心经, a text which uses Chinese (*Tang*) characters to render the Sanskrit (*Fan*) sounds. This brief text has been seen as the work of Xuanzang himself. Xuanzang is the earliest possibility, but it must be kept in mind that his work is not esoteric. He rather sees the relativity of things, emptiness, or else *abhidharma*. The brief text T.256 may, of course, be the work of someone else during the Tang 唐. Fukui Fumimasa 福井文雅 has proposed Amoghavajra (705–774 CE).⁵

Xuanzang’s T.251 is quite similar to “Kumārajīva’s” text, T. 250. Xuanzang was central for “new” translations (*xinyi* 新译), and Kumārajīva was central for “old” translations (*jiuyi* 旧译). Xuanzang “edited” the earlier text. Xuanzang’s brief text, which apparently still may be used as a *dhāraṇī* to protect one’s health, also in its Sanskrit version, was changed to a longer Sanskrit text, to a real *sūtra*. Xuanzang’s work appeared in a time of important sectarian developments in China. His text was used by the Faxiang 法相 (Yogācāra, Vijñānavāda) school. Kuiji 窥基 (632–682 CE), Xuanzang’s disciple, was the first patriarch of Faxiang. In China a school is doctrinal, called *zong* 宗, but in India a school always was defined by its *Vinaya*.

Chinese Versions after Xuanzang

The five Chinese versions after Xuanzang all offer the long version, his *sūtra*. I already mentioned the text of Fayue, Dharmacandra, T.252. There further is T.253 *Boreboluomiduo Xin Jing* 般若波罗蜜多心经, the work of Bore 般若 (*Prajña*), and of Liyan 利言 in 790 CE. Then there is the work of Zhihui Lun 智慧轮, Prajñācakra (fl. 847–882 CE), in 861 CE, T.254. It has the title *Boreboluomiduo Xin Jing* 般若波罗蜜多心经. T.255 of 856 CE has the same title, but it is a translation from Tibetan by Facheng 法成. Finally there is T.257 of Shihu 施护, Dānapāla, from Udyāna, of 1005 CE: *Sheng*

Fomu Boreboluomiduo Jing 圣佛母般若波罗蜜多经. It has the words *sheng Fomu*, noble (*āryā*) Buddha mother (*Bhagavatī*). Sometimes the words *Foshuo* 佛说 *Buddhabhāṣita*, proclaimed by Buddha, are added in the beginning.

The earliest commentary on Xuanzang's text is the work of his disciple Kuiji: T.1710 *Boreboluomiduo Xin Jing Youzan* 般若波罗蜜多心经幽赞, *Subtle Revelation of the Scriptural Text: Heart of the Perfection of Wisdom*.

I know that I offer some views which are hard to prove. My main argument is that it all makes sense and that it does not contradict any available information.

So, there is the original brief Chinese *Heart Sūtra*, put together by Zhu Daosheng and attributed to Kumārajīva, ca. 406 CE in Chang'an. It was recited to stay in good health. After about two centuries and a half, in 649 CE, Xuanzang offered his updated version. The brief text was used to protect health. Xuanzang may have brought his Sanskrit version of this text, and he may have offered a longer Sanskrit version, a "real" *sūtra*. After Xuanzang his *sūtra* version was translated several times to Chinese, once from Tibetan.

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Notes

1. Willemen, JBS 17 (2020): To appear.
2. Nattier, JIABS 15 (1992): 187; 智 *zhi*, normally means *jñāna*, hardly ever *prajñā*, except here.
3. Willemen. *Essence of Scholasticism*. Delhi 2006.
4. For Huiyuan on Mt. Lu: Zürcher. *Buddhist Conquest of China*, 204–253.
5. Nattier, JIABS 15 (1992): 192.

The Position of Conceptualization in the Context of the Yogācāra *Bīja* Theory*

Nobuyoshi YAMABE

In the early stages of my research, my scholarly attention was focused on the Yogācāra theory of *bīja*, “seed.” Analyzing a controversy over the origin of *bīja* recorded in the *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論 (*CWSL*, **Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, T No. 1585), I suspected that this controversy might reflect a doctrinal development in the formative process of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (*YBh*). The first theory in the relevant portion of the *CWSL* maintains that all *bījas* are primordial, while the second argues that all *bījas*, which, according to this view, are equivalent to *vāsanās*, “imprints,” are deposited by one’s act. No *bīja* can exist primordially without presupposing one’s act. My hypothesis was, and still is, that the first position reflects an older system in the *YBh*, while the second reflects a later system.

Bīja and *vāsanā* are usually treated as synonymous, and in the established system of Yogācāra this is no doubt true. However, in the older portions of the *YBh*, this apparently was not the case. There, as far as I can see, *vāsanā* was used for a much narrower range of meanings than *bīja*. In my opinion, for the broadening of the usage of *vāsanā*, “conceptualization” played a key role. This is the main point of the present article.

I have already presented this hypothesis in a series of articles.¹ However, since most of these papers are in Japanese, my arguments in this regard are not much known in the West. Therefore, taking this opportunity I would like to present my hypothesis anew in English.

1. Controversy over the origin of *bīja* in the *Cheng weishi lun*

The synopsis of the relevant controversy in the *CWSL* is as follows (T31:8a20-b23 [No. 1585]):

Table 1

1. *Bījas* are Primordial (“Candrapāla 護月 et al.”).

1.1. “All *bījas* exist naturally. They are not engendered through infusion.”

* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a conference, “Conceptuality and Non-Conceptuality in Buddhist Thought,” held at the Center for Buddhist Studies, University of California, Berkeley, on November 4-6, 2016, and at a lecture given at the Department of Asia, Africa and Mediterranean of the University of Naples “L’Orientale” on November 9, 2018. The invitation to the present Festschrift was kindly extended to me by Professor Toshiichi Endo through Dr. Mingyuan Gao. I thank Dr. Gao for his patient encouragement and assistance during the preparation of this paper and Mr. Nicholas Stewart Hobhouse for kindly checking its English. Since I made some last-minute changes, any remaining errors are, needless to say, my own responsibility. The research for this article has been funded by the JSPS KAKENHI grant (number 17K02218).

1 Yamabe 1987; 1989; 1990a; 1990b; 1991. Among these, the one closest to the present article is Yamabe 1989. The present article should be considered a revised English version of Yamabe 1989. See also my recent articles: Yamabe 2020a; 2020b.

1.2. “They can only be enhanced through infusion.”

1.3. Scriptural Sources

1.3.1.a. *Akṣarāśisūtra*²: “All sentient beings have manifold *dhātus* from the beginningless past. They exist naturally like a heap of *akṣa*-nuts.”

1.3.1.b. *Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra*: “The *dhātu* from the beginningless past is the common support for all the *dharmas*.”

1.3.1.c. *Manobhūmi*: “*Bījas* exist naturally from the beginningless past but are infused anew by defiled and pure [karmas].”

1.3.1.d. *Manobhūmi*: “Among various sentient beings, those who are destined to attain *nirvāṇa* have complete *bījas*, but those who are not destined to attain *nirvāṇa* lack *bījas* of the three types of *bodhis*.”

1.3.2.a. *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*: “Various sentient beings naturally have five distinct *gotras*.”

1.3.2.b. **Pañcavijñānakāyaśaṃprayukutā-manobhūmi-viniścaya*: “In the hells, three pure *indriyas* are present. They are *bījas* and not active *dharmas*.”

1.3.2.c. *Bodhisattvabhūmi*: “The originally existing *gotra* is transmitted from the beginningless past and acquired naturally.”

2. *Bījas* are Engendered (“Jinasena 勝軍, Nanda 難陀 et al.”).

2.1. “*Bījas* are all engendered through **infusion**.”

2.2.a. “‘The infused’ and ‘the infuser’ both exist from the beginningless past. Therefore, *bījas* are present from the beginningless past.”

2.2.b. “*Bīja* is equivalent to *vāsanās* (種子既是習氣異名 [**paryāya*]), and *vāsanā* always presupposes **infusion**. Just like the scent of sesame [oil] arises because it is ‘infused’ (lit., scented) by flowers.”

2.3. Scriptural Sources

2.3.1.a. ‘*Bahudhātukasūtra*’: “Because the minds of various sentient beings are **infused** by various defiled and pure *dharmas*, boundless *bījas* are accumulated there.”

2.3.1.b. **Mahāyānaśaṃgraha*: “Inner *bījas* definitely have **infusion**. Some of the outer *bījas* have **infusion**, but others do not.”

2.3.1.c. **Mahāyānaśaṃgraha*: “Three types of *vāsanās*, such as that of speech, comprise the *bījas* of all defiled *dharmas*.”

2.3.2.a. **Mahāyānaśaṃgraha*: “*Śrutavāsanās* arise infused through listening to the True Dharma that has flown out of the purest *Dharmadhātu*. They have the nature of the *bīja* of supramundane mind.”

2.4. Re: Conflicting Scriptural Sources

2.4.1. a. **Pañcavijñānakāyaśaṃprayukutā-manobhūmi-viniścaya*: “If beings have two types of ultimate hindrances to *tathatā*, they are said to be those who are not destined for *nirvāṇa* (*aparinirvāṇadharmakā*). If beings have only ultimate *bīja* of *jñeyāvaraṇa* but not of *kleśāvaraṇa*, some of them are called *śrāvaka-gotra*, and others *pratyekabuddha-gotra*. If beings have neither of the *bījas* of the two ultimate hindrances, they are called *tathāgata-gotra*.”

2.4.2.b. “[Three] pure *bījas* are present [in the hells]’ (1.3.2.b) means that they will arise in the future, not that they are already present.”

Here, the first opinion is attributed to Candrapāla et al. in the *Cheng weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記 (*Shuji*, T43:304b5-7 [No. 1830]). According to this view, *bījas* exist naturally in sentient beings and are not engendered through infusion. Infusion can only enhance the pre-existing *bījas*. On the other hand,

2 See Yamabe 1987.

the second opinion is attributed to Jinasena, Nanda et al. by the same *Shuji* (T43:305a20 [No. 1830]). It argues that *bījas* are all engendered through infusion.

Since this is an argument about *bīja* 種子, the word *bīja* naturally appears throughout. If we observe the above table more closely, we notice that in addition to *bīja* itself, *dhātu* 界 and *gotra* 種性 often appear in the first theory of “primordial *bīja*” as key words. On the other hand, in the second theory of “engendered *bīja*,” *vāsanā* 習氣 and “infusion” 熏習 are frequently seen. In addition, it is also noteworthy that the textual sources quoted by the “engendered” theory are, except for the obscure “*Bahudhātukasūtra*,”³ relatively late (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* and *Mahāyānasamgraha*).

First of all, the “engendered” theory presupposes that *bīja* is equivalent to *vāsanā* (種子既是習氣異名 [**paryāya*]) as a matter of course. In the modern scholarship also, up to a certain point at least, this was the prevalent view. But this equation is not so obvious if we observe the usage in the old portions of the *YBh*. For example, see the following list of *paryāyas*, “equivalents,” in the *Manobhūmi* of the Basic Section of the *YBh*:

*bījaparyāyāḥ punar dhātur gotraṃ prakṛtir hetuḥ satkāyāḥ prapañca ālaya upādānaṃ duḥkhaṃ satkāyadrṣṭyadhīṣṭhānam asmimānādhi-
ṣṭhānaṃ cety evambhāgyāḥ paryāyā veditavyāḥ* / (*Manobhūmi*,
YBh, Bhattacharya ed., 26.18-19; emphasis added [here and below])

Then, equivalents of *bīja* are *dhātu* (“element”), *gotra* (“spiritual potentiality”), *prakṛti* (“origin”), *hetu* (“cause”), *satkāya* (“Self”), *prapañca* (“worldly existence”), *ālaya* (“that which is clung to”), *upādāna* (“that which is appropriated”), *duḥkha* (“suffering”), *satkāyadrṣṭyadhīṣṭhānam* (the basis of the notion of Self), and *asmimānādhiṣṭhāna* (“the basis of the feeling of identity”). These sorts of equivalents should be known [as equivalents of *bīja*].⁴

Here, we do find *dhātu* and *gotra* as equivalents of *bīja*, but we cannot find *vāsanā* among so many words. In shorter but similar lists of “equivalents” of *bīja* in the *YBh* also, we often notice that *vāsanā* is missing.⁵ This fact makes us suspicious about the equation of *bīja* with *vāsanā*. At the very least this equation is not obvious and requires careful examination.

Thus, in what follows, let us observe the early usage of *bīja* and *vāsanā* separately. For the purpose of this discussion, I follow Lambert Schmithausen’s analysis and regard the “Basic Section” and the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* as the old portions of the *YBh*.⁶

3 For this *sūtra*, see Hakamaya [1981]2001 and Yamabe 1987, 25, 31.

4 See Yamabe 1990b, 931; 2017a, 15-16.

5 E.g., ŚBh, Shōmonji Kenkyūkai ed., 1998, 2.21-22; 2007, 110.20 (quoted below in §2.4); 2018, 62.4; BBh, Wogihara ed., 3.6-8 (quoted below in §2.5). In this paper, the two numbers separated by a dot in the references to Sanskrit texts show the page and line numbers. See also Matsumoto 2004, 69-83.

6 Lambert Schmithausen analyzes the *YBh* roughly into the following three portions:

1) Parts of the “Basic Section,” in particular, *Śrāvabhūmi*, *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and

2. Early usage of *bīja*

In the old portions of the *YBh* thus defined, *bīja* is already used for a wide range of meanings. Let us discuss some of the representative usage below.

2.1. *Bīja* of Reincarnation

First, let us look at the following passage (“*Pratītyasamutpāda* Analysis”⁷):

*evam avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā utpadyante*⁸ *saṃskārapratyayaṃ ca vijñānaṃ | tac ca vijñānaṃ dṛṣṭe dharme hetubhūtaṃ āyatyāṃ abhinirvṛttivijñānaphalaparigrahāt | sarvaṃ ca vijñānaṃ*⁹ *adhikṛtya ṣadvijñānakāyā ity ucyante | tac ca vijñānaṃ āyatyāṃ paunarbhavikānāmarūpabījopagataṃ | tad api nāmarūpabījam āyatipaunarbhavikaṣaḍāyatanabījopagataṃ | tac ca ṣaḍāyatanabījam āyatipaunarbhavikasparśabījopagataṃ | tac ca sparśabījam āyatipaunarbhavikaveditabījopagataṃ | ayaṃ tāvat punarbhavasya madhyānte ākṣepako hetur veditavyo yena vijñānādyo veditaparyavasānah kṛtsna evātmabhāva ākṣipto bhavati | (Vastusaṃgrahaṇī [VSg]§III.1.i¹⁰ = Savitarkasavicārādi-bhūmi [SavBh] of the *YBh*, Bhattacharya ed. 200.14-21; see also Harada 2004, 152-57)*

Thus, *saṃskāras* arise conditioned by *avidyā* (“ignorance”), and *vijñāna* (“consciousness”) conditioned by *saṃskāras*. And that *vijñāna* is a cause in the present lifetime because it supports the *vijñāna* as a result that is to be actualized in a future [lifetime]. The groups of six *vijñānas* are so called referring to all the *vijñānas*. And that *vijñāna* is accompanied by the *bīja* of the *nāmarūpa* (“mind and body”) of a reincarnation in a future [lifetime]. That *bīja* of *nāmarūpa* also is accompanied by the *bīja* of *ṣaḍāyatana* (“six sense-bases”) of the reincarnation in a future [lifetime]. And that *bīja* of *ṣaḍāyatana* is accompanied by the *bīja* of *sparsā* (“contact”) of a reincarnation in a future [lifetime]. And that *bīja* of *sparsā* is accompanied by the *bīja* of *vedita* (“sensation”) of the reincarnation in a future [lifetime]. They should be known as the projecting cause in the present lifetime of a reincarnation [in a future lifetime], and by these [*bījas*] the entire personal existence from *vijñāna* to *vedita* is projected.

Vastusaṃgrahaṇī, which does not refer to *ālayavijñāna*.

2) The rest of the “Basic Section,” which sporadically refers to *ālayavijñāna* but not to the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*.

3) *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, which discusses *ālayavijñāna* in detail and presupposes the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*.

(*Ālayavijñāna*, §1.6.6, my paraphrase)

In this paper, I treat the 1) and 2) above as the old portions of the *YBh*.

7 See Schmithausen [1987]2007, 170.

8 Bhattacharya ed., *-pratyayā utpadyante* (om. *saṃskārā*), but the manuscript (folio 54 recto 7) reads as above. For this article, I have consulted images of the photographs (taken by Rahula Sankrityayana) provided by the Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen, catalogue number xc_14_28.

9 Bhattacharya ed. has *vijñānaṃ*, which is supported by the Tibetan (D. tshi 102a6) and Chinese (T30:321c1) version of the *SavBh*. However, the Tibetan (D. zi 247b3) and Chinese (T30:828a17) versions of the *VSg* suggest *saṃtāna* here.

10 For the section numbers of the *VSg*, see Mukai 1985. §III.1.i is found on p. 34.

In this passage, *vijñāna* is said to be accompanied by the *bījas* of the various elements of personal existence in a future life. Thus, we can confirm that the *bīja* of reincarnation (*punarbhava*) is a fairly old notion.

2.2. *Bīja* of *Kleśa*

nyon mongs pa 'i phyogs su gtogs¹¹ *pa* 'i gnas ngan len gyi rten du gnas pa ni *bag la nyal zhes bya ste* | *kun nas dkris pa skye ba* 'i *sa bon lta bu yin no* | (*Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, §II.1.vii [D. 'i 193a7, Pek. 'i 222a1-2])
復次煩惱品所有麤重隨附依身。說名隨眠。能為種子生起一切煩惱纏故。(T30:802b9-10 [No. 1579])

The *dauṣṭhulya* (“corruption”) belonging to the class of *kleśa* (“mental defilement”) and sticking to the body (**āśrayasamniṣṭa*)¹² is called *anuśaya* (“dormant mental defilement”). It is like a *bīja* that gives rise to *paryavasthāna* (“active mental defilement”).¹³

Here, a potential form of *kleśa* (i.e., *dauṣṭhulya*, *anuśaya*) is compared to *bīja*.

2.3. *Bīja* of Karma?

*yāni punas tatrādattaphalāni bījāni tāni kānicid upapadyavedanīyāni*¹⁴
bhavanti | *kānicid aparaparyāyavedanīyāni*¹⁵ | *kalpaśatasahasraiḥ*
svabījataś ca punas teṣām ātmabhāvānām paripūrīr bhavati |
(*Manobhūmi*, *YBh*, Bhattacharya ed. 26.2-5)

Some of the *bījas* that have not given their fruit are **destined to receive [their fruit] when reborn [in the next lifetime]**; some **in a later lifetime**. Even after hundreds of thousands of *kalpas* (“eons”), their personal existences will be completed from their own *bījas*.

Here the expression *teṣām ātmabhāvānām paripūrīr bhavati*, “their personal existences will be completed,” indicates that, like the passage quoted in §2.1, this one discusses the process of reincarnation. In this passage, *bīja* is not expressly linked to karma. However, since *upapadyavedanīya*, “destined to receive [their fruit] when reborn [in the next lifetime],” and *aparaparyāyavedanīya*, “destined to receive [their fruit] in a later lifetime,” are terms that usually modify karma, it is likely that here *bīja* is used in the sense of the *bīja* of karma.

2.4 *Bīja* of All Elements

tatra katame dhātavaḥ | *katamad dhātukauśalyam* | *āha* | *aṣṭādaśa dhātavaḥ* | . . . | *tatra katamad dhātukauśalyam*¹⁶ | *yat punar etān aṣṭādaśa dharmān svakāt svakād dhātoḥ svakasvakād bījāt svakasvakād gotrāj*

11 Pek. *gtegs*.

12 I understand that the Tibetan *rten* corresponds to the Chinese 依身 (**āśraya*), and *gnas pa* to 隨附 (**samniṣṭa*). This translation is based on this reconstructed Sanskrit expression. For the word, *āśraya*, see Yamabe 2020c, 251, n. 7, 258-59, n. 24.

13 This translation is primarily based on the Tibetan version (but see also the previous n. 12).

14 Bhattacharya ed., *upapadya vedanīyāni*.

15 Bhattacharya ed., *aparaparyāye vedanīyāni*. Here, I follow the manuscript (folio 8 verso 1).

16 This sentence is a reconstruction by the editors based on the Tibetan translation.

jāyante nirvartante prādurbhavantī jānāti rocayann upanidhyāti | idam ucyate dhātukaśalyam | (Śrāvakaśhūmi, Shōmonji Kenkyūkai ed., 2007, 110.14-21; corresponding to Shukla ed., 244.12-245.9)
 (Question:) Of these [items a *śrāvaka* practitioner should be proficient in], what are *dhātus*? What is proficiency in *dhātus*? (Answer:) **The eighteen *dhātus***. . . (Question:) Of these [two questions], what is proficiency in *dhātus*? (Answer:) One knows and approvingly thinks that these eighteen elements also arise, come up, and emerge from their respective *dhātus*, *bījas*, and *gotras*. This is called proficiency in *dhātus*.

Here the first thing to note is that *bīja*, *dhātu*, and *gotra* seem to be treated interchangeably.¹⁷ Namely, each of the eighteen *dhātus* arises from its own *dhātu*, which is equivalent to *bīja* and *gotra*. Since the eighteen *dhātus* mean all *dharmas*, it amounts to saying that all *dharmas* arise from their own *bījas*. This is a significant statement, since the *Śrāvakaśhūmi* does not have the tenet of *viññaptimātra* or *ālayaviññāna*. Thus, before the introduction of these concepts, *Yogācāra* already had the idea that all *dharmas* arise from their own *bījas*. What is meant here must be that an anterior *dhātu* gives rise to the posterior *dhātu* of the same kind,¹⁸ as shown in the following quotation from the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (*AKBh*).

gotrārtho dhātvarthaḥ | yathaikasmin parvate bahūny ayastāmrarūpyasuvarṇādigoṭrāṇi dhātava ucyante evam ekasminn āsraye santāne vā aṣṭādaśa goṭrāṇi aṣṭādaśa dhātava ucyante | ākarāś tatra goṭrāṇy ucyante | ta ime cakṣurādayaḥ kasyākarāḥ | svasyā jāteḥ | sabhāgaḥetutvāt | asaṃskṛtaṃ tarhi na dhātuḥ syat | cittacaittānāṃ tarhi . . . (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. Pradhan, ed., 13.17-20)

The meaning of *dhātu* is “ore” (*gotra*).¹⁹ Just as the manifold ores of iron, copper, silver, gold, and so forth in a mountain are called *dhātus*, the eighteen “ores” in one body or [personal] continuum are called “eighteen *dhātus*.” In this case, “ores” refer to origins (*ākara*). Then, whose origins are the eye and so forth? [Each of the eighteen *dhātus* is the origin] of [the subsequent *dhātu* of] its own type (*jāti*), because [the former is] the **homogeneous cause** [of the latter]. [Objection:] In that case, an unconditioned [element] (*asaṃskṛta*) would not be a *dhātu*. [Answer:] In this case, [it is a cause] of mind and mental functions. . . .

Here, both *dhātus* and *gotras* in a mountain, which are the origins of various metals and jewels, clearly refer to ores. Ores are not something buried by anybody. They are there from time immemorial. Thus, this image fits well with the image of “primordial *bījas*.” All elements are within us innately without presupposing

17 See also n. 4.

18 See also Yamabe 2017a, 16. On this point, Takatsukasa Yūki’s argument (2016) needs to be taken into consideration. According to the passage from the **Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā* (T27: 682a13-15 [No. 1545]) quoted in *ibid.*, p. 1226, n. 5, the Sarvāstivāda orthodoxy admits that *cakṣurvijñāna* [at one moment] functions as the *hetu-*, *samanantara-*, and *adhipati-pratyaya* for *cakṣurvijñāna* [at the next moment]. This does not contradict my view stated here. The *yogācāra* view quoted in the same **Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā* (T27: 682b2-3), however, denies that the five *viññānas* arise successively. I would like to discuss this point in more detail on another occasion.

19 See Seyfort Ruegg 1976, 342 + n. 15.

our acts. This *AKBh* passage is also important because we can confirm that *dhātu* in this context is a *sabhāgahetu*, “homogeneous cause,” of the same element.

2.5 *Bījas* of Awakening: Primordial Elements and Enhanced Elements

In the above quotation, *gotra* is used in the sense of “ore.” This is an important point. However, in Yogācāra texts, a much better-known meaning of this word is “spiritual lineage or potentiality.” Then, we should ask how these two meanings are linked. Let us now see an oft-quoted definition of the twofold *gotra* in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.

*tatra gotraṃ katamat | samāsato gotraṃ dvidvidhaṃ | prakṛtiṣṭhaṃ
samudānītaṃ ca | tatra prakṛtiṣṭhaṃ gotraṃ yad bodhisattvānāṃ
śaḍāyatanaviśeṣaḥ | sa tādrśaḥ paraṃparāgato 'nādikāliko
dharmatāpratilabdhaḥ |
tatra samudānītaṃ gotraṃ yat pūrvakuśalamūlābhyāsāt pratilabdhaṃ |
...
tat punar gotraṃ bījaṃ ity apy ucyate dhātuḥ prakṛtir ity api |
(*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, Wogihara ed., 3.1-8; Dutt ed., 2.4-8; the source
of the CWSL, §1.3.2.c of Table 1)*

There, what is *gotra*? In sum, *gotra* is twofold: The one existing by nature and the enhanced one. Of these [two types of *gotras*], **the *gotra* existing by nature** is the distinct/superior²⁰ state of the six sense-bases of bodhisattvas. That [distinct/superior state] was naturally acquired in the beginningless past and has been transmitted as such [to the present]. **The enhanced *gotra*** is what is acquired through the practice of merits in the past [lives]. . . .

Further, this *gotra* is also called *bīja*, *dhātu*, and origin (*prakṛti*).

Since *gotra* in this context is equivalent to the *bījas* of undefiled wisdom, *gotra* here means the *bījas* of supramundane elements.²¹ The equation of *gotra* to *bīja* (and to *dhātu*) is confirmed by the last line of this quotation also.²²

20 Park 2017, 87 suggests that *śaḍāyatanaviśeṣa* “may mean the ‘superiority of the six sense-bases of bodhisattvas over Śrāvakas or Pratyekabuddhas.’” I myself have noted this possibility in Yamabe 2017c, 171-73 from a slightly different point of view, thus I agree with him on this point.

21 Somewhat similar *bījas* of mundane and supramundane attainments are also found in the **Abhidharma-Mahāvibhāṣā*:

善根有三種。一順福分。二順解脫分。三順決擇分。順福分善根者。謂種生人生天種子。生人種子者。謂此種子。能生人中高族大貴。多饒財寶眷屬圓滿。顏貌端嚴身體細潔。乃至或作轉輪聖王。生天種子者。謂此種子。能生欲色無色天中。受勝妙果。或作帝釋魔王梵王。有大威勢多所統領。順解脫分善根者。謂種決定解脫種子。因此決定得般涅槃。順決擇分善根者。謂煖頂忍世第一法。(阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論, T27:34c27-35a7 [No. 1545]). There are three types of *kuśalamūlas* (“roots of merit”): (1) *pūnyabhāgīya* (“conducive to favorable states”), (2) *mokṣabhāgīya* (“conducive to liberation”), and (3) *nirvedhabhāgīya* (“conducive to insight”). ***Pūnyabhāgīya-kuśalamūlas*** refer to the *bījas* for rebirths among humans and deities. **The *bījas* for rebirths among human beings** mean that these *bījas* bring about births in noble families with great fortune and thriving relatives. Their faces are handsome, and bodies elegant. Some of them even become universal monarchs. **The *bījas* for rebirths among deities** mean that these *bījas* bring about excellent rewards among *kāma*, *rūpa*, and *ārūpya* deities. Some of them become Indra, a Māra king, or a Brahmā king, who have great power and control many beings. ***Mokṣabhāgīya-kuśalamūlas*** mean planting *bījas* that will definitely bring about liberation [from *samsāra*]. Owing to these, one will definitely attain *parinirvāna*. ***Nirvedhabhāgīya-kuśalamūlas*** refer to *uṣmagata*, *mūrdhan*, *ṣānti*, and *laukikāgradharma* (the four stages practice leading to the insight).

22 On the interpretation of this passage, see Matsumoto 2004, 66-98 and Yamabe 2017b, 19-22.

I think that the “ore” image of both *dhātu* and *gotra* is relevant here. If one digs up a mountain that contains gold ore, one gets gold, and if a mountain with silver ore, one gets silver. But if one digs up a mountain without any ore, one will get nothing. As is well known, in the Yogācāra *gotra* theory, if one has no *gotra*,²³ one is hopeless in one’s pursuit of supramundane attainments. This predetermination becomes understandable if Yogācāra *gotra* theory is based on this kind of image. If the ore of awakening is not present in a being, he or she can never attain the jewel of awakening. Thus, this kind of *dhātu/gotra* (i.e., *bīja*) image comes very close to the idea of “primordial *bīja*.”

For interpreting *prakṛtistha-gotra* and *samudānīta-gotra*, we should further refer to the following passage, also from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*:

*tatra dhātupuṣṭiḥ katamā | yā prakṛtyā kuśaladharmabījasampadam
niśrītya pūrvakuśaladharmābhyāsād uttarottarānām kuśaladharmā-
bījānām paripuṣṭatarā paripuṣṭatamā utpattisthitiḥ*²⁴ | *iyam ucyate dhātu-
puṣṭiḥ* | (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, Wogihara ed., 80.12-15; Dutt ed., 56.23-25)

What is the nourishment of *dhātu* here? Arising and abiding in a more nourished and [then] most nourished [manner] of the *bījas* of wholesome *dharma*s in each subsequent moment due to the former practice of wholesome *dharma*s based on the existence by nature of the *bījas* of wholesome *dharma*s. This is called the nourishment of *dhātu*.

This is a discussion of the *bījas* of wholesome elements. Here, the correspondence between *prakṛtyā kuśaladharmabījasampadam*, “the existence by nature of the *bījas* of wholesome *dharma*s,” and the aforementioned *prakṛtistham gotram* seems to be clear. The exact meaning of *utpatti-sthitiḥ* (or *utpatti sthitiḥ*) needs further examination,²⁵ but *kuśaladharmabījānām paripuṣṭatarā paripuṣṭatamā*, “a more nourished and [then] most nourished [manner] of the *bījas* of wholesome *dharma*s,” seems to correspond to *samudānītam gotram*, “the enhanced *gotra*.” Thus, the first member, *prakṛti-*, of the compound *prakṛtistha-gotra* is likely used in an adverbial sense, “by nature (*prakṛtyā*).”²⁶

*mdor bsdu na khams ni gnyis yod de | rang bzhin gyis gnas pa dang |
goms pas yongs su brtas*²⁷ *pa’o* |

23 See further the following quotation from the *Manobhūmi*:

*tat punaḥ sarvabījakam vijñānam parinirvāṇadharmakāṇām paripūrṇabījam
aparinirvāṇadharmakāṇām punas trividhabodhibījavikalam* || (*Manobhūmi*, YBh,
Bhattacharya ed., 25.1-2; the source of the CWSL §1.3.1.d of Table 1)

And that *vijñāna* endowed with all *bījas* of those who are destined for *parinirvāṇa* has the entire *bījas*. That of those who are not destined for *parinirvāṇa* lacks *bījas* of three kinds of awakening.

The *Manobhūmi* sporadically refers to *ālayavijñāna*, so this text (at least in the current version) must presuppose *ālayavijñāna*. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the quoted passage mentions only *sarvabījakam vijñānam* and not *ālayavijñāna*. In any case, I assume the expression *paripūrṇabīja* is in line with the aforementioned model of the eighteen *dhātus* that function as *bījas*. This passage does not necessarily presuppose the doctrine of *vijñaptimātra*.

24 Dutt ed., *utpattiḥ sthitiḥ*.

25 Perhaps, *utpatti* should be compared with *pūrvābhyāsasamutthitam bījam* (*BBh*) quoted below in this section.

26 On *prakṛtistha-gotra*, see also Yamabe 2017, 15-25.

27 Pek. *rtas*.

de la rang bzhin gyis gnas pa ni ji ltar khams bco brgyad po 'di dag
so sor nges par gryud la yod pa'i sa bon no ||
de la goms pas yons su brtas²⁸ pa'i khams ni dge ba 'am mi dge ba'i
chos sngon gyi skye ba gzhan dag tu kun tu brten²⁹ pa gang yin pa
de dag yang dag par grub par bya ba'i phyir | da lta sa bon yongs su
brtas³⁰ pa rten la gnas pa yin te | des na de rkyen chung ngu tsam la
yan dmigs nas des bkri zhing des 'gro bar 'gyur ro (Vastusamgrahaṇī
§III.7.i [D. zi. 288b1-3; Pek. 'i 330a3-6])

當知諸界略有二種。一住自性界。二習增長界。

住自性界者。謂十八界墮自相續。各各決定差別種子。

習增長界者。謂則諸法或是其善或是不善。於餘生中先已數習令
彼現行故。於今時種子強盛依附相續。由是爲因。暫遇小緣。便能
現起定不可轉。(T30:846c18-23 [No. 1579])

*samāsato dhātur dvividhaḥ | prakṛtisthaś cābhyāsaparipuṣṭaś ca |
tatra prakṛtisthadhātur³¹ yathaite 'ṣṭādaśadhātavaḥ svasaṃtānapatitāni
pratiniyatāni bījāni |

tatra abhyāsaparipuṣṭadhātur ye dharmāḥ kuśalā vākuśalā vā pūrvam
anyajātiṣv āsevītā te samudāgamāya vartamānabījāni paripuṣṭāny
āśraye (or santāne)³² sanniviṣṭāni | tena te 'lpam api pratyayamātram
ālambya tair nīyante tair cābhinirvartyante |

In sum, *dhātu* is twofold: the one existing by nature and the one
nourished through habitual practice.

Of these, **the *dhātu* existing by nature** is, for example, the eighteen
dhātus, [which are] *bījas* staying in their own respective continuities.
The *dhātu* nourished through habitual practice is the present *bījas*
sticking to the body (or personal continuity) nourished so that the good
or bad *dharmas* habitually practiced in other, former lives might arise
[easily]. Therefore, these [*dharmas*] are advanced and made to give rise
[to their fruit] depending on even a small condition from these [*bījas*].

This passage also shows that all elements (eighteen *dhātus*) are within us
originally, and some of them are enhanced through our good or bad acts.
This seems to be the basic structure of the *dhātu* found in early Yogācāra
texts. In what follows, I will call this type of model an “early *dhātu* model.”
It should also be noted that in this model, the *dhātus* are clearly pluralist.

28 Pek. *rtas*.

29 Pek. *bsten*.

30 Pek. *rtas*.

31 In my former reconstruction (Yamabe 1987, 26-29), I put both **prakṛtisthadhātu* and **abhyāsaparipuṣṭadhātu* in the plural forms. To these reconstructions, Matsumoto 2004, 87 suggested a singular form, *prakṛtistho dhātuḥ*, based on such expressions as *prakṛtisthaṃ gotraṃ* (*BBh*, quoted above) and *prakṛtisthaṃ bījaṃ* (*BBh*, quoted below). As Matsumoto rightly guessed, my reconstructions were in order to make the number of the subject agree with that of the following predicates (**ṣṭādaśadhātavaḥ*; **ye dharmāḥ*. . .). It is, however, possible to use a singular subject with plural predicates, as in the following case: *dharmāyatanaṃ ye vedanā sañjñā saṃskārā avijñaptir asaṃskṛtaṃ ca* (*Pañcaskandhaka*, Li and Steinkellner eds., 18.10-11). In the face of the parallel expression in the *BBh* (*samāsato gotraṃ dvividhaṃ / prakṛtisthaṃ samudānītaṃ ca* /), I also feel that singular forms are more natural for these two subjects here. Therefore, on this point I would like to accept Matsumoto's suggestion. In addition to these, I have made a few more changes to my former reconstruction.

32 Tibetan *rtan* suggests *āśraye*, but Chinese 相續 seems to indicate *santāne*.

Exactly the same structure is found in the following quotation, also from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*:

*yat punas tad eva bījaṃ vibhajyānekaprakāraṃ gṛhṇāti | idaṃ
nānādhātuḥjñānabalāt |
sa punar dhātupravibhāgaḥ samāsataś caturākāro veditavyaḥ |
prakṛtisthaṃ bījaṃ
pūrvābhyāsasamutthitaṃ bījaṃ
*viśodhyaṃ bījaṃ | tadyathā parinirvāṇadharmakāṇāṃ |
aviśodhyaṃ ca bījaṃ | tadyathā aparinirvāṇadharmakāṇāṃ |
yat tāvat yathā dhātvanurūpaṃ pratipadam avatāraṃ³³ prajānāti |
idaṃ nānādhātuḥjñānabalāt |* (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, Wogihara ed.,
401.4-11; Dutt ed., 276.20-24)*

Analyzing the same *bīja*, [the Buddha] recognizes many kinds. This is by means of the power of the knowledge of various *dhātus*.

The analysis of the *dhātus* should be known, in sum, as fourfold:

the *bīja* existing by nature,

the *bīja* actualized through former habitual practice,

the *bīja* to be purified, namely, of those who are destined for *parinirvāṇa*, and the *bīja* that cannot be purified, namely, of those who are not destined for *parinirvāṇa*.

The way [the Buddha] knows the practice and entrance [to the truth] in conformity with the *dhātus* is by means of the power of the knowledge of manifold *dhātus* (See also the English translation in Engle 2016, 650).

Here also, the following correspondence is clear:

prakṛtisthaṃ gotraṃ = prakṛtisthaṃ bījaṃ
samudānītaṃ gotraṃ = pūrvābhyāsasamutthitaṃ bījaṃ

Although the word *dhātu* does not appear, the following passage from the *Manobhūmi* in the Basic Section also shows the “early *dhātu* model”:

*sa ca bījasantānaprabandho 'nādikālikah | anādikālikatve 'pi śubhā-
śubhakarmaviśeṣaparibhāvanatayā³⁴ punaḥ punar vipākaphala-
parigrahān navībhavati |* (*Manobhūmi*, *YBh*, Bhattacharya ed.,
25.20-26.1; the source of the *CWSL*, §1.3.1.c of Table 1)

The succession of the continuity of *bīja* is beginningless. Even though it is beginningless, since it takes its result of karmic retribution again and again due to being infused by distinct, good or bad karma, it becomes new.

Incidentally, the expression *anādikālika*, “beginningless,” reminds us of the well-known verse in the *Abhidharmasūtra*. This verse is not found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* but is quoted by the *Mahāyānasamgraha* and a few other sources, including the “primordial *bīja*” theory of the *CWSL*.

*anādikāliko dhātuḥ sarvadharmasamāśrayaḥ |
tasmīn sati gatīḥ sarvā nirvāṇādhiḡamo 'pi ca† |*
(*Abhidharmasūtragāthā* quoted in the *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya*, Lévi ed.,

33 Wogihara, *pratipadavatāraṃ*.

34 Bhattacharya ed., *-vanayā*, but the manuscript (folio 8 recto 6), *-vanatayā*.

37.12-13; Buescher ed., 116.1-2; also quoted in the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, §I.1; the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*, Johnston ed. 72.13-14 [in the original pagination]; the source of the *CWSL*, §1.3.1.b of Table 1; †Lévi ed., *vā*.)

The *dhātu* from the beginningless past is the common basis for all *dharmas*. When it exists, all the destinies [in *saṃsāra*] and the attainment of *nirvāna* exist.

Unlike the other passages quoted above, this one presents a singular *dhātu* as the basis of all phenomenal elements. Apparently, the Yogācāra *dhātu* model was transformed from pluralism to monism, and this verse seems to represent a somewhat developed stage. Nevertheless, the word *anādikālika* is probably inherited from the earlier discussions of *dhātu* we have observed in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

3. Early Usage of *Vāsanā*

In contrast to the wide range of meanings of *bīja/dhātu*, the usage of *vāsanā* seems to have been fairly limited in the old portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. As far as I can see, *vāsanā* is used only for the following two meanings.

3.1 Imprint of *Kleśa*

*tatra yā tathāgatasya spandite vā prekṣite vā kathite vā vihāre vā kleśa-sadbhāvasadrśa*³⁵*ceṣṭāsamudācārapracuratā*³⁶ | *ayaṃ tathāga-tasya vāsanāsamudghāta ity ucyate* | *arhatām punaḥ prahīṅnakleśānām api kleśasadbhāvasadrśī ceṣṭā* *spanditaprekṣitakathitavīhrteṣu bhavaty eva* | (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, Wogihara ed., 404.18-22; Dutt ed., 279.8-11)

Of the [one hundred and forty attributes exclusive to Buddhas], behaviors similar to [that of a person who] has *kleśas* do not arise much for a **Tathāgata**, whether he is moving, seeing, speaking, or staying. This is said to be the uprooting of *vāsanā* for a Tathāgata. On the other hand, for *arhats*, even though they have abandoned *kleśas*, they still have behavior similar to [that of a person who] has *kleśas*, whether they are moving, seeing, speaking, or staying.

Both *arhats* and the Tathāgata have abandoned *kleśas*. Thus, actual *kleśas* do not arise for them. Nevertheless, *arhats* have some after-effects, or traces, of *kleśas*. So, they sometimes behave as if they had *kleśas*. Only the Buddha is free from those kind of traces. These traces are called *vāsanā*.³⁷

35 Dutt ed., *-sadrśam*.

36 Dutt ed., *pracuratā*. Ch. 多不現行 (T30:574a20).

37 This kind of *vāsanā* is also found in the **Abhidharma-Mahāvibhāṣā*.

復次二乘猶有相似法故。謂阿羅漢愛恚雖斷。而有愛恚相似餘習。如二阿羅漢俱是不時解脫。同止一處。一則多得敬養名稱。一則不得。彼得者便似自高如有喜愛。彼不得者便似自下如有憂感。故不說為世法不染。唯佛永拔愛恚習氣。假使一切有情皆得勝利恭敬名譽。如來不得一毫之分。終無自下似憂感相反生慶悅。設佛獨得一切勝利恭敬名譽。諸餘有情無一毫分。終無自高如喜愛相反生慈愍。故佛獨稱世法不染。(阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論, T27: 872c4-14 [No. 1545])

In addition, because the two vehicles still have similar elements[, they are not said to be unaffected by the eight worldly affairs]. Namely, although *arhats* have severed lust and anger, they still have

3.2 Imprint of Karma

*yad apy uktam asty atītam karma yataḥ sattvāḥ savyābādhāvyābādhām vedanām vedayantīti*³⁸ | *tatrāpi tadvāsanāyām tadastitvopacāram abhipretyoktam* | *yeṣu saṃskāreṣu yac chubhāśubham karmotpannaniruddham bhavati tena hetunā tena pratyayena viśiṣṭā saṃskārasantatiḥ pravartate sā vāsanety ucyate* | (*SavBh*, *YBh*, Bhattacharya ed., 127.19-128.3)

It is further stated: “Past **karma** exists, from which sentient beings experience harmful or harmless sensation.” Here also, referring to the *vāsanā* [of karma], karma is **metaphorically said** to exist. When good or bad karma arises and perishes in *saṃskāras*, caused and conditioned by that, a **distinctified continuity of saṃskāras** evolves. This is called *vāsanā*.

From a Yogācāra point of view, past karma itself perishes the moment it is made, but its imprint remains and brings about corresponding result when the time comes. This imprint of karma is called *vāsanā*.³⁹

Another noteworthy passage is found also in the same *SavBh*:

tatra vāsanāhetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāyākṣepahetuḥ prajñāpyate | *tat kasya hetoḥ* | *tathā hi* | *śubhāśubhakarmaparibhāvītiḥ saṃskārās traidhātuke* | *ṣṭāniṣṭagatiṣv*⁴⁰ | *iṣṭāniṣṭātmbhāvān ākṣipanti* | *bāhyānām ca bhāvānām tenaivādhipatyena sampannaviṣannatā* | *tasmāt saṃskārānām śubhāśubhakarmavāsanām adhiṣṭhāyapekṣāhetuḥ prajñāpyate* || (*YBh*, Bhattacharya ed., 107.20-108.4)

Of these [fifteen causal bases], based on *vāsanā* as the causal basis (*vāsanāhetvadhiṣṭhāna*), the projecting cause (*ākṣepahetu*) is designated. For what reason? It is because *saṃskāras* infused by

after-effects similar to lust and anger. For example, two *arhats*, both of whom can attain liberation at any time, stay together in the same place. One of them attains much respect and reputation, while the other does not. The one who attains them appears to be conceited and attached. The one who does not attain them appears to be belittling himself and dejected. Therefore, we do not say that they are not tainted by worldly affairs. Only **the Buddha** has ultimately uprooted the *vāsanā* of **lust and anger**. Even if all sentient beings gain benefit, respect, and reputation, while the Tathāgata does not gain anything, he does not belittle himself or appear to be dejected. On the contrary, he develops joy. Even if only the Buddha gains all benefit, respect, and reputation, and the other beings gain nothing, he is not conceited or appears to be attached. On the contrary, he develops compassion. Therefore, only the Buddha is said not to be tainted by worldly affairs. See also Lamotte 1974.

38 Bhattacharya ed., *savyābaddhā vyābādhām vedayantīti*. Tib. *gnod pa dang bcas pa dang / gnod pa med pa'i tshor ba myong bar byed pa* / (Pek. Dzi 75b3). Ch. 受有損害無損害受 (T30:305b2 [No. 1579]; T31:523a18-19 [No. 1602]).

39 A similar idea is quoted in the **Abhidharma-Mahāvibhāṣā*:
問何故無有成就去來有覆無覆無記表業。有說。彼業習氣不堅牢故。無成就去來世者。如善惡業習氣。堅牢則能成就去來二世。無記不爾。(阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論, T 27:638a18-24 [No. 1545])
Question: For what reason is there no “acquisition” of obstructed or unobstructed neutral manifest karma in the past or future? . . . Some maintain: Because the *vāsanā* of that karma is not solid, one does not acquire past or future [karma]. If it is **the vāsanā of good or bad karma**, it is solid and thus can be acquired in the past and future. Neutral [karma] is different.

40 This is a supplement by the editor Bhattacharya, which is well supported by the Tibetan and Chinese versions.

righteous or unrighteous **karma** project desirable or undesirable personal existence (*ātmabhāva*) in desirable or undesirable destinies in the triple worlds. Influenced by that [*vāsanā*], external objects are rich or poor. Therefore, based on the *vāsanā* of righteous or unrighteous karma, the projecting cause is designated.

The basic idea should be the same as the previous quotation. Here also, the *saṃskāras* infused by good or bad karmas are called *vāsanā*. *Vāsanā* clearly refers to the imprints left by karmas in *saṃskāras*.

4. Conceptualization as a Cause of Saṃsāric Phenomena

Thus far, we have observed that in the old portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, *bīja* was used for a much wider range of meanings than *vāsanā*. The idea of the *bījas* of all *dharmas* is already attested in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*. On the other hand, the usage of *vāsanā* seems to have been limited to two meanings: the traces of *kleśa* and the imprints of karma. Unlike *bīja*, which is closely tied to the idea of primordial *dhātu*, *vāsanā* presupposes some conscious act on the part of sentient beings. Thus, it is unlikely that material elements (*rūpa*) that cannot act through their own will leave impressions. Therefore, the *vāsanās* of all *dharmas* are logically impossible. Accordingly, *bīja* and *vāsanā* could not have been synonymous in the early stages. In order that the *vāsanās* of all *dharmas* become possible, some kind of “leap” is needed. I think it is here that “conceptualization” played a key part.

In the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, we can find the idea that conceptualization (*vikalpa*) brings about the saṃsāric world.

tasyā eva tathatāyā evam aparijñātatvād bālānām tannidāno ’ṣṭavidho vikalpaḥ pravartate trivastujanakaḥ sarvasattvabhājanalokānām nirvartakaḥ | (Bodhisattvabhūmi, Takahashi ed., 107, §8.1)

Because that very *tathatā* is not thus fully understood, from this cause, for immature people the **eightfold conceptualization** generating threefold *vastu* (“object, thing”) evolves and gives rise to the entire **world of sentient beings and the receptacle**.

Sattvabhājanaloka means sentient beings and the exterior world in which they live. Thus, these are the totality of the world of *saṃsāra*. According to this passage, this saṃsāric world is brought about by the eightfold conceptualization.⁴¹

tac caitad dvayaṃ bhavati samāsataḥ[†] vikalpaś ca vikalpādhiṣṭhānaṃ vikalpālambanaṃ ca vastu | tac caitad ubhayaṃ anādikālikam cānyonyahetukaṃ ca vedītavyaṃ || pūrvako vikalpaḥ pratyutpannasya vikalpālambanasya vastunaḥ prādurbhāvāya | pratyutpannaṃ punar vikalpālambanaṃ vastu prādurbhūtaṃ pratyutpannasya tadālambanasya vikalpasya prādurbhāvāya hetuḥ ||

41 See also Deleanu 2013, 891.

*tatraitarhi vikalpasyāparijñānam āyatyāṃ tadālabhanasya vastunaḥ prādurbhāvāya || tatsambhavāc ca punar niyataṃ tadadhiṣṭhānasyāpi tadāśritasya vikalpasya prādurbhāvo bhavati || (Bodhisattvabhūmi, Takahashi ed., 110, §8.4; *sic, sandhi not observed)*

In sum, this [explanation] consists of these two [elements]: (1) **conceptual thought** (*vikalpa*), and (2) the “**object**” (*vastu*) that forms the foundation of and the cognitive object of conceptual thought. Both of them should be understood as having existed since the beginningless past and as having been each other’s reciprocal cause. A previous **conceptual thought** [serves as the cause] for the appearance of a present “**object**” that constitutes the cognitive object of a [present] conceptual thought. Moreover, a present “**object**” that has been caused to appear and that is the cognitive object of a conceptual thought [serves as] the cause for the appearance of the present **conceptual thought** for which it constitutes a cognitive object. Regarding this [point], the lack of thorough knowledge regarding [the nature of] a conceptual thought here [in this life serves as the cause] for the appearance of an “**object**” in the future that will become the cognitive object of that [conceptual thought]. Moreover, because of the arising of that [“object”], inevitably a conceptual thought for which that [“object”] serves as the foundation and the basis will also appear.⁴²

According to this passage, conceptualization in the past brings about *vastu*, “object, thing,” in the present. This *vastu* is the cognitive object of conceptualization and as such brings about conceptualization in the present. If one does not fully understand (the nature of) this conceptualization, it will bring about *vastu* in the future. Thus, conceptualization and *vastu* mutually cause each other. Taken together with the following passage, I understand that the “previous,” “present,” and “future,” in the above quotation mean respectively the past, present, and future lifetimes. Thus, this must be a description of the mechanism of *samsāra*.

tatra yo ’sāv aṣṭavidho mithyāvikalpo bālānāṃ trivastujanako lokanirvartakaḥ so ’sya caturvidhasya yathābhūtaparijñānasya vaikalpyād asamavadhānāt pravartate || tasmāc ca punar mithyāvikalpāt samkleśaḥ | samkleśāt samsārasaṃsr̥tiḥ | samsārasaṃsr̥teḥ samsārānugataṃ jātijarāvvyādhimaraṇādikaṃ duḥkhaṃ pravartate || yadā ca bodhisattvena caturvidhaṃ yathābhūtaparijñānaṃ niśritya so ’ṣṭavidho vikalpaḥ parijñāto bhavati || dr̥ṣṭe dharme tasya samyakparijñānād āyatyāṃ tadadhiṣṭhānasya tadālabhanasya prapañcapatitasya vastunaḥ prādurbhāvo na bhavati | tasyānudyād aprādurbhāvāt tadālabhanasyāpi vikalpasyāyatyāṃ prādurbhāvo na bhavati | evaṃ tasya savastukasya vikalpasya nirodho yaḥ sa sarvaprapañcanirodho vedītyaḥ || evaṃ ca prapañcanirodho bodhisattvasya mahāyānaparinirvāṇam iti vedītyaṃ || (Bodhisattvabhūmi, Takahashi ed., 114-15, §10.1-2)

42 For this translation, I rely heavily on Engle 2016, 95-96, though I have made some modifications based on my own understanding.

Regarding this [topic], the **eight types of wrong conceptual thought**, which give rise to the three “objects” (*vastu*) for immature beings, and which bring forth the [entire] world [of sentient beings and their physical environment], arise because [an individual] lacks, namely does not have, the four forms of thorough knowledge of the way the [eight types of wrong conceptual thought] truly is. Furthermore, **pollution** [arises] from the [eight types of] wrong conceptual thought; the **transmigration in saṃsāra** [arises] from the pollution; and the **suffering** of birth, old age, illness, death, etc., that follows *saṃsāra* arises from the transmigration in *saṃsāra*.

When the eight types of wrong conceptual thought is thoroughly known by a *bodhisattva* relying upon the four forms of thorough knowledge, due to the correct and thorough knowledge of the [eight types of wrong conceptual thought] in the present life, there is no appearance for the *bodhisattva* in future [lives] of the “**object**” that constitutes the foundation and cognitive object of those [conceptual thoughts] and that belongs to *prapañca* (“the worldly existence”). Because that [“object”] does not arise or appear, there is no appearance [for the *bodhisattva*] in future [lives] of the **conceptual thought** for which that [“object” would serve as] the cognitive object. Thus, this **cessation of conceptual thought together with its “object”** should be known as the cessation of all *prapañca*. Thus, the cessation of *prapañca* should be known as the *parinirvāṇa* of Mahāyāna for a *bodhisattva*.⁴³

In this passage, we can observe the following process:

mithyāvikalpa → *saṃkleśa* → *saṃsārasaṃṣṛti* → *duḥkha*

Therefore, if one fully understands the mechanism of the wrong conceptualization, the chain of *saṃsāric* causality will be broken. In this context, *vikalpa* seems to be playing the role of *kleśa* and karma in the traditional model of *saṃsāra*. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that *vastu* is subsumed under *prapañca*, which in this context probably means, “worldly existence.”⁴⁴

*sarvabījakaṃ vijñānaṃ katamat | pūrvakaṃ prapañcaratihetum upādāya
yaḥ sarvabījako vipāko nirvṛttaḥ | (Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā
bhūmiḥ, YBh, Bhattacharya ed., 4.11-12)⁴⁵*

What is the *vijñāna* endowed with all *bījas*? The karmic retribution endowed with all *bījas* that has arisen relying on the former **attachment to frivolous thought/worldly existence** as a cause.

This passage is a little difficult to interpret because of the ambiguity of the word *prapañca*. If *prapañca* means “frivolous thought” (which is close to *vilakpa*, “conceptualization”) here, it might be another statement that conceptualization causes *saṃsāra*.

43 For this translation, I have referred to Engle 2016, 100 and Takahashi 2005, 177-78.

44 See Schmithausen [1987]2007, 53 (§3.1.2).

45 See also Schmithausen [1987]2007, 110 (§6.1.1).

5. *Vāsanā* of Conceptualization

As we have seen, in the model of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, *vikalpa* seems to play the role of *kleśa* and karma in the traditional model of *samsāra*. If so, it might be natural that *vikalpa* is also considered to leave its imprint (*vāsanā*), as do *kleśa* and karma. See the following statement in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*.

yon tan 'byung gnas 'di lta ste dper na | shel shin tu gsal ba [la] tshon dang phrad pa de lta bur ni gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid la kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid kyi tha snyad kyi bag chags blta bar bya'o | (Samdhinirmocana-sūtra, Lamotte ed., 62 [§6.9])

**tadyathā Guṇākara svacchasphaṭike raṅgasamprayogaḥ | evaṃ paratantralakṣaṇe parikalpitalakṣaṇasya vyavahāravāsanā draṣṭavyāḥ || (Reconstruction in Lamotte ed., 63)*

Guṇākara, **imprints of designations of *parikalpita-lakṣaṇa*** (“conceptualized characteristics”) in *paratantra-lakṣaṇa* (“other-dependent characteristics”) should be seen as like a contact of a very clear crystal with a hue.⁴⁶

Namely, **vyavahāra-vāsanā* makes various images appear on the clear crystal ball. Thus, here **vyavahāra-vāsanā* is understood to be the cause of worldly phenomena that appear in front of us.

sems can rnams gzhan gyi dbang dang yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid la kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid du sgro btags nas | gzhan gyi dbang dang yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid la | kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi mtshan nyid rjes su tha snyad 'dogs te |

ji lta ji ltar rjes su tha snyad 'dogs pa de lta de ltar tha snyad btags pas yongs su bsgos pa'i sems tha snyad btags pa dang rjes su 'brel pa 'am | tha snyad btags pa bag la nyal gyis gzhan gyi dbang dang yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid la kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi mtshan nyid du mngon par zhen no ||

ji lta ji ltar mngon par zhen pa de lta de ltar gzhan gyi dbang [dang yong su grub pa'i] ngo bo nyid la kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid du mngon par zhen pa'i rgyu de dang | rkyen des phyi ma la gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid kun tu bskyed de |

gzhi des na | nyon mongs pa'i kun nas nyon mongs pas kyang kun nas nyon mongs par 'gyur | las kyi kun nas nyon mongs pa dang skye ba'i kun nas nyon mongs pas kyang kun nas nyon mongs par 'gyur zhing | yun ring por yang na sems can dmyal ba rnams dang | yang na dud 'gro rnams sam | yang na yi dwags rnams sam | yang na lha rnams sam | yang na lha ma yin rnams sam | yang na mi rnams kyi nang du kun tu rgyug cing 'khor bar 'gyur te | 'khor ba las mi 'das pa'i phyr ro | (Samdhinirmocana-sūtra, Lamotte ed., 70-71 [§7.10])

Superimposing *parikalpita-svabhāva* (“conceptualized nature”) onto *paratantra-* (“other-dependent”) and *pariniṣpanna-svabhāva* (“consummate nature”), sentient beings give concomitant designations (*rjes su tha snyad 'dogs*, Bodhiruci 名字... 說(?), Xuanzang 隨起言說, **anuvyavahāra*) of the characteristics of *parikalpita-svabhāva* to *paratantra-svabhāva* and to *pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*.

46 See also an English translation in Powers 1994, 85.

To the extent that they give concomitant designations, with their minds **infused with** (*yongs su bsgos pa*, Bodhiruci?, Xuanzang 熏習, **paribhāvita*) **designations**, with the awareness (*rjes su 'brel pa*, **anubaddha*, Bodhiruci?, Xuanzang 隨覺, **anubodha*)⁴⁷ of designations and with the dormancy (*bag la nyal*, Bodhiruci?, Xuanzang 隨眠, **anuśaya*) of designations, they are attached to the characteristics of *parikalpita-svabhāva* in *paratantra*- and *pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*. To the extent that they are attached to [*parikalpita-svabhāva*], they give rise to *paratantra-svabhāva* in the future caused and conditioned by the attachment to *parikalpita-svabhāva*.

Caused by that, they are defiled by the pollutions of *kleśa*, karma, and *janman* (“birth”). For a long time, they wander and transmigrate in [the realms of] *saṃsāra*, [namely,] hell beings, animals, hungry ghosts, gods, or asuras, and do not transcend [it].⁴⁸

Here, the attachment to the characteristics of *parikalpita-svabhāva* brings about *paratantra-svabhāva* in the future. Thus, the same model observed in the Tattvārthapaṭala of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* is here presented in the framework of the *trīsvabhāva* theory. In this context, the following passage is also highly noteworthy:

der dang por 'di ltar len pa rnam pa gnyis po rten dang bcas pa'i dbang po gzugs can len pa dang | mtshan ma dang ming dang rnam par rtog pa la tha snyad 'dogs pa'i spros pa'i bag chags len pa ra rten nas | sa bon thams cad pa'i sems rnam par smin cing 'jug la rgyas shing 'phel ba dang yangs par 'gyur ro || (Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, Lamotte ed., 55 [§5.2])

**tatra prathamataḥ sarvabīja(ka)ṃ cittaṃ vipacyate saṃmūrcchati vṛddhiṃ virūddhiṃ vipulatām āpadyate yaduta dvididham upādānam upādāya: sādhiṣṭhānarūpīndriyopādānaṃ nimittanāmavikalpa-vyavahāraprapañcavāsanopādānaṃ ca*⁴⁹

Then first, the *sarvabīja(ka)ṃ cittaṃ* ripens, merges and grows, thrives and develops appropriating a twofold support: the physical sense faculties along with their seats as the support, and **the imprint of the designations (*vyavahāra*) and frivolous thoughts (*prapañca*) on the objective images (*nimitta*), names (*nāma*), and conceptualization (*vikalpa*)** as the support.⁵⁰

Here clearly, the *vāsanās* of lingual activities are playing a key role in the process of *saṃsāra*. **Parikalpitasvabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā* in the following quotation from the **Pañcaviññānakāyasamprayuktā-Manobhūmi* of the

47 As pointed out by Lamotte (1935, 196, n. 13) the Tibetan translation suggests **anubandha*, while Xuanzang's Chinese version, **anubodha*. Since *anubodha* seems to make a better pair with the subsequent *anuśaya*, here I follow Xuanzang's version.

48 See also Powers 1994, 105-7.

49 Sanskrit reconstruction by Schmithausen (2014, 174, §141.1)

50 My translation is based on the Sanskrit reconstruction and is heavily dependent on Schmithausen 2014, 194-95 (§167) and 367 (§312.1.1), though I have made a few modifications. See also Powers 1994, 69-71.

Viniścayasamgrahaṇī seems to be a direct offspring of **nimittanāmvikalpa-vyavahāraprapaṅcavāsana* in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*.

de la nang gi len pa ni kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid la mngon par zhen pa'i bag chags dang rten dang dbang po'i gzugs so || *de yang gzugs can gyi kham na'o* || *gzugs can ma yin pa na ni bag chags len pa kho nar zad do* || (“Pravṛtti Portion”⁵¹ of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, §I.1.(b) A.1(b)1; Pek. zi 4b2-3; D. zhi 3b7-4a1; Hakamaya [1979]2001, 390) 了別內執受者。謂能了別遍計所執自性妄執習氣。及諸色根根所依處。此於有色界。若在無色。唯有習氣執受了別。(T30:580a4-7 [No. 1579])

**tatrādhyātmam upādānaṃ parikalpitasvabhāvābhiniveśavāsana* | *sādhiṣṭhānaṃ cendriyarūpam* | *tac ca rūpidhātor ārūpye tu vāsanopadānaṃ eva* |⁵²

Of these, inner appropriation (appropriated elements) is **the *vāsanā* of attachment to *parikalpita-svabhāva*** (“conceptualized nature”) and physical sense faculties with their bases. This is in the material realm. In the immaterial realm, there is only appropriation of *vāsanā*.

Since we can conceptualize any thinkable objects, **parikalpitasvabhāvābhiniveśavāsana* is possible for all *dharmas*, as follows:

bīja* | *samāsavyavasthānaṃ katamat* | *yālayavijñāne sarvadharmāṇāṃ parikalpitasvabhāvābhiniveśavāsana* | *sā ca vāsanā dravyato 'sti saṃvṛtitaś ca tebhya dharmebhya 'nyānyalakṣaṇā na vaktavyā tad yathā tathatā* | *sā ca sarvatragadauṣṭhuyam vaktavyam* | (Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayukutā-manobhūmi-viniścaya* [bīja §4]; Pek. zi 30a5-7; D. zhi 27b1-3; Xuanzang T30:589a9-13 [No. 1579]; Paramārtha T30:1025c9-13 [No. 1584])⁵³

What is the concise description of *bīja*? It is the ***vāsanā* of the attachment to *parikalpita-svabhāva*** of all *dharmas*. That *vāsanā* exists substantially but conventionally, and it and these *dharmas* cannot be said to have the same or different characteristics, just like [*dharmas* and] *tathatā*. This should be said to be the universal *dauṣṭhulya* (“corruption”).

Here the identification of *bīja* with *vāsanā* is completed, namely, *bīja* in general is defined as *sarvadharmāṇāṃ parikalpitasvabhāvābhiniveśavāsana*.

Conclusion

In the early stages of the Yogācāra tradition, *bīja* was already used for a wide range of meanings. Even the expression, “the *bījas* of the eighteen *dhātus*” (i.e., all the *dharmas*), was possible. Here, *bīja* was closely associated with *dhātu* and *gotra*, namely, innate elements within us, which can be enhanced

51 See Schmithausen [1987]2007, 299-300, n. 226.

52 Sanskrit reconstruction by Yamabe in collaboration with Noritoshi Aramaki.

53 For this Sanskrit reconstruction, see Yamabe 1990a, 67.

by our acts. The *CWSL*'s "primordial *bīja*" theory seems to have inherited this line of thought. On the other hand, the usage of *vāsanā* was much more limited in the early portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Apparently, it was used only in the sense of *kleśavāsanā* and *karmavāsanā*. Thus, at that point, *bīja* and *vāsanā* were not synonymous. In particular, "the *vāsanā* of all *dharmas*" was not possible, presumably because *rūpas* cannot leave their own *vāsanās*.

On the other hand, from the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* onward, later texts do not hesitate to equate *bīja* with *vāsanā*. They also see no problem with "the *vāsanās* of all *dharmas*." This concept became possible when conceptualization came to be considered the fundamental cause of *saṃsāra*. In this model, conceptualization plays the role of *kleśa* and karma in the traditional model. Thus, the *vāsanā* of conceptualization came to be considered the fundamental cause of *saṃsāra*. In this model, since one can conceptualize any thinkable objects, "the *vāsanās* of all *dharmas*" became possible. At that stage, *bīja* and *vāsanā* came to be equated. The *CWSL*'s "engendered *bīja*" model seems to reflect this new model.⁵⁴

54 Many years have passed since I published the earlier version of this paper in Japanese in 1989. Among the studies that have been published since then, the most noteworthy achievements on the *bīja* theory would be Changhwan Park's works (2007, 2014, 2017; see also a helpful review of Park 2014 by Gao Mingyuan [2019]). Park's main point is a critical reappraisal of Harada Waso's (e.g., 1996) and Robert Kritzer's (e.g., 1999) arguments that the "Sautrāntika" theories referred to by Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* can be traced back to the *Yogācārabhūmi* (Park calls their arguments "The Kritzer-Harada Hypothesis" [Park 2014, 12]). Park emphasizes the continuity between the Sautrāntika theories in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the arguments of Śrīlāta referred to in the *Nyāyānusāra*. He focuses on the *bīja* theory and points out many similarities between these two sources.

His research is certainly significant and deserves full attention. However, since the present paper is an examination of the *bīja* theory within the *Yogācārabhūmi* and does not, in principle, refer to Vasubandhu, his main line of argument is not directly relevant to the discussions in this paper. His suggestions merit a comprehensive treatment, and I would like to prepare a separate paper to discuss his approach. In the introduction to his doctoral dissertation, he stated: "subsidiary karmic elements' (*anudhātu*), i.e., karmic impressions (*vāsanā*) implanted by the original karma into the series of the six sense-bases (*ṣaḍāyatanaśaṃtāna*) and carried over time up until their final moment of fructification. These *anudhātus* are, in Śrīlāta's final language, equated with nothing but the six sense-bases infused with such karmic impressions" (Park 2007, 43). Here, *anudhātu* is a characteristic term employed by Śrīlāta and is generally considered to be equivalent to *bīja*. If so, this amounts to meaning that *bīja* and *vāsanā* are equivalent to Śrīlāta. If this equation was accepted in a non-Yogācāra Buddhist tradition, that could mean that *bīja* and *vāsanā* were widely equated in Buddhism and might call my view presented above into question. Therefore, I prepared a short discussion to examine this point.

However, in the published version of his dissertation (2014), which I got more recently, most of his statements directly equating *bīja* with *vāsanā* have been edited out. Thus, it does not seem necessary to discuss his arguments within the framework of the present paper.

In Park 2017, he emphasizes the similarities between the theory of *ṣaḍāyatanaṅvīṣeṣa* in the *YBh* and Śrīlāta's *anudhātu* theory. This point merits careful consideration, but even if some similar ideas are shared between Yogācāra and Śrīlāta, that would not directly affect my discussions in this paper, which attempt to trace the process of development within the Yogācāra tradition.

Regarding Śrīlāta's *anudhātu* theory, Dr. Gao has referred me to Dhammajoti 2011. This is a significant article, and since the present paper is for a Festschrift for Professor Dhammajoti, I should discuss his important study. However, as stated above, on this occasion I would like to focus on the development within the Yogācāra tradition.

For these reasons, I would like to await another occasion to discuss Park's and Dhammajoti's important contributions.

Abbreviations

- AKBh *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.
 BBh *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.
 CWSL *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論 (**Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*). T No. 1585.
 D. Derge edition of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon.
 Pek. Peking edition of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon.
 SavBh *Savitarkā savicārā, Avitarkā vicāramātrā, Avitarkāvicārā bhūmiḥ* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.
 ŚBh *Śrāvakabhūmi*.
 Shuji *Cheng weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記. T No. 1830.
 T *Taishō shinshū daizokyo* 大正新脩大藏經.
 YBh *Yogācārabhūmi*.
 VSG *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

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Mental Consciousness and Physical Objects

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In Buddhism and other Indian philosophical schools, consciousness (*viññāna*) is generally classified into six different types, i.e., visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and mental consciousnesses. The first five consciousnesses are characterized as sensory, and in virtue of this characterization they perceive their respective sensory objects, i.e., visible matter, sound, smell, taste, and the tangible, all of which are exclusively physical objects. Now what are the objects of the sixth mental consciousness? Do they include these physical or sensory objects?

In the history of Buddhist philosophy, the Dārṣṭāntikas explicitly held that the objects of mental consciousness do not include sensory objects. This view is reported in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, a Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma text: “The Dārṣṭāntikas thus speak: Each of six consciousnesses (such as visual consciousness) has its own cognitive objects (*ālambana*). They say that mental consciousness does not take as objects the objects of five [sense-] consciousnesses (such as visual consciousness) as it has other cognitive objects [than these ones].”¹ Although the Dārṣṭāntikas held back from specifying what exactly are the objects of mental consciousness, they nevertheless made it abundantly clear that any such codification would not include the objects perceived by the five sense-consciousnesses. Later Sautrāntikas further clarified this Dārṣṭāntika view by holding that only sensory faculties (*indriya*) have unmediated contact with their respective sensory or physical objects; for sense-consciousness and mental consciousness are only able to cognize these objects through the mediation of mental images (*ākāra*). This view is usually defined as “indirect realism”; it is generally perceived as an innovative idea of the Sautrāntikas and their predecessor, the Dārṣṭāntikas.

The Sarvāstivādins, in contrast, refuted such a view and held that mental consciousness takes as objects the sensory objects and directly apprehends them without the mediation of mental images; in fact, there is ample written evidence for the debate on this issue between the two parties.² But my question is: How do the Yogācāras, being, as they were, closely associated with both groups, treat this issue? For instance, do they accept or refute the notion that mental consciousness cannot take as objects the sensory objects? Do they think that mental consciousness can have direct access to physical objects without the mediation of mental images? Moreover, which side would they take in the debate: the Sarvāstivāda or Sautrāntika position?

This issue has attracted some attention among contemporary scholars. For instance, after noticing a discrepancy in both Xuanzang's (玄奘 602–664) and Paramārtha's (499-569) translations of Dignāga's (ca. 480-540) *Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti*, Lin (2008) puts forward the argument that the two Yogācāra translators must have held different views on whether it is possible for mental consciousness to have direct access to sensory objects. Lusthaus (2013), too, makes a rather interesting point on this very issue in his discussion on the opening section of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (hereafter YBh), a Yogācāra text of voluminous proportions.

In the current paper, I will begin with Lusthaus's discussion on the YBh passage, which lists the cognitive objects of mental consciousness. I will argue, contra Lusthaus, that this listing includes the five sensory objects as perceived respectively by five sense-consciousnesses. In other words, in this passage from the opening section of YBh, it follows the Sarvāstivāda view that the cognitive objects of mental consciousness consist in all *dharma*s, which certainly include the five types of sensory objects.

Let me begin by quoting Lusthaus's (2013: 587) interesting comments:

Quite strikingly, unlike the previous *bhūmi*, here in the mental *bhūmi* what is not being taken as an *ālambana* is the aggregate of physical matter (*rūpaskandha*) ... But in this *bhūmi* the mental faculties of *manas* and *manovijñāna* do not have direct access to *rūpa*, to physical objects. That is the job of the senses, not the mental faculty. It views sense-objects only indirectly, as sense-spheres (*āyatana*). Xuanzang adds the word "inner," i.e., the six *inner* sense-spheres (六內處 *liu nei chu*) to emphasize that the mental sphere operates at a remove from the physical world. The senses feed it objects, which it then processes in its own way, in its own sphere. It is not simply that *manas* and *manovijñāna* acquire whatever knowledge of physical things they obtain only as mediated through the sense – that, after all, is not only standard Abhidharma fare but common sense as well. Rather, it is that *rūpa* and the *rūpaskandha* ceases to provide cognitive supports (*ālambana*), so that attention and analysis turn exclusively to the mental sphere, even when pondering how physical events and causes produce cognitive repercussions. This is the critical Yogācāra move that has been mistaken for idealism ever since.

These comments, as in many writings of Lusthaus, are full of philosophical insights. To wit: his musings are of a kind that attracts the attention of any philosophically minded scholar. Nevertheless, and apropos of the above quotation, I find his claim baseless. If mental consciousness does not have "direct access" to physical objects, it may or may not suggest a "critical" shift in the direction of "idealism." I am not going to argue about this point here, rather I will focus on the issue itself: is it possible for mental consciousness

to have direct access to physical objects? Or, to put it another way, do all the cognitive objects (*ālambana*) that fall into the purview of mental consciousness include physical objects?

First of all, it is worth pointing out that Lusthaus’s claim that it is not possible for mental consciousness to take as objects “the aggregate of physical matter” is partially the fault of poor translation. His claim was based on a passage from the *Manobhūmi* section of YBh, which outlines the objects of the mental faculty (*manas*) or mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*):

*ālambanaṃ katamat | sarvadharmā ālambanaṃ | kevalaṃ tu
vedanāskandhaḥ saṃjñāskandhaḥ saṃskāraskandho ’saṃskṛtaṃ
cānidarśanam apratiḡhaṃ ca rūpaṃ ṣaḍāyatanaṃ sarvabījāni ca ||*³

Lusthaus (2013: 586) translates this passage as follows:

What is its *ālambana*? It takes all phenomena (*sarvadharmā*) as its *ālambana*. Its *ālambana* is not shared [publicly, i.e., it is only accessible subjectively]. It takes [as its *ālambana*] only the aggregates (*skandha*) of hedonic tone (*vedanā*), associative-thinking (*saṃjñā*), and embodied-conditioning (*saṃskāra*); the unconditioned; invisible and non-resistant physical things (*rūpa*); the six [inner] sense spheres (*ṣaḍ-āyatana*); as well as everything derived from mental seeds.

Note that he translates the term *kevala* (*’ba’ zhiḡ, bu gong zhe* 不共者) as “to be not shared publicly,” and goes on to argue that the cognitive objects (*ālambana*) of mental consciousness are “to be only accessible subjectively.” This, in my opinion, is contextually at odds with the whole sentence. It is better, therefore, to translate the passage in the following way:

What are its cognitive objects (*ālambana*)? It takes all *dharmas* as its cognitive objects. [The cognitive objects] that are exclusively of (*kevala*) [the mental faculty (*manas*) or mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) include] the aggregates of feeling (*vedanā*), ideation (*saṃjñā*), and volition (*saṃskāra*); the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*); invisible and non-resistant matter (*rūpa*); the six [inner] abodes (*ṣaḍāyatana*); as well as all mental seeds.

The key difference between my translation and his is that it pushes the term *kevala* back within the context of the whole sentence; and, by doing so, the translation corresponds with the predicate “to be exclusively of” or, alternatively is consonant with the Chinese translation “to be not shared with (five sense-consciousnesses).” Furthermore, my translation is also supported by the commentaries on YBh provided by both Kuiji (窺基 632–682) and Dunryun (遁倫 active during the seventh century): “The exclusive objects [of the mental faculty or mental consciousness] are not shared with five [sense-]consciousnesses.”⁴

A familiarization with the discussions surrounding mental objects in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, will yield the truism that there is so much highly contested historical debate behind this simple listing. The mental objects that are not shared with the five sense-consciousnesses can be further classified into three groups: 1) all mental seeds; 2) the six inner abodes; 3) the other five items. Among them, the mental seed is characteristically Yogācāra in its conceptual definition, and was not mentioned in the Abhidharma listing. Kuiji and Dunryun further clarify things by remarking that these mental seeds include only the defiled seeds, but not the undefiled ones.⁵

As for the second group, the term *ṣaḍāyatana* (six abodes) in Sanskrit is not clear, but Xuanzang's translation adds the word "inner" (*nei* 内) and clarifies that this term refers to the six *inner* abodes, which contain the five senses and the mental faculty (*manas*). Crucially, these six inner abodes are distinguished from the six "outer" abodes, i.e., the five sensory objects and *dharma*. Lusthaus seems to misread the term by attributing it to a line of sensory objects, seeming to take Xuanzang's qualification as meaning that "the mental sphere operates at a remove from the physical world" (*op. cit.*). If the six inner abodes are taken to be the objects of mental consciousness, then what can be said about the six outer abodes? Are they also mental objects? Since they are not mentioned explicitly in this listing, there is room for Lusthaus to speculate that they are not objects of mental consciousness. But if we examine this passage carefully, we will find that the six outer abodes are implicitly mentioned under "all *dharmas*," which is the very first part of the definition for mental objects.

In the Abhidharma literature, there are several ways to explain the inferred multiplicity of the term "all *dharmas*," depending on the different schemes of classifying reality. One such scheme classifies reality into twelve abodes. In the *Vijñānakāya*, a Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma work, these twelve abodes, and how they function as the cognitive objects of respective consciousness, are outlined as follows:

There are twelve abodes (*āyatana*): the eye-abode, the visible-abode, the ear-abode, the sound-abode, the nose-abode, the odor-abode, the tongue-abode, the taste-abode, the body-abode, the tangible-abode, the mental-abode, and the *dharma*-abode.

Question: By how many consciousnesses is the eye-abode cognized?
... By how many consciousnesses is the *dharma*-abode cognized?

Answer: The visible-abode is cognized by two consciousnesses: visual and mental consciousnesses. The sound-abode is cognized by two consciousnesses: auditory and mental consciousnesses. The odor-abode is cognized by two consciousnesses: olfactory and mental consciousnesses. The taste-abode is cognized by two consciousnesses: gustatory and mental consciousnesses. The tangible-abode is cognized by two consciousnesses: tactile and mental consciousnesses. The remaining seven abodes are cognized by mental consciousness alone.⁶

If reality is broken down into twelve abodes, then all these elements or *dharmas* combined are constitutive of the objects of mental consciousness. For instance, among them, the five sensory objects pertain to the shared objects of their respective sense-consciousness and mental consciousness; however, the other seven abodes, i.e., the six inner abodes and the *dharma*-abode, are exclusively the objects of mental consciousness. This explains why the six inner abodes are listed as mental objects which are “not shared with the five sense-consciousnesses” in YBh. By the same logic, the five sensory objects are included in “all *dharmas*,” and perceived as the cognitive objects of mental consciousness.

Another popular scheme classifies reality into eighteen realms (*dhātu*), consisting of the twelve abodes and six consciousnesses. Accordingly, the cognitive objects of mental consciousness would include all these eighteen elements; again, the five sensory objects must be perceived as the shared objects of their respective sense-consciousness and mental consciousness. In his *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (hereafter AKBh), Vasubandhu (ca. 400-480) makes this point explicit: “The visible, sound, odor, taste and the tangible are perceived (*anubhūta*) respectively by the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile consciousnesses. All of them are cognized by mental consciousness. They are respectively cognized by two consciousnesses. It is therefore known that the [other] thirteen realms are cognized by a single mental consciousness, because they are not objects of the five groups of [sense-]consciousness.”⁷ His critic Saṃghabhadra (active during the fifth century) echoes this point of view;⁸ such concordance indicates that they are in full agreement with each other, and that Vasubandhu at this point had not yet deviated from the orthodox Vaibhāṣika position.

In the above discussions, one may notice that the key concept of *dharma* is ambiguous. On the one hand, being one of the twelve abodes or eighteen realms, it is designated as the object of the mental faculty (*manas*) or mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*). On the other hand, it seems to cover all the twelve abodes or the eighteen realms. The corollary for this orientation seems to be: when mental consciousness cognizes all these abodes or realms, it is able to apprehend all *dharmas* as objects. In the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, we see two ways of dealing with this incongruity. One is to consider the *dharma*-abode or *dharma*-realm as metonyms for all *dharmas*. If this is agreed, then all the twelve abodes or the eighteen realms can be subsumed under the nomenclature for a single abode or realm—*dharma*. Such an opinion is reported in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*: “Some other masters say that the *dharma*-realm covers completely all *dharmas*”; “some say that the *dharma*-abode covers all *dharmas*.”⁹ In a typical Sarvāstivāda ontology, the *dharma*-realm should also include *dharmas* of the past, present and future. This position is explained thusly:

Question: What is the *dharma*-realm?

Answer: *Dharmas* that have been, are being, and will be cognized by the mental faculty are called the *dharma*-realm. Those that have been cognized by the mental faculty refer to the *dharma*-realms that have been cognized by the past mental faculty. Those that are being cognized by the mental faculty refer to the *dharma*-realms that are being cognized by the present mental faculty. Those that will be cognized by the mental faculty refer to the *dharma*-realms that will be cognized by the future mental faculty.¹⁰

Another way of resolving this problem is to limit the content of the *dharma*-abode or *dharma*-realm to “seven *dharmas*” only, namely, to the non-informative matter (*avijñaptirūpa*), the three aggregates, i.e., feeling, ideation, and volition, and the three unconditioned, i.e., space, cessation through understanding (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*), and cessation without understanding (*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*). In his AKBh, Vasubandhu states: “The aggregates of feeling, ideation and volition should also be established as abodes and realms. That is, these three [aggregates], together with the non-informative [matter] and the three unconditioned—these seven entities can be called *dharma*-abode and *dharma*-realm.”¹¹ Again, similar statements are found in Saṃghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra* (T1562.342a2-4) and also in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (T1545.65a29-b1, T1545.985.b15). According to Dhammajoti (2007b: 38-9), this development that tapers down the *dharma*-abode or *dharma*-realm to the specifics of the seven *dharmas* was originated from the *Jñānaprasthāna*. By doing so, it reformulates the older classification schemes of aggregates (*skandha*), abodes (*āyatana*) and realms (*dhātu*) into a new five-grouped taxonomy in which the non-informative matter and the three unconditioned are integrated.

As we see, these seven *dharmas* correspond to the group three category in the Yogācāra listing, which consists of the aggregates of feeling (*vedanā*), ideation (*saṃjñā*), and volition (*saṃskāra*), the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), invisible and non-resistant matter (*rūpa*). The invisible and non-resistant matter is apparently a Yogācāra adoption of the Sarvāstivāda concept of non-informative matter (*avijñaptirūpa*). The Yogācāras here do not specify the number of unconditioned *dharmas*; nevertheless if recourse is taken to the standard Yogācāra list for what is unconditioned, we will find that it includes six elements: 1) space, 2) cessation through understanding, 3) cessation without understanding, 4) motionless cessation (*ānīñjya*), 5) cessation of ideation and feeling (*saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*), and 6) thusness (*tathatā*).

As a whole, this tabulation by Yogācāra of mental objects seems to combine the two incongruous Abhidharma traditions (“all *dharmas*” versus “seven *dharmas*”) through an augmentation of its own elements (“mental seeds,” etc.). Even with this complication, it is patently clear that the five sensory objects are not only included, but are mutually coexisting objects prevailing within their respective sensory and mental consciousnesses. Just a

few lines above the YBh passage under discussion, there is further evidence to support these findings. For instance, this is what it has to say about the objects of visual consciousness:

All the visible, extensive and informative [matter] are the operative field (*gocara*) of eyes, objects (*viṣaya*) of eyes, the operative field of visual consciousness, objects of visual consciousness, cognitive objects (*ālambana*) of visual consciousness, the operative field of mental consciousness, objects of mental consciousness, and cognitive objects of mental consciousness.¹²

According to this passage, physical matter, as far as it is visible, extensive and informative (*viñapti*), can be the operative field (*gocara*) or object (*viṣaya*) of eyes, visual consciousness and mental consciousness. At the same time it can be the cognitive object (*ālambana*) of visual and mental consciousnesses. However, similar to the case of the Sarvāstivāda concept of non-informative matter (*aviñaptirūpa*), when the physical matter is invisible or non-resistant, it can only be cognized by mental consciousness, and so serves as its cognitive objects. The same applies to the other four types of sensory objects: sound, odor, taste, and the tangible. They are the objects shared by the mental consciousness with their respective sense and sense-consciousness.¹³

So, according to this opening section in YBh, the cognitive objects of mental consciousness consist in “all *dharmas*,” which include the sensory objects such as visible matter, sound, odor, taste, and the tangible. This implies that mental consciousness can have direct access to physical objects as sense-consciousnesses do. Furthermore, I would further assert that this passage does not in any sense suggest any movement toward “idealism”.¹⁴

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- Mahāvibhāṣā* *Mahāvibhāṣā* ascribed to 500 arhats. *Apidamo da piposha lun* 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論, trans. Xuanzang, T27: 1545.
- Nyāyānusāra* *Nyāyānusāra* of Saṃghabhadra. *Apidamo shun zhengli lun* 阿毘達磨順正理論, trans. Xuanzang, T29: 1562.
- T Taishō Edition of Chinese Tripiṭaka in tripitaka.cbeta.org.
- Vijñānakāya* *Vijñānakāya* of Devaśarman. *Apidamo shi shen zu lun* 阿毘達磨識身足論, trans. Xuanzang, T26: 1539.
- YBh (C) *Yogācārabhūmi*, Chinese translation. *Yujiashi di lun* 瑜伽師地論, trans. Xuanzang, T30: 1579
- YBh (S) *Yogācārabhūmi*, Sanskrit edition. *The Yogācārabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga*, ed. by V. Bhattacharya. University of Calcutta 1957.
- YBh (T) *Yogācārabhūmi*, Tibetan translation. *rNal ’byor spyod pa’i sa*, D4035-4042 (Tshi 1a-, Dzi, Wi, Zhi, Zi, ‘I 68b7).
- YJLJ *Yujia lun ji* 瑜伽論記 of Dunryun, T43: 1828.
- YJSDLLZ *Yujiashi di lun lue zuan* 瑜伽師地論略纂 of Kuiji, T43: 1829.

Notes

- 1 *Mahāvibhāṣā* T1545.449a16-18;
謂譬喻者作如是說。眼等六識身所緣境各別。彼說意識別有所緣。不緣眼等五識所緣。
- 2 Dhammajoti (2007a: 136-170) provides some general background on the Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntika debate on this issue.
- 3 YBh (S) 11,12-14. See YBh (C) T1579.280b11-13 and YBh (T) D4035.5b6-7.
- 4 YJSDLZ T1829.7a29: 不共境者，不共五識故。 YJLJ T1828.319a1-2: 不共境者，不共五識故。
See YJSDLZ T1829.7a20; YJLJ T1828.318c24-25.
- 6 *Vijñānakāya* T1539.546c18-24: 有十二處，謂眼處、色處、耳處、聲處、鼻處、香處、舌處、味處、身處、觸處、意處、法處。問：眼處幾識所識，乃至法處幾識所識？答：色處二識所識，謂眼識及意識。聲處二識所識，謂耳識及意識。香處二識所識，謂鼻識及意識。味處二識所識，謂舌識及意識。觸處二識所識，謂身識及意識。餘七處唯意識所識。
- 7 AKBh 57,16-20 ad AK I.48a: *rūpaśabdagandharasaspraṣṭavyadhātavo yathāsaṃkhyam caḥṣu-śrotraḥrāṇājihvākāyavijñānair anubhūtā manovijñānena vijñāyante | evam ete pratyekaṃ dvābhyāṃ vijñānābhyāṃ vijñeyā bhavanti | śeṣās trayodaśa dhātavaḥ pañcānāṃ vijñānakāyānāṃ aviśayavād ekena manovijñānena vijñeyā ity ākhyātaṃ bhavati |*
- 8 See *Nyāyānusāra* T1562.377a3-6.
- 9 *Mahāvibhāṣā* T1545.370c19-20: 有餘師說，法界總攝一切法盡。 *Mahāvibhāṣā* T1545.985b8: 或說，法處攝一切法。
- 10 *Mahāvibhāṣā* T1545.370c3-7: 問：法界云何？答：諸法為意已、正、當了是名法界。已為意了者，謂諸法界已為過去境界所了。正為意了者，謂諸法界正為現在境界所了。當為意了者，謂諸法界當為未來境界所了。
- 11 AKBh 17,2-5 ad AK I.15cd: *ete punas trayaḥ | vedanāsaṃjñāsaṃskāraskandhā āyatanadhātuvyavasthāyāṃ dharmāyatanadhātuvākhyāḥ sahāvijñāptyaṣaṃskṛtaiḥ || ity etāni sapta dravyāṇi dharmāyatanam dharmadhātuḥ cety ākhyāyante ||*
- 12 YBh (S) 5,8-10: *sarvāsāṃ varṇṇasaṃsthānavijñāptināṃ caḥsurgocara[ś caḥsurviśaya]ś caḥsurvijñānagocara[ś caḥsurvijñānaviśaya]ś caḥsurvijñānālambanaṃ manovijñānagocaro manovijñānaviśayo manovijñānālambanam iti paryāyāḥ ||* See YBh (C) T1579.279b15-17. All these three Sanskrit words, *gocara*, *viśaya* and *ālambana*, are denotative of the term “objects.” To distinguish them, I have translated them respectively as “the operative field,” “objects” and “cognitive objects.” Note that eyes, as well as visual consciousness and mental consciousness, can have *gocara* or *viśaya*; but only visual consciousness and mental consciousness can have *ālambana*. So one way to distinguish *ālambana* from its related “objects” is to see that the term is usually associated with consciousness (*vijñāna*) and thus acts as its intentional or cognitive object. In contrast, *gocara* as the operative field or *viśaya* as objects, can be more objective and independent.
- 13 See YBh (S) 6,19-7,2; 7,16-18; 8,8-10; 9,5-7 and YBh (C) T1579.279c12-14, 279c22-24, 280a3-5, 280a15-17.
- 14 This paper is excerpted from a larger work of mine entitled “Mental Consciousness and Its Objects”, in *Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness: Tradition and Dialogue*, edited by Mark Siderits, Ching Keng, and John Spackman, Brill, forthcoming.

